by Hannah Gurman
Download the full article: Tribal Engagement and the Heavy History of Counterinsurgency Light
For months now, James Gant has been dreaming of returning to Afghanistan, where he served for nearly four years since 2003 as a Special Forces officer for the U.S. Army. "I feel like I was born there. The greatest days of my entire life were spent in the Pesch Valley and Musa Qalay and with the great Sitting Bull." In a short time, Gant's dream will come true. Although the army originally ordered him to Iraq, where Gant served from 2006-2007, it has now re-written his orders. Soon, he will return to Afghanistan to re-unite with Sitting Bull and pursue an alternative strategy to defeat the Taliban.
Gant first met Sitting Bull in April 2003, when he and his team of nine soldiers, mostly Special Forces officers, were deployed to the Konar Province of Afghanistan on orders to "kill and capture anti-coalition members." After successfully fighting off an attack in the first months of their deployment, they made their way over to the village of Mangwel, where they met the tribal doctor who agreed to introduce Gant and his team to the tribal elder. When they sat down, Sitting Bull, whose real name is Malik Noorafzhal, asked Gant why none of the other US forces passing through his village had ever stopped to talk to him. It was the beginning of Gant's self-described "journey of discovery" through which he and his team threw their fate in with Sitting Bull's tribe, fighting and negotiating alongside them to resolve decades-long land disputes between local tribes and build their capacity to defend themselves from the Taliban.
Gant has received much praise in the military for his work with the Afghan tribes. One senior military officer dubbed him "Lawrence of Afghanistan" after the larger-than-life British officer who fought alongside Arab tribes in their rebellion against the Ottoman empire. The similarity is evident in a personal photo of Gant in Afghanistan, in which he is wearing a long black robe and headdress, looking straight into the camera with a serious gaze and a strong sense of purpose. While the analogy to Lawrence was originally intended to underscore the incredible promise of Gant's vision and influence, it unwittingly reveals the links between Gant and the darker side of the history of counterinsurgency.
Download the full article: Tribal Engagement and the Heavy History of Counterinsurgency Light
Hannah Gurman is an assistant professor at New York University's Gallatin School and is in the early stages of a larger research project in an attempt to (re)institutionalize counterinsurgency in the U.S. military and foreign policy establishment.
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Comments
Ultimately, the goal is to transform Afghanistan -- sooner rather than later -- such that it (1) no longer poses a problem for the United States and the international community and (2) is made more compatible to our needs and those of the expanding global economy.
Do we believe that this can be best accomplished -- within the time required -- via or with benefit of MAJ Gant's "one tribe at a time" method? (Does MAJ Gant's approach actually work toward achieving the goals outlined above?)
Or do we believe that other methods are more appropriate to the tasks at hand?
For Mac McCallister:
EXCELLENT!!! Bravo I say!!!!
If I could be so bold as to add to your sentiments. We "westerners" all too often cater to a frame thought, or rather, indulge a contradictory and relativist frame of thought. One that is rooted elsewhere outside of Americanisms. I don't recall any post-WWII effort to establish civil society that has even come close to the "Jeffersonian model", but rather a view closer to a model that is seen in post WWII Europe etc. Hence my ealier references to the Atlantic consensus.
Too many bleat on about the death and destruction the west (translate: the Americans) has heaped upon the lessers of the earth. Too many have opined heavily that we have done because we don't understand other cultures etc., etc.
That same crowd, however while giving worshipful lip service to cultural understanding and our lack thereof etc., halt their insistence toward understanding when a culture clashes with the sacred cows of western liberal political sensibilities. (translate: Euro-global parlimentary social-democratic views)
Fully agree "being on side of the Afghan people" (neutralitist likely yes...?) is a horrific cop-out.
To throw more gas on that fire, I would love to have had Ms. Gurman get into her thoughts on neutrality, rather than rehashing the tired Karnow'ist view of so called American imperialist history. I believe that discussion would be very germane.
Interesting.
For what it's worth, to my knowledge there is no program anything like what Major Gant described in his paper in place, nor is there any intent by any of the current leaders to implement anything like what he described either.
