During a recent e-mail discussion concerning Iraq's tribal society William (Mac) McCallister provided several insights as well as a briefing presentation on his methodology for tribal structure analysis and a reading list for executing counterinsurgency in a tribal society. The reading list follows his e-mail.

I have been studying and working with various tribes in Iraq for the last four years plus and am currently serving as the "tribal" advisor for II MEF in Anbar. Concerning recent commentary on US forces as a "tribe" - it is old news as far as I am concerned.

We are and have been a major if not the major "tribe" for the last four years. Paul Bremer, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, was referred to by Iraqi Sheikhs seeking an audience to pledge their loyalty and seeking patronage as the "Sheikh of Sheikhs" when they came to the palace in search of a meeting. I personally participated in coordinating a meeting with 400 Sheikhs and CPA officials for a traditional "tribal meeting" in Hillah four years ago.

We are engaged in a counterinsurgency in a tribal society. It has taken us four years to realize that we must execute operations within the existing cultural frame of reference. To quote T.E. Lawrence - Irregular warfare is more intellectual than a bayonet charge.

I've attached a reading list for executing counterinsurgency in a tribal society. Also attached is a PowerPoint brief that describes a methodology I developed on structure analysis to assist in gaining an appreciation for the operational environment.

The methodology is now in use in Anbar province and in the process of being "socialized" among the incoming MEF staff and commanders scheduled to replace the units currently serving in Anbar.

Reading List for Counterinsurgency in a Tribal Society

Researched and Compiled by William S. McCallister

Background

The design and execution of a counterinsurgency campaign in tribal society must reflect the opponent's cultural realities, his social norms and conventions of war and peacemaking. The fight in Anbar province is a "clash of martial cultures" and reflects two divergent concepts of victory and defeat and "rules of play". The conventions of war and peace for both sides are based on unique historical and social experience and are expressed in each side's stylized way of fighting and peacemaking. The central tenet in the design and execution of counterinsurgency operations is that it must take into consideration an opponent's cultural realities so as to effectively communicate intent.

The study of the "tribal terrain" is a challenge. The reason - comprehensive research materials on Iraqi tribal organization, tribal diplomacy, and the art of tribal war and peacemaking are sparse. The majority of reading materials therefore are general and regional in nature and require "reading between the lines" to gain an appreciation for tribal organizing principles, cultural operating codes, and the tribal art of war and peace. The material is intended to assist the student of the tribal art of war and peace in developing an analytic structure for assessing personal experiences, observations and unit after action reports. The ultimate objective is to assist the warfighter in assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and cultural criteria to determine why certain approaches succeed or fail.

The reading list is organized into four major sections - Psychological Dimensions and Human Factors, Tribal Dynamics, the Arab Art of War, and Additional Readings.

Psychological Dimensions/Human Factors

Books

The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements by Eric Hoffer.

This book deals with some peculiarities common to all mass movements, be they religious movements, social revolutions or nationalist movements. Highlights certain essential characteristics which give all movements a family likeness.

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies by Special Operations Research Office of the American University.

This book contains a detailed description of the organization and operations of underground movements with special attention to human motivation and behavior, the relation between the organizational structure of the underground, and the total insurgent movement.

The Multiple Identities of the Middle East by Bernard Lewis.

This book deals with the critical role of identity in the domestic, regional, and international tensions and conflicts of the Middle East today. It examines religion, race, and language, country, nation and state and shows how imported Western ideas such as liberalism, fascism, socialism, patriotism and nationalism influenced Middle Easterner's ancient notions of community, self-perceptions and aspirations.

Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq by Hanan Makiya.

This book describes how Saddam Hussein's "Ba'athist" Iraq was established, ruled and maintained by fear. The Ba'athist developed the politics of fear into an art form, one that ultimately served the purpose of legitimizing their rule by making large numbers of people complicit in the violence of the regime. The Iraqi Ba'athists were a wholly indigenous phenomenon, and the longevity of their rule can be understood only against the background of public acquiescence or acceptance of their authority. This book gives the reader an appreciation for the "ideology of violence" inherent in the numerous anti-Iraqi forces such as the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade and Iraqi insurgent groups affiliated with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ).

Articles

A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere.

The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy by Dr. Douglas J. Macdonald.

Martyrdom Operations and Their Apocalyptic Imagery by Professor Charles Strozier and Fabienne A. Laughlin.

Tribal Dynamics

This section focuses on Iraqi tribalism, such as tribal organizing principles and the dynamics that coordinate and regulate the behavior of intra- and inter-tribal and state relations. The readings are intended to introduce and facilitate further study of the complex relationship between tribes and the central government. This section is divided into seven sub-sections; tribal organization (principles and cultural operating codes), concepts of shame and honor, tribal warfare (causes of and how the tribe organizes for war), Islamic rulings in warfare which form the basis for the conventions of tribal war, concepts of truce in Islamic sources, tribal diplomacy and patronage.

1. Tribal Organization

Books

Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod.

This book is a compilation of papers presented at the 1999 ICF sponsored "Tribes and Power" seminar conducted at the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, London University. The reader will gain an appreciation for the "tribal factor" which has not only been strengthened but has become decisively manifest in Iraq. Saddam Hussein reinstated an already active tribal value system and their tribal networks in mobilizing allegiances and in an attempt to restructure modern political social institutions. Tribal networks have not only endured but have taken new and varied forms.

The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Sa'id bin Taymur, 1932-1970 by Uzi Rabi.

The author presents a historically detailed but theoretically nuanced study of the evolution of Oman under the leadership of Sa'id bin Taymur. The book details the creation of a Unified Tribal State, an administration that unified Oman while negotiating with powerful tribal forces within Omani society. This book provides the reader with a theoretical framework to structure U.S. military -- tribal relationships in Iraq.

Power Point Presentation

Tribal Analysis Strategy, Iraq by William S. McCallister.

2. Concepts of Shame and Honor

Books

Honor: A History by James Bowman.

Research draws from a wealth of sources across many centuries to illuminate honor's curious history in Western culture. The author stresses that Western concepts of honor are different from that found elsewhere in the world.

Acquaintance with our own culture of honor is indispensable for understanding the tribal honor/shame culture of the Islamic world.

3. Tribal Warfare

Articles

Declaration of Tribal War by the Southern Confederation of Tribes.

The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion by William S. McCallister.

Victory in Iraq, One Tribe at a Time by Amatzia Baram.

The Role of Tribes at the Council on Foreign Relations website.

Strategic Implications of Communal Warfare in Iraq by W. Andrew Terril.

4. Islamic Rulings on Warfare

Articles

Islamic Rulings on Warfare by Youssef H. Aboul-Enein Sherifa Zuhur.

Just War: An Islamic Perspective by Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini.

Islam and the Theology of Power by Khaled Abou El Fadl.

5. Concept of Truce in Islamic Sources

Articles

"The Concept of Hudna (Truce) in Islamic Sources" by Dr. Mustafa Abu Sway (Preliminary Article).

Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspective by George E. Irani and Nathan C. Funk.

6. Tribal Diplomacy

Books

The Political Language of Islam by Bernard Lewis.

This book traces the development of Islamic political language from the time of the Prophet to the present and highlights the difference between Western political thinking and theory and clarifies the perception, on-going discussion, and practice of politics in the Islamic world.

Articles

The Code of Hammurabi translated by L.W. King.

Babylonian Law--The Code of Hammurabi by Claude Hermann Walter Johns.

Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East by George E. Irani.

Negotiating in the Bazaar by Moshe Sharon

Islamic Army in Iraq Pursues Strategy of Negotiation and Violence by Lydia Khalil.

Distrust Breaks the Bonds of a Baghdad Neighborhood in Mixed Area, Violence Defies Peace Efforts by Sudarsan Raghavan.

Important Islamic Terms, Concepts and Definitions at the Living Islam website.

7. Patronage

Articles

Hereditary Republics in Arab States by Brian Whitaker.

Legal and Judicial Reform in the Arab World: A Primer by Sharif Ali Zu'bi and Zeid D. Hanania.

The Arab Art of War

Arab insurgency history and theory draws on its own unique dynamic and historical experiences. An appreciation for our opponent's cultural perspective on insurgency warfare is key in tailoring our own counterinsurgency campaign. Three Arab insurgency models are of particular interest: Algeria, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Intifada. The inclusion of the "Battles of Islam" during the time of the Prophet Muhammad in this section is intended to give the reader an appreciation for the tribal warfare "ideal" and similarities to classical insurgency concepts. Also included in this section is the work of Sayyid Qutb, regarded as the architect and strategist in the development of modern Jihadi Salafi ideology. He has been cited as the figure that has most influenced the al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.

Books

The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict by Dilip Hiro.

This book details the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict; the longest conventional war in the 20th century. The Iran-Iraq conflict was rooted in the competition and rivalry between Iran and Iraq going back to the days of the Ottoman Turkish empire (1517-1918) and the Persian empire under the Safavids (1501-1722). This book gives the reader a historical appreciation of present-day Iraqi politics and Iranian intervention in Iraq. The nature of this competition and rivalry remains unaltered, only the context in which it occurs has changed.

Milestones by Sayyid Qutb.

In true Salafi style, Qutb re-analyzed the Quran to draw inspiration for present day Jihadi Salafi ideology. He studied the methods the Prophet Muhammad and his jamaat (movement) used to realize their own jahili society. Sayyid Qutb believed that God had revealed his plan to Muhammad in a specific sequence (hence 'Milestones' or 'Signposts' on the Road), which the contemporary jamaat needs to follow if it is to restore the Muslim world to its past glory.

