Share this Post
Understanding Options for Military Deployments to the U.S. Southwest Border
Federal troops have had a long, but at times controversial history of operations along the U.S. Southwest Border going back as far as military conflicts with Mexican in the 1840s, with subsequent basing and excursions along and even across the border with Mexico to show force, hold territory and exhibit hegemony, defend settlers, suppress and combat Native Americans, defend against excursions from bandit and Mexican revolutionary forces, and more recently counter smuggling efforts. While these U.S. military forces were originally relatively large-sized and by necessity self-sufficient forces, the scale of the forces and their missions have been greatly reduced during the last half of the twentieth century and the first two decades of the twentieth first century. While the U.S. does have thousands of active duty military forces on bases nearby the border (such as at Ft. Bliss, Ft. Huachuca, White Sands, Coronado, the Naval Air Station at El Centro, etc.), only very few these federal military forces are currently authorized and tasked with operations along the U.S. Border. In addition to federal active duty military forces, state-run National Guard forces have been often used by Border State Governors to support their state’s law enforcement, but these deployments are typically either small in scope or short in duration due to the high costs of these deployments given the relatively limited budgets of these states.
With recent calls for securing the U.S. border with Mexico using the United States military, this article reviews the current authorizations and limitations for US military deployments along the United States border for both the use of active duty and National Guard forces. Additionally, this article looks at the current process for the use of active duty federal troops on the US Southwest Border and provides an analysis of possible means by which an increased military presence can be made on the border under current authorizations and laws.
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
The largest restriction on the use of U.S. military forces in the United States, and consequently along the southwest border, is due to parameters set by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. Posse Comitatus is tradition under English Common law granted to Sheriffs to call up citizens to enforce laws. U.S. federal troops operating in former confederate territories used this tradition to enforce newly established federal laws to force federal will on the local former-Confederate populace. In a move to unify the nation at the end of Reconstruction as the southern states re-exerted their power in Congress, the Posse Comitatus Act was intended to restrict the military from being used to serve as posse comitatus or other forms of law enforcement within the United States. As a result Congress passed the act in 1878 to prohibit the use of the U.S. Army to enforce laws unless the Constitution or an act of Congress explicitly authorized such use. The act, which was revised in 1956 to include the Air Force (18 USC § 1385) stated:
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses part of the army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”
Traditionally, the Navy and Marine Corps have been included Posse Comitatus as a matter DoD policy based on intent of the law. The Coast Guard is exempt from Posse Comitatus as they hold a dual status of military and law enforcement under Title 15. This act sets the limited conditions whereby federal military forces can today operate as law enforcement within the United States.
The Use of National Guard
The use on the U.S. Border of National Guard forces (Air and Army National Guard, considered in the 32 USC statute as the militia) and their ability to enforce the law, requires some further explanation because of differences between their use by the States and their use by the federal government. One of the primary differences is that National Guard forces are under the control of their state on a part-time basis but can be activated for fulltime duty in support operations for the state (under 32 USC § 502 (f)). In this status, under title 32, the Governor has the ability to place a soldier in a full-time duty status under the command and control of the State even while they directly funded with Federal dollars through the National Guard Bureau (NGB). Even though this duty status is authorized by Federal statute, this section is a statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus Act and thus the Governor may use the National Guard in a law enforcement capacity. However, while they have been used in a law enforcement role at times in response to riots, prison sieges, or looting, they are typically only use in a supporting role to law enforcement for counter drug or border security law enforcement operations.
In recent years border Governors have deployed portions of their State’s National Guard forces to the border to assist law enforcement. For example in 2016 units and personnel of the Texas National Guard deployed as part of Operation Drawbridge working the Texas Department of Public Safety and Texas Border Sheriffs and manning a surveillance systems with the Texas Border Security Operations Center. Ground troops of the Texas National Guard also assisted U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) in the Rio Grande Valley and Laredo Border Patrol Sectors as part of Operation Phalanx in 2010, and Texas National Guard air assets provide aviation support to the operation in 2012. These operations were similar to previous Texas National Guard deployments that surged the State’s resources in multiple operations such as Operation Linebacker and Operation Rio Grande in fiscal year 2006, Operation Wrangler in fiscal year 2007, and Texas Virtual Border Watch in fiscal years 2007-2010.