In other words, it was a great experience, it's a great story well-told, but it is not a "strategy" and it is not a program of either intent or record. Soooo, no one needs to fear (and many clearly do) Major Gant's perspective from his experience.
Village Stability Operations, on the other hand, are showing tremendous promise in the various forms that they are manifesting into around Afghanistan. Each is designed to reinforce local institutions of governance and connect that inherent legitimacy to a GIROA at the District level that too often simply cannot or does not make it out to engage the populace. Village Stability is making those connections, fusing the legitimacy of the people with the officialness of GIROA, and it showing promising signs of helping to stabilize some critical communities. This is not "tribal" so much as it is "community", building on tribal structures, and connecting them where they exist, but rooted in the community itself and getting past the major limitations of dividing engagement on tribal lines.
My thoughts. Otherwise I second everything Dave Maxwell has laid down on this thread.
"You act like AWK is the biggest problem in Afghanistan."
Ian, I obviously have to spell everything out for you. I personally dont care about AWK nor do I believe that he is the biggest problem in Afghanistan. I mention AWK to describe the Karzai administrations clear-hold-build and consolidate strategy currently in play. But I guess you missed this point in my previous post so I will repeat again...
When the Karzai administration picks a close relative to administer a province it "clears" the field of competitors. The Karzai relative then enters into relevant patronage relationships with local allies to "hold" and control territory. The members of the newly established patronage network then "build", expand and consolidate their control... The Karzai administration now controls Kandahar. Could this be a reason why the local administration and Kabul are less than enthusiastic about our proposed military operations in the area?
Now, lets take it one step further... President Karzai is also allied with Karzai loyalist (for now) Gul Agha Sherzai, Governor of Nangahar province who has successfully undermined the local poppy economy and now controls the distribution of development aid to assist in consolidating his position and power in the province.
President Karzai through AWK is also allied with Matiullah Khan in Uruzgan province. Matiullah Khan controls the northern approaches (trade routes) into Kandahar and staging areas into Hazara territory. His militias will eventually be integrated into the central government security forces (if history is an indication for how local strongmen are integrated into the state security apparatus).
President Karzai is presently engaged in direct and indirect negotiations with select Taliban factions to exploit the movements more ambitious leaders and inherent rivalries. Like it or not this is the way the locals nation-build and none of your great ideas are going to change the way the locals do business.
I actually give President Karzai a hell of a lot more credit for how he is executing his "clear-hold-build and consolidate" strategy then his naysayers. But then all that is needed to bring peace to Afghanistan and for the Karzai government to be considered legitimate is for him to eliminate corruption, distribute basic services and counseling to the great unwashed masses and to administer the rule of law equitably amongst all Afghans... just like we do in the United States.
Since you appear to loathe the Afghan way what are you willing to do to make your dreams of a more perfect union come true in Afghanistan? We did succeed in changing German and Japanese political culture. Why not in Afghanistan? Maybe the reason we succeeded in Germany and Japan is that we totally destroyed two industrialized nation-states (nuked one country twice) and totally crushed and discredited the ideologies that fueled the insanity. Have we crushed and discredited the ideology that fuels the Taliban insanity or that fuels the desire of the locals to conduct business in their own way? How many more Afghans will have to die to make your vision of a peaceful Afghanistan come true? If history is any indication, the mother-may-I approach you propose will only prolong the blood-shed and misery.
You and I fundamentally disagree... I see your "logic of violence in civil wars" (Kalyvas) and raise you "give war a chance" (Luttwak) so as to be done with it. Pick a damn side and please dont tell me "the people of Afghanistan." Your approach guarantees that we will be engaged in a generational war!
The saving grace is that the Afghans are actually working it out despite all our protestations that we should all just get along.
MAC
Ms. Gurman,
I would never advocate the military be the lead agency for human rights efforts, especially in light of the non-existence of any real and meaningful legal framework for the implementation of such an effort. Not sure there should be either,
Most of us here have a pretty good grasp of what realist terms are and the results of cost/benefit analysis. I find it interesting that when it comes down to brass tacks, most know somebody's gotta die and somebody ain't. It is really that draconian and dispassionate isn't it...
I will say this regarding neutrality; those espousing such a concept rely on the good graces of someone else having to come and clean up the resulting mess. Need I mention "who" that someone might be?
