This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the "Act"). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.

Here are the "bottom-line" findings (excerpted from the report) on achievements and shortfalls (bolded emphasis SWJ):

This report provides, consistent with the Act, an assessment of how the Iraqi Government is performing on 18 specified benchmarks, rather than the effects being generated. Some of the benchmarks may be leading indicators, giving some sense of future trends; but many are more accurately characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved after the strategy is fully underway and generates improved conditions on the ground.

The security situation in Iraq remains complex and extremely challenging. Iraqi and Coalition Forces continue to emphasize population security operations in Baghdad, its environs, and Anbar province to combat extremist networks, and create the space for political reconciliation and economic growth. As a result of increased offensive operations, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Tough fighting should be expected through the summer as Coalition and Iraqi Forces seek to seize the initiative from early gains and shape conditions for longer-term stabilization.

Moving key legislation depends on deal-making among major players in a society deeply divided along sectarian, ethnic, and other lines. Meaningful and lasting progress on national reconciliation may also require a sustained period of reduced violence in order to build trust. For this reason, most of the major political benchmarks identified in the legislation-- i.e., final passage of monumental pieces of legislation through Iraq's Council of Representatives by consensus-- are lagging indicators of whether or not the strategy is succeeding or is going to be successful.

Iran and Syria have continued to foster instability in Iraq. As noted, Iran funds extremist groups to promote attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces, and the Iraqi Government. We see little change in Iran's policy of seeking U.S. defeat through direct financial and material support for attacks against U.S. military and civilians in Iraq. Iran is engaging in similar activities in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, foreign fighters (especially suicide bombers) continue to use Syrian territory as their main transit route to Iraq. The Syrian Government also allows major insurgent organizers and financiers to operate in Damascus.

The economic picture is uneven. Key economic indicators paint a modestly improved picture— unemployment has eased slightly and inflation is currently abating. Government revenue is steady due to high oil prices, but the Iraqi Government has not yet made needed investments to increase oil and refining output. Private-sector activity is picking up in some areas, notably the more than $1 billion that have been invested in wireless telecoms, but investors remain wary due to poor security and the continuing need for a stronger legal framework.

On the Current U.S. Strategy - New Way Forward:

Current U.S. strategy -- the New Way Forward -- recognizes that the fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi Governments will be necessary to achieving our common goal: a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on Terror. The building of a strong strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government will be an important part of the effort to achieve this end state, which remains a long-term goal, and requires the application of all elements of national power, including especially diplomatic, economic, and political power.

While our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a transition of responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its security forces, the New Way Forward recognized that, in response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it was necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a greater role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace Iraqi efforts to provide security, but to help provide the necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government can continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts against the accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in Iraq and some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), and can meaningfully address the all-important issue of reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society. The strategy recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi Government. Amid such violence, it became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to make the difficult compromises necessary to foster reconciliation.

At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Relying on lessons learned from our experience in training and equipping the ISF, we have significantly enhanced our training and mentoring commitment. We will continue this commitment through a combination of partnering Coalition units with Iraqi Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team personnel with the majority of ISF units. U.S commanders are committed to helping the Iraqi government expand the size of the ISF to make it a more capable counter-insurgency force.

We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi governmental capacity not just at the national level, but at the provincial and local levels as well. Most notably, this has required an expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program with 10new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving PRT leaders and BCT commanders additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders are charged with supporting moderate elements against extremists in their areas of responsibility and launching projects that have an immediate impact in areas cleared of terrorists and insurgents.

Expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete, with only about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel deployed to date. The full complement of "civilian surge" personnel will be completed by December 2007. In addition, economic assistance funds provided by Congress in the Act for Iraq have yet to be released. As provided for in the Act, the President has waived certain restrictions on a portion of these funds in a determination, which is being provided to Congress separately.

For more on current U.S. strategy see Dave Kilcullen's SWJ post Understanding Current Operations in Iraq.

On the 18 Congressional benchmarks concerning the Iraqi Government:

1. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and then completing the constitutional review.

2. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform.

3. The current status is unsatisfactory, but it is too early to tell whether the Government of Iraq will enact and implement legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis.

4. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

5. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) Commission. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial elections law. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing provincial council authorities. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date for provincial elections.

6. The prerequisites for a successful general amnesty are not present; however, in the current security environment, it is not clear that such action should be a near-term Iraqi goal.

7. The prerequisites for a successful militia disarmament program are not present.

8. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.

9. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.

10. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

11. The Government of Iraq has not at this time made satisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law; however, there has been significant progress in achieving increased even-handedness through the use of coalition partnering and embedded-transition teams with Iraqi Security Force units.

12. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress in ensuring the Baghdad Security Plan does not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliations.

13. The Government of Iraq— with substantial Coalition assistance— has made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence but has shown unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia control of local security.

14. The Government of Iraq -- with substantial Coalition assistance -- has made satisfactory progress toward establishing the planned JSSs (Joint Security Stations) in Baghdad.

15. The Iraqi Government has made unsatisfactory progress toward increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces units capable of operating independently.

16. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

17. The Iraqi Government is making satisfactory progress in allocating funds to ministries and provinces, but even if the full $10 billion capital budget is allocated, spending units will not be able to spend all these funds by the end of 2007.

18. The Government of Iraq has made unsatisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the ISF (Iraqi Security Force).

Much more at the link...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Press Links:

White House: President's Press Conference

Washington Post: President Unbowed as Benchmarks Are Unmet

Washington Times: Bush Asks for More Time

New York Times: Firm Bush Tells Congress Not to Dictate War Policy

Los Angeles Times: Bush Quiets GOP Revolt over Iraq

Baltimore Sun: Bush Reports Progress on Iraq

Chicago Tribune: Sober Report on Iraq

Boston Globe: As Bush Stays Firm, House Votes Pullout

Miami Herald: Bush Cautiously Optimistic on Iraqi Forces

USA Today: House Votes Against War as Bush Defends It

Christian Science Monitor: Bush Report Sharpens Iraq Debate

Associated Press: Iraq War Report Implies Longer US Surge

Four years on in Iraq, the White House still portrays the war as a life and death struggle between the forces of good, the US led Multi-national forces, and the forces of evil, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

With the advent of the new "surge" strategy, the media ledes have been triumphing the numerous coalition "anti-Al Qaeda" operations in Anbar province including the areas of Karmah, Baqubah and the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad. These operations have the intent to secure Baghdad and other major urban areas from insurgent terrorism. The strategy writ simple is to deny the insurgents an urban sanctuary and killing ground as well as to secure the Iraqi population from their sectarian attacks through a series of wide-area operations. But are we fighting the right enemy?

A better question is whom are we fighting? The response heard most often is that we are fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq. In May 2007 the President declared "Al Qaeda is public enemy number one in Iraq." The consensus opinion, from the Pentagon to the PFC, is that America is waging a desperate fight against Al Qaeda both in and out of Iraq and it will directly determine the national security on the streets of Europe and America. Additionally, for four years Abu Mussab Zarqawi, AQI's first leader, was portrayed as the commander of the insurgency. It was an easily consumable media narrative so effective that even the Iraqis believed it until his death.

There is no question that Al Qaeda is a real threat but are they the main threat? Has AQI has been catapulted to the top of the insurgency by virtue of the fact that they carry out the most dramatic and sectarian attacks or hard intelligence? In fact, listening to Washington one would think that the coalition forces are pretty much fighting "All AQI. All the Time." As with most things in Mesopotamia, this is not nearly so clear cut. The answer may or may not surprise you.

When I completed my most recent book "The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency" many of my warfighting peers, both in and out of Iraq, insisted AQI was commanding the insurgency. When asked what gave them this impression they insisted that AQI was by far the smartest, most capable of the insurgent groups due to their car bomb (SVBIED) attacks. They argued that AQI had fostered a virulent, militant form of Islam among the formerly secular Sunni Iraqis. Some also point out that the formation of the Islamic State (Emirate) of Iraq and attempts to enforce Islamic law (Shari'a) on the population was the strategic error that pushed the Iraqi tribes of Anbar province into the arms of the coalition. In short: AQI was bad. Very bad. Having survived an AQI suicide bombing, I knew this to be true but does stopping the spectacular nature of their tactical weapons selection override the strategic mission to secure Iraq from all insurgents. In some minds, it had.

On the other hand, many advocates of immediate withdrawal, weary of the bloodletting, bank on the hope that the other groups of the insurgency will dispose of AQI as soon as the US forces withdraw and leave the battlefield. AQI is often described by administration opponents as a convenient smokescreen and boogeyman for the White House to use to keep American troops in Iraq. Knowing the particulars of AQI's strategy, who wants to take a chance on the insurgents doing our job once we leave?

Both sides of the argument have points but some of them are extreme and require a bit of myth-busting before any salient discussion of counterinsurgency strategy can occur.

We Really Don't Know Our Enemy That Well - It is well documented that the Sunni insurgency is composed of three wings of insurgents. It is composed of the nationalist Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) and their former military elements (FREs). This force may be upwards to 29,000 active combatants carrying out over 100 unconventional attacks per day using improvised explosive devices, rockets and automatic weapons ambushes. The FRL-originated Jaysh al-Mujahideen is composed of former Saddam Fedayeen, Special Republican Guard intelligence officers, former-Ba'athists, Sunni volunteers and their families. The second wing is the nationalist Iraqi Religious Extremists (IREs). These are forces including the Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunnah and other smaller groups, which may total approximately 5,000 fighters, sprinkled throughout western, central and northern Iraq. On occasion come into the conversation when one of their attacks is particularly daring or when the coalition claims it is negotiating their departure from the battlefront. Inevitably these "lesser" insurgent groups are portrayed as bit players on the sidelines of the epic.

Finally, the foreign fighters of the Al Qaeda in Iraq and its umbrella group the Islamic Emirate of Iraq (aka Islamic State of Iraq) may be as few as 1,500 fighters and supporters and may also have direct links to the two other tiers.

