Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2007, 208 pgs, $24.95.

John Robb's long anticipated book is finally out, and I have to say that I think it's an important contribution to anyone trying to make sense of today's evolving security challenges. It's a rather brilliant synthesis of Fourth Generation Warfare, net war, swarming and global insurgency. For those of you who not routinely read the Global Guerillas blog, Robb is a former counter-terrorism officer with the U.S. Air Force, and is now based out of Boston as a consultant. His blog has been highly regarded by forward thinking analysts as evidenced in the warm foreword written by the prescient James Fallows of The Atlantic Monthly. For those who are familiar with Robb's main themes Brave New War offers a book length treatment of the problem and a number of recommendations for dealing with today's religiously inspired, globally networked urban terrorists.

The author's major projection in Brave New War is a world facing a "global bazaar of violence" as terrorists and would be insurgents around the world learn from and adopt the tactics, techniques and procedures of success in Iraq. The concept of a bazaar is part of Robb's conception of future terrorism and irregular war. In this interconnection bazaar individuals are continually trading techniques, sharing past experiences or recipes, adopting original ideas from one group and merging them with plans or weapons from another era or another theater. In the marketplace of the global guerrilla, there is a lot of trading and few copyright laws being enforced. Rapid adaptation by the community and mimicking is not only condoned, it is often encouraged. In some ways, Robb's conception is very similar to the Wikipedia encyclopedia.

The fast growing informal encyclopedia operates like a large cooperative with many contributions and improvements from a community of interest, which self-polices itself but constantly improves the product. In conflicts around the globe, Robb sees these same phenomena occurring regularly which he calls Open Source Warfare. In the computer development world in business, open source (sometimes called open architecture) is a means of both designing and building systems using common or free software and components that are not copyrighted or tightly controlled. Instead, anyone can use the code and system pieces to create and constantly adapt new programs or capabilities. For Robb, Open Source Warfare is available for any actor interested in adopting, adapting, and improving on new tactics and techniques, globally and in real time. Obviously the World Wide Web and other collaborative tools are facilitating Open Source Warfare or what might become known as Wikiwar. Maybe Tom Friedman is right, and that collaborative tools will create a truly flat world. I just suspect, as in most of the New York Times journalists latest work, is that the dark side of collaboration is going to become more and more of a problem for us.

As evidenced by 9/11 and in Iraq part of the kit bag of today's global insurgent is the deliberate targeting of critical infrastructure or systems to inflict incremental damage and cumulative economic costs on a government. Robb calls this approach systems disruption, as the global guerrillas' fundamental strategy for bringing nation states to their knees. Our increasingly interconnected society and our vulnerable tightly coupled networks afford any terrorist many relatively easy targets. Today's guerrilla is becoming adept at identifying the key nodes in these systems, and generating large cascading effects. But the global guerrilla tries to operate beneath the threshold of a punative or overwhelming governmental response. Partial disruptions, as opposed to catastrophic destruction, maximizes the long term economic attrition against the state, paralyzes the government and undercuts it legitimacy.

For devoted readers of Robb's popular Global Guerrilla blog, this text will serve as an integrated summation and extension of his key themes. For new readers, Brave New War offers a tightly organized and concisely packaged course in modern irregular warfare. Rather than looking backward and trying to graft old models to new times, the author has intelligently recognized what today's thinking enemy has harnessed from our own technology. Robb deftly synthesizes a number of concepts drawn from the old Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) literature with the fresh insights of John Arguilla, David Ronfeldt, and Colonel Thomas Hammes. Robb offers a great list of recommended readings, to which I would add Professor Bruce Hoffman's updated Inside Terrorism and any of Ralph Peters' insightful anthologies (Beyond Baghdad, Beyond Terror, and Never Quit the Fight). Rupert Smith's The Utility of Force is also a necessary addition. These authors would add depth to the human motivations underlying the actions and behaviors Robb captures so succinctly. The latter's grasp of the dueling narratives of competing commander's and the literal "theater" of operations nicely complements Robb's systems disruption. The importance of the imagery of acts of violence today cannot be separated from the acts themselves.

Iraq and Afghanistan have showed how effective our enemies are at learning. They've ruthless proven to be cunning and opportunistic in every dimension of the fight, and they are completely —to share their ideas and success in real time. On the other hand, we are still catching up, even as they constantly exploit Open Source Warfare's long menu of lessons learned. There are still folks in the Pentagon who think that transformation, RMA's and Shock and Awe are still relevant and deserving of additional funding. State on state warfare may not be entirely a thing of the past, but Open Source Warfare and deliberate partial systemic disruption is as well. Without reservation Brave New War is for professional students of irregular warfare and for any citizen who wants to understand emerging trends and the dark potential of 4GW.

Frank Hoffman is a retired Marine and Washington-based national security consultant.

With some interest I have been tracking these exchanges over what Paul Yingling, Jack Cushman and Doug McGregor have had to say about our military operations since 9/11. It takes a great deal of courage to say things that are sure to be unpopular whether you are beyond the reach of those who might be offended or not, and therefore we ought to listen for that reason alone. And Paul Yingling is most at risk, therefore his message interests me the most.

There is another reason to listen. I know Jack Cushman and Doug McGregor personally, and they are in the top few percentiles points of their respective generations in intellect and passion for the profession of arms. I suspect Paul Yingling is too. Intellect and passion for our business should be cultivated.

There is a third reason to listen closely, and that is to encourage others to share their views. I think these discussions are healthy, actually they are a sign of hope for the institution. It was exactly these kinds of discussions that led to the Post Vietnam Army Reforms of the 1980's. And during the mid to late 70's general officers had to face tough questions from Leavenworth and War College students. Most bore our criticisms with good grace. I suspect those of the present day will do so as well.

Having said this, let me add some thoughts of my own based on what I read and what the serving O-4 to O-6 crowd tells me. I'll not be nearly as eloquent as Yingling, Cushman, and McGregor. But I may be as controversial.

Serving O4-O6 officers today have far more sustained combat experience than the younger generation of retirees acting as contractors or serving on CGSC and War College faculties. They have also been commanded by general officers from two stars on up without combat experience at the battalion level. They feel they have much relevant experience those senior to them lack, and their less experienced seniors have not listened to them. My generation held this view during and just after Vietnam.

This crowd also complains about the same old US Army tendencies of over centralization at the top, broad formulas indiscriminately applied, and staff arrogance at high levels. You can over-manage a counterinsurgency. And you simply can't make up for too few battalions by micro managing the few you have.

The counter-insurgency business is about winning at the battalion AOR level, and every battalion has a unique problem. It requires disciplined soldiers, crafty sergeants, quick minded lieutenants, flexible captains, broadly educated majors and wise lieutenant colonels. It requires battalions that are led from the front by leaders who are open-minded enough to learn from others; with the time to train as a team and learn good habits. Their leaders possess common sense, understand human nature, and figure out the best way to win their war in their unique AOR -- making measurable progress, suffering fewer casualties, and keeping high unit morale. It is at the battalion level that they began figuring out that the key to success is to understand the native tribal structure. It took several years before "higher" helped them with a comprehensive study of tribal relationships in Baghdad and Anbar province.