At the risk of being equally pedantic, your reference to George Ball's alternative just reinforced the "Atlantic Consensus" thingy. At the same time Ball was lamenting the presence of, and reliance on "white troops", and pointing out that the RVN was not performing, the UK was successfully bringing an end to its handling of the "Malaya emergency."
We were in Vietnam because of the "Atlantic Consensus" to insure that NATO, the shortlived SEATO treaty, and other cold war commitments were meaningful; and to invoke the UN charters and all the other altruistic pursuits of maintaining an eye single to the end state of universal human rights for all etc. All the meantime others within that concensus were just readjusting their colonial applications.
In the case of Afghanistan it is certainly very useful to assess the historical effects of empire(s). I would include the ancient (and resurgent) ones at the top of the list. The Afgani's are likely more familiar with Iskandar Shah, the various forms of Persia, the Mongols, the Mogols et al, than they are with American empires... Our view of history must not be single focused.
Finally and to track along a similar statement made by COL Maxwell earlier; we did commit in excess of 300K troops, limit the bombing in the North, and implemented many of the things that Ball recommended. And to what end? It would be equally shortsighted, in the other direction, not to see if Gant's recommendations have merit.
Not as an attempt to re-engage Hannah with whom I somewhat agree, particularly on the inadvisability of 'counterinsurgency' but just a general comment on her last paragraph:
Having seen Ball's dissents and ideas at the time, I believe they had some merit but he was an internationalist whereas, rightly or wrongly, the large majority of Americans are not. Lyndon was wholeheartedly with that majority and Ball was thus doomed to have no influence.
Ball was allegedly fond of the quote""Nothing propinks like propinquity." The message in that is no matter how good your message, if you cannot get close enough to the seat of power to influence decisions, you should sell your ideas to someone who can get close.
However, there are some who are too elitist or concerned with credit to do that, thus a lot of good ideas go wanting. Pity...
LPierson:
I will make this my last comment, as I think I have responded as best I can to the basic critique of my piece.
It was not my intention to condescend to readers of SWJ, but rather to put some current issues of action into a critical historical and conceptual perspective. The premise is that any good debate about courses of action stands to benefit from an occasional reflection on the fraught history and conceptual ambiguities of counterinsurgency. To that end, I appreciate comments about the selectivity of my historical narrative and conceptual framework.
The purpose of my article was to raise uncomfortable and still unanswered questions about the doctrine and practice of counterinsurgency, not to advocate an alternative approach. I share your concerns about the human rights paradigm and in any case would caution against the military leading the way in a human rights based effort. We could have a longer discussion about neutrality, which, if set in realist terms, would have to balance costs and benefits of specific situations.
On the issue of debating courses of action, at the risk of sounding pedantic, I would recommend some reflection on George Ball's dissent against Vietnam between 1964-66. He had a course of action, but LBJ and others saw it as defeatist, and therefore labeled it inaction. That was an unfortunately narrow and ultimately short-sighted perspective.
I am chiming in late.
I didn't find the literary technique Ms. Gurman used to engage the folks here at SWJ as indicative of an important effort, nor productive in its result. I did however, find this piece really shrill and condescending in MANY ways.
There isn't a single individual writing here that isn't historically astute, historically well read, nor lacking in academic credential. And most of us are even adults. So I didn't get the intent of the delivery method.
The articulating of an assumption that we are unwittingly, or wittingly for that matter, engaged in a push toward colonial domination exists within a very small community. That same community exercises a significant degree of hedgemony when it comes to discussion. In truth it isn't discussion in an objective form, but rather a manifestation of an attempt to "educate" regarding the folly of a position. In this case the US is wrong for being in Afghanistan.
The continued notion that the likes of us needing to be convinced that war is not the answer lacks foundation. It is a wearisome position.
It is also not helpful especially in light of significant swaths of territory on this globe that are ungoverned, period. AND those areas provide too many spaces for lethal mischief. Sorry, this may hurt the tender sensitivity of washed academia, but lethal mischief isn't something that goes away because we Americans stop being "imperial" or less arrogant.