Arizona also has a supported law enforcement in border security, but at a relatively smaller scale. For example, Arizona’s National Guard operates a counter drug taskforce as part of Joint Task Force Arizona that employs National Guard personnel in a variety of support roles to law enforcement. These tasks vary and include potentially costly but relative mundane tasks such as when an element Arizona’s Army National Guard 2220th Transportation relocated concrete barriers between El Centro, California, to Naco, Arizona to support Customs and Border Protection in 2014. The California National Guard have also been involved with supporting law enforcement along the Border. For example, in 2010 they participated in Joint Task Force Sierra in which California National Guard members provided observation support for Customs and Border Patrol and U.S. Coast Guard. New Mexico, operating under a lesser budget, uses small numbers of National Guard troops, both air and ground assets, in counterdrug efforts across the State to include the State’s border region.
In addition to state activation under 10 USC § 331, the Federal Aid to State Governors statute, the President may, upon the request of the State’s legislature or of its Governor (if the legislature cannot be convened) call into the National Guard into federal service whenever an insurrection occurs in any State against its government. At that point the President may call into federal service “such of the militia of the other States in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.” In this status, they are exempt from the restrictions from the Posse Comitatus Act.[xi]
Moreover, the President can federalize National Guard forces by ordering them to active duty in their reserve component status or by calling them into Federal service in their militia status either as full units or partial units as a call up of federal reserves for up to 365 days to augment federal military (under 10 USC § 12304), or a relevant Secretary can call up National Guard to 24 consecutive months after a declaration of a National Emergency by the President.[xii] When on federal duty they fall under USC title 10 and for all purposes are treated as active-duty military forces and must comply with Posse Comitatus restrictions.
Furthermore, under 10 USC § 332 authorizes the President to use of Militia and other Armed Forces to enforce federal authority. This allows that whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the U.S. make it impractical to enforce the laws of the U.S. in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use of them as part of the armed forces as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. These forces also operate as a statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus Act.[xiii] An example of this was President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1957 deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to integrate Little Rock Central High School to enforce federal Civil Rights legislation. Finally, the President can use the National Guard, along with active duty forces, in the event of invasion, rebellion or inability to execute Federal law with active forces under 10 USC § 12406. Under this statute these military forces are exempt from Posse Comitatus restrictions.
To summarize, Governors of Border States can use their state’s National Guard on the U.S. Border under 32 USC § 502 (f). Moreover, under this status these troops can serve in law enforcement roles. Meanwhile the President has the authority during the right of set conditions to mobilize a state’s or another state’s National Guard for limited periods of time to serve along the U.S. Borders. However, the troop’s ability to serve a law enforcement varies depending on the authorities by which they are called up. If activated as a Partial Mobilization (under 10 USC § 12302) or Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up (10 USC § 12304), these troops serve under the same Posses Comitatus restrictions of active duty military (under title 10) and cannot serve in a law enforcement capacity in the United States. The troops are able to serve in a law enforcement capacity if activated under Federal Aid to State Governors (10 USC § 331), Use of Militia and Armed Forces to Enforce Federal Authority (10 USC § 332), Interference with State and Federal Law (10 USC § 333), or during invasion and rebellion (10 USC § 12406). Thus, the only time that active-duty military (Army and Air Force) and federalized National Guard troops for law enforcement in exemption of the prohibitions of Posse Comitatus Act is pursuant to the presidential power to enforce federal authority, quell domestic violence, or invasion.[xiv]
The National Guard Counter Drug Program
Currently, the National Guard contributes to supporting law enforcement counter drug operations on the U.S. Border and across the United States through the National Counter Drug Program. This program that began in 1991 supports the detection, interdiction, disruption, and curtailment of drug trafficking activities and through the application of military unique skills and resources supplied by the National Guard. Section 112, Title 32, United States Code (32 USC 112) (D) authorized the National Guard to conduct counterdrug operations.[xv] Moreover, Section 1004 of the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (P. L. 101-510) authorized
“the Secretary of Defense to provide an expanded range of counterdrug support to any other department or agency of the federal government or any state, local, or foreign law enforcement agency, provided such support meets specific procedural criteria.”