Articles

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria by Constantin Melnik (April 23, 1964).

Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency by Roger Trinquier.

Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A "Thorn in the Neck" of the United States? by Emily Hunt.

The "Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa" article introduces the Algeria based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)". The GSPC is a radical Algerian network, allied with al-Qaeda. Although relatively unknown in the United States, the GSPC represents one of the top terrorist threats in the northwestern corridor of Africa with connections in Europe, as well as aspiring militant groups in the United States.

Hezbollah (Power Point Presentation) by Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.).

Hezbollah by Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S).

Hezbollah Command Leadership: It's Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions by Magnus Ranstorp.

An understanding of Hezbollah's structure provides a greater insight into the organization, function and roles of the Organization of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) and its military wing Jaysh al-Mahdi and its links to Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America by Douglas Farah.

The Palestinian Intifada: An Effective Strategy? by James F. Miskel.

Hamas and Hezbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective by Dr. Ian F.W. Beckett.

Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency by Dr. Max G. Manwaring

The Battles of Islam at the Official Classical Islam website.

Inclusion of this website is intended to promote the study of warfighting and diplomacy during Islam's formative years, as well as to encourage discussion as to the Prophet Muhammad's exploitation of insurgency tenets in Islam's ascendancy and defeat of larger, more powerful tribal confederations. Present day Salafist operations in Iraq and around the globe parallel Muhammad's strategy of conquest. A closer study of Osama Bin Laden's strategy and operations of al-Qaeda point to similarities with the Prophet Muhammad's exploitation of classical insurgency concepts. An appreciation for the linkages over time provides insight into the strategic blueprint, ideational foundations, policy choices, and tactics, techniques and procedures of the Salafist "Islamic State of Iraq".

Additional Readings

Tribal power is inversely related to the strength of the central government. When the central government is strong, tribal power is diminished. The core competencies of a functioning state are its military, police, civil service and judicial system. In a tribal society, when the central government is weak or non-existent and unable to fulfill its responsibilities, the tribal system will assume this function. The following articles are provided to assess the ability of local government to realize its core competencies and to monitor the strength of tribal power.

Articles

State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model by Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink.

Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators by Robert I. Rotberg.

War Making and State Making as Organized Crime by Charles Tilly.

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William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. While on active duty, Mr. McCallister served in numerous special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He is a published author in military affairs and tribal warfare and has guest lectured at Johns Hopkins University and presented numerous papers at academic and government sponsored conferences such as the Watson Institute, Brown University; Department of the Navy Science and Technology and DARPA; and the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also appeared as a guest on National Public Radio (NPR). Mr. McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International (AKI) in Iraq. He continues to study current events in Iraq in tribal terms, including the tribal art of war and peace, tribal mediation processes, development of tribal centers of power, and tribal influence in political developments. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing Iraqi reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terror.

In September of 2003 I went into Baghdad's Sadr City Ali Baba market (now called al-Nidawi market) for my first illicit black-market arms purchase. Early on outfitting Iraqi soldiers and bodyguards required use of all resources ... including the street markets. Every one of my men had their own Kalashnikov, commandeered from Police stations, army barracks or Ba'ath party offices but the ability to sustain them with ammunition, working sidearms, high capacity ammunition magazines and light machineguns was beyond anyone's capability except for the local black market.

Prior to the invasion, hundreds of thousands of weapons were widely distributed for use by the 400,000 man Iraqi armed forces, regime security forces and Al Quds civilian defense force. The security forces and intelligence agencies created thousands of caches of weapons for the follow-on insurgency. Most caches included several artillery shells, dozens of mortar shells, rocket launchers, automatic rifles, and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Weapons of all types imaginable from the Makarov pistol to the SA-16 Man portable Air Defense Missile System (MANPADS) were cached. They are still discovered daily. In the chaos of the victory of coalition forces over the Iraqi army the population stripped the Iraqi government of well over a million, automatic rifles, light machineguns and heavy crew served weapons.

Another contributing factor in the proliferation of small arms was the release of all criminals by both Saddam Hussein and coalition forces. Over 100,000 dangerous criminals were set free and consequently home invasion and revenge murders became rampant. The AK-47 became the must have tool critical for personal defense of the home. Early in April 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued CPA Order Number Three, which allowed every family to be in possession of one rifle, shotgun or pistol including Kalashnikov automatic rifles for self-defense of the home. This was accomplished easily: Many had taken the opportunity to steal the hundreds of thousands of weapons. Others paid approximately $50 dollars for a Kalashnikov and a magazine of ammunition.

When I first investigated the Iraqi arms black market, it became instantly clear that the population would become a source of logistical support for the fledgling Iraqi insurgency. The quantity of weapons and ammunition in the public realm was staggering. One buying expedition for empty magazines resulted in offers of over 20 RPG-7 rocket launchers and dozens of explosive rounds, two SA-7 MANPADs with batteries, dozens of mortar rounds and a cache of over 20,000 rounds of 14.5mm heavy machinegun ammunition. If you were a serious cash player, with no visible ties to the coalition (most sellers thought I was a Sudanese insurgent), almost anything could be delivered in the span of two cups of tea or approx 15 minutes.

The logistical pipeline of the insurgency at that time was sustained by supplementing cached and stolen arms with purchases from the small arms black market. In fact, the sales of weapons on the black market was so prevalent that the coalition authorized the shooting of illicit arms dealers, the most notable being the deaths of two open-air arms dealers by US Army snipers in Tikrit. At that time coalition forces had lost 91 soldiers to the insurgency. Unlike the rebellion in 1920 under the British that sputtered due to a lack of guns and ammunition, a top concern of CJTF-7 was that the black market of looted arms would sustain the intensity and duration of this insurgency.

Unfortunately, the black market still thrives and the selling and reselling of weapons continues unabated. The US government supplied the Iraqi army 380,000 rifles and pistols that it did not initially register or control. The US Army inspector general reported over 4% (14,000) of the Glock-17 pistols for the police were stolen between delivery to the Iraqi police and issue to officers. As one Iraqi policeman told Reuters "I sold my Glock pistol and my bullet-proof vest for $1,500 so that I can feed my family until I find a safer job. They were mine to sell, after all I had risked my life and faced death."

The 2006 destruction of the Shiite Golden Mosque in Samarrah led to an explosion in arms purchases for home and community defense in both the Sunni and Shiite regions of the country. The Geneva-based Small Arms Survey reported that in 2007 the price of a Kalashnikov rose to between $210 and $800 depending on the location and one's faith. Prices of Kalashnikov bullets rose to nearly $1 per round. Glock 17 or Walther P99 handguns stolen from the police and army rose to nearly $2,000. RPG-7 launchers were sold to militiamen at four times the previous street price. The SVD Sniper rifle, which could have been brought for $300 early in the insurgency now stands at $1,800.

Weapons have an inherent cultural and personal value, not just for community defense. The rifle is a cherished cultural feature for many tribes and peoples, such as in Yemen, Somalia and even America. In some cultures, it is a symbol of power and manhood, in others it is a sign of community status. In Middle Eastern cultures it is auspicious and a sign of wealth to fire of hundreds of rounds during wedding celebrations. There will always be rifles in the Iraqi home. However, many Iraqis retain numerous hidden weapons and explosives that, like the gold or jewelry they hide in their walls, are insurance to be converted into cash. The focus should be to ensure these weapons are not sold to the insurgents or to dealers who will supply the insurgents. The intent of any program enacted by the coalition should not be to remove all weapons from the community but to remove the large excess military hardware that could be sold in difficult times to anti-Iraqi forces. Our search and seize tactics are highly unpopular and alienate many we are trying to influence Perhaps there is a better way.

Incentivize the Community to Starve the Insurgency

In October 2003 I proposed a program called the Community De-weaponization Initiative (CDI) to Ambassador L. Paul Bremer via USAID as community revitalization and security program. The CDI's goal was as simple as it was revolutionary-- take cash and leverage the economic power of the United States to buy out the insurgency's street-based logistic capacity, starving the internal resupply structure of the insurgency. This in turn would curtail or limit the amount of attacks on the Iraqi population and coalition forces in the field. The program was dismissed because the initial $50 million dollars requested was believed to be far too excessive.

This program was recently brought back up for discussion after an incident where my Iraqi staff negotiated the release of three kidnapped Turkish engineers in Kirkuk. The kidnappers were a cell associated with the foreign terrorist group the Islamic State of Iraq but during negotiations had complained that they not been paid in months. Demanding $150,000 US dollars the cell leader, a Jordanian, stated in frustration "We want to take the money and go home."

However the CDI is not principally oriented to the religiously motivated terrorist or insurgent. Ideologically motivated insurgents, including those of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al Islam and the Islamic Army of Iraq are the least susceptible to financial inducements. The CDI is oriented to disrupting the IED and ambush social networks by micro targeting three other categories of individuals who actively or passively support the insurgency.

These groups include financially motivated insurgents who plant and detonate IEDs or sell weapons to support their families. The next targeted group is the immediate family members who support the insurgents or militiamen out of economic and financial frustration. Finally, it targets the greater community social support network by showing that the sale of military grade weapons and explosives in exchange for cash could bring needed infusion of social welfare in some desperate communities. Cash to tribal leaders in direct exchange for weapons or IEDs, done through the CDI, could bring big material benefits including community diesel generators, ability to purchase fuel oil or assist families with cash that wish to leave the insurgency or who are displaced.