Overwhelming evidence exists that that the FRLs have been waging the lion's share of the insurgency. Until 2004 they were considered a separate part of the insurgency but recently they have been called 'Al Qaeda-associated' because AQI was operating in their area of operations ... by 2007 it wasn't hard for Washington to make a semantic and rhetorical leap to refer to all insurgency forces as "Al Qaeda."

This is an error worth remembering. For over four years the FRLs (especially the paramilitary Saddam Fedayeen and Special Republican Guard) almost exclusively carries out IED, indirect fire (IDF), sniping, aircraft shoot downs and ambush attacks with conventional weapons with alarming regularity which account for the lion share of the US forces' 3,500 KIAs. The smaller IREs did the same type of attacks but occasionally peppered their missions with Suicide bombings. AQI almost exclusively perform carries out suicide car bombings and suicide vest bombings (SVBIED/SPBIED). They occasionally perform IED, rocket, MANPAD and even a few impressive massed infantry attacks on Iraqi Police and government buildings (such as the symbolic assault on Abu Ghraieb prison in 2005). In fact, AQI's impact on US forces is actually quite small in comparison to the FRLs and IREs.

When the first SVBIEDs of the post-war were launched against the Jordanian embassy, the UN's Canal Road HQ and Sheik Hakim in Najaf the mindset of our commanders was to associate all insurgent related terrorism events to Zarqawi and Al Qaeda. This group-think about the foreign fighters went on right up until Zarqawi was killed in 2006. Faced with an increase in IED and SVBIED attacks after his death, and because some minor groups were joining forces in resistance councils it became convenient to call everyone Al Qaeda in Iraq.

AQI Does Not Command the Insurgency - In November 2005 at a speech at the US Naval Academy the President once accurately described AQI as "the smallest, but the most lethal" insurgent force. Many claim that their size, intelligence, and history put them at the top tier of the resistance. To claim AQI leads the insurgency would have to allow that AQI has a more politically savvy guerilla military and political operation on the ground than the entirety of the former regime and the present Government of Iraq. This is giving them too much credit.

AQI is a microscopic paramilitary terror force that selects very specific weapons for very specific targets to meet strategic goals of their cultish reading of Islam. However, AQI itself has been subject to a significant degradation since January 2005. I believe that since mid-2003 AQI coordinated their SVBIED campaigns in 2004 and 2005 with the support of the FRLs networks. It hard to believe that foreign fighters can enter the Iraqi Sunni community, anywhere, without first kissing the ring of the local FRL or Iraqi religious extremist insurgents.

The AQI SVBIED is used almost exclusively as the basis of Zarqawis' anti-Shiite sectarian war strategy (to punish the Shiite community and encourage the Sunnis to fight together) and kills relatively few coalition soldiers compared to other weapons. Without question the number one killer in Iraq is the roadside IED, followed closely by automatic weapons fire - this is the tactical situation on the ground and it is an unambiguous indicator that a much larger force than AQI is performing these attacks. It is obvious that the FRL backed insurgent groups, with their massive all-Sunni pre-war intelligence and paramilitary apparatus remain intact in carrying out the traditional anti-coalition ambush operations they put into motion in 2003. Granted, in the dynamic and fluid terror-dome that is Iraq, our soldiers could be fighting AQI in the morning, FRLs in the evening and IREs all night but the most likely terror cells our soldiers will encounter in Iraq are the FRL's IEDs on the roads.

Still some classify any Iraqi insurgent support of AQI objectives, active or passive, is often pointed to as a reason to classify all insurgent groups as Al Qaeda. This reading of the enemy does not take into account the diverse strategies, goals, personalities and political linkages of the other insurgents. It lumps them all into one pot and uses the same hammer to try to smash them. Hammering this particular insurgency is like smashing a ball of mercury with your palm. You may get a little of it under your control (and the toxins that come with it) but the rest will disperse, roll away and reform as they please.

AQI has reached its tactical goals in a very limited sense, as they are on the ground fighting the Americans --this makes great video propaganda but beyond the attacks, there is nothing there but air. On the other hand, AQI has never been within sight of their stated political goal - to establish a base and safehaven for the spread of their Salafist variant of Islam into the heart of the Middle East.

On occasion, AQI has made feeble attempts to operate in the political sphere through armed force. Sunni Iraqis are Moslems but even they don't want to be told how to live their religious and social lives by foreign extremists. Each attempt, no matter how small, to radicalize and dictate to the Sunni community in Iraq failed miserably. Examples of these failures include the heavy losses in the Iraq-wide mini-Jihad of July 2004 where AQI forces rose up in several cities and tried to impose Islamic law in them; several attempts to impose Shari'a in Ramadi, sections of Mosul and Tel Afar, the 2005 Haifa street uprising in Baghdad and the multiple attempts to seize the Baqubah city government.