Too much micro-management from on-high gets in the way. The complaint most often heard is that "higher" is thinking too tactical and near term, imposing controls and process, rather than enabling subordinates with their designs.

Counterinsurgencies benefit when the vision from the top is continually challenged by the view from the bottom. Best results occur when colonels get around to talk to company commanders, brigadier and major generals walk the ground and talk frequently to battalion commanders and corps commanders talk frequently to brigade commanders and so on. What the circulating commanders really should want to know is whether they and their subordinates are really working the "right" problem. The question they need to ask is "What is your re-stated mission and commander's intent?" From this he learns two important things. A restated mission and intent together define how the commander who owns the AOR has framed his problem. The exchange of views over this helps them both discover and then work the right one. The visiting higher commander can learn more details about the relevant forces and factors at work in his bigger AOR. This then will lead to a better problem framing at his level. And the exchange can coach the subordinate into a better understanding of his.

In counter insurgency work the kind of thinking we have called "operational art" is required down at battalion level as well. The crux of the problem in our Army is that officers are not systematically taught how to cope with unstructured problems. Operational art is really the art of taking an unstructured problem and giving it enough structure so that planning can lead to useful action. I find officers up to O-6 (in some cases higher) who are excellent at analyzing a structured problem - reducing it into its elements- but are lousy at synthesis - creating a construct that explains how parts relate. That's usually the difficulty in counterinsurgencies -- the "design" end of solution development requires inductive thinking. (SAMS helps with this in most cases. Some SAMS grads tell me that their background in history and theory helps them be more creative. I'm not sure what matters more, the self-selection of officers into SAMS, or what they learn while at SAMS. It's probably both.)

I also think we have muddled our thinking with code. Take the terms "kinetic" and "non-kinetic" for instance. In COIN we are now big on the "non-kinetic" but we may have substituted new formulas for clear thinking.

Human nature responds to rewards and punishments. Our attempts at "rewarding" must result in real rewards the recipient values. Our measures of success are often how many "rewards" we have dispensed, rather than how suitable they were, much less what behavioral change those rewards have produced. But even suitable rewards need to overcome the enemy's punishing those who accept them. And sometimes "the people" must fear our coercion more than the enemy's. This latter piece of logic has often been the key to counterinsurgency -- think Malaya. When you can't coerce because of the open information environment, you have to compensate in two ways. BOTH OF THESE ARE DIFFICULT TO DO. You have to take the fight to the insurgent and get him reacting to you, and you have to mount extra measures to protect the people from the insurgent's coercion.

The first, taking the fight to the insurgent, is difficult because you really have to know your opponent, where we have been ignorant, and you have to be creative, where we rather like pat methods and formulas. We have also lacked the courage to be as hard with our opponents as we've needed to be to win.

The second, protecting the people from the insurgent's coercion, is difficult because this requires large levels of manpower for a long time, and it requires large numbers of disciplined and savvy manpower (not to mention a working justice system the people trust and respect). We have harbored myths about these things and we have not owned up to the difficulties and consequences of the truth in these matters.

Of our errors, Abu Ghuraib may have been the biggest disaster of them all. Any one who has served for even a short while in troop command realizes how "not much good happens" after midnight when young bored troops go unsupervised and are open to temptation. It's simply inconceivable how any experienced commander could have left this flank unguarded. He should have had his "trusted agents" visit at all hours of the day and night.

While others have lectured on the responsibility of generals, the rank immediately below them should not be spared. If you want to block reforms, install a "council of colonels" to guard the gates of change. No one is as conservative and arrogant as a staff colonel in the comfort zone of his expertise. During my time on active duty this was the most conservative rank. Had I not gotten around older and more entrenched colonels at Ft. Leavenworth both the AirLand Battle reforms and the creation of SAMS would have been stillborn. And sometimes no one is as hesitant to speak truth to power than an O-6 commander. It's a matter of incentives and risks. The jump from O-6 to O-7 is a huge prize, the cut is so severe, and the process is shrouded in mystery.

We humans are fallible. I have made my share of grave mistakes. Our saving grace is learning from them. Of one thing I'm sure, there are no grand formulas. Progress results from hard work on many fronts. And hard work is only motivated by discomfort with the status quo.

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SWJ Editors Note - Related Small Wars Council Discussions:

Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

Of "Intellectual and Moral" Failures

Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap, a respected but frequently provocative author, has critiqued the Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual in a commentary titled "We have a COIN shortage" in the May Naval Institute Proceedings. I would have normally dismissed General Dunlap's observations as a rare but poor example of discourse, as I have a lot of respect for him personally. But this commentary reflected more than just an inadequate grasp of irregular warfare. Having recently returned from a counterinsurgency symposium at Maxwell Air Force Base, it is clear that a broader misunderstanding exists about the nature of irregular conflict and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 that needs to be cleared up.

General Dunlap opens with a tart observation that the Army/Marine Corps got a lot of publicity with the publication of the new field manual. Newsweek called it "The Book" on Iraq, which I think is a stretch but a natural reaction. He goes on to suggest that the publicity exceeded notable events such as the airstrike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi last summer or the "yet more debilitating air attacks against al Qaeda havens in Somalia." This gives the reader an early hint about where our Air Force counterinsurgency theory is coming from.

General Dunlap goes on to lambaste the manual as the product of the nation's ground forces and a thinly veiled attempt to establish a Joint/national approach that is protracted, costly, manpower intensive, and inherently a "traditional land component solution." Such an approach is too costly for America, and is far too late for Iraq, the General adds.

While I happen to agree with his assessment about Iraq, the simple fact remains that the manual wasn't written or intended to satisfy one of today's insurgencies. It fills a 25 to 30 year void in our doctrinal library thanks to the Vietnam Syndrome and the Pentagon's insistence on only preparing for wars we would like to fight instead of those our enemies are prepared to wage. My normally coherent Air Force partner would like to continue that trend despite consistent historical evidence to the contrary. The field manual is simply operational level doctrine for two Services, no strategic agenda other than ensuring that today's ground warriors are ready for the most probable types of war that nation will face for some time.

My Air Force friends don't accept that assessment of future conflict. If you have any doubts, read this, "Real innovation for 21st century conflict calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." Instead, General Dunlap argues that we should be seeking to exploit our technological genius and the "air and naval component's way of war" which are high tech and low cost. This is the same way Admiral Owens used to sell his "systems of systems" model as well. It's very attractive to naí¯ve politicians who do not know better and want to eliminate risk. The problem is that these approaches have great applications in high intensity conventional combat, and have worked in Kosovo, Afghanistan and in Somalia when matched with some ground forces.