This option of allowing people to sell extra weapons, secretly point out 'an object on the street', or sell a mortar base-plate in the backyard allows them to maintain a veneer of respectability because they did not sell out the insurgency directly.

Providing financial compensation in exchange for removing the logistical base of the insurgents is far less odious than offering a direct bribe. A man that can make a large lump sum quantity of money turning over his IED trigger, selling out his artillery shells in the garden, dropping off two or three MANPADs at a CDI disposal facility or pointing out to an NGO investigator the mortar arms cache in the date grove is one less player that the coalition has to capture or kill. However, the CDI gives him an opportunity to do it on his terms at a time of his choosing and under anonymity of a civilian disarmament program run by NGOs and not the US Army.

The risk of CDI money flowing back to the insurgency is minimal. With the current economic situation in Iraq few former insurgents, or their wives, will turn any money back over to the Jihad or go out and buy weapons at a higher price from a skyrocketing market controlled by the coalition.

Though controversial, I believe that the real center of gravity for the financially motivated insurgents that dominates many of the Shiite militias and armed Sunni groups is the immediate family. Iraqis, like all of us, cherish their family -- particularly their children and they have a ferverent desire to ensure their children study and live in a level of minimal comfort at least equal to that before the invasion. That comfort generally means food, electricity and air conditioning particularly in summer. This actual lack of minimal living standards has been complaint number one in all regions of Iraq. The loss of that level of family comfort, coupled with the loss of security after the fall of Hussein led to many to support the insurgents.

From the day this proposal was first offered, the coalition has lost nearly 3,600 additional soldiers. The material and equipment losses are equally staggering. Had this program been implemented at the time and "budgetary concerns" not been an overriding issue, the program could have been effected for a fraction of what has been spent fighting the war. Additionally, the economic benefits may be an inducement to bring the Sunni community into greater and less temporary alignment with the central government.

You Have Weapons? We have Cash!

The original CDI proposed requested $50 million dollars to purchase all manners of weapons -- from rifles to grenades to IEDs. Any weapons that could be sold to the insurgency would be bought out by the program at prices that would be irresistible to the community and eventually, to the holders of insurgent weapons caches.

This program was radically different from the small scale rifle and MANPAD buy back programs Commander, Joint task Force Seven (CJTF-7) and Multi-national Force -- Iraq conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2005.

Again the intent of the CDI is to buy out the entire insurgency supply base, not just police up a few hundred pieces. It is designed to puts large quantities of money in the hands of any potential insurgent supplier and to get the insurgents themselves to turn-in or steal the caches, IEDs or weapons under their control. They would then exchange them for cash. At that point they would take the cash given to them, amounts of which could be substantial, and leave the insurgency altogether.

Weapons would be purchased at prices that no insurgent force or arms dealers could control or resist. If an extra Kalashnikov was purchased at the 2003 street price of $125 (it has now increased to an average $400 as of January 2007). The CDI would pay three times the market price or more per weapon depending on the item in question. Had MANPADs been bought back for the street price terrorists are —to pay ($15,000-20,000) instead of the $500 offered by CJTF-7 three years ago more than the 400 they purchased would have been recovered. According to the Washington Post that program left unaccounted over 4,000 missiles.

Attempts to artificially raise the price of weapons (by wholesalers hording large quantities of weapons) can easily be foiled with targeted raids and those resellers taken off the market. Prices would be matched to the point where the insurgents and criminals could no longer afford to buy weapons as the CDI would always pay a better price. The Iraqi community would quickly see it would be better to sell to the CDI rather than an intermediary or insurgent, take the cash from extra weapons, explosives or known arms caches of insurgents and buy him or herself a better life.

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Willingness to participate was so anticipated at the time of the proposal to the CPA that just the rumor of a start date created a round of arms hording amongst families and tribes in Basrah.

The Current Price is Unacceptable

The average cost to coalition forces daily is the lives of two soldiers and several vehicles. To me the losses of these soldiers is priceless. However, the combined costs in SGLI insurance payouts, a wounded warrior's rehabilitation, and the repair and replacement costs of just one Humvee and crew would again be a fraction of just paying a Sadrist cash not to lay his Explosively Formed Penetrator; or paying a religious extremist to drop off his car bomb in a remote field or paying an IED triggerman $2,000 cash to pre-detonate an freshly laid IED and call it a 'miss.'

Overtime, the trust built on money could yield new intelligence assets who would turn over entire IED/SVBIED networks for cash --particularly if they send their family abroad. However, 'show me the money' will always be a principal demand. That money must be given freely in direct exchange for a weapon -- no questions asked.

At the time of this writing the US has spent almost $350 billion dollars fighting the Iraq insurgency man for man, bullet for bullet. Considering that the coalition spends $177 million per day on Iraq, channeling a small portion of those funds into buying out the insurgents and his logistical pipeline could be the key to breaking their ability to execute well supplied operations in the future.

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Accompanying PPT: Community De-Weaponization Program

Discuss at Small Wars Council

4GW as a Model of Future Conflict

Boyd 2007 Conference, 13 July 2007

Warfare Since Boyd Panel Presentation

F. G. Hoffman

I have been asked to be the token diversity candidate from outside the 4GW "church" today, and am honored just by the chance to appear at an event that preserves John Boyd's deep intellectual contributions, and to be on stage with my fellow panelists and Col Eric Walters. My assigned task is to explain why academics and historians have problems with the 4GW construct. My remarks will draw up upon my work on an alternative concept called Hybrid Warfare which I have presented at Oxford University this past winter. My comments will also draw upon unpublished work about to be released in a book titled Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, edited by Dr. Terry Terriff, of University of Birmingham (UK) and Aaron Karp and Dr. Regina Karp of Old Dominion University, in which several of our distinguished speakers have prominent contributions including Mr. Lind and Col Hammes.

Let me begin by summarizing the arguments up front. The 4GW construct is often criticized for three major faults.

The theory is described as "weak" and the concept is too diffused, having become over time the equivalent of everything that is asymmetric.

Second the history that is drawn upon is uneven and often "too selective," that is it is packaged to support a major component of the theory without full examination of trends or detailed counter-findings.

Finally, the generational framework is labeled "indefensible" and unnecessary. In my own assessment, I find that it hides more than it reveals.

The events of 9/11 did more than collapse a pair of buildings, or punch a hole in the Pentagon. It punctuated the end of one era of war, and heralded the dawning of a new one. This new age was a surprise to some, but it was accurately forecasted in the prescient article penned by a collective of cutting edge thinkers in 1989. The new age presents policy makers and statesmen with its own method of conflict, a way of war that is extremely foreign to America's armed forces. This mode of war makes conventional thinkers highly uncomfortable and traditional military solutions unworkable.

This kind of war, as Mao suggested long ago, has several constituent components and overwhelming military power by itself is insufficient. Regardless of unfounded speculation in some corners, this does not eliminate the utility of the timeless Clausewitz or some 15 centuries of recorded military history before Westphalia. Quite the contrary, this current conception should cause us to reconsider our strategic complacency, and reassess today's security challenges.

More than a decade's worth of unipolar delusion and unilateral triumphialism went up in smoke on 9/11. European illusions fell later after the attacks in London, Madrid and Paris undercut the idea that savage violence was something in the Continent's collective past. American hubris about its invulnerability and the over-financed Pentagon were the principal victims of 9/11, reinforced by subsequent events in Iraq.

The 4GW school was the first to identify the roots and nature of this threat. The future portends an even more lethal strain of perturbation. Purportedly a dog's breakfast of ethnic, demographic, religious, and socio-economic trends could soon create what the CIA called a "perfect storm" of conflict. Iraq's insurgents and jihadist foreign fighters will benefit from their education in Iraq, and will soon return home or to alternative battlespaces with greater motivation, lethal skills and credibility. Their Darwinian evolution against America's vaunted military has refined their methods and emboldened their plans, while the clash within Islam continues unabated.

Fourth Generation Warfare

Almost immediately dismissed as "elegant irrelevance," it is now difficult to ignore 4GW. We may quibble with the accuracy or the necessity of the generational framework, or the selective historical foundation, but not with the need to comprehend and respond to today's most common mode of warfare. Colonel Hammes is correct that "this kind of warfare is not new or surprising" and in his description of irregular conflict as "evolving." But irregular warfare has a long history. Thus, it's hard to me to put away my tattered copy of Asprey's two volume history and pass over Pontius Pilate, Caesar, the Spanish Guerrillas or the long history of Irish insurgency. That is not to say that there is not anything new to today's conception or that the 4GW community was not a decade ahead of others.

One can also readily agree with Colonel Hammes that "there is nothing mysterious" about this form of warfare, that its non-traditional nature and emphasis on political will, amorphous structure, and mass mobilization techniques are well grounded in the annals of conflict. 1 Clearly, the notion that "superior political will when properly employed can defeat greater economic and military power" was not mysterious to the Founding Fathers. Why else might the Continental Congress have met and issued its famous promulgation in 1776. Certainly, this concept informed Washington's strategy. Just as clearly, protracted conflict, social and political networks, diasporas, and ideological fervor were not lost on Lawrence and his Bedouins or Michael Collins and his generation.