Their failures are why AQI manufactures its own reality. TV transmitted SVBIED attacks and Internet based AQI videos makes the insurgency appear wildly successful. This information operation has been far more successful than the attainment of any stated political goals. That is because they have managed to use their net-centric strategic information operation in such as way that they have credibility to their target audience. This has led to a thin but steady stream of manpower and money. Apart from that and the inspirational aspects of their news operation. AQI has not achieved any tangible support from the Iraqi people ... except those that need them to take the heat of coalition operations off of them.

On the other hand, the FRLs have a history of cold, calculated manipulation of the Iraqi people and events using selective intelligence collection, assassination and intimidation and propaganda. It must be remembered that Zarqawi's original AQ backed group Tawheed Wal Jihad came into Iraq just days before the invasion and set up in Fallujah under control of the Saddam Fedayeen. The Iraqi Baath party grew from a covert political organization and its current adherents still operate as "neo-Ba'athists" in Damascus and Latakia, Syria; Cairo, Egypt and even the UAE. The FRLs are operating as a covert intelligence and Fedayeen driven terrorist force, just as they were in the 1950 and 60s before they overthrew the government of Abd al-Karim Qasim and took power. Having had decades of experience researching the lives of the population, they are even more dangerous as their knowledge of the political and personal dynamics in Iraq runs deep. When necessary they have AQI, organized criminals and other forces to assist them.

AQI Did Not Bring the SVBIED, the SPBIED, the IED and Beheading to Iraq -- Many supporters of the 'All AQI. All the time.' meme have limited knowledge of Iraq before the war. The former regime intelligence and paramilitary forces were active for years prior to the war perfecting numerous types of unconventional weapons, which are used extensively throughout the insurgency. In each instance, these systems were first developed and deploy by the FRLs in both the invasion and post-war insurgency. Take beheading for example. Largely attributed to AQI and Zarqawi there was in fact an extensive use of it in 2000 and 2001 by the Saddam Fedayeen. They were tasked to carryout an "anti-prostitution" campaign that targeted against political opponents. They publicly beheaded over 200 wives and women family members of Saddam's enemies. Videos of the brutal beheadings could be found on the streets of Baghdad for less than .25 cents a full year before AQI carried out their first beheading.

The menu of post-war IEDs were found to have been developed by the regime's intelligence agencies under the title "The Ghafiqi project" and "Challenge project" months before the start of the war.

The first SVBIED and SPBIED attacks in Iraq were carried out during the invasion the war by an Army Sergeant and two women. Numerous other SVBIEDs greeted the 3rd Infantry Division during their Thunder Run into Baghdad. Not to mention that a large sophisticated Iraqi intelligence service-built VBIED was part of the plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush in Kuwait in 1993.

Is Iran Supporting AQI? -- Iran has created real friction with its involvement with the Shiite militias. In fact, the rise of the Jaysh al Mahdi/Mahdi Militia could be a regional threat unto itself that could eclipse Al Qaeda in the next few years (I will address in another blog). Yet there is little to no evidence that Iran is playing both sides of the fence. Although some advanced weapons such as EFPs, RPGs and mortars have undoubtedly found their way into the hands of the Sunni insurgents through black market arms sales and seizures of Shiite militia arms caches, the Iranians have little to gain for a Sunni insurgency to flourish with AQI at its helm. They have but to watch and let the Sunni insurgency play the game for them. This theme has taken residence in the minds of many who want to see Iran brought into the conflict as a way to take pressure off of Iraq. It's just not credible at this time.

The bottom line is that for US decision makers and commanders to win in Iraq they must to clarify exactly whom we are fighting and deal with them accordingly. There may be misgivings about switching gears from AQI to the FRLs at such a late date because that would openly require an acknowledgement that the strategy of "All AQI. All the time." was flawed from the beginning. Additionally any ceasefire with the former regime insurgents would require a broad political framework involving a regional approach that would have to include Syria, Saudi Arabia and the FRLs themselves. Many in Washington find this politically abhorrent.

In the end, mistaking the FRLs for AQI or AQI for the IREs or a mix of one or the other means that the strategies needed to defeat one specific group will be lost to the singular mindset of 'military destruction of AQI at all costs.' This myopia has lead the effort in Iraq for nigh four years now. Many have become so entrenched that the American people believe they are fighting no one else.

Defeating, disarming or buying out key insurgent groups could yield greater results and a lessening of combat losses through targeted military operations, negotiation, reconstruction, civil affairs projects and cash. From down here at the deck plates level this seems like common sense but it has yet to filter up to the policy makers.

If General Petraeus and his excellent counterinsurgency advisor David Kilcullen are to succeed then the hard reality of enunciating to the American public requires that the terms we use to label the opposition have to be changed. If this is part of an aggressive information operation, as some have suggested, to turn the Iraqi people against the Iraqi Insurgents by giving them all a bad name (AQI), then it's a desperate gambit as most Sunnis know who the real insurgents are in their neighborhood. This rhetoric has already had a negative operational effect by making our own soldiers believe that all of the Sunni insurgents and community supporters are Al Qaeda. This may have led to several instances of battlefield murder, torture and abuses of prisoners.