Funds are allocated through the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to each State separately based on a plan approved by the Secretary of Defense. Among the capabilities that the National Guard provides are: intelligence analysis and fusion (including highly successful counter-threat finance analysis), aviation support, mobile radar, Airborne Reconnaissance, Signals Intelligence, language transcription, linguistics, criminal analysis, air surveillance support, training and training facilities, and civil operations in the form of anti-drug messaging.[xvi] The current National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA 2018) provides a $10 million budget for this program.
Current Authorities for Active-Duty Federal Military Support on the US Borders
Under normal conditions (i.e., other than where federal authority needs enforced, domestic violence quelled, or invasion), active duty military, and National Guard forces federalized under title 10 (10 USC) can operate in the United States’ along the US Borders under a limited set of authorizations, and only in a role where they support law enforcement. These authorizations include for the purposes of counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and counter-transnational organized crime support. In these roles, active-duty (Title 10) forces, while unable to conduct law enforcement under Posse Comitatus restrictions, may serve in a supportive role to law enforcement.
10 U.S.C. § 124 identifies the Department of Defense (DoD) as the federal government’s single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The geographic combatant commander, in this case United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), are delegated to conduct detection and monitoring in foreign areas within their area of operations. In the case of the USNORTHCOM, this authority is currently delegated to the Commander of Joint Task Force North (JTF-N, formerly JTF-6).
Joint Task Force North (JTF-N)
The primary instrument that DoD provides counter-drug support to law enforcement on the U.S. Southwest Border is Joint Task Force North (JTF-N). This taskforce, operating on a relatively small budget (typically with a budget of about five to seven million dollars per year), is a one star command, and with a small staff of about 140 personnel that is a mix of civilian billets and uniformed billets from Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines. The unit also typically has liaison officers present from Border State’s National Guards and the U.S. Coast Guard. Through this small unit structure, JTF-N serves as a facilitator for other military units, and elements of units within DoD to support law enforcement along the U.S. borders allowing it to have a greater effect than one would expect from its size.
While executing a JTF-N mission, military units and individuals are under the tactical control of the JTF-N commander and work in direct support of a federal law enforcement agencies.[xvii] JTF-N’s mission statement reads:
“Joint Task Force North supports federal law enforcement agencies in the conduct of counter drug/counter transnational organized crime operations and facilitates Department of Defense training in the USNORTHCOM areas of responsibility to disrupt transnational criminal organizations and deter their freedom of action in order to protect the homeland and increase DoD unit readiness.” [xviii]
In 1989, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) was initially established as Joint Task Force – Six (JTF-6) in response to President George H.W. Bush's renewed counterdrug efforts. In an order issued by the Commanding General of U.S. Army’s Forces Command, Army Gen. Colin Powell, on Nov. 13, 1989. “The order established JTF-6 to serve as the planning and coordinating operational headquarters to support local, state and federal law enforcement agencies within the southwest border region to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.”[xix]
JTF-N, who partners with multiple federal law enforcement agencies to include US Customs and Border Protection, has currently or historically provides six categories of support to law enforcement to include operational support, engineering support, intelligence support, general support, interagency synchronization, and technology integration.[xx] Due to restrictions of Posse Comitatus, JTF-N and attached units do not have the ability to make arrests, or to monitor or detain persons north of the United States borders. In terms of support they provide aviation (manned and unmanned) and ground reconnaissance, ground sensor units, intelligence support on foreign countries, transportation, logistics, biometrics, and engineer support.