General Dunlap's positive references to kinetic strikes in Somalia and Kosovo conveniently ignores a lot of history dating back to Britain's ineffective applications of airborne killing power in Mesopotamia 80 odd years ago, and more recently in Afghanistan. Kosovo was simply high tech, high cost, and extremely low in effectiveness. Yes, airpower was decisive in toppling the Taliban in 2001, with ground forces from the Northern Alliance helping force the Taliban to mass in defensive positions. But the record goes both ways, as on April 29 and May 9 this year a number of air strikes were conducted to counter the Taliban's preparations for an anticipated spring offensive. These strikes produced unexpected civilian casualties that have angered President Karzai and undercut NATO and Coalition efforts to secure the population's allegiance. (Of course, ground units have also produced accidental collateral damage as well.) General Dunlap is confusing regime destruction with the more constructive requirements of COIN. This approach certainly didn't do much for the IDF last summer against Hezbollah.

Down at Maxwell, the Marine and Army officers got an earful about the FM's purported ground centricity. The Air Force, which made a belated and limited attempt to participate in the manual's development, was unhappy that air power was relegated to an appendix vice a separate chapter. Frankly, I don't think it rates a distinct chapter or an appendix.

Airpower, properly understood, is an invaluable contributor to successful counter-insurgency operations as it is to most other forms of conflict. Most Marines understand their own Small Wars history and recognize the early innovative applications of aviation in Nicaragua in the 1920s as a form of fire support, logistics, and medical evacuation, and reconnaissance. It is not an accident that Jim Corum and Wray Johnson's Airpower in Small Wars is on the Commandant's PME reading list, or that Professor Johnson (a retired Air Force officer) is the course director for irregular warfare at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. A larger number of Marines have served in either OEF or OIF certainly recognize the critical contributions that airpower made to their own military tasks in theater. Aviation was critical to operational success in both fights for Fallujah and well as Najaf in 2004, including Air Force strike contributions. Many a Marine unit commander has told me that the sound of an AC-130 overhead at night is the best lullaby they've ever heard. Other forms of aerospace capability, like unmanned aerial vehicles, have also been noteworthy in both OEF and OIF. Marine commanders and their staffs recognize that air power is fundamental to the conduct of intelligence, fires, maneuver, and logistics in warfare in general, and to irregular conflicts as well.

Could that recognition have been more explicitly made in key chapters in the new field manual--sure. Was it critical to the Army and Marine generals and their respective doctrinal teams or school houses, apparently not. Senior Marines don't consider themselves ground centric, and embrace a more comprehensive view of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

The Marines and our Army brethren also understand that the center of gravity for a host nation under attack by an insurgency is generally the population. It's not about killing insurgents, or putting "warheads on foreheads." COIN requires constructive and indirect approaches, not just strike sorties. This has led American, French and British doctrine to focus on principles and parameters for the conduct of irregular conflicts that center on controlling or securing the population from harm or interaction with the insurgent. It's very difficult to do that from space or from a bomber. If success is ultimately tied to the people, I am sorry but they live on the ground. Their government operates on the ground, and people need to be secure to go about their lives. Until civilian populations take up residence in space or start to raise families at 10,000 feet, there will be limitations as to what airpower writ large, or the Air Force more specially, can accomplish.

Equally disturbing at Maxwell were comments from Air Force officers who bemoaned the nature of the fight in Iraq. I heard criticisms about Army dominance of the war's conduct, too little apportionment of sorties to "deep battle" targets, and about the Air Force being relegated to an Army Air Corps. Some worried that decentralized and flexible command practices resulted in "penny packed" uses of airpower. What I never heard was a constructive argument for another way of doing business, strategically or operationally. Nor did I sense that most Air Force officers understood the fluid nature of the competition or the need to adapt. Does airpower have to be employed the same manner across the full spectrum of combat, or can the Air Force adapt its tool sets and mindset to a wider range than just optimized for interdiction into "kill boxes."?

To advance its own development, as well as to better articulate its unique contributions to America's security interests I think my airpower friends need to change tack. Instead of badly mischaracterizing the Army/Marine Corps efforts to prepare their warriors for the complexities of modern counterinsurgency, I strongly suggest they devote their intellectual energy to developing its own Service doctrine, to engaging OSD/Joint forums where IW and COIN concepts are being debated, and in ensuring that Air Force perspectives are voiced. Right now it's living in a glass house. The Air Force should be more candid, it needs to catch up to what is now year six of a long war. A thorough articulation of Air Force contributions in irregular warfare, now in draft form, is obviously needed to ensure that it thoroughly understands and is intellectually prepared for the realities of modern irregular warfare. Until then, we don't have a COIN shortage, just a lack of common cents.

Frank Hoffman is a frequent contributor to most military journals, and was a contributing author to FM 3-24.

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SWJ Editors Note - Related Small Wars Council Discussions:

"Non Cents"

Punitive Ops Revisited

New AF COIN Doctrine

America's Asymmetric Advantage

We received this overview of a soon to be published book from the author, Ms. Karina Marczuk. Marczuk is the Deputy Director of the Office of the Secretary of the State, Deputy Chief of the Crisis Management Team of the State within the National Security Bureau -- Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland. This SWJ blog post is an excerpt from a much longer and detailed article published in the January -- March edition of Romanian Military Thinking. We encourage our readers to visit their link for a detailed discussion of Marczuk's book and an European view of the security role of police forces.

Mediterranean Constabulary Forces: Theory, Practice, Solution?

Karina Paulina Marczuk

Contemporary American and European international relations researchers, security analysts and strategists have noted the importance of maintaining security, inside traditional nation-states and during operations abroad. The larger part of modern literature notes that only police forces with military status (known as paramilitary forces, gendarmerie-type forces or constabulary forces) can provide security and public order management, especially during the stabilization phase of peacekeeping operations.

The issue of maintaining public security and public order within states and during interventions abroad by police forces with military status is discussed in my soon-to-be-published book Mediterranean Constabulary Forces -- Theory, Practice, Solution?

The subject of the book is constabulary forces in several Mediterranean countries (French National Gendarmerie, Italian Carabineers Army, Portuguese National Republican Guard, Romanian Gendarmerie, Spanish Civil Guard and Turkish Gendarmerie). I attempt to answer such questions as: Does only one, common and universal definition of gendarmerie-type forces exist? What should we call them, according to the rules of European (dominated by French and Italian researchers) and American schools? What were the common features of Mediterranean constabulary forces in the past and what are they now? How have national, internal and public security and public order conceptions changed in the post-Cold War period? What is the role of the so-called Barry Buzan Copenhagen School (broad security conception) of security in this process? What does the broad conception of security mean for modern constabulary forces? What is the position of gendarmeries in the national security systems of the states? Are the constabulary forces a new tool to provide public order and security inside the country and during peacekeeping operations? And finally, does the international cooperation of Mediterranean police forces with military status form a basis for European cooperation in the internal security field?

In attempting to answer these questions, my book provides a brief description of the French, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian and Turkish constabulary forces. I also explore the American system for keeping order and tranquility inside and outside the country -- the activity of the US Army National Guard, which is a de facto reserve army. Last but not least, I address the Polish Gendarmerie history and the changes in the Polish system of internal security after 1989, when former President Lech Walesa intended to create a National Guard of the Republic of Poland.

