Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog. We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.

During the second half of the 19th century, stability in southeastern Europe was challenged by newly emerging nation-states as well as the decay of the Ottoman Empire.

Times of crisis can be a brief window of opportunity for large institutional bureaucracies to overcome jurisdictional boundaries and make changes to business...

What is operational art? An example from the Normandy breakout in WWII.

Afghanistan required a different approach yet we failed in our analysis, strategy, and application of resources.

The Surge was only one piece of a broader confluence of events, critically the Shiite victory in the civil war, the formation of “Sons of Iraq” groups, the cease-...

A model for the Iraqi military that seeks to minimize the threats of sectarianism, insurgency, and rampant unemployment over the next five years through mandatory...

Insurgency has evolved in five seminal ways since Mao's time. Ideas and literature on it should too.

Scott balanced risk and opportunity through a combination of careful planning and preparation, combined with strategic and operational understanding and patience.

The growth of Islamism in the Pakistan Army is a distinct threat to US interests in the region.

The Joint Force requires culturally “savvy” leaders capable of developing a global perspective, able to synthesize diverse viewpoints, and with the ability to...

Military historian Martin van Creveld argues that women’s presence in the military is little but an expensive charade.

Operators must understand local culture and must harness the power of local institutions to fight an irregular enemy. A proposed method to do so.

When an adversary arrives in a form that was unanticipated, an intellectually curious officer will be able to draw upon years of education tested not in the...

Terrorism can and should be defined for the discrete purpose of developing international counterterrorism strategies by countries with common interests and...

An interesting entree into the utility of game theory: There is an application of mathematical logic which illustrates why peer evaluations are bad.

True to its name, Syed Saleem Shahzad’s Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban goes beyond the common misperception of Al-Qaeda as a static organization...

For COIN, a trinity of attributes is needed to complement traditional military acumen: analytical intelligence, openness of mind, and broad culture.

The military would benefit from more officers with hard science backgrounds enabling them to solve the challenging problems the military faces in modern wars.

 If you’re afforded the opportunity to lead a critical team at a critical juncture in our nation’s history…  see the big picture and embrace it...

Observations from a month-long secondment in Afghanistan with DCOMISAF.

The most frustrating moment for the J2 occurs when the operations summary contains more useful intelligence-producing data than the official intelligence reporting.

Transnational criminal organization violence is spilling over the southern border of the US, but without a definition the extent of the epidemic is unknown.

Re-evaluate exactly what we want from our educational system and to strip away the non-essential.

Mexico's new president Enrique Peña Nieto has trumpeted its proposed reforms, but there are more similarities than differences with the Calderon Administration.

The war in Afghanistan is a war of perceptions on progress made thus far. A widening gap in perceptions will complicate the transition .

An advocacy for social media and digital collaboration in the military.

Platoon/Company sized elements are being tasked with the execution of security handovers that have been in development for over ten years.

Lebanon's national rejection of returning to civil war coupled with the buoyancy provided by the Lebanese Armed Forces will keep it from sinking into the Syrian abyss.

Though discredited, the phased framework of shape-clear-hold-build remains applicable over time when adapted to local circumstances by harmonized independent stakeholders.

Forward-leaning, informed speculation on the future operating environment can make the difference between being able to respond to unexpected events or failing to adequately...