If the Petraeus strategy is to neutralize AQI first, he may eventually succeed, but he may also secure a rested, rearmed, refueled, retrained insurgency that are not AQI. The FRLs appear smart enough to let Petraeus do just this and may even cooperate a little all the while winking and supporting AQI suicide operations ... only time will tell who is the more clever bargainer at the camel bazaar.

Over the last weekend in June, three failed car bomb attacks in the UK signaled the potential resurgence of al-Qaeda and groups sympathetic to its global salifist jihadi network. First, on Friday, 29 June, two car bombs packed with propane gas canisters, gasoline and nails meant to be detonated by cell-phones—VBIEDs in current counterterrorism parlance—were positioned near a night club, poised for a "one-two punch" yielding mass casualties. The first unsuccessful car bomb was discovered by rescue workers and rendered safe, as was the second car bomb discovered nearby. The next day, two men drove a flaming SUV into the terminal at Glasgow's airport. These would be "martyrs" were captured by bystanders. It appears at least one sustained severe burns requiring treatment in hospital, an irony as the men were physicians themselves.

The men, Iraqi doctor Bilal Abdullah and Kahlid Ahmed, along with co-conspirators Mohammed Asha, a Jordanian-educated physician, and several others, are not the first British residents of a diaspora community to plot or carry out terrorist attacks. Two weeks prior to these attempts, seven men, including Dhiren Barot, were found guilty in an al-Qaeda linked plan to use limousines laden with gas canisters to attack soft targets by detonating the devices beneath buildings.

British counterterrorism officials assume that all three recent attempts are linked to al-Qaeda in motivation and ideology, if not direct control or support. The London and Glasgow attacks are linked, but the depth of the conspiracy and the exact nature of their links to the broader global jihad await the results of the fast-moving investigation. What is known thus far is that the investigation is yielding a treasure trove of forensic and human intelligence. This aids efforts to counter future attacks and understand the evolution and migration of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures. Four immediate observations can be drawn from an assessment of these attacks.

• First, their timing coincides with the arrival of a new government. This reminds us that all terrorist attacks are instrumental in nature. These attacks were coordinated to yield maximum political influence as well as maximum casualties.

• Second, the "Martyrs of Mesopotamia" are inspiring "Global Martyrs." The use of car bombs demonstrates the migration of tactics employed in Iraq to other theatres of operation. As Sir John Stevens, the UK's senior counterterrorism official has warned, al-Qaeda has "imported the tactics of Baghdad...onto the streets of the UK."

• Third, while these attacks were unsuccessful in generating casualties or damage they can be viewed as a success from the jihadi standpoint. While the operational bombing technique has not been refined, the power of the message remains. Failed attacks still signal resolve and cause mass or systems disruption. Police and intelligence services can become swamped and distracted as failed attacks enhance the level of "noise" which they must assess to discern emerging threats. Failed strikes draw resources and attention serving as means of deception masking other conspiracies and clouding the indicators of pending attacks.

• Fourth, networked diasporas require attention. Diaspora communities can provide extremists with a permissive environment that can favor conditions that enable the emergence of extremist cells. Radical enclaves may emerge with diaspora communities and serve as catalysts for radicalization. When linked to lawless zones and other radical enclaves through social networks and Internet media a powerful "networked diaspora" results.

Britain is currently the vanguard of violent jihadism in Western Europe with adherents of extreme Islamist sects active in British cities. Members of these groups—separate and in concert—construct viable rationales that legitimize extremist narratives and actions. The threat is certain to extend beyond these current attempts—more London bombings are on the way—as reflected in the statements of British Islamist Anjem Choudary who led the banned Al Muhajiroun: "There is no doubt whatsoever that there will continue to be attacks against the British government...there are many in Britain who take their ideology from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and are ready to carry out many more attacks." Ultimately, this threat if unchecked will mature in the United States and elsewhere.

Countering the reach of the global jihad within networked diasporas is a global security priority. Police and intelligence services worldwide—especially in "Global Cities" with international political and economic importance and transnational connections—must develop relationships with diaspora communities. These efforts must build upon community policing and develop the cultural understanding and community trust required to recognize the emergence of extremist cells, radicalization, efforts to recruit terrorists, and efforts to exploit criminal enterprises or gangs to further terrorist activities. These efforts need to be linked to develop the intelligence needed to combat a global networked threat. This requires more than "information-sharing" and co-operation, it requires a multi-lateral framework for the "co-production" of intelligence so police and intelligence services can recognize global interactions with local impact and local activity with global reach.

John P. Sullivan is a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, a member of the board of advisors for the Terrorism Research Center, Inc., and serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a global counter-terrorism network (Routledge 2006).

First, let me say that we are working hard to get these out the door in volume 9, future volumes, and in some enhancements to our site that we should be rolling out in the fall. Our responsiveness to article submissions has not been where it needs to be, but that's a solvable problem and we're solving it.

I have just sent an e-mail to all the authors who have an article submission pending. If you thought you had one there, too, and didn't get that e-mail, then there is a problem. No doubt on my end. Maybe I've just messed up your e-mail address, maybe I've completely lost your submission, or perhaps that spam filter is a little over-zealous. Anyway, contact us to remediate me. Please note I'm talking here about submissions for SWJ Magazine. We've got some Reference Library update submissions hanging fire, too, but that's another list. If in doubt, ping us.