The first part of the book consists of two theoretical chapters. Chapter I - The Nature of Mediterranean Constabulary Forces: Police Forces with Military Status, discusses the unique nature of the constabulary forces, based on historical and contemporary backgrounds in the selected Mediterranean countries. I seek common features among these gendarmeries and attempt to establish a common name for them, using both European and American approaches. To compare Mediterranean gendarmeries with the American system, the chapter contains a short analysis of the American Army National Guard as an example of a reserve arm. Comparing all the mentioned schools, I establish a new title for modern constabulary using the phrase "auxiliary forces" -- derived from the Latin word auxilia. Auxila troops were expeditionary forces used by the Roman Empire to keep order in its colonies.

Chapter II is devoted to the role of Constabulary forces in the national security systems of states. It concerns contemporary definitions of security, national security and international security and the relations between them. The lesson here is a new approach to security matters which today means a broad security concept (the so-called Copenhagen School by Barry Buzan) that is developing into a human security theory. I also address the internal aspect of security, including public order and public security management. It is necessary to note that the borderline between internal and external security is blurring. That is why some researchers start to talk about intermestic security (a neologism made from two words: inter and domestic) because of the threats posed by trans-national groups (organized crime and terrorists).

The second part of the book (Chapters III -- VI) provides descriptions of French, Portuguese, Romanian, Italian, Spanish and Turkish gendarmerie forces. These descriptions are based on official publications, as well as on internal documents which the I received from Polish and foreign governmental institutions.

In Chapter III I stress that in France, Portugal and Romania a similar model of the internal security structure exists, based on the Napoleonic gendarmerie-type force. Here we can find a comparison between these three formations, including their history, contemporary tasks and competence. The purpose is to explore common features.

Chapter IV - The Army of Carabineers as the Fourth Kind of Italian Armed Force, gives examples from the history of Italian Carabineers, their contemporary tasks and position in the national security system of Italy. The history of this formation and the history of Italian small states resulted in the Carabineers becoming the fourth pillar of the Italian Armed Forces. Being a militarized institution, the Carabineers were able to serve as one of the important factors during the unification process of Italy in the 19th century. Their present tasks include the fight against the mafia and participation in peacekeeping operations.

Chapter V - The Civil Guard in Spain: A Return to Civilian Police Forces discusses the present changes in the structure and organization of the Spanish Civil Guard. In September 2006, the Spanish Government established that the Guardia Civil (GC) must have the same Director General as the Spanish National Police - the type of reform made in Belgium and Austria, where gendarmerie-type forces no longer exist. Today, the Civil Guard is the main formation devoted to the fight against Basque terrorism and illegal immigrants.

Chapter VI - The Turkish Gendarmerie: The Concept of Military Police Units, provides a description of this formation. It is necessary to stress that Jandarma is the most militarized gendarmerie in the Mediterranean region. This section discusses its history, the role played by the father of the modern Turkish state Mustafa Kemal Atatí¼rk and finally, it examines the changes in the structure of its formation in Turkey's attempt to become a member of the European Union.

Chapter VI is Institutionalization of the Cooperation of Mediterranean Constabulary Forces and explores a system for European co-operation in the internal security field.

SWJ friend Jim Guirard of the TrueSpeak Institute e-mailed us his latest Words Have Meaning related commentary.

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Dear SWJ Blog,

David Kilcullen of General David Petraeus' staff in Baghdad makes a fine start but has much farther to go in attacking the pseudo-religious scam of al Qaeda-style Terrorism (AQST) in Islamic religious terms.

To date, the State Department, the White House and the Defense Department -- and even the otherwise excellent new COIN Manual itself -- have studiously avoided this approach in favor of Western secular words only. This is because of an understandable but, I think, inordinate fear of making mistakes (as indeed we would from time to time) if we were to begin combating AQST in religious terms and frames of reference.

Such favored Western secular and law enforcement terms as criminals, thugs, bring to justice, killers and even terrorists are quite true but are little better than shooting with blanks when it comes to their impact on hearts, minds and souls (don't forget the "and souls" element) in the Muslim and Arab worlds where --

First, the ever deceitful enemy is incessantly talking in terms of "Jihad" (Holy War) by "mujahideen" and "shahideen" (martyrs) destined for "Jennah" (Paradise) as a proper reward for killing all of us "kuffar" -- us alleged "infidels" and "unbelievers" -- and where

Second, all too many of us tend to confirm the validity of such pro-al Qaeda terms -- and thus to polish Osams bin Laden's and Ayman al-Zawahiri's haloes -- either by repeating these words of self-sanctification or by failing to contest their validity, or both.

Enter now David Kilcullen, who calmly breaks stride by correctly, prudently and one-word-at-a-time referring to these suicide mass murderers as ungodly "munafiquun (hypocrites) who pose as defenders of the faith while simultaneously perverting it." Great!

He then recounts that in the bloody battle for Ramadi "The gangsters called themselves 'mujahideen'' but there was nothing holy about their war." Great, again!

In both cases he challenges the patently false religious claims of the terrorists and implies that they are enemies of Quranic Islam who are using "religion as cynical cover for carnage," a reference which sounds very much like "apostasy" (murtadd) to this reader. Great, for a third time!

In all three of these assertions the man is leveling serious religious charges, not against Islam itself but against a pseudo-Islamic ideology which is in fact the antithesis of the "peaceful, compassionate, merciful, beneficent and just" Allah who is repeatedly so described by the Quran. But to complete the job, both he and those who would follow his example need several additional semantic tools by which to portray these evildoers and their so-called "religious insurgency"

(a) NOT as constituting so-called "Jihad" (Holy War) but ungodly "Hirabah" (unholy war, war against society) and forbidden "Irhab" (Terrorism), instead;

(b) NOT as the "jihadis" and the "mujahideen" they falsely claim to be but as the irhabis (terrorists) and the mufsiduun (evildoers, mortal sinners and corrupters) they really are;

(c) NOT as the Godly heroes of "Jihadi Martyrdom" they falsely claim to be but as the Satanic perpetrators of "Irhabi Murderdom" (Genocidal Terrorism) they really are;

(d) NOT as destined for a virgin-filled Paradise for killing all of us so-called kuffar (infidels) but to a demon-filled Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) for killing so many thousands of innocents, fellow Muslims, "People of the Book" and "Sons of Abraham," instead;

(e) NOT as the abd'al-Allah (Servants of Allah) they falsely claim to be but as the abd'al-Shaitan (Servants of Satan), the murtadduun (apostates) and the khawarij (outside-the-religion deviants) they really are.

Only once we know such correctly condemnatory words and begin to use them -- prudently but insistently, as well -- might we then begin to undermine the so-called "Jihadi Martyrdom" imagery by which these ruthless killers live, die and expect to enter Paradise as a reward for defeating "The Great Satan." (Realize, please, that according to today's AQ-concocted and universally parroted lexicon, that is who we are. For who other than TGS himself would go about killing "holy guys" and "martyrs" on their way to Paradise?)