Whether this really is something entirely new, as Hammes and other advocates of New Wars suggest, is challengeable. 2 Serious scholars like Dr. Tony Echevarria have found the entire construct to be both "artificial and indefensible." 3 The generational construct is hard to buy into, it relies on what Sir Lawrence Freedman concludes is "selective history and poor theory." 4 The assertion that a form of war, "visible and distinctly different from the forms of war that preceded it" has emerged is a bit much. 5 Arguably, what has occurred is simply part of war's evolution, a shift in degree rather than kind abetted by new technologies and more importantly new or reemerging environmental or socio-political conditions. As Clausewitz noted, war is a true chameleon, with continuous adaptation in character in every age.

In fact, as Professor Colin Gray has noted, little in what is described as fundamentally different in the 4GW literature is inconsistent with a Clausewitzian understanding of war as a contest of human wills. The emphasis on impacting the political cohesion or will of one's opponents remains a fundamental aspect of Clausewitz's canon. Clausewitz described the totality of the enemy's capacity to resist as "two inseparable factors, ...the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will." 6

A number of historians have challenged the generational framework, and find that it overlooks several centuries of relevant conflict and the alternative possibility of seeing contemporary conflict within the realm of evolutionary change in irregular warfare that crosses through time. Academics like Sir Lawrence Freedman of Kings College find little to gain by accepting a generational construct, and much historical evidence overlooked. I have also mentioned a litany of case histories and individuals that do not fit nicely within the generational framework as defined, and thus my own assessment is again, that the concept of conflict defined with the 4GW theory may be valid but that the four generations do not help me understand it at all, and that the generations tend to hide more than they reveal. In order to respond to these comments, I recommend that the 4GW school defend itself by focusing and documenting what is believed to be enduring and to clearly depict what has changed.

However, the 4GW advocates did correctly capture the rise of nonstate actors, the confluence or blurring of civilian and military spheres, and salience of culture and popular will. They also predicted the intensity of this new form of conflict, or our vulnerability to this style. Overall, the theory of 4GW may be viewed as ineloquent in its historical foundation but its relevance is unquestionable. While the proponents have done an excellent job of laying out the nature of this challenge, few have attempted to detail of prescriptions (with exception of the gentleman on my right). 7

While historians may disagree with 4GW proponents regarding their grasp of history, the need for increased attention to the nontraditional components of what they describe as 4GW is incontrovertible. So too is the criticism that war is evolving in a manner inconsistent with the Pentagon's infatuation with Revolutions in Military Affairs and a Transformation agenda warps defense investments towards kinetic solutions. 8

What is not debatable is the intensity of this form of conflict, or the West's relative vulnerability or the fact that we have been very slow to address the implications of the increasingly blurred character of modern wars. We are slow to see that the most frequent form of war is now "amongst the people" and very slow in shaping our institutional tool set. It is not just that conventional warfare or interstate conflict is on the decline, there is a fusion of war forms emerging, one that blurs regular and irregular warfare, and terrorism, as well as subversion.

For a decade or more, most of us overlooked these trends. The American military has been focused on the wrong set of strategic drivers and indicators. In effect, they had misidentified the true Revolution in Military Affairs as Dr. Freedman has noted. Had the United States achieved the transformation agenda it put forward, I think it would have been at a substantial strategic disadvantage in the real world today. No doubt, its capacity to defend against ballistic missiles and to attack the space-based assets of a mythical peer competitor would be superb. Undoubtedly, the ability to dominate the electronic spectrum would be unsurpassed, and everything within a 200-mile square box would be detected by some ever present "unblinking eye" over the battlespace. The much cited "fog of war" would magically be blown away by America's information dominance, somehow resulting in a long Pax Americana. More probable, all of this would be utterly irrelevant to the problems at hand. Security officials at the Pentagon had badly misread what really constituted a threat to our national security interests, due to an enthusiastic embrace of an idealized and outdated versions of warfare. Advocates of 4GW, including the gentlemen on this stage, do not suffer from any embarrassment or lack of sleep in this regard.

What some of the critics of 4GW have overlooked is the critical importance of the cognitive and virtual dimension of today's conflicts. I expect several speakers to discuss this today. Now as we all know, T. E. Lawrence and the French expert Galula underscored this same issue in their seminal works. But the speed, frequency, and graphic imagery that is possible today with modern media is simply beyond their comprehension. It may still be beyond most of us. Recent scholarship by Dr. Audrey Cronin has persuasively compared the ongoing cyber-mobilization of Muslims around the world to the French Revolution and the levée en masse. This has profound implications for human conflict in this century as Dr. Cronin has perceptively warns "Western nations will persist in ignoring the fundamental changes in popular mobilization at their peril."

Today's 24/7 news cycles and graphic imagery produce even faster and higher response cycles from audiences around the globe and offer powerful new "weapons" to those who can master them.

Today, many small groups have mastered "armed theater" and promoted "propaganda of the deed" to arouse support and foment discord on a global scale. There is a plethora of outlets now in the Middle East and an exponentially growing number of websites and bloggers promoting a radical vision. These outlets constantly bombarded audiences with pictures, videos, DVDs, and sermons. Ironically, in Iraq and in the Long War we are facing a fundamentalist movement that is exploiting very modern and Western technologies to reestablish an anti-Western social and political system. The 4GW school, in its initial offering, identified the potential for this phenomena and the associated religious and cultural factors that might inspire it.

Conclusion

Call it what you may, 4GW or Complex Irregular or Hybrid Warfare, it presents a mode of conflict that severely challenges America's conventional military thinking. It targets the strategic cultural weaknesses of the American Way of Battle quite effectively. It's chief characteristic—blurring and convergence—occurs in several modes. In the blurring of combat and conflict, combatants and noncombatants, and the physical and the metaphysical. The convergence of various types of conflict will present us with a complex puzzle until the necessary adaptation occurs intellectually and institutionally. This form of conflict challenges cherished but false American conceptions about warfighting, and will continue to thwart the West's core interests and world order over the next generation.

Because of their perceived success, call them what you may, but 4GW challengers will not be a passing fad nor will they remain low tech killers. Our opponents eagerly learn and adapt rapidly to more efficient modes of killing. We can no longer overlook our own vulnerabilities as societies or underestimate the imaginations of our antagonists. In a world of 4 GW or Hybrid Wars, the price for complacency and inept strategy only grows steeper.

Endnotes

1. T. X. Hammes, "War Evolves Into the Fourth Generation," Contemporary Security Policy, August, 2005, pp. 189-192.

2. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge UK: Polity, 1999; Herfried Munkler, The New Wars, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005.

3. Antulia J. Echevarria, "Deconstructing 4GW," in Global Insurgency, Terry Terriff, Regina Karp and Aaron Karp, eds., Routledge, 2007, p. 237.

4. Lawrence Freedman, "A Comment on T.X. Hammes," Global Insurgency, p. 262.

5. T.X. Hammes, p. 192.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 77.

7. The exception being William Lind, et al, Draft FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War, Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, 2004.

8. See my "Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next RMA," Orbis, Summer 2006.

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Links

Boyd 2007 Conference Report - DNI Net

Boyd 2007 Conference (Part 1) - ZenPundit

Boyd 2007 Conference (Part 2) - Zenpundit

Boyd 2007 Conference Source Material - Shlok Vaidya

William Lind and John Norman - Dreaming 5GW

Boyd 2007 Conference Discussion at the Small Wars Council

I received the following memo by Colonel J. B. Burton (USA), Commanding Officer of Dagger Brigade Combat Team in Iraq, via "Warlord Loop" e-mail. An abbreviated version appeared in the Washington Post - see Tom Rick's Inbox dated 8 July 2007. COL Burton has been kind enough to permit the SWJ to post it in full. Where a military acronym is used I have inserted an explanation.

US Army Officer Retention

The main message from our junior officers is that their service is not about financial gain. These officers want the Army to invest in the human capital that they represent for the future via educational opportunities and duty assignments that reflect their real world experience and contributions to their Nation's security.

They want recognition for their performance and want a competitive OPMS (Officer Personnel Management System) that rewards top performers. They want challenging duty assignments and educational opportunities that allow them to invest in themselves while providing the time and stability to invest in their families. Educational opportunities are more important than bonus money as it invests in our military's human capital, while also giving officers a break to have a somewhat normal life.

Most of our single junior officers lack the opportunity to invest the time and effort in developing the relationships that eventually lead to marriage and the development of a family life, for the most part due to the Army's current OPTEMPO (Operational Tempo). The same is essentially true for married officers who want the chance to raise a family and be there as a parent for their children.

The Army should focus on educational opportunities and duty assignments that promise at least 2-3 year breaks from the deployment cycle. Officers will accept any bonus if offered, but only after they have already made the decision to stay with the Army. If we are convinced that money is the answer to retaining those that have decided to depart the ranks, then we should up the ante to the $50k(+) level to gain their attention.

Discussion Points and Quotes from Captains

For officers that were already planning to stay in the Army, they support this new bonus of "free money." In effect, "it's $20k for doing what they were going to do anyway." At this time, we should keep at least the $20k bonus in effect now that it has been announced, or we may unintentionally discourage those who were already staying in the Army.

$20k though is not enough in itself to sway the others to remain in uniform as they feel they have served their country and fulfilled the commitment in their initial contract. They have nothing to be ashamed of after serving 2-3 combat tours for their nation, and they want to get on with their lives. "They have seen the realities of war while commanding a platoon in combat. Most are not phased by the offer of $20k, which to them is a small sum of money. It computes to only half the cost of a cool car or 4 months' base pay."