We have a fledgling peer review process in place, too. It adds some of the rigor that this community deserves.

Though we are stacked with great content to be published, let me encourage potential authors to send in still more. You'll be in good company. Our adustments to our publishing will really open up the flood gates in the fall, as we'll support online publishing of original articles one-at-a-time as soon as they pass the peer review process. We will still publish volumes of SWJ Magazine, but they won't be our only method of getting your good original word out.

To our readers, all I can say is patience is a virtue. And not to be too much of a leg humper, so is charity. We started this operation with a vision, not a business plan. And we have spent little effort at raising funds beyond some simple Google ads and a "donate" button. Well, we're about at the breaking point for where two unfunded guys working at night can deliver what the community needs, wants, and deserves, despite the great volunteer efforts of our SWC moderators, peer reviewers, technology mentor, etc. To really up the ante, we need to bring in some hired help (administrative, editorial, technical) and/or quit our day jobs.

MANY thanks to our donors. We greatly appreciate your generosity. We'd be happy to have more folks who gain value from Small Wars Journal and Small Wars Council join that elite club of supporters. You can also support us by making all your Amazon.com purchases (not just books) through the links at our site, here and in some of the sidebars. Amazon gives us a referral fee, and you pay the same low price, just be sure to access Amazon through our site and not straight in. Finally, if any of you have cracked the code on grants and fund raising, or have some pull with advertisers who might find SWJ a productive venue, we'd be glad to benefit from your wisdom and influence.

We have great expectations for the continued growth of this community at Small Wars Journal.

- Bill

Sunni insurgent groups that call themselves "the honorable resistance" rebelled against American occupation and rejected democracy with a Shiite majority. After four years of fighting, many of these rejectionists have reluctantly concluded they cannot wrest central power from the upstart Shiites. Knowing the Americans do not intend to stay, they now fear that Qaeda extremists will become their rulers. Many of these fighters supposedly can be reconciled.

Anbar illustrates this point of view. Even as insurgent Web sites persist in endorsing jihad, attacks against American forces have substantially declined. How to account for this gap between rhetoric and reality? In the judgment of Marine Brigadier General John R. Allen, who leads the effort to support the tribes in Anbar, "jihad rhetoric probably comes from a fairly finite collection of tech savvy jihadis both here in Iraq as well as across the Web... The tribes know what they have done (by attacking al Qaeda) and the risks they will face for years to come."

It's conventional wisdom now to say that Anbar improved because the Sunni tribes aligned against al Qaeda. True enough, but an incomplete explanation. With inadequate manpower, the Marines and Army National Guard and active duty soldiers persisted year after year with gritty, relentless patrolling that convinced the tribes the American military was, as one tribal leader said to me, "the strongest tribe". Hence the tribes could turn against al Qaeda, knowing they had the strongest tribe standing behind them.

But why join "the strongest tribe" if it is migrating back to the States? In Anbar, the Marines are trying to cement relations between the tribes, the police chiefs and the local Iraqi Army battalion commanders so that, with American advisers, they will support one another - and be supported by the Shiite-dominated central government. "They (the tribes in Anbar)," Allen wrote me recently, "expect their government to assist in rebuilding their cities and giving their children a better life. They expect security and expect to have their own young men and women incorporated into this security."

Insurgents and their supporters communicate with the world through daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films, countless websites, and even television stations. Mainstream Arab media amplify the insurgent message to a mass audience.

The insurgency's media efforts are decentralized, fast-moving, and technologically adaptive, with the overall message emerging from the collective efforts of individuals and small groups, transmitted daily to an audience of millions. Anti-Shi'ite hate speech is an increasingly prominent part of the insurgent message.

Kimmage and Ridolfo argue that popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world. At the same time, the greatest strengths of the insurgency's media strategy -- decentralization and flexibility -- have revealed vulnerabilities that can be exploited by forces interested in a free and democratic Iraq.

Join the New America Foundation and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for a timely discussion (12 July - Washington, D.C.) on the Iraqi Sunni insurgency's media campaign with Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, followed by commentary from James K. Glassman and Jeffrey Gedmin. Schwartz Senior Fellow Peter Bergen will moderate the question and answer session.

Copies of the report, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas," will be available at the event.

Ultimately, Gershenfeld envisions not a roomful of equipment, but a single machine that might sit on your desktop and be able to "print" complex objects in 3D. But this is far down the road and far removed from our concerns here . . .

What does this have to do with counterinsurgency?

For now, consider the implications of the fact that a suite full of inexpensive machines -- say between $5,000 and $25,000 in cost -- can be used to fabricate just about anything, given a little training on the machines and a good bit of ingenuity.

Who might be able to use such a setup? Consider who is . . .

a) frequently called upon to create creative solutions to unusual problems?

b) frequently located in areas of the world far removed from regular resupply of just about everything?

c) often comprised of a number of natural tinkerers?