While such truth-in-language will not persuade all or even most of today's terrorists of the apostate and satanic nature of their ways, it will in time greatly erode the certainty of their "jihadi" resolve. Those who posit that such killers are "impervious to counter methods" of a religious nature and are "not susceptible to having their hearts and minds won over" may be right. But how will we ever know if we never even try?

In addition to whatever impact such an initiative has on the Hell-bound Terrorists themselves, it will help to strengthen the anti-murderdom resolve of most truly faithful Muslims -- many of whom, like so many of us, are quite thoroughly hoodwinked by AQST's false labeling, by habit of language, by brainwashing, by pseudo-Islamic preachings and by a wide variety of peer pressures into a 'round-the-clock parroting of al Qaeda's seductive but patently false language of self-sanctification.

By painting the truthful alternative image of Irhabi Murderdom (of Genocidal Terrorism), we will begin to expose al Qaeda's grandiose promises as a monumental satanic scam which entices religiously motivated young Muslims into becoming irhabis, mufsiduun, munafiquun, murtadduun and khawarij -- and dispatches them in due course not into Allah's Paradise but into Shaitan's demon-filled Hellfire, instead.

And in that truthful RELIGIOUS frame of reference we might begin to find the much-needed disincentive to the suicide mass murder by which al Qaeda, al Sadr, Hizballah, the Afghan Taliban and their genocidal ilk are now attempting to inflict a "death by a thousand cuts" catastrophe on the entire civilized world.

Of course, those true believers in the al Qaeda Apostasy -- as well as those individuals who are simply criminals, psychopaths, mercenaries, thugs and Caliphate-hungry imperialists -- and will still have to be hunted down and either be killed or be captured and imprisoned.

But is it not also time, as David Kilcullen (and maybe Gen. Petraeus himself?) seems to be recommending, that we at least "GIVE A BLOODY GOOD TRY," as the British and as Kilcullen's own Australians would say, to these long-avoided strategies, operations and tactics for saving not only ourselves but Islam itself from those deviants who would turn that huge and growing religion into nothing but a perpetual killing machine of all Christians, of all Jews and of all Muslims, as well, who happen to disagree?

Finally, as a means of assessing the anti-Terrorism utility of the "war of words" and "war for hearts, minds and souls" recommendations explained above, one might try to picture what the late Osama bin Laden's reaction to each might have been before he was so deservedly cast into Eternal Hellfire some time ago.

(And how is that for a somewhat speculative but quite possibly true "psyop" ending to this story about AQST's satanic mastermind?)

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Jim Guirard -- TrueSpeak Institute 703-768-0957 Justcauses@aol.com ... and Truespeak.org

A DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-Terrorism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief of Staff to former US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long. His TrueSpeak Institute and TrueSpeak.org website are devoted to truth-in-language and truth-in-history in public discourse.

In reply to Dave Kilcullen's post on religion and insurgency:

The problem is that the insurgency in Iraq and elsewhere is fueled, if not based on an Islamic jihad. The element most intransigent and so far impervious to counter methods is the suicide bomber who believes that he goes to heaven for killing men, women and children in the name and the cause of an extreme religiosity.

The counterinsurgency (COIN) manual was based on selective abstracts from past insurgencies that were at base political movements, where the allegiance of the people could be swayed by one side or the other. In Iraq, no Sunni is going to convert and become a Shiite, or vice versa. Granted, the Baathists behind the curtain believe they can manipulate the jihad extremists, but AQI has displaced them as the field leaders. And AQI does intend a caliphate based on its interpretation of religion.

The COIN manual was based on a different model, one that does not apply to the root cause of the insurgency - a radical religion whose adherents are not susceptible to having their hearts or minds won over.

Many of the TTPs in the COIN manual do apply. But no country has written the manual for eradicating the virulent disease of Islamic jihad based on a twisted interpretation of religion, God and the kingdom of heaven.

A few commentators have panned the new counterinsurgency manual for insufficient emphasis on religion. There is a grain of truth in this criticism but, as a practitioner, the evidence I see does not really support it. Rather, field data suggest, some critics may misunderstand both current conflicts and the purpose of doctrine. Worse, they may be swallowing propaganda from munafiquun who pose as defenders of the faith while simultaneously perverting it. (Did I sound like a politician there? Never mind. I will show factual evidence for this assertion, so the resemblance is fleeting...I hope).

The theorists posit the existence of something called "religious insurgencies", which are allegedly defined by their religious (read: Islamic) dimension. They argue that the passion religion arouses, its stringent dogma, and its capacity to de-humanize the "other" makes religious insurgents uniquely violent and fanatical. This allegedly immunizes such insurgencies against efforts to address legitimate grievances, "hearts and minds", governance improvement, resource and population control, and minimum force — key techniques in the new doctrine. This, they argue, foredooms counterinsurgency to fail in current conflicts. For the serious version of this argument, read Frank Hoffman's analysis here at SWJ; for the populist variant, read anything recent by Ralph Peters or Edward Luttwak. Most critics (not all—the sublime Hoffman is an exception) argue that counterinsurgency is too "soft" for religious insurgents, that unbridled brutality — "out-terrorizing the terrorists" (Luttwak), "the value of ferocity" (Peters) is more appropriate.

Consider this elegant insight from David Morris in The Big Suck: "Ramadi is the Chernobyl of the insurgency, a place where the basic proteins of guerilla warfare have been irradiated by technology and radical Islam, producing seemingly endless cells of wide-eyed gunslingers, bomb gurus, and aspiring martyrs. Globalization wrought with guns and God. A place devoid of mercy, a place where any talk of winning hearts and minds would be met with a laugh, both sides seeming to have decided, This is where the killing will never stop, so give it your best shot." This, incidentally, is a far more nuanced view than that of the "Islam=Bad" polemicists, and comes from an extremely perceptive piece based on participant field observation, which is well worth repeated reading.

But there are three problems with this argument. First, there is solid field evidence that modern counterinsurgency methods, properly updated for the new environment, actually are effective against current insurgencies. Second, insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq are not actually particularly religious — certainly, they are no more religious than the societies they are attacking. Indeed, there is an empirical problem with the whole notion of a "religious" insurgency, since almost all historical insurgencies have included a strong religious dimension, so that it is not clear that discrete "religious insurgencies" actually exist as observable phenomena. And third, doctrinal publications are not templates, but generic expositions of principle; not cookbooks, but frameworks. Practitioners must populate these frameworks with current, locally accurate, deeply understood insights into the societies where they operate. There is simply no substitute for what we might call "conflict ethnography": a deep, situation-specific understanding of the human, social and cultural dimensions of a conflict, understood not by analogy with some other conflict, but in its own terms.

Take Ramadi. Eleven months ago, it was the blackest rat-hole in the dark insurgent sewer of the upper Euphrates valley. The war in Ramadi, as David Morris rightly notes, was fuelled by insurgent cells with a mastery of consumer electronics, grass-roots propaganda and a blood-lust driven by tribal identity, youthful lack of empathy and sense of invulnerability (a sense of invulnerability that turned out to be laughably unfounded, I'm delighted to say). The gangsters called themselves "mujahidin" but there was nothing holy about their war: it was Lord of the Flies with cell-phones, car bombs, video cameras, sniper head-shots, torture with electric drills and execution by chainsaw. Children tricked into becoming human bombs, religion as cynical cover for carnage.