Since 1997, the unit’s mission tempo and scale have been cut back but still supported federal law enforcement to counter drug trafficking and counter-transnational threats roles along the air ground and maritime borders of the United States. In recent years, the unit typically conducts about two dozen small-scale missions per year and these are typically platoon to company-sized elements depending on requests from law enforcement agencies and the availability of units to volunteering for these missions as training opportunities. Historically, the unit facilitated mission much more frequently with 3,300 mission carried out between 1990 and mid-1997.[xxi] Additionally, the scale was historically greater. For example, in 1996 in the San Diego County border area, 4,200 Marines and Army Green Berets rotated small teams into the area through a California National Guard operations center.[xxii] Moreover, JTF-6 by the mid-1990s also had an active rapid support field unit of Army Special Forces that was at its immediate disposal to respond to actionable intelligence.[xxiii]
In 1997, JTF-N, operating as JTF6, encountered problems that heavily regulated and scrutinized its future actions and operations. Parts of the problem arose in July 1997 from a high profile use of force issue where U.S. Marines conducting listing post/observation post (LP/OP) operations in Redford, Texas exchanged gunfire with a U.S. teenager resulting in his death.[xxiv] This incident was on the heels of a January 1997 shooting in Brownsville, Texas when Special Forces soldiers deployed in an LP/OP shot and wounded an armed Mexican drug smuggler. As a result, that same year, the Secretary of Defense suspended the authorization for counter drug ground reconnaissance and ground-based detection and monitoring. In October 1998, the Secretary of Defense lifted this suspension, but retained the sole approval authority for these missions.[xxv] Thus, this involved more intense scrutiny of JTF-6’s (and now JTF-N’s) operations and greatly reduced the operational tempo and scope of active duty military operations along U.S. Borders.
In addition to counter-narcotics support to law enforcement, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 (NDAA 1991), under section 1022 authorizes a DoD Task Force that provides support to law enforcement agencies for counter-drug activities to also provide support to law enforcement agencies also conducting counter terrorism activities. NDAA FY-2015 amended this authority to allow JTF-N to support LEA conducting counter terrorism activities.[xxvi] CT authority and funds could only be used if a case can be made that migrants, or their smuggling networks can be linked to transportation of potential terrorist into the United States. There is some evidence that these networks are the same (see for example Bensman 2018).[xxvii] Currently, USNORTHCOM has authorized this support primarily to be given through Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH), a SOCOM unit under USNORTHCOM. SOCNORTH typically works on foreign soil supporting, training, or cooperating with partner nations, bur could provide support to US law enforcement (i.e. similar to JTF-N’s support to law enforcement involved counter drug efforts) but without the unit participating in law enforcement themselves.
Counter-Transnational Organized Crime Authorization
In addition to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism support to law enforcement, Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2016 (FY-16) added the authorization the Secretary of Defense to provide support to counter transnational organized crime (C-TOC). Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)
“means self-perpetrating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary, or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption or violence or through a transnational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication methods.“ [xxviii]
Thus, the NDAA FY-16 allows for DoD resources to provide detection, monitoring, and communication of movement of surface traffic outside the geographic boundary of the United States and within the United States not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside the boundary. NDAA FY-16 also provided for, among other things, the transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies as well as the establishment of bases of operations for the purpose of facilitating C-TOC within or outside the United States.
For the US Southwest Border, NDAA FY-16 effectively just expands JTF-N’s mission set to allow support to law enforcement to include C-TOC efforts beyond counter drug efforts. However, budget limitations does not necessarily allow for focused operations specifically beyond support to law enforcement counter-narcotics, but does allow JTF-N to support law enforcement with counter narcotics efforts that also may end up having a broader C-TOC focus.
