Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog. We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.

People and culture are important – but they are not the only important things. Their importance is relative to the mission and the operational environment. ...

Fit the operation to the narrative, not the narrative to the operation.

The US Army is finding itself in the difficult position of attempting to redefine itself in a climate of reduced resources. It shouldn't pin its future to peer-to-peer...

Simply put, interagency reformists have failed to understand the environment within which they are proposing change.

Time now for a return to the basics if the organization is to endure well into the current century.

A warning and call to action from the French criminologist.

Understanding the great paradox of the U.S. military: the better our conventional capabilities, the more likely we are to face increasingly irregular and asymmetric...

Policy implications from Stathis Kalyvas’ concepts of attitudinal and behavioural support.

Beware the experts, expats, urbanites, and a host of other easy routes.

The “Red” element can enhance analytical products, challenge critical planning outcomes, scrutinize the viability of source reporting, and assess potential...

The subject of Israel’s relations with Iraq does not make for headline news. If Israel attacks Iran, that could quickly change...

As some try to connect the dots of recent events, is there an Iranian role in what appears to be Stage 2 of the Arab Spring?

One of the reasons, if not THE reason, that we struggled to accomplish our objectives in Afghanistan is that we applied an industrial-era approach to the way we conceptualize...

In assessing our “lessons learned” it is vital that the service look forward and not just retrospectively so it does not learn the wrong lessons. 

Multi-national corporations--particularly from the extractive sector with long project life cycles, access to capital, and attractive return on investment--could act as a new...

The Syrian regime’s use of shelling and aircraft are now being complimented with wholesale executions in rebel-controlled neighborhoods.

Water scarcity is an increasingly dangerous problem in the USCENTCOM AOR.

The prevalence of PTSD and mental disorders in weak and failed states is exacerbated by insurgencies, defying efforts break the cycle.

Pershing's leadership attributes and willingness to understand and work through the Moro culture achieved success in a complex operational environment.

Without international intervention, Syria will continue to slip into deeper sectarianism, which is the worst case scenario for Iraq.

“Afghan Led” is a critical aspect of our counterinsurgency operations that we must grasp to enable ultimate mission success.

The uniformed analytic community largely lacks institutional expertise and struggles to provide commanders with meaningful intelligence products.

A scathing and scholarly critique of the impact of De-Ba’athification on the America’s efforts to stabilize Iraq. 

Further thought is required if this concept is going to succeed in the future.

Historians often turn wars and battles into linear sequences outlining casual chains for which the mind has a natural bias.

Transition can’t simply be, “We are leaving...good luck.”

The barbarians have come and the rules of war and peace stand transformed.

Cyber warfare isn’t hype; it’s real.  

 “We’ve won the war,” General Dan Halutz boasted.

What began as an Israeli air campaign rapidly evolved into an extensive ground war of bloody house-to-house battles that the Israelis were ill prepared to wage.