Having been deployed, these young men and women have been able to save thousands of dollars unlike their civilian peers. They indicate that something in the realm of $50k would likely be more enticing; especially to those few married officers with children. Of note, these officers see troopers re-enlisting all the time for $19-23k (a full year's base pay for an E-3), with duty station of choice. These officers aren't offered similar incentives, and they take note.

The population that is targeted has seen at least two deployments (usually in the same unit), no CCC (Captains Career course) and they feel they are no longer competitive due to the Army's maintenance of an outdated 20-year career model.

These officers do not look forward to the prospect of "another 10 years of back-to-back deployments with little-to-no time to build families or pursue self-development."

The lack of anything coming from HRC (Human Resources Command) with regard to assignment of choice, graduate school, etc. discourages the targeted populations as this reeks of empty promises. "How could HRC announce an incentive program but leave out all the pertinent details for implementation?"

When HRC decided to make filling MiTTs (Military Transition Teams) a priority, they jeopardized the conventional Army and its officers. "To volunteer for a MiTT assignment, HRC guaranteed the officers their next follow-on assignment after deployment and / or post graduate opportunities. Thus, this preferential treatment has taken the lucrative duty assignments (ex. ROTC, Fort Meade, Fort Carson, etc.) away from those officers who were stop-lossed in a MTOE (Modification of Table of Organization and Equipment) unit and could not volunteer for a MiTT even though they may already possess the experience and capabilities to qualify for these assignments."

These officers want something that provides them with a break from the deployment cycle. A common response is "Send me to a place where I don't have to deploy again," "I would like a two year break prior to deploying again," and "If I go to the CCC, I'll only get sent to a MiTT."

Some of these officers view graduate school as a pre-requisite to a successful career given the recent push to use graduate school as an incentive for retention. "Why would the Army offer it as an incentive if it weren't important for advancement?"

However, instead of promoting graduate school as an incentive for officer competency, it was tagged with a 6-year ADSO (Active Duty Service Obligation) and therefore became a retention program.

Previously, Army funded degrees did not accompany these lofty ADSOs. Additionally, despite the advertisement of graduate school, many officers soon realize that their deployment timeline does not align with the start of these programs in the early fall of every year.

Bottom line is that the ADSO of 6 years is preventing junior officers from accepting these opportunities, feeling as if they are signing too much of their life and future over with no perceived benefit beyond completion of graduate school.

Potential Solutions

1. Mandatory Assignment Cycles. Institute A and B billet assignments similar to that of the USMC: For every 3 year operational assignment (A Billet), you are FORCED into a 2 - 3 year non-operational (B Billet) assignment (call it a mandatory warrior re-blue program) - Basic Training, Ranger Training Brigade, ROTC, USMA, BOLC (Basic Officer Leader Course), IOBC (Infantry Officer Basic Course), etc. This structure would do a few things:

i. Swells the ranks of the institutional army with combat proven veterans who can effectively educate the future combat leaders based on their personal experiences.

ii. Reduces the same people always fighting the same wars, ultimately increasing the number of combat proven veterans available to our Army and the Joint Force.

iii. Kills the fast-track operational junkies versus the slow-track TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) sloggers - everyone has to do institutional time and everyone has to do operational time - no shame in the institutional assignment, just another step along the career path that 'gives back' to both the Army and the Soldier.

iv. Gives exhausted veteran combat officers, and more importantly their families, a much-needed and deserved break to become close again and reconnect with children who don't know their parents.

v. Gives single officers a chance to explore for that significant other and start a family that just might produce a future generation of Soldiers and leaders because of the satisfying lifestyle that military service delivered.

vi. Gives those who did not qualify for a fellowship or scholarship for graduate school the opportunity to pursue education during their non-operational assignment.

vii. Open up billets to younger Officers; for instance, IOBC or BOLC's basic formation mentor is a CPT, but have combat proven lieutenants and former platoon leaders as squad mentors for every 6 officers.

Just an example: The Department of the Navy does this well - shore and sea duty; younger officers are exposed to a variety of billets at younger ages; makes the Marines and Navy very effective in DC for Title 10 responsibilities because most have worked around the beltway -- not that I ever want to be around that bullshit, but there are a lot of junior officers who are interested in being a place to best influence the decision-makers of our country, and they have the tactical, ground experience that may be able to aide in our country's strategic decisions.

2. Fellowships / Scholarships for our more junior ranks. Open scholarship opportunities for company grade officers returning from extended combat tours - Yale, Harvard, state schools, etc. Open these opportunities to any school for which they qualify instead of financial constraints, which dictate the schools they can attend. It is important to not forget about programs such as PGIP (Postgraduate Intelligence Program), JOCCP (Junior Officer Cryptological Career Program), and other specialized military training that offer education benefits. In today's Army, a number of professional development schools require arbitrary mandatory assignments and duty positions to have been completed prior to attendance. A large number of junior officers who have not completed command already meet the overall requirement of experience to attend these courses due to the OPTEMPO that they've been caught up in. We should not deny a junior officer the opportunity to attend specialized training, to include post graduate opportunities, simply because the officer has not completed company command or attended an ICCC (Infantry Captains Career Course). Reward performance and potential vs. sticking to traditional gate strategies for OPMS.

The Army should focus on a graduate school model that brings a 1-for-1 return. Namely, for each year of graduate school that the Army pays for, the junior officer will receive a 1 year addition to their ADSO.

In addition to this method the Army should strive to assign junior officers to billets that allow them to utilize their new found education and professional development. This type method will likely result in voluntary extensions in the long run, making 6 year ADSO's for attendance to graduate school irrelevant.

Most desire a commitment to graduate education with a utilizing, follow-on assignment to capitalize on that education, while not placing their opportunities to command at higher ranks at undue risk (which is the current 20-year model).

3. Graduate school opportunities in conjunction with CCC attendance. An alternative to sending junior officers to civilian graduate school programs for extended periods of time would be to have each CCC establish agreements with civilian graduate school programs that offer CCC graduates the opportunity to receive graduate degree's at a reduced timeline due to course work completed during the CCC along with other previously completed Army professional schools. Allow junior officers to extend their time at the CCC to complete these programs IOT receive master's degrees.

4. Guaranteed company commands. Regardless of ICCC scheduling and attendance, plug these warriors in for commands. Most of them really want to command Soldiers now; if it is not possible in the units where they were raised, then PCS (Permanent Change of Station) the officer to another unit with a vacancy - and advertise the vacancies on a website through AKO (Army Knowledge Online) or some well-known median. Otherwise, command is continually given based on YG (Year Group) instead of overall ability. Our talented officers leave the formation for civilian jobs where they believe merit supersedes longevity. This plan would utilize the OER (Officer Evaluation Report) system to the benefit of Soldiers and allow commanders to put their best Officers in critical positions.

5. Rotate operational units differently. Most officers and Soldiers would rather rotate to Iraq, then do a second rotation to Afghanistan, then a third tour back to Iraq - this shakes up the scenery, allows us to fight a different enemy in different terrain, and think through different problem sets. It also puts a new set of eyes on the trends and problems for each conflict - might skin the cat a different way!

6. Writing incentive bonus. Grant additional pay (on top of their monthly pay) for professional articles and publications into Infantry Journal or Armor Magazine which contribute to the greater body of tactical knowledge in the force; these Officers would write volumes. Chain of command reviews and fills out some form prior to sending to the publication. The publication has the final "say so" after an editor puts his/her eyes on it. After accepted, grant a little additional pay for the contributed piece. It encourages these officers to write about their lessons learned and experiences for the greater good of the Army and for historians.

7. Reward your top officers. Every year, officers receive OERs. In the last several years, we have watered down the importance of changing our format. Ultimately, the Army must recognize our top performers and award them with assignments that continue to provide personal satisfaction and career progression.

"The HRC system has become numb to individual performance and begun to see every officer as equal. However, time and again, our senior leaders can clearly recognize the emerging leaders from the average performer. A personalized system identifies those who must be rewarded and motivates others."

Failure to recognize our Army's top performers completely negates any merit system. The current OER system fails to motivate junior officers to work hard and excel. "As the memo already points out, HRC has ceased to look at us as individuals." "As long as I don't get a DUI or fornicate on the boss' desk, I will be promoted with my peers."

"Anyone who has any more time in grade than me will always outrank me regardless of performance, until the general officer level."

8. Commander's discretionary incentives. In order to positively effect the retention of superior junior officers within his formation, a brigade commander must be given the flexibility to pinpoint "incentive packages" to those who are most deserving and would benefit the Army greatest. A Brigade Commander with an allotment of incentives that include money, duty station of choice, specific jobs for non-combat arms officers (military intelligence, signal, etc), graduate school, language school. He can allocate these incentives how he sees fit in order to retain high quality officers. Each battalion commander would create an OML (Order of Merit List) from within his unit which allows the brigade commander to pinpoint and reward his top performers. Giving the brigade commander flexibility to tailor these incentives to the needs of his junior officers will reap greater rewards that a blanket nominal amount will fail to do.

9. Branch / career field / duty station of choice. Anything that provides these warriors some predictability in their lives should be entertained as options for retaining our Army's future leaders.

Summary

This is a very tough crowd of warriors. They have been ridden hard. Some have been involuntarily extended on their first duty assignment to their fourth year on active duty and are now serving on their 2nd or 3rd combat deployment. They see no end in sight, so our offerings should acknowledge this group specifically that has been caught up fully in the deployment cycle.

They joined willingly when the vast majority of their civilian peers did not. They are our Nation's modern "300" but they are also young men and women with personal goals, aspirations and desires. They see themselves destined to be at war for the rest of their careers, while their civilian peers are moving on with their lives.