Perhaps now you can see where this is heading. Seems like any of the following might have good use for a "Fablab" as described by Gershenfeld:

-military engineers, such as Marine Combat Engineers or Navy Seabees

-Civil Affairs folks

-regular infantry and other combat units deployed to austere environments at the end of a long supply chain

-Special Operations Forces personnel who frequently have to fend for themselves in underdeveloped locales.

Consider the infantry example (the easiest one for me to imagine since it's what I do). What if, in addition to a company intelligence cell, made up of a handful of Marines whose primary or collateral duty is to spot enemy patterns and relationships, there was also a "Fixit" or "Fabrication" or "Manufacturing" cell at the company level, comprised of a handful of Marines who have a penchant for tinkering, building, fixing, etc., and outfitted with the equipment mentioned above. What sorts of things might it come up with? Here are some possibilities:

a) Mods to existing equipment: Ground combat types love to play with their gear and figure out new and better ways to make it do what it needs to, or to meet new requirements -- hold something else in a certain way, mount something here, fasten something there, and so forth. A "Fabrication Cell" could easily develop such solutions.

b) Stand-ins for the supply chain: I doubt that a Fabrication Cell would be able to recreate major end items from scratch, but its worth considering how they might be able to make the teeth less reliant upon the tail. End-using units could probably create a number of solutions for items that the supply chain either doesn't have or that take a very long time to arrive.

c) Reconstruction: One of the frequent complaints about reconstruction in Iraq is that the focus is on large-scale, big ticket items that take forever, have an astronomical cost, and have little immediate impact on the daily lives of most Iraqis. This is an area that begs for decentralization. A company-level Fabrication Cell would be well-positioned to repair or create a number of kinds of local infrastructure, whether power generators, wells, irrigation machines, milking devices, incubators, air conditioners, or other such items that help keep the populace happy and on our side, instead of the insurgents'.

d) Mission-specific products or solutions: In February, The Wall Street Journal carried the interesting story of the development of a portable fingerprint scanner for use by US troops in Iraq.

This is a story of can-do in a no-can-do world, a story of how a Marine officer in Iraq, a small network-design company in California, a nonprofit troop-support group, a blogger and other undeterrable folk designed a handheld insurgent-identification device, built it, shipped it and deployed it in Anbar province. They did this in 30 days, from Dec. 15 to Jan. 15. Compared to standard operating procedure for Iraq, this is a nanosecond.

Conclusion

This all might make for one of the stranger ideas to have been floated here on SWJ, but it seems like there's something there waiting to be exploited. My rifle platoon of reservists contains a mechanical engineering major, an electrical engineer, a number of welders, auto aficionados, and construction experts. Seems we're only a step or two away from having an in-house Fabrication Cell already . . .

Captain Manchester serves with 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines.

Fatah is now like 'Sarge' in the Beetle Bailey cartoon. It has gone over the brink and is holding onto a tree on the side of the cliff. The Americans and Israelis have offered Fatah a rope. The question is both whether the Fatah leadership will grab it and whether the Americans and Israelis will know how to handle the lifeline. None of this is a given. This is, at best, a tenuous situation. It might lead to a happy ending, or it might be a debacle. Everything depends on how Fatah handles Israeli and American support, and how they handle Hamas.

First, Fatah has to commit to real reform and transparency. Its own people and its allies have every right to demand it. There should be a rigorous World Bank audit of how every dollar in aid is spent. Hamas did not win the last election because of its stand toward Israel; it won it by providing the only responsive social services in the Palestinian territories. Fatah must work with non governmental relief agencies to create a truly responsive social service network that will be prepared to create a climate of confidence in the West Bank and prepare the political battlespace before Fatah counterattacks militarily in Gaza. Once Fatah regains military control, it must be prepared to win the battle for the hearts and minds of Gaza's population. If they cannot do that, no amount of military force is relevant.

From an American and Israeli perspective, we must keep our fingerprints off the direct planning for the Gaza counteroffensive, which will take at least a year to prepare. We should finance the Jordanians, Egyptians, and Sunni Gulf states to provide training, advisors, and equipment to the abysmal Fatah security forces. All of those nations have a vested interest in eliminating the unholy alliance between Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian Quds organization. However, direct American or Israeli involvement in the conflict would likely be the kiss of death for Fatah.

It will likely take at least a year for Fatah to be ready to launch a counter-attack in Gaza. The Fatah security forces must be instilled with pride, training and discipline to match Hamas. They need to gain confidence in their reformed political leadership; if Fatah can reform, and that is a big if, the Israelis have to accept the fact that, to win in a stand up fight, Fatah will need a reasonable amount of tanks and some attack helicopters. The quantity of such weapons needed to retake Gaza would never pose even a minimal threat to Israel, but the thought of such weapons in the hands of any Palestinians in any amount has long been anathema to the Israelis.

The is won't happen overnight, and that is not necessarily a bad thing The best way to prepare the battlefield for the return of Fatah is for the secular and relatively sophisticated Gaza Palestinians to live under the fundamentalist yoke of Hamas for a while under continued western sanctions. Let's see how they vote in eighteen months.