Today, the town is transformed. Attacks are down from 100 a day to less than four. Tribal and community leaders have allied themselves with the government. Imams are preaching against the insurgents. Police recruits are up from 200 a few months ago, to around five thousand today. There is improved security, with children walking to school, markets and shops re-opening, citizens back on the streets. This week, throughout Anbar, a whole day went by without a single attack anywhere — this in a province that senior intelligence officers regarded as "lost" less than six months ago. Of course, there are still severe threats: al Qa'ida killed innocent civilians in a suicide bombing just last week. But overall, the picture is vastly better than last year. How did this happen? Not through brutality and terror, but by the consistent application of proven counterinsurgency techniques. Local units, partnering with the population, conducted careful, minimum-force sweeps of the town, painstakingly cleared out insurgent cells, established a permanent presence with U.S. and Iraqi police and military units permanently protecting the population, alienated and eliminated terrorist cells, dealt effectively with legitimate grievances, and applied minimum but effective force. Officers who understood the cultural and social make-up of the population crafted effective local alliances. Proven counterinsurgency techniques were applied against the mythically implacable "religious" insurgents. Result: success. And Ramadi is but one of many examples.

As I say, these were not really "religious" insurgents at all. In Afghanistan and Iraq the enemy invokes religious principle as a tool for manipulating the population. In both conflicts, to listen to the insurgents' propaganda, you would think they were God-fearing mujahidin engaged in a righteous struggle against unbelieving occupiers, the ihtilal of the salidi. In each case the insurgents set themselves up as a model of religious rectitude, but the facts contradict their claims. The Taliban are world leaders in opium production, whereas more than 70% of Afghans believe the production of narcotics is un-Islamic. Last year, Taliban leaders told their field commanders to constrain their more egregious instances of pedophilia, because their tendency to take and sodomize young boys was losing them popular support. Very moral of them. I have seen former Iraqi insurgents break down in bitter tears when they realized that guerrilla leaders they believed were true Muslims were actually tattooed habitual criminals with links to organized crime, murder-for-profit gangs and the old Ba'athist oligarchy. Righteous ghazis these are not.

Indeed, the whole notion of religious insurgency is somewhat problematic. In any conflict where there is a religious difference between the two sides, religion is likely to become an identity marker and political rallying-point. We observed this with Catholics in East Timor, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Mau-Mau in Kenya, firqat in Dhofar, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and in Thailand where Islam became a surrogate marker for Malay ethnicity. Historically, most insurgencies involved at least some religious dimension. Even Communist insurgencies of the classical period invoked Marxist concepts in pseudo-religious fashion.

And in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa — the critics' favorite examples of "religious insurgency" — all the major players are Muslims. Islam is invoked by all sides as a rallying cry, not solely by the insurgents. And in fact the conflict is entirely political: it concerns power in human social structures, not theological disputation. As I wrote in response to Edward Luttwak a few weeks ago, "Dr Luttwak argues that 'the vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers, illiterates or at best semi-illiterate, naturally believe their religious leaders' (who, Dr Luttwak suggests, incite violence with claims that America seeks to destroy Islam and control oil resources). Again, this is at variance with field observation. In fact, neither Iraqis nor Afghans are particularly assiduous mosque-goers. And religious figures are prominent on all sides of both conflicts, in moderate and extreme political groups; there is an extremely wide range of clerical opinion, ranging from quietism through support for democratic government, to extremism. More fundamentally, in these societies, religious faith is not a function of ignorance and credulity, as Dr Luttwak implies, but a widespread cultural norm that infuses all social classes, political orientations and education levels." The true identity difference in Afghanistan is ethnic — the Taliban are 100% Pakhtun — while in Iraq key identity drivers are tribal, economic and ethnic.

But I said there was a grain of truth in the criticism, and it is this: because insurgents like the Taliban or AQ subjectively believe they are fighting to uphold God's will, their strategic calculus and tactical thought-patterns differ significantly from those of more pragmatic, materialist groups that fight for "real-world" objectives. This doesn't make them any more religious than the societies against which they fight, but it does mean we have to take this strategic approach into account when designing approaches to defeat them. Also, when Western nations become involved in large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Muslim countries, religion becomes a unifying factor for factions who regard our intrusion as sacrilegious. This is an extremely strong argument for thinking twice before entering such conflicts, by the way. It is also an argument for working by, with or through local allies whenever possible, ruthlessly minimizing our involvement. But this is recognized in the new doctrine, and features in our approach to Iraq and Afghanistan. In both countries, we operate at the request of legitimate, Islamic, democratically-elected governments that have asked for help. As soon as that help is no longer needed, we will leave. There is zero religious justification for any call to war against infidel invaders. Those who invoke religion in these conflicts are, quite simply, hypocrites. And Western armchair theorists who concede the enemy's religious arguments are either unfamiliar with reality on the ground, or deceived by enemy propaganda.

The bottom line is that no handbook relieves a professional counterinsurgent from the personal obligation to study, internalize and interpret the physical, human, informational and ideological setting in which the conflict takes place. Conflict ethnography is key; to borrow a literary term, there is no substitute for a "close reading" of the environment. But it is a reading that resides in no book, but around you; in the terrain, the people, their social and cultural institutions, the way they act and think. You have to be a participant observer. And the key is to see beyond the surface differences between our societies and these environments (of which religious orientation is one key element) to the deeper social and cultural drivers of conflict, drivers that locals would understand on their own terms.

The notion of "religious insurgency", in short, is poorly supported by the evidence. And the related idea that out-terrorizing insurgents is the only way to win current conflicts is dangerous nonsense. The facts on the ground show that proven, humane counterinsurgency methods do work, and that these methods — constantly updated and adapted as the enemy and the environment evolve — are the most effective approach.

David Kilcullen is Senior Counter-Insurgency Advisor to the Commanding General, Multi-National Force—Iraq. These are his personal views only.

Several excerpts from and links to recent blog posts on Bing's latest SWJ Iraq trip report:

Westhawk: Bing West and a 'Bottom-up' Approach

Mr. West seems very pessimistic about the upper reaches of the Iraqi government. The politicians and officers at the top are corrupt, incompetent, or disloyal to the whole country. This does not leave much hope at this point that Iraqi society can come together in a unified effort against the country's violence.

In his point #4, Mr. West mentions that the Americans are already preparing for what will happen after the "surge" strategy ends (in either success or failure). According to Mr. West, this summer the Americans will select advisor team leaders for assignments to Iraqi units, with duty presumably beginning in the autumn.

As we have mentioned in previous posts this week, this September the American political situation will likely force a change in the U.S. military strategy in Iraq.

