Bringing time into the assessment of counterinsurgency warfare.

Implications for information operations in Guatemala.

Why is this new age an age of instability—instead of an age of empires, or warring states, or even peace and prosperity?

If we ignore village life – or try to bend it to our view of what it should be – we will fail in Afghanistan as we did in Vietnam.

A new perspective on alternative analysis and the intelligence process

A critical analysis of statements by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri reveal a fragmented and weakened Al Qaeda disguising its internal incoherence and lack of appealing...

Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.

Unlike a certain mathematical solution counterinsurgency is a laden with human error and complexity.

Interoperability is a function of leadership, hardship, and time. To quickly achieve it, focus on individual personalities, understand that everyone has value, and exercise...

Good stories trump doctrine for effecting cultural change because they reach us emotionally; they inspire.  Consider America's first battle and what we can...

An interview with MIT Professor Roger D. Petersen.

Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.

Guerilla warfare is not an “Eastern Way of War,” it is the universal war of the weak.

Some US objectives remain unmet.

Chavista strategists have decided its best course of action is to run Chavez for president for a fifth time, only this time by proxy.

The issue of the reach of the state needs to be put into a wider focus by including women and gender issues as part of the narrative.

One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.

If physical success on the battlefield cannot be translated into part of a larger aim, it is largely irrelevant even if it does a great deal of physical damage to the enemy...

The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.

Deeper understanding of groupthink, its causes, and mitigation techniques should help a commander and his staff prevent it from occurring, and red teams can assist in the...

Despite success at degrading Philippine terrorist networks, much of the security gains have been transitory, while the underlying socio-economic problems in Mindanao and...

As SOCOM takes on the task of addressing population-centric conflict post-Iraq/Afghanistan, it must field a new type of SOF Operator--master of the full-spectrum of...

Unlike other major wars the US has fought, Iraq & Afghanistan demonstrate extremely low occurrence of troops who become POW/MIA & high injury survival rates.

The study demonstrates the naivety of a superpower that allows an alleged ally to receive billions of dollars with which Pakistan financed groups that kill American soldiers...

What happened to the sports college?

What happens in Vegas may stay in Vegas, but what happens in the Middle East and South Asia spreads to the world.

Sudan is the Sub-Saharan country that most resembles those of North Africa, with its shared religion, culture, and language. Will the Arab Spring blow south?

The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was one of Special Forces’ greatest success stories and by far the greatest example of how to fight unconventional warfare with an...

Russia has integrated cyber operations into its military doctrine.

Maintaining official armies in Africa makes little security, political or economic sense. The continent will do better without them altogether