Use of Force
The use of force is a consideration of any military forces deployed to the border. Following the 1997 Redford and Brownsville Shooting incidents, use of force by military personnel along the border are a very serious concern for any military forces deployed to US Border. While there has been no historical incidents of cross border engagements with the U.S. military since the 1916 Pancho Villa raids, the modern border area creates an environment where military personnel may potentially come under fire from heavily armed traffickers from Mexico. Additionally, cases like the Redford and Brownsville, an a lesser known incident in 1992 where animal poachers fired upon and wounded two soldiers in an JTF-6 border observation post manned by US Army Special Forces (without return fire), demonstrate a real potential threat to military from north of border.[xxix]
As of 13 June 2005, in border security missions, DoD forces retain the right of self-defense. Specifically,
“Unit Commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unit defense includes the defense of other DoD forces in the vicinity”. [xxx]
Unit commanders may augment or restrict these Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) by submitting a request for mission specific rules of engagement to and gaining approval from the Secretary of Defense. DoD forces are to use de-escalation, and when possible use of non-deadly force, and only use deadly force when all other lesser means have failed.
Synopsis of Current Authorities for the Use of Military Forces on U.S. Borders
Thus, under normal conditions Title 10 active duty military may provide support to law enforcement in securing the border against C-TOC, CT, and counter-drug threats to include monitoring and detection, intelligence, transportation, logistics, engineering. However, they cannot to make arrests or detain persons. National Guard forces deployed by Governors under Title 32, and under state control provide the option of using these troops as law enforcement as they exempt from Posse Comitatus restrictions. Taken together, these provide a set of options that an increased military presence on the border under current authorizations and laws. We will consider each of the options in the final section.
Military Deployment Options to the U.S. Southwest Border and Current Authorizations
Based on current law and authorizations, the military can deploy to the U.S. Southwest Border in several ways. First, the National Guard of U.S. Border States under 32 USC § 502 (f) can be deployed by order of the Governor. These troops can engage in direct law enforcement activities and are an exception to Posse Comitatus but would likely be most effective in providing support to law enforcement as these troops would need additional training in law enforcement techniques. Long-term funding may become an issue as these funds likely would have to come from National Guard counterdrug funds requested beforehand from the Sec Def in the normal budgeting process or taken from state budgets. Larger wealthier States, like Texas could more easily fund these operations, and less wealthy states such as New Mexico, or less political inclined States like California would have less capability.
A second option would be to increase the use of Title 10 federal active duty forces or federalized National Guard forces using Joint Task Force North as a conduit bringing up the operational tempo to pre-Redford levels. However, this support would be subject to Posse Comitatus restrictions and only authorized to serve in a support role to law enforcement. However, support could be used in terms of force multiplying effects such as providing Border Patrol with increased mobility through use of military air mobilization assets and could also be used to conduct engineering projects at an increased tempo to create border fencing and create more roadways for law enforcement to access the Border. Funding for these operations would likely have to come from $705 million DoD 2028 Counter Drug funds and would have to be diverted from other areas of operations.[xxxi]
As a third option, the President could declare a National Emergency and federalized National Guard units under 10 USC § 12304. This would allow the Directors of Homeland Security and or the Department of Justice to activate units of the National Guard for up to 24 months in a support role to law enforcement and acting under the Posse Comitatus restrictions.
A fourth option, though one extreme and politically dangerous, would be for the President to deploy active duty and federalized National Guard forces under 10 USC § 332 to enforce federal authority. This is option could potentially be used in the State of California because of declaration of a sanctuary status for illegal immigrants. However, any troops deployed in this status would act under the Posse Comitatus restrictions.
 Matt M. Mathews. 2007. The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective. The Long War Series. Occasional Paper 22. Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Matthews_op22.pdf
 Larson, Eric V. and John E. Peters. Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251.html
 Joint Task Force North. 2015. Counterdrug Counter Narco-Terrorism Legal Authorities Handbook. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. Ft. Bliss, TX, page 64.