Speaking to topics such as neutrality, and democratic discussion that must include women and human rights point to a certain paragigm; a paradigm that could easily be argued as being as much the problem as so called American Colonial design. Neutrality did what to prevent Rwandan genocide? Neutrality has done what to prevent the genocide in Darfur? It could be easily argued that neutrality is not conducive in denying space to those who will do us harm. In fact it could easily be argued with substantial evidence that neutrality led to others not being engaged to prevent the use of ungoverned spaces by those with harmful intent.
Aditionally, the concept of human rights as defined by the charter is as foreign to most in this world as the concept of cows ropin' cowboys. While there is significant lip service given, most outside of the "Alantic Consensus" crowd intend to invoke human rights as a tool for use against that consensus. Thus why the mention of said items in the article? (Rhetorical question)
Productive and important talk across idealogical and experiential differences can be amusing and entertaining. Of course, I will not deny anyone the opportunity to exercise their right of expression here at SWJ, Ms. Gurman knock yourself out. However, we here thrive in debating courses of action. I challenge you to be a part of that kind of discussion.
Hannah,
You are correct. I hate to admit it, but the rules of logical argument (and friendly debate) compel me to admit you are correct in your assertion that the no better friend, no worse enemy is misapplied. I lament the insitutional tendency of the DoD to gravitate toward lethal action in the face of a situation that does not necessarily require it. COIN is such a situation. It is that tendency, in my opinion, that leads to the no better friend, no worse enemy concept being misunderstood and, by extension, misapplied. I am at a loss for a remedy to this phenomenon. However, I remain committed to my initial position, which is no better friend, no worse enemy is a solid approach not only to COIN but to foreign policy in general. Thanks for the thoughts.
I would suggest that Tajikistan, for Dushanbe's own reasons, plays a role in the proxy war of Afghanistan, just as other regional rivals do.
Tajikistan was quite adept at figuring out a solution for Tajikistan, but that doesn't mean that India/Tajikistan's support for a policy supporting Tajiks in Afghanistan will lead to peace there. Perhaps quite the opposite.
Oh good, I'm glad this comment thread has devolved back into a debate over MAC's and my ideas, rather than the topic at hand.
You act like AWK is the biggest problem in Afghanistan. He is not. The biggest problem in Afghanistan is the profound distrust of the American presence in Afghanistan among the population at large, which sees no benefits from us. If anything, they see us as having brought a situation of degraded security and the favoring of self-appointed "elders" (read small-scale warlords) over the usual ways of doing business.
There is overwhelming evidence that local conflicts are exacerbated by what we are doing in Afghanistan. Local conflicts are the feeders to the larger fight generally, as a brief perusal of Kalyvas will show--but also especially in Afghanistan because of how local conflicts .
The only role the central government has had in the past in many rural areas in Afghanistan has been to provide an outlet for local conflicts that can't be resolved by the traditional means. Now that outlet for young men is to run across the border and get arms, then come back as "Taliban." The outlet for traditional conflicts desperately needs not to be that.
Should I keep going? The next thing I'm going to say might be upsetting: that the US military doesn't have the capabilities or the legitimacy to start talking seriously about reconciling local conflicts. I will continue if there's demand.
To Carl Prine's very spot-on remarks about Afghanistan having spent the last several decades perfecting the art of keeping the exogenous juices flowing by way of war: fine, but countries somehow figure a way out of the situation (Tajikistan for example). It would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility of getting out of the vicious cycle, even if Afghanistan's looks unbelievably vicious right now.
Carl, if the MAC you refer to in your post is me then we will not go round and round... I agree wholeheartedly with you that there are many "populations" in play in this conflict. I also agree that those in the Goat poo-spackled villages of Astan may actually be the least important that we face. Change that... they are the least important that we face.
We are all modelistas and in order to hold a conversation necessarily speak in abstractions... but this does not mean that we dont acknowledge the complexity of it all... I very much embrace it. "Oh, solidarity groups all around".
You say that "the goal of the various Taliban militias, feral bands, "security" groups and armed tribal syndicates ultimately might not be about keeping people from sliding off their fences in a contest of wills, but rather ensuring that no matter what happens the money keeps rolling in." EXACTLY... this is why a mother-may-I / social work approach to ERADICATING this type of threat is unlikely to work...
r/
MAC
Finally... Ian provides an alternative. Since we are incapable of judging local disputes, it will have to be the Afghans judging local disputes with us there making sure theyre not on the take and with an enforcement mechanism looming in the background.