They see that they represent a small portion of the Army's Officer Corps that has actually deployed to fight this war, and they are frustrated by the knowledge that the majority of their peers may not have deployed thus far. They have spent the past 4 years in a continuous cycle of fighting, training, deploying, fighting, etc. and they see no end in sight.

They have seen their closest friends killed and maimed leaving young spouses and children as widows and single parent kids.

They want time for themselves and time to raise families for awhile. When they look forward to a 15th month deployment, with 12 months in-between, they see their 'home station' time as being compressed, intensified training which means more time away from families and personal pursuits.

It's not about the money, at least not $20k. Increasing the incentive to $50k or more might get their attention. What these warriors really want is for their Army to invest in them personally by giving them time back to invest in themselves and their families.

COL JB BURTON

Commanding Officer

Dagger Brigade Combat Team

1st Infantry Division

Multi-National Division Baghdad

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

Previous SWC Discussion on this Topic

General Wayne Downing, US Army (Ret.), passed today and will be missed by those that knew him best and those that did not know him but benefited from his leadership, command presence and life-time dedication and critical contributions to our profession and way of life. Our condolences and best wishes to General Downing's family, friends and brothers in arms.

From COL John Collins (USA Ret. via the Warlord Loop)

Lieutenant General Sam Wilson just telephoned me, and notifies that General Wayne Downing's funeral service and interment will be at West Point at times and dates to be announced.

From the US Military Academy at West Point

General Wayne A. Downing, a member of the Class of 1962, has brought extraordinary credit to the United States Military Academy through his lifetime of uniquely distinguished service to the Nation. As a combat leader, educator, global strategist, and national security expert, Wayne Downing's critical contributions to national defense and security have immeasurably raised the prominence of West Point as an institution vital to the American way of life.

Wayne Downing served the Nation in critical roles during three decades of our Nation's wars. Upon commissioning into the Infantry, he embarked on a thirty-four-year military career, rising to the rank of four-star general and the position of commander of all United States Special Operations forces. His reputation was that of a smart, decisive, forceful, and caring leader, known in particular for his unwavering determination to accomplish any mission assigned and provide his soldiers the best possible support. Since retiring from the Army in 1996, General Downing has repeatedly answered the call of public service. He is one of our Nation's foremost advisors and experts on fighting the war on global terrorism. General Downing's career has epitomized the phrase "lifetime of service to the Nation" and exemplified ideals inherent in Duty, Honor, Country.

Granted a competitive appointment to the United States Military Academy as the Son of a Deceased War Veteran (WW II) from the State of Illinois, Wayne Downing's early military career included assignments on Okinawa and in the Republic of Vietnam with the 173d Airborne Brigade, followed by instructor duties at the Infantry School and company-level command in the 1st Training Brigade at the United States Army Infantry Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1968. He then returned to Vietnam to command Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, followed by duties as the Battalion and then the 2d Brigade Operations Officer.

Following graduate school at Tulane University, Wayne Downing served as a senior operations research/systems analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Then a major, he served successively as operations officer and then executive officer of the 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Stewart, Georgia, in 1975 and 1976. A series of commands followed: he commanded Task Force (Alaska), 24th Infantry Division from 1976 to 1977 and the 2d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry Division from 1977 to 1979.

Following completion of the Air War College and a tour as secretary to the Joint Staff, United States European Command, Vaihingen, Germany, he commanded the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Germany. His culminating field grade command was activation and command of the 75th Infantry Regiment from 1984 to 1985. There, he also oversaw the activation of a third Ranger Battalion and guided its integration into the newly formed regiment, which also included the 1st and 2d Ranger battalions, previously independently

operating units.

Promoted to brigadier general in 1985, Wayne Downing advanced to the forefront in the special operations community. In November 1989 he was appointed commanding general of Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In December of that year he commanded the joint special operations forces that were so successful during the swift liberation of Panama during Operation Just Cause. One year later, during Operation Desert Storm, General Downing commanded a joint task force of 1200 American special operations forces who conducted highly effective attacks on the Iraqi SCUD missile infrastructure.

Deep behind enemy lines, the direct action of special operations forces led to the end of the SCUD attacks on Israel and dramatically reduced the overall ballistic missile threat in the theater of operations. These operations directed by General Downing were largely responsible for thwarting the Iraqi regime's attempt to use attacks on Israel to break up the allied coalition. In August 1991, he was appointed commanding general of the United States Army Special Operations Command. In 1993, he was appointed Commander-in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command. In this capacity he trained, equipped, and deployed 47,000 special operators from the Army, Navy, and Air Force in worldwide deployments in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives and the Global Combatant Commanders.

He retired from active duty in 1996, highly decorated by his Nation and many of its allies. His retirement from public service was short lived, however, as global terrorism became increasingly active. Following the deadly attack on Khobar Towers in June, Wayne Downing led a 40-person presidential task force that investigated the attack and made recommendations on how to better protect Americans abroad. Three years later, he was appointed by the U.S. Congress to the National Commission on Terrorism, which advocated implementing an aggressive global strategy to combat the rising, undeclared war of terrorism against the United States. The national emergency that began on September 11, 2001, drew him from retirement yet again; he accepted appointment by the President as the National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. In this position his responsibilities involved coordinating the diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and military facets of the global war on terrorism.

In recent years, General Downing has often returned to West Point, where he has served since 2003 as the Distinguished Chair of the Combating Terrorism Center. At West Point, he has helped to develop the next generation of the Long Gray Line, providing an extraordinary mentor and role model for the Corps of Cadets. He also serves as a visiting faculty member at the University of Michigan Ross Business School, where he conducts seminars on leadership and transformation management.

Accordingly, the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy takes great pride in presenting the 2006 Distinguished Graduate Award to Wayne A. Downing.

COL John Collins on General Downing

Second Lieutenant Wayne Downing, fresh out of West Point, was lucky beyond belief when he acquired my friend Colonel Chester B. McCoid as his mentor before he entered combat in Vietnam. Wayne often told me he learned more about war-fighting from hard bitten Chet in four months than he learned in four years at West Point.

General Downing not only looked like a recruiting poster, but maintained an open mind all the time he climbed the Army's promotion ladder from gold bars to four stars.

Correspondence from me to him in August 1993, for example, said, "A picture on the wall of my office shows David standing over Goliath. The caption reads 'Who Thinks Wins.' U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) needs all the help it can get to thrive during these trying times.

We discussed a clearinghouse for new ideas when you were a brand new brigadier general. Now that you are CINCSOC, I offer to show your staff how to put concepts into practice. You have a lot to gain and nothing to lose." Almost immediately he told his deputy, Rear Admiral Chuck Le Moyne, "Let's do it," but USSOCOM's clearinghouse never amounted to much for administrative and procedural reasons -- partly because USSOCOM, unlike the Warlord Loop, couldn't use email to attract and sustain contributions. The entire project dropped dead the day General Downing retired in February 1996. I already miss him immensely.

The National Review On-Line recently posted an interview with LtGen James N. Mattis, commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Corps Forces CENTCOM. Mattis is widely-known for his boldness and ferocity in combat. Yet Mattis did not discuss operations. Instead, he focused on perceptions. "I noticed (in the newspaper) today that 'a bomb went off in Baghdad'... the moral bye, the passive voice by our media, makes it appear like what the enemy is doing is just an act of God of some Godamned thing...getting our narrative out will be as important or more important than tactics."

The jihadist narrative is well developed. In an analysis entitled "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas", Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo of Radio Free Europe examined 966 statements posted on websites by insurgent groups. They concluded that the statements "used religion-based, pejorative code words for the targets of the attacks." The insurgent groups coalesced around a narrative that depicted US forces as Christian crusaders, the Iraqi Army as traitors to Islam and the Shiites as heretics - all deserving death in the name of religion. Mattis called this narrative, "tyranny in a false religious garb".

Mattis is correct in pointing to the lack of a united American response. Americans are as divided about the narrative of Iraq as we were about Vietnam. Some believe Saigon fell because the South Vietnamese government and military were hopelessly incompetent; others believe we lost our will and, by reducing our aid, enabled North Vietnam, amply armed by China and the Soviet Union, to win by force of arms.

In the Iraq case, On June 10, former Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the issue: " As the national intelligence estimate characterizes al-Qaeda, it says they are the accelerant. They have the most effective bombs, the more vicious soldiers.... But it is not just an al-Qaeda problem. It's much bigger than that. It is a sectarian conflict that I choose to call a civil war."

Therein lies the rub. Mr. Powell presented two narratives side by side: defeating al Qaeda by military force, and interjecting in a civil war that cannot be won by American military force. Mr. Powell endorsed elements of both narratives, while tilting in favor of depicting Iraq as a civil war driven by religious hatreds that transcend terrorist provocations.

The term "civil war" conjures up an image of fighting on a scale far larger than currently exists. Secretary Powell, presumably well-briefed by US Army generals who are his colleagues, suggested the civil war will increase in intensity, posing the question, " Are we delaying the inevitable conclusion of this civil war that ultimately will be fought out between Sunnis and Shias, Shias and Shias, Sunnis and al-Qaeda?"

There was no such ambiguity in General Mattis's interview. He said, "If this is important, we can win this. We know we can win it. There's nobody more convinced of that than the young troops who have spent the most time over there."