The Hamas victory in Gaza was not necessarily a bad thing. The Palestinians have long needed a dash of cold water. Their great weakness is that the Palestinians have always found others to blame. To be sure, they will still try to do so. Until they realize that their future is in their own hands, they will never be a viable society.

We should encourage our Arab allies to train the Palestinians differently than we have done with the Iraqis. We have tried to build the Iraqi Army in our image. This is alien to Arab soldiers who have a much different view of male bonding and unit cohesion. Our Arab friends should be encouraged to give the Palestinians basic weapons familiarization and small unit skills training as well as building clearing drills. However, they should pick the best and brightest of the students and make them small unit officers and NCOS. At that point, they should allow the students to work out their own tactics. They know how Hamas fights. Ironically, this is how the Israelis built their nascent army in the 1940's.

If we Americans can indirectly help our Arab allies solve this situation it could prove to be a model for how we handle such challenges in the future.

Gary Anderson was a UN Observer in Lebanon and Gaza and has traveled extensively in the region. He has also served as a counterinsurgency advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

This piece of pseudo-history below bounces around the internet every year about

this time. Like most things of its ilk, it probably has a few errors, and its author

is writing to reinforce a point with succinct and selective facts. But darn if it

doesn't strike a nerve.

As we in the U.S. chill our lite beer (ughh!) and refill

the propane tanks to burn plenty of meat for the 4th, let's not forget the stories

and sacrifices of the many proud Iraqis and Afghanis who are out there trying to

do the right thing, whether it be for their country or just for their family. Their

history, when it is finally written, looks like it will be on par with this list,

at least in terms of blood. Unfortunately, the outcome is still very much in question.

Perhaps they have underwhelmed us with a lack of 56 such bold and audacious men,

who have had all they can stands, can't stands no more, and stepped off in unison

with a flourish just begging for a remake starring Mel Gibson and Harrison Ford.

But, hey, this thing started on our schedule, not theirs. And our sterile expectations

and remote perceptions are not their ugly reality.

I, for one, shall raise at least one frothy cup on this holiday to the many patriots out there. May their journey eventually be as successful as ours was. I wish our helping them get it started had been more helpful.

----------------------------

Why we celebrate the 4th of July

Have you ever wondered what happened to the 56 men who signed the Declaration

of Independence?

• Five were captured by the British as traitors, and tortured before they

  died.

• Twelve had their homes ransacked and burned.
• Two lost their sons serving in the Revolutionary Army; another had two sons

  captured.

• Nine of the 56 fought and died from wounds or hardships of the Revolutionary

  War.

They signed and they pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.

What kind of men were they?

• Twenty-four were lawyers and jurists. Eleven were merchants, nine were farmers

  and large plantation owners: men of means, well educated. But they signed the

  Declaration of Independence knowing full well that the penalty would be death

  if they were captured.

• Carter Braxton of Virginia, a wealthy planter and trader saw his ships swept

  from the seas by the British Navy. He sold his home and properties to pay his

  debts and died in rags.

• Thomas McKeam was so hounded by the British that he was forced to move his

  family almost constantly. He served in the Congress without pay, and his family

  was kept in hiding. His possessions were taken from him, and poverty was his

  reward.

• Vandals or soldiers looted the properties of Dillery Hall, Clymer, Walton,

  Gwinett, Heyward, Ruttledge, and Middleton. At the battle of Yorktown, Thomas

  Nelson, Jr. noted that the British General Cornwallis had taken over the Nelson

  home for his headquarters. He quietly urged General George Washington to open

  fire. The home was destroyed, and Nelson died bankrupt.

• Francis Lewis had his home and properties destroyed. The enemy jailed his

  wife, and she died within a few months. John Hart was driven from his wife's

  bedside as she was dying. Their 13 children fled for their lives. His fields

  and his gristmill were laid to waste. For more than a year he lived in forests

  and caves, returning to find his wife dead and his children vanished. A few

  weeks later he died from exhaustion and a broken heart. Norris and Livingston

  suffered similar fates.

Such were the stories and sacrifices of the American Revolution. These were not

wild-eyed, rabble-rousing ruffians. They were soft-spoken men of means and education.

They had security, but they valued liberty more. Standing tall and straight, and

unwavering, they pledged: "For the support of the declaration, with firm reliance

on the protection of the divine providence, we mutually pledge to each other, our

lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor."

They gave you and me a free and independent America. The history books told you

a lot of what happened in the Revolutionary War. We didn't fight just the British.

We were British subjects at that time and we fought our own government!

Some of us take these liberties so much for granted, but we shouldn't. So take

a few minutes while enjoying your 4th of July holiday and silently thank these patriots.

It's not much to ask for the price they paid.

Remember: Freedom is never free! I hope you show your support by sharing this

with as many people as you can. It's time we get the word out that Patriotism is

NOT a sin, and the Fourth of July has more to it than beer, picnics, and baseball

games.

~Author Unknown~

Edited to add: Read more about this bit of internet fluff, also circulated under the title The Price They Paid, on the Urban Legends Reference Pages.