The Belmont Club: Ear to the Ground

Bottom line: Iraqis on the ground are increasingly doing well but Iraqis at the top are screwing up. One reason why diplomatic solutions sometimes fail is that higher levels of abstraction are achieved at the price of losing information in detail. This problem is solved in data-mining situations by allowing the user to "drill down" and rediscover the detail. But that presumes you have a drill. This loss of information is especially acute in countries where national systems do not have an adequate correspondence with actors on the ground. Whatever the shortcomings of the US involvement in Iraq might be, especially under the strategy where troops are fielded in community-based joint security stations or patrol bases, is that it has resulted in a "bit bang" or information explosion which mutually influences operations on the ground on both the Iraqi and American sides.

ShrinkWrapped: Optimism and Pessimism

The second reason for optimism is that even if the surge fails in its political objective, ie establishing conditions whereby the Iraqi government makes the difficult political decisions necessary to end the sectarian estrangement, thereby ending the support for the insurgency, both Democratic realists and Republican strategists have a nidus of a plan which any future administration can use as an ongoing foundation for the war against Islamic fascism.

The Fourth Rail: Bing West's Iraq Report

Bing West's observations on the state of the Iraqi Army and police, both challenges and setbacks, largely mirror my own. He also makes several recommendations for moving forward, but only considers Baghdad and Anbar province as the major centers of gravity in Iraq. Here is where I disagree. While Baghdad and Anbar province are vital to success, securing both the Baghdad "belts" and Diyala are integral to the security effort, and the absence of these two theaters in his report is a glaring omission.

PrairiePundit: Iraqi Trip Report Congress Should Read

West provides on the ground experience and details that will not be found in mainstream media stories. I highly recommend reading this in full if you are interested in what is happening in the war and what it is going to take to win. Those who want to lose should avoid reading this because you may be disappointed.

On Wednesday, April 11, 2007 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asked New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg if some of the city's police could be deployed with the U.N. for peacekeeping missions. This question succinctly points to the need to develop and deploy new transnational police capabilities to address global threats such as insurgency, terrorism, and the disorder that results from failed states.

Underlying the secretary-general's request is the stark fact that the distinctions between crime and war are blurring. Insurgents, genocidiares, and their terrorist cousins challenge the state monopoly on violence. Increasingly, they do so in conjunction with criminal enterprises: gangs and organized crime. Recognizing this, the U.N. is seeking international police to participate in its 16 peacekeeping missions around the world.

Yet, much more is needed than individual police officers. The current global situation calls for new security capabilities. Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and related activities are important elements of global security. Typically military forces are deployed to address conflict and quell hostilities. Often they are augmented by civilian police (CIVPOL) to foster order and the transition to stability. But in today's world, strategic crime can challenge a state's solvency. Lawlessness and disorder in a single failed state can spark a regional conflagration. More robust and agile capabilities are required.

Military forces have much to offer, but are rarely configured to sustain long-term policing and crime control capabilities. Conventional militaries are designed to fight other militaries not police the streets of a community or investigate complex criminal conspiracies. Policing involves a complex set of social control skills and community interaction. Community policing activities help identify threats and criminal enterprises, but more importantly they help sustain public order and secure communities—a prerequisite to functional states.

Both military and police capabilities are required to address complex hostile situations at acute phases of the conflict spectrum. Yet, the nature and range of skills required for effective social control during armed insurrection and active hostility is more than a typical uniformed police officer on patrol can address. Some nations have a third force option between the police and military to fill this gap. These formed police forces or stability police units such as France's Gendermerie, Italy's Carabinieri, or Spain's Guardia Civil. These forces traditionally performed internal security functions, but increasingly are deployed abroad to support peace operations.

Indeed the need for such expeditionary police (EXPOL) capability led the European Union to establish a multinational police peacekeeping force that can draw on up to 5,000 specially trained police for civilian peace operations. Similarly, Canada's Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Australian police services are regular contributors to international peacekeeping. The RCMP, for example, operates an International Peace Operations Branch responsible for managing and deploying provincial, municipal, and regional officers along with their own constables worldwide.

These formed units are ideal for high intensity policing tasks such as crowd control and riot suppression, advising local police, and a range of tactical operations, such as serving warrants or dignitary protection. They have also been able to provide significant support to war crimes investigations, and investigations into criminal support to insurgent activities demonstrating the need for standing constabulary capabilities.

Constabulary operations, such as these, are the "missing mission" in the United States security structure. The U.S. has no national police service (the FBI is a non-uniformed investigative agency) and state and local police address these functions internally. Few if any local U.S. Forces could field or contribute to an on-going expeditionary capability without straining their ability to perform their home mission. The U.S. also has no standing constabulary or EXPOL force and relies upon scarce or ill-fitted military units (and ad hoc civilian police units) to fill expeditionary needs. The same is true for NATO and the U.N.

The time has come to develop standing constabulary forces at several levels: U.S., NATO, and U.N. Such a building block approach would allow national and regional operations, as well as global U.N. efforts. A serious evaluation of U.S. policy and force structure is required. Many questions need to be answered: how would this service be structured; where would it reside (in the Department of Defense, Justice, State or Homeland Security); would it operate solely as an expeditionary force or domestically as well? Further questions related to the training and scope of operations must also be addressed. Would the service cover terrorism, and counter-insurgency in addition to peace operations? Finally, would it be a standing force like the Gendarmerie or a composite force like the Australian, Canadian, and EU forces?

Policing and crime control skills must be integrated into strategic and operational responses to peace operations and related conflicts that challenge transnational stability. A global framework of standing or composite constabulary forces could fill this need. It is time to fill the missing mission—the time for expeditionary police is now.

John P. Sullivan is a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, a member of the board of advisors for the Terrorism Research Center, Inc., and serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department . He is also co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a global counter-terrorism network (Routledge 2006).

Consider for a moment the differences in informational-warfare responsbilities of junior leaders in the Marine Corps -- corporals -- and the propagandists in insurgent and terror cells -- cameramen.

Infantry squad leaders -- often, corporals -- know (or should) that the behavior of their Marines sends signals to those always watching them in an insurgency: the people and the insurgents. When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons; seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals; understanding of native customs and mores; and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and terrorists who watch them: it hastens cooperation from the populace and hard-targets them from insurgent attacks. This is the basic informational component of a strategic corporal in Iraq.

Consider now a strategic cameraman. Numerous attacks in Iraq and elsewhere are filmed for propaganda purposes. The classic case is that of the IED or VBIED. Numerous IED videos circulate throughout cyberspace for recruiting or fundraising purposes.

From an informational standpoint, the area immediately affected by a corporal with a squad of Marines is local and physically located. The area immediately affected by a cameraman posting attack videos online is global and virtual.

If our enemies can manage to squeeze virtual and global effects out of tactical and local actions, why can't we?

The Origins of The Strategic Corporal

In 1999, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles Krulak coined the term "strategic corporal" to reflect the devolution of greater responsibility onto the small-unit levels of military leadership.

In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests -- the Strategic Corporal.

In its very first definition, Gen Krulak alluded to the informational component of the "strategic corporal," noting that individual Marines are "conspicuous symbols" of American foreign policy. But how eagerly does the Marine Corps institutionally embrace this informational aspect of a strategic corporal?