How could two generals reach such differing conclusions? Mattis's turf is Anbar Province, where conditions have improved remarkably, proving wrong the military's own predictions of a year ago. Excepting al Qaeda, most guerrillas do not roam from province to province. Because the insurgency is locally based, it's possible for conditions to improve inside Anbar and not improve elsewhere.

General Mattis was correct that the press issues a "moral bye" each time a story reads: 'a bomb killed 40 civilians' rather than 'a suicide bomber murdered 40 civilians'. The problem is that America is divided into two camps about how to write the narrative of Iraq.

The Anti-Terror camp identifies the jihadists as the main enemy. General Petraeus insists that "Iraq is the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign." In his judgment, AQI is "public enemy number one" because it slaughters thousands of innocent Shiites in order to provoke a civil war. The Washington Post reported that last November CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden told the Iraqi Study Group that al Qaeda was in fifth place among the main causes of the violence. Whatever the truth of that report, Hayden also believes that a US failure in Iraq will result "in a safe haven (for al Qaeda) from which then to plan and conduct attacks against the West".

Al Qaeda in Iraq has a different goal than the insurgent groups that call themselves "the honorable resistance" rebelled against American occupation and rejected democracy with a Shiite majority. It is the belief of the Anti-Terror camp that after four years of fighting, many of these Sunni rejectionists have reluctantly concluded they cannot wrest central power from the upstart Shiites. Knowing the Americans do not intend to stay, they now fear that Qaeda extremists will become their rulers. The Anti-Terror camp believes many of these fighters can be reconciled. The same belief is applied to the Shiite militias; namely, that while the death squads must be destroyed, most militias can be disarmed or neutralized. So with perseverance, the terrorist movement based around AQI can be destroyed while other insurgent and militia groups reach local understandings about power-sharing, allowing Iraq to emerge as a pluralistic, democratic-based society, albeit plagued like Columbia with violence.

Anbar illustrates this point of view. Even as insurgent Web sites persist in endorsing jihad, attacks against American forces have substantially declined. How to account for this gap between rhetoric and reality? In the judgment of Marine Brigadier General John R. Allen, who leads the effort to support the tribes in Anbar, "jihad rhetoric probably comes from a fairly finite collection of tech savvy jihadis both here in Iraq as well as across the Web.... The tribes know what they have done (by attacking al Qaeda) and the risks they will face for years to come. "

It's conventional wisdom now to say that Anbar improved because the Sunni tribes aligned against al Qaeda. True enough, but an incomplete explanation. With inadequate manpower, the Marines and Army National Guard and active duty soldiers persisted year after year with gritty, relentless patrolling that convinced the tribes the American military was, as one tribal leader said to me, "the strongest tribe". Hence the tribes could turn against al Qaeda, knowing they had the strongest tribe standing behind them.

But why join "the strongest tribe" if it is migrating back to the States? In Anbar, the Marines are trying to cement relations between the tribes, the police chiefs and the local Iraqi Army battalion commanders so that, with American advisers, they will support one another - and be supported by the Shiite-dominated central government. "They (the tribes in Anbar)," Allen wrote me recently, "expect their government to assist in rebuilding their cities and giving their children a better life. They expect security and expect to have their own young men and women incorporated into this security. "

The Anbar narrative points toward strong provincial self-rule in a Sunni province. This is a simpler model of government than in the mixed areas in and around Baghdad. It is a bottom-up approach toward reconciliation, at least as important as the compromise legislations inching through the National Assembly sheltered in the Green Zone. Bottom-up or top-down, though, the onus falls on the central government to deliver a modicum of resources.

Sunni and Shiite extremists do not attack each other; both attack the defenseless. Unfortunately, the Iraqi police and soldiers kill or capture relatively few of these cowards. Most of the violence against the population is perpetrated by Sunni extremists. Their numbers aren't large, and number of firefights in Iraq is astonishingly low. This is a police war, not a battle between squads, platoons or battalions. American troops in large numbers are needed to prevent the Sunni insurgents from tearing the country apart by forcing the Iraqi soldiers to flee from city after city, to include ceding large parts of Baghdad. Any precipitate withdrawal on our part would demoralize the Iraqi forces. It's not enough, then, for US soldiers to protect the population; our soldiers must also either cripple the Sunni extremist movement or inculcate in the Iraqi forces a sense that they will emerge as the winners.

In Baghdad, American forces must restore security to every district; then they must solidify relations among neighborhood watch groups, the local police and the Iraqi Army units. Both tasks can proceed simultaneously. In the summer heat, though, that is a daunting mission. Realistically, continuing with the surge into early 2008 would be prudent.

However, February of '08 is the key Presidential primary month. Most Republican candidates will not run on continuing the status quo; the surge is expected to recede and to be replaced by Plan B - the gradual withdrawal of US combat forces. But discussing withdrawal undercuts the momentum the surge is gathering. Thus General Petraeus must score a hat trick with his report in late September. He must: 1) persuade a skeptical public that terrorism, not sectarian hatred, is the root cause of the simmering civil war; 2) affirm that Iraqi forces can gradually defeat those terrorists; and 3) assure, without divulging any timetables, that most US combat forces will be quietly withdrawn over the next few years.

The Sectarian Camp, on the other hand, believes an intransigent hostility between the Shiites and Sunnis will lead inevitably to a full-blown civil war and ethnic cleansings -regardless of the current surge. Iraq is being torn apart by religion, not terrorism. Senator Barack Obama argues that "Iraq was a diversion from the fight against the terrorists". Senator Clinton advocates withdrawing US troops from Baghdad and other areas of sectarian strife.

In this view, the cancer of hate has already metastasized and spread throughout the body politic. Removing the terrorists - Petraeus's Public Enemy Number One - will not remove the root cause of the violence. Senator Clinton has been quite direct about this: "Thousands of people are dying every month in Iraq. Our presence there is not stopping it. This is an Iraqi problem — we cannot save the Iraqis from themselves.... I think I have a lot of support among general officers and military experts that it's (the surge) not going to work."

Indeed, there are distinguished generals, experienced policymakers and disquieting incidents that support that view. For instance, in February when I visited Salman Pak, a staunch Sunni enclave on the southern outskirt of Baghdad, the sectarian hostility was palpable. When I went back in April, the American advisers proudly showed me the progress made under a new, non-sectarian Iraqi National Police battalion. However, the nearby presence of Iraqi forces and the well-meaning efforts of their leaders had not altered the bloodletting between the local sectarian communities.

Among the Shiites, there are powerful interests dedicated to sectarian supremacy. The American toleration of Moqtada Sadr in 2003 and 2004, when there were numerous opportunities to remove him from power, was a crucial mistake. Iran's influence among the Shiite militias is malign.

It's clear, though, that the Sunni extremists are the number one enemy. With their murderous car bombs and hate-filled suicide bombers, they are the provocateurs of the low-grade civil war. In late April, I visited with Iraqi and American units in various neighborhoods throughout Baghdad. Everywhere the residents were eager to talk to the American soldiers. (Venting to Americans about the lack of Iraqi government services was as normal as booing at a baseball game.) In almost every conversation, sooner or later anxiety about the unknown cropped up - who might walk by and incinerate us in an instant.

By slaughtering Shiites for the "crime" of heresy, the terrorists erected a wall of distrust that separated neighborhoods, causing the Shiites to band together out of fear. Every neighborhood then had punks and toughs who grabbed power by claiming to be the guardians. Ethnic cleansing followed as the Sunni middle class elected or were forced to flee, with Shiite poor occupying the abandoned houses. Petraeus stopped that by putting US rifle companies in every district.

On balance, no one knows, as Secretary Powell put it, how much "bigger the problem is"; that is, how deep the roots of sectarian hatred have pushed. Incidents, no matter how horrifying in themselves, do not constitute a trend. Hence two narratives are competing to frame the story of Iraq: whether the root cause of the violence is terrorism that can be contained, or sectarian hatred that cannot be contained.

We know where General Mattis stands. He wants Americans to come together and support one narrative. No hesitation in Mattis: show him the fight and his instinct is to win it. His experience was Anbar, where the ferocity of the fighting was characterized by the two battles for Fallujah. For years, Anbar was the toughest fight, where the core enemy is al Qaeda in Iraq, Yet Anbar swung faster than anyone had projected.

No one yet knows whether a similar change is germinating in Baghdad neighborhoods, where American and Iraqi forces are now patrolling from every one of the 67 police precincts. This is the key question General Petraeus will address in September.

The Senate overwhelmingly confirmed General Petraeus as our military commander in a messy, vicious war. He would not be leading our troops in battle if he did not believe in his mission. Judgments about the surge being rendered in advance, no matter how well-meaning, lack the professional expertise and depth of analysis that Petraeus and his experienced staff possess. So let's wait and listen to him before reaching conclusions. He is our military leader.

A former Marine and former assistant secretary of defense, Mr. West visits Iraq on a regular basis. He is working on his third book about the war.

Stopped in at Borders for my weekly fix and came across Ralph Peters' latest anthology. (Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts that Will Shape the Twenty-First Century, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007, 367 pgs, $27.95) While I am pretty familiar with Ralph's worldview and his extensive writings in the Armed Forces Journal, this one appeared to include a lot of his material that I had not seen. A few hours of reading confirmed my suspicion, and I wanted to let the readership know that this may top the cake for a brutal dose of reality and nonpolitically correct reporting from around the globe.