 National Guard Association Fact Sheet. Accessed 8 April 2018. https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf
 Texas Department of Public Safety. Operation Drawbridge. https://www.dps.texas.gov/PublicInformation/operDrawbrdg.htm
 Texas Legislative Budget Board. 2016. State Funding for Border Security 2006-07 Biennium through the 2016-17 Biennium. http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/Documents/HAC_Summary_Recs/84R/2218_Border_Security_Funding.pdf
 Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs. Counter Drug Task Force. Accessed 9 April 2018. https://dema.az.gov/joint-task-force-arizona/joint-counter-narcotics-task-force
 Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs. 2014. US CBP recognizes Arizona Soldiers’ contribution to border security. https://dema.az.gov/resources/news/us-cbp-recognizes-arizona-soldiers%E2%80%99-contribution-border-security
 National Guard. 2010. Inside the California Guard's border security mission. http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/586656/inside-the-california-guards-border-security-mission/
[xi] National Guard Association Fact Sheet. Accessed 8 April 2018. https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf
[xii] National Guard Association Fact Sheet. Accessed 8 April 2018. https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf
[xiii] National Guard Association Fact Sheet. Accessed 8 April 2018. https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf
[xiv] Larson, Eric V. and John E. Peters. 2001, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251.html
[xv] National Guard. Counterdrug. Accessed 10 April 2018. http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/Counterdrug%20Fact%20Sheet%20(Dec.%202017).pdf
[xvi] National Guard Regulation 500-2/Air National Guard Instruction 10-801. National Guard Counterdrug Support. 29 August 2008. http://www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubs/500/500_2_10-801.pdf
[xvii] Joint Task Force North. Accessed JTFN DoD Training Opportunities. Accessed 9 April 2018. http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/Support/Military-Training-Opportunities/
[xviii] Joint Task Force North. Accessed JTFN DoD Training Opportunities. Accessed 9 April 2018. http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/Support/Military-Training-Opportunities/
[xix] Joint Task Force North. Joint Task Force North - History. Accessed 9 April 2018.
[xx] Joint Task Force North. Joint Task Force North – Tri-Fold. Accessed 9 April 2018. http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/Portals/16/trifold%20Oct%202017%20A.pdf
[xxi] Dunn, Timothy J. 2001. Border, Militarization, Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications. Social Justice, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 7-30
[xxii] Dunn, Timothy J. 2001. Border, Militarization, Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications. Social Justice, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer), p. 12
[xxiii] Dunn, Timothy J. 2001. Border, Militarization, Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications. Social Justice, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer), p. 10
[xxiv] Dunn, Timothy J. 2001. Border, Militarization, Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications. Social Justice, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 7-30
[xxv] Joint Task Force North. 2015. Counterdrug Counter Narco-Terrorism Legal Authorities Handbook. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. Ft. Bliss, TX
[xxvi] Joint Task Force North. 2015. Counterdrug Counter Narco-Terrorism Legal Authorities Handbook. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. Ft. Bliss, TX
[xxvii] Bensman, Todd. 2018. The Ultra-Marathoners of Human Smuggling: How to Combat the Dark Networks that Can Move Terrorists over American Land Borders. Homeland Security Affairs. Vol XIV.
[xxviii] Joint Task Force North. 2015. Counterdrug Counter Narco-Terrorism Legal Authorities Handbook. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. Ft. Bliss, TX, page 15
[xxix] Joint Task Force North. 2015. Counterdrug Counter Narco-Terrorism Legal Authorities Handbook. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. Ft. Bliss, TX
[xxx] CJCIS. 3121.01B. Standing Rules for the use of Force for US Forces. Replicated in Joint Task Force North. 2015. Counterdrug Counter Narco-Terrorism Legal Authorities Handbook. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. Ft. Bliss, TX
[xxxi] National Defense Authorization Act. 2018.p. 715