When first conceived, it conjured notions of NCOs capable of doing far more than their predecessors had been -- allowing them to influence conflicts at the operational and even strategic level. This is certainly the case today with the training of an infantry squad leader. Some even go so far to argue that the corporals of today have the same skill sets as captains of 1980.

But what of the term "strategic corporal" itself? As an institution, it seems the Marine Corps today only invokes this term when admonishing leaders to watch out for the press. For example, if your Marine screws up and CNN is present, then he'll become a strategic corporal. The soldiers at Abu Ghraib became inadvertent strategic corporals. Pay attention the next time someone uses this term and note two things: the context usually involves the media; and the connotation is almost always negative.

This is not the way it's supposed to be. Taken in this way, the strategic corporal becomes a condition meant to be avoided. Who wants their Marines screwing up on national TV? Moreover, it reduces the concept to something akin to "being on one's best behavior all the time." This is certainly a good way to think of one's conduct, but it results in ceding the virtual informational battlespace to any enemy who is not afraid of media. In fact, the strategic corporal can mean a whole lot more for US operations -- specifically with regard to the media -- and can even help us win conflicts.

Information Operations at the Lowest Levels

Two trends vex information operations. The first is the globalization of electronic media.

The military has traditionally divided perception management into two areas and skillsets: public affairs and psychological operations. In brief, public affairs is usually handled like the old-fashioned PR machines of large companies, featuring photo-ops, interviews, press releases and the like. The target audience is generally the US public and public affairs is usually imbued with the notion of telling things as they are, or getting stories out. Psychological operations are targeted toward an enemy, or a given neutral populace, and are meant to make them think a certain way. These two communities have traditionally been taught to never associate with one another due to the differing needs governing their roles. The problem lies at the intersection of the warfighter's need for deception and the public's need for transparency.

Today though, the globalization of all forms of media means that it is more and more difficult to segregate media products for a given audience. With regard to Iraq, this means that any given story, video, interview, or announcement that is accessible via the internet can potentially have four audiences, all of whom will have a tendency to view it differently:

a) Iraqis

b) Muslims elsewhere

c) Americans

d) the rest of the world.

There is much further segmentation within these groups as well. The point is that electronic media can no longer be carefully segregated as to who will view, read, or listen to it. This may still be possible for types of information that is not digitized, such as announcements via a loudspeaker system, or handbills and leaflets. For anything that can be sent by email though, the walls have come down.

The second trend is a growing distrust in traditionally manufactured "information." Corporate press releases, press conferences, advertising, and the like are more and more seen as possessing suspect and murky agendas. Sometimes, though not always, new media -- such as blogs, podcasts, and YouTube videos -- overcome these suspicions, possessing as they do a less-polished feel to them. Ultimately many consumers of information mitigate their suspicions by developing something like a personal relationship and trust with the source, whether it is an institution or an individual.

These trends make for a bewildering environment in which to operate. Consider two recent phenomena:

In March, Multi-National Forces-Iraq created its own YouTube channel [see more here.] On the homepage for the channel, MNF-I states that

Multi-National Force - Iraq established this YouTube channel to give viewers around the world a "boots on the ground" perspective of Operation Iraqi Freedom from those who are fighting it.

Video clips document action as it appeared to personnel on the ground and in the air as it was shot. We will only edit video clips for time, security reasons, and/or overly disturbing or offensive images.

What you will see on this channel in the coming months:

- Combat action

- Interesting, eye-catching footage

- Interaction between Coalition troops and the Iraqi populace.

- Teamwork between Coalition and Iraqi troops in the fight against terror.

In other words, the MNF-Iraq has decentralized its public affairs to some extent, allowing videos submitted by troops to reach a very wide audience.

At the same time, a controversy recently erupted about the Army's new guidance for posting on message boards, blogging, emailing, sending letters home, or creating a resume. The controversy was due to the fact that the going perception of the new policy was that it was intended to shut down personal blogs by Army members. Apparently this was not the case. Nevertheless, the fact is that within two months of each other, one military agency -- MNF-Iraq -- sought to decentralize its informational goals, while another -- the Army -- sought to put added restrictions or layers of oversight on the informational capabilities of its soldiers.

What is to be done?

In such a confusing media environment, how might the Marine Corps enable its small-unit leaders to become as effective in the informational domain as the strategic cameraman described above? Here are three possible solutions:

1) A Media Intent: Marines are used to operating within a commander's intent. Why not have an intent for electronic media, at even the lowest levels? Such guidance would serve to lay down some clear expectations and endstates for the production and distribution of electronic media in a war zone. Rather than simple censorship, a media intent statement might allow Marines to focus their own electronic efforts toward the commander's endstate.

Such a statement might sound like this:

Reporting indicates that insurgent leaders in the area are attempting to spread the rumor that the Coalition is fabricating evidence that it finds when conducting home searches in our AO. I want to produce footage showing that every arrest we make after searching a home is tied to concrete evidence found at the site.

An intent could be a very valuable guide. The same Marine squad might be in a firefight in the morning and eat lunch at a community leader's home in the afternoon. They might have footage of both. But an intent could guide which video is put on a blog and which is put on a hard drive for reminiscing after returning home. Instead of "This is me getting hit by an IED," videos like "This is me rebuilding a school" or "This is me meeting a sheik" might come to dominate.

2) Selective Magnification: Alternately, a commander might designate that everything his unit does is recorded by Marines within it. He could then designate an information cell to cull through the footage to find what he needs for the effects he desires. Such footage might also serve a training and adaptation role, by helping Marines see their own behaviors and tweak them accordingly.

3) Information Specialists: Major Daniel Greenwood recently authored a paper entitled Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concepts: A Proposed Framework for Future Counterinsurgency Operations. Among many other ideas, he argues that:

Future "information specialists" should be recruited and selected for employment at the Company/Platoon level to undermine local insurgent propaganda efforts.

Maj Greenwood goes on to elaborate in a footnote:

The Marine Corps Recruiting Command employs E-5 Sergeant Marketing/Public Affairs (MPA) specialists at all 48 recruiting stations throughout the nation. Arguably one of the most valuable members of the command, these junior Marines combine their initial public affairs training with imagination, initiative and hard work to interact with the local population, schools and the media, telling the Marine Corps story. This same approach should be employed at the tactical level within the COIN [counterinsurgency] environment.

Conclusion

There's no reason for "strategic corporal" to refer only to some sort of "gotcha" moment.

In his article Counterinsurgency Redux, David Kilcullen argued that one feature of counterinsurgency today is the importance of energizing one's base:

In modern counterinsurgency, the side may win which best mobilizes and energizes its global, regional, and local support base -- and prevents its adversaries doing likewise.

This should be the goal of information operations -- to help energize the counterinsurgent's bases of support.

The current generation of Americans in their teens and twenties loves to make media. Those who join the Marine Corps are no exception. Harnessing their technical skill and imagination can help build trust with the populace in a counterinsurgency and fortify the will of the public at home -- allowing positive strategic effects from junior Marines

Josh Manchester is an infantry officer in the Marine Corps Reserve. He thanks Captain Scott Cuomo for his help in developing this article.