For those tired of the mainstream media's twisted presentation of facts and generally warped reasoning, pick up Ralph Peters' latest book. Anytime you are frustrated by the banal posturing of government officials and want straight-forward thinking, take a close look at Wars of Blood and Faith. It is a coherent assessment of today's most pressing threats and opportunities from Africa to India to the Middle East. So if you're a student of strategic affairs, a policy official enshrouded with the official view and want to break out of the blinkered pap you get from the party line, or simply an American citizen who wants to find insightful and at times brutally frank perspectives on current challenges, you don't need not to look any further. Ralph Peters and Wars of Blood and Faith provide the most penetrating assessment of what could be called the age of identity-based conflict.

I know I don't need to puff up the author's reputation, which was well established by his two decades of service to the Nation as an Army intelligence officer. His longstanding credentials as a fearless, perceptive, and accurate analyst are hard to beat. With more than 20 books to his credit, he somehow keeps up a prolific volume of quality material. In this anthology, Ralph extends his reputation even further as a writer. The opening section on the 21st century military begins with a biting essay titled "The Shape of Wars to Come." It's a searing intro to this era's religious-based violence, an era that will generate an "an unprecedented expansion in the varieties of organized violence."

Peters has lots to say about the new counterinsurgency manual. Some of this we have already hashed out on the journal's pages, but I think the discussion on the influence of religion on modern irregular warfare remains in play. I know some people have impressions from their exposure to current operations, and my own research is inconclusive, but there is something to this issue that bears detailed scrutiny. To Peters, we have exited a brief aberration of conflict and reentered a much longer era of fundamental struggles over God and blood. Now that the brief age of ideology is over, he thinks we are returning to the recurring tides of human history existence in which wars were fought over blood and belief, not over political systems or resource distribution. This is a profound distinction, and one that many politicians, officers and civilian experts cannot seem to fathom. "No matter how vociferously we deny it," Ralph notes, "our wars will be fought over religion and ethnic identity." The author leaves the reader with little doubt that those wars will be brutally savage and protracted.

For Peters, conflict over primitive faith and blood loyalties should induce alternations to the Maoist era counterinsurgency doctrine. The prescriptions in FM 3-24 claimed to have understood that today's era was different and clearly attempted to come to grips with the complexities of insurgents fueled by religious hatred and primal loyalties. Peters argues, persuasively to this reviewer, that violence stemming from the confessional or ethnic identity is profoundly different and not easily rectified or solved by our historically grounded counterinsurgency theory of the past half century. In the midst of violent struggles between intolerant religious factions and age-old ethnic rivals, Peters finds the new manual replete with outdated remedies. LtCol Peters emphasizes, "A Maoist in Malaya could be converted. But Islamist terrorists who regard death as a promotion are not going to reject their faith any more than an ethnic warrior can—or would wish to-- change his blood identity."

With regard to new insights on COIN theory, the influence of religion and conflict, I would also encourage readers to closely review Dr. Steve Metz's superlative new monograph, titled Rethinking Counterinsurgency, which is available on line at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute. I would also encourage readers to review the longitudinal data compiled and analyzed by Harvard's Dr. Monica Duffy Toft in the recent issue of International Security. Her essay, titled "Getting Religion?: The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War" (International Security, Spring 2007, pp. 97-131) amplifies on research I had cited in my earlier postings on this topic, and her conclusions (based off of 42 civil wars over a 60 year period) are that religious conflicts are more destructive, harder to stem, are four times as deadly, and last twice as long. Her analysis suggests that there are numerous contextual explanations, aside from pure spiritually motivated zeal and savagery.

Ongoing operations in Iraq may provide another data point on this issue. When we can step back and view the data critically and objectively, I hope we can produce some clearer conclusions. For now, I will abide with Wars of Blood and Faith. It is a stunning collection of provocative writing on current and future national security challenges and cuts to the chase on so many complicated issues.

LtCol Hoffman is a Research Fellow employed by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and is also a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia, PA.

More odds and ends from the blogosphere and far flung corners of the Small Wars Journal "empire of knowledge".

Happy Blogiversary

The Wall Street Journal takes a look at 10 years of blogging:

It's been 10 years since the blog was born. Love them or hate them, they've roiled presidential campaigns and given everyman a global soapbox. Twelve commentators -- including Tom Wolfe, Newt Gingrich, the SEC's Christopher Cox and actress-turned-blogger Mia Farrow -- on what blogs mean to them...

Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, spokesman for Multi-National Force -- Iraq, comments: "Around here, folks like to read Small Wars Journal, Blackfive and The Mudville Gazette."

On Al Qaeda in Iraq - Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets?

SWJ Post - Al Qaeda in Iraq -- Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets? by Malcolm Nance - two strong responses (so far):

Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail -- Al Qaeda and its Role in the Iraq Insurgency

The attempts to minimize the role played by al Qaeda in Iraq in the larger Sunni insurgency took a significant step over the past week. Clark Hoyt, the public editor of the New York Times, claimed that the media had become complicit in the government's attempts to paint the entire Sunni insurgency with an al Qaeda brush. Also this week, Malcolm Nance published an article at the Small Wars Journal claiming al Qaeda is being given too much credit for the violence in Iraq. In the article, titled "Al Qaeda in Iraq--Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets?," Nance claims al Qaeda is but a bit player in the Iraqi insurgency and is largely controlled by the Baathist remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime. To Nance, al Qaeda is both a U.S. Boogeyman and Baathist Puppet...

Michael Goldfarb at The Weekly Standard's WorldWideWeekly.com - Al Qaeda in Iraq: Not Just a Boogeyman

Roggio just posted what I think is the definitive takedown of the argument put forward earlier in the week by Small Wars Journal contributor Malcolm Nance. Nance's theory is that al Qaeda is basically a bit player in the insurgency--small, but lethal--and that the administration is trying to hype the threat the group poses in order to convince the American people that withdrawing from Iraq would be the equivalent of surrendering in the war on terror. Suffice to say, Roggio isn't buying it...

Nance's essay strikes me as part of a larger, renewed push by the antiwar crowd to discredit the idea that the war in Iraq has any real connection to the war on terror--as Roggio points out, the New York Times put in its two cents last Sunday with a piece by the public editor declaring that "President Bush and the United States military in Baghdad are increasingly pointing to a single villain on the battlefield: Al Qaeda...

LTG Odierno Update

A month ago we posted Lieutenant General Ray Odierno's (Commanding General Multi-National Corps -- Iraq) Counterinsurgency Guidance. Since then we have received several e-mails in praise of the general's leadership, understanding of the situation on the ground in Iraq and providing the guidance to get the job done. Here is one from a reliable and knowledgeable source:

LTG Odierno impresses me with his grasp of "the art of the possible" in Iraq, and his command style-- which I like very much (little theatrics, all business, works in small groups).

I also am very much impressed with the professionalism & experience of this Corps' staff-and I would assess that it very much reflects their commander. I think I have to guard against being too impressed with the staff to maintain some objectivity. But after having read the V Corps AAR [After Action Reviews] & OPORDs [Operation Orders] and LTG Metz's earlier 2005 III Corps AAR, I would assess that the current team appears to be a cut above the others.

This may (and actually I think this the case) reflect the accumulated experience gained on the ground over the past 4 plus years. GEN Petraeus's influence on the Corps is undoubtedly felt, but I think it too early to assess how much. Odierno & Petraeus are a very good command team--- a hard-nosed operational commander and a very good strategic thinker. Odierno has a thorough, nuanced, and thoughtful appreciation of the situation, much better than popularly portrayed in the media (as in Fiasco).

Petraeus is positive, upbeat, and brings a fresh look to often intractable Iraqi problems. This stands in contrast to his predecessor who appeared worn down after nearly three years on the job & ready to throw in the towel. Although the Corps conducted extensive "shaping" operations from Feb-June, the key "Surge" operations began on 19 June when the 5th "surge" [Battalion Combat Team] BCT became operational. All of these operations are conducted in the Baghdad "belts," or in areas hitherto not occupied or patrolled. The Corps has dubbed the umbrella operation "Phantom Thunder," of which Arrowhead Ripper is a part.

See Dave Kilcullen's SWJ post Understanding Current Operations in Iraq for a detailed and ground-truth discussion of Phantom Thunder.

I Marine Expeditionary Force

I MEF sponsored a Tactical Capabilities for Irregular Warfare conference 20 -- 24 June at Camp Pendleton, CA. The purpose was to identify, refine and integrate IW capabilities required by the tactical warfighter.

The going-out summary of identified requirements and initiatives included:

• Actionable Intelligence at the Company Level

• Biometric Data

• Combat Hunter Skills

• Cop-Like Skills

• Increased Language/Cultural Information

• Information Operations Capability

• Standardized Training (MTT)

• Enhanced Patrolling Skills

• Precision Engagement

• Squad Fires (Employ Supporting Arms)

• Battalion Level Subject Matter Expert Advisor Cell

I MEF 5-3-5 Philosophy:

Recent Small Wars Council Odds and Ends

On New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

On John Robb's Brave New War (members only)

On Combat Tracker Teams

On COIN Aircraft

On Combat Optics

On U.S. Policy, Interest and Endgame in Iraq

On Iraqi Security Forces

Could Someone Please Explain the "Surge" Strategy to Me?

On The Illogic of American Military Strategy in Iraq

On Thomas P.M. Barnett - Army America Needs vs. The Wars Americans Prefer to Wage

On Carlton Meyer on Airborne Operations

On Wargaming

Council Members Like Randall Knives, Ka-Bars Too...

Much more at the Council - join the discussion - membership is easy and the price is right...