Sounds great Ian, could you describe what this enforcement mechanism will look like? What are the rules, institutions and procedures you seek to impose on the locals to enforce your standards of conduct? Tell me, how is your system going to control Ahmed Wali Karzai? Are you going to dismiss him? What if he doesnt want to listen to your "mother-may-I" pleadings to stop his corrupt behavior? Will you task your enforcement mechanism looming in the background to eradicate him and his ilk? Or will a concerted reeducation campaign to change the behavior of the likes of the Ahmed Wali Karzais of Afghanistan do the trick?
What I am asking you is to explain the structure and manning of this "making sure theyre not on the take" organization you propose to establish to monitor the locals so they adhere to your concept of proper behavior.
You are going to have to pick a side when you are monitoring the locals to make sure they are not on the take, are you not? Or are you proposing a free-flow friends to all, respected by none approach to dealing with the locals?
What is this enforcement mechanism you speak off? How many folks will it take to man this organization and who will pull the trigger on this enforcement mechanism when a local politician doesnt want to play by your rules? Maybe public opinion will get Ahmed Wali Karzai to change his ways... I am not going to hold my breath... you can if you like.
What does... . "I will just remind readers once again that dispute resolution is the terrain on which the Taliban are beating us, not frontal assaults on our forts. And, the bickering is incessant until the TB judge sets them straight with the threat of violence backing it up"... even mean? You are the one that is talking about an enforcement mechanism looming in the background.
Abstractions are great in a make-believe world. But we are living in the real world. Somebody has to execute your concepts Ian... why don't you explain how your abstraction might play themselves out in the real world. I take that back... no need to explain... you are not in the execution business... you are an idea man.
No need to apologize... you don't hurt my feelings.
Hugs,
MAC
"The population in COIN sits on the fence while waiting to see in which direction the scale of power will tip."
This statement posits many things that might or might not be true in most of today's intra-state conflicts, most especially in Afghanistan.
Perhaps the truly shocking observation would be that the population doesn't matter so much in Afghanistan, or that the population that's really the COG is in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, which puts to some lie prognostications about the seamless prosecution of a pop-centric COIN campaign on the left hand side of the Durand Line.
Mac and I will go around and around on this, but I contend that like the Mujahidin wars of a generation past, there are many "populations" in play in this conflict, and those in the goat poo-spackled villages of Afghanistan might be the least important that we face.
Perhaps one reason why our efforts haven't worked isn't because of a lack of resources (or time, or cultural immersion, or tribalzing the conflict, or teaching Raj-style governance to the Karzai kleptocracy), but rather because the people upon whom we focus so much attention aren't so much sitting on a fence but rather pawning off our development largess to the guerrillas, becoming really just another endogenous input to them.
They're not so much the fish through which the guerrilla swims but, mixing different fauna metaphors, their pigeons, upon whom they derive some benefit by shaking them down for cash.
The goal of the various Taliban militias, feral bands, "security" groups and armed tribal syndicates ultimately might not be about keeping people from sliding off their fences in a contest of wills, but rather ensuring that no matter what happens the money keeps rolling in.
If exogenous inputs double from donations, or by skimming off misguided ISAF developmental projects, or because of rising smack prices, regardless of attitudinal adjustments triggered by US measures of force and suasion, can we say the old Classic COIN model is dead?
In which case, Gant's sincere words are used by elites in DC and across NATO simply to sell endemic bloodletting. This is not what Gant wants, but it might be what they do.
Matt: If I have misrepresented the no better friend, no worse enemy concept, then that is partly because practitioners of the concept have also misrepresented it. I have heard and read officers describe the challenge of fight...talk...fight, explaining that in some cases, the object of both actions were the same people. So while I see some semblance of coherence in your description, I don't think that coherence applies in practice or even in theory across the board.
Ms. Gurman has misrepresented the concept of "No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy". She implies American forces are attempting to be both a friend and enemy to the Pashtu, which she reckons is tantamount to the same duality coalition forces complain of among their Pashtu coutnerparts. Ms. Gurman is wrong here either because she is intellectually immoral or simply ignorant of the concept. No better friend, no worse enemy is a choice offered to the population, not a dual-pronged approach to COIN. The population in COIN sits on the fence while waiting to see in which direction the scale of power will tip. When Americans say there is no better friend or worse enemy than themseleves, they are advertising their dual skill sets as friend or ally, and providing the choice to the population. The Roman Army at its zenith was, in the words of Gibbon, as likely to offer insult as it was to tolerate it. From my view point, the no better friend, no worse enemy ethos is a 21st century version of that same mentality, and it is wholly appropriate in COIN today.
MAC,
I bear no grudges, and I'm barely wise enough, but just enough, to know that there's no winning or losing in blog comments, only getting the last comment. So, I wholeheartedly invite you or anyone else to give me a better verb than "eradicate" to describe what Major Gant's tribal allies did to their tribal enemies. Is "kill" better? This is an entirely separate point, anyway.
"we will be engaged forevermore in mediating between rival communities and their incessant bickering"
No, not "we"--this is the thing about our current heavy emphasis on building up military capabilities like ANA and local militias while not working at all on civilian capabilities. But the way things are now, there will be no one to leave any dispute resolution process to when we leave, but there will be also sorts of crazy-eyed military folks to whom we will leave the Hobbesian war of all against all. We do not have the capability to judge local disputes, it will have to be Afghans with us there making sure they're not on the take and with an enforcement mechanism looming in the background.
I will just remind readers once again that dispute resolution is the terrain on which the Taliban are beating us, not frontal assaults on our forts. And, the bickering is incessant until the TB judge sets them straight with the threat of violence backing it up.
Also, I apologize for executing a clear-hold-build strategy on you.
I don't see MAC saying anything about "clear-hold-build" but I do see him, along with Major Gant, saying all sorts of things about re-engineering local communities.
Ian, you really need to listen better. You really dont hear the "clear-hold-build" refrain when I explain that there also exists a "pick a side and hold your nose" option? If you would take the time to meditate, contemplate and concentrate on the matter instead of developing straw men for you to knock down, you might recognize that "clear-hold-build" isnt exactly new or original. It is actually inherent in everything we do. For example, when the Karzai administration picks a close relative to administer a province it "clears" the field of competitors. The Karzai family member then enters into relevant patronage relationships with local allies to "hold" and control territory. The members of the newly established patronage network then "build", expand and consolidate their control. You are actually executing a "clear-hold-and build" strategy yourself when you target the likes of me and Jim Gant.
I propose that it isnt the colonial/imperial modelistas that are attempting to re-engineer local communities but people like you. The traditional colonial/imperial modelistas, like me, do not want to change how the locals behave but want to exploit the behavior. I personally see no benefit in remaining in Afghanistan for the next generation to "socially re-engineer" the locals to think like us or you for that matter. Your "re-engineer" accusation is based on a total misunderstanding or worse willful misapplication of what I actually wrote. I fear that in your drive to win this argument at all cost you are cherry picking and manipulating my comments in the worst way. Don't lose your soul brother... or you will become just like what you hate the most... someone like me.
"Divide, defeat, and depart" is my latest personal motto, especially when I consider the ramifications of your recommendations of not picking sides, not abandoning communities and to mediate and assist in resolving local disputes. If too many others buy into this pipe-dream, we will never depart Afghanistan since, unable to pick a side we will be engaged forevermore in mediating between rival communities and their incessant bickering.
"You surely do not approve of the Gant/MAC idea of picking tribal sides and eradicating large Pashtun groups we designate as disloyal".
Eradicate, really? What a silly, intellectually lazy, and downright dishonest statement. Are you running out of cogent arguments and only left with emotional appeals?
Finally... "I'm pretty reluctant to say "Give us an alternative, then!" because that is the default SWJ Blog comment on things that are critical of the tribal deal" ... Ian, please get over it...The request by me for you to provide an alternative instead of only criticism sure hasnt stopped you from spouting your suck or pushing an ideology or policy agenda.
MAC
Hannah, I guess we're just going to disagree that "clear-hold-build" is necessarily imperial. Also, I don't see MAC saying anything about "clear-hold-build" but I do see him, along with Major Gant, saying all sorts of things about re-engineering local communities. It's important to say that these two approaches are very different, and I'm quite opposed to the latter.
I'm pretty reluctant to say "Give us an alternative, then!" because that is the default SWJ Blog comment on things that are critical of the tribal deal. But, come on: Rumsfeld's decisions took the Afghanistan mission all the way to 2008. The current effort in Afghanistan is in great part a cleanup of that mess. I will give you enough credit to assume that you've considered the grave, certainly lethal implications of a quick NATO withdrawal for large portions of the non-Pashtun population there. You've ruled out counterinsurgency as bearing the ethical legacy of Trinquier in Algeria. You surely do not approve of the Gant/MAC idea of picking tribal sides and eradicating large Pashtun groups we designate as disloyal. Are you one of MAC's modernizationalists, with blind faith in the inexorable march towards democracy and capitalism everywhere? Something tells me you're not.
So, out of curiosity, no pressure, but do you have any bright ideas? I have written critical comments of Gant and MAC on other SWJ posts where I propose not picking sides but also not abandoning communities, instead foregrounding civilian forces with military backup whose job it is to resolve local disputes that feed into the larger conflict. Is that imperialist too?
Hannah,
I enjoyed your article. I wish there was more debate over what we're actually doing in Afghanistan, and I think that your article adds to that debate. But, as Carl Prine and COL Maxwell have suggested, it is better to leave Jim Gant out of the strategic debate. He has simply written about his experience and passionately defended an alternative viewpoint to the zero-sum argument of Pop-Centric COIN versus Counter-Terrorism. He is not alone. As I stated in my initial post, I believe we would be better off if more SF officers would articulate what FID is through their own experiences.
OK, back to your piece. I'm putting on my academic hat :).
First, if we're going to use an analogy to critique, then I'd probably go with Daniel Dravot, a Man who would be King. I've found this character to best appropriate the difficulties of nation/empire building as described by Peachey Carnehan in a dank, dim-lit British Pub. Their initial search for adventure, glory, and fame transposed with their ultimate failure serves as a great analogy for those who would wish to transform other cultures.
Second, there's a resurgence of critique against T.E. Lawrence. Some are beginning to argue that he was nothing more than an elite self-promoter. The basis of this thought is that their is no record of Faisil or any other Arab supporting his narrative. From this viewpoint, Lawrence may have just served as a passenger along for the ride making up his stories of gradieur after the fact. Contrastingly, Gant's work is backed by Sitting Bull. Gant and Stephen Pressfield managed to get an on-going discussion from the tribal elder on Pressfield's website.
Finally, dressing up in native attire does not equate to "going native." Prof. Anna Simons of NPS argues that assimilating into other cultures through wearing the clothes, adopting the customs, sharing food, etc is just another way to shape one's environment and accomplish one's objective. She goes on to define "going native" as a point in time where you take on the local's goals when they become in direct conflict with your nation's goals.
Mike
Ian: I agree with MAC's implied point that the clear hold build strategy has colonial/imperial implications (although I don't see that as mutually exclusive to a modernization approach). In a realist sense, the question then becomes one of cost-benefit, in terms of US national interest.
Dave: I take your point about the differences you highlight between Gant and Lansdale. Perhaps I should have been clearer about these differences, as well as the serious challenge facing anyone who wants to make tribal/community engagement a more comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan.
However, I don't think these caveats undermine the fundamental conceptual comparisons about friendship/partnering etc that I draw between Gant's/Lansdale's/Lawrence's imagination of the site of conflict. And while your attempt to parse out a difference between US-led COIN and HN-led COIN makes sense in theory, it is more problematic in practice, as this difference is often in the eye of the beholder.
Thanks for the challenging conversation.
"I was thinking of very old times, when the Romans first came here, nineteen hundred years ago--the other day .... Night came out of this river since -- you say Knights? Yes; but it is like a running blaze on a plain, like a flash of lightning in the clouds. We live in the flicker -- may it last as long as the old earth keeps rolling! But darkness was here yesterday. Imagine the feelings of a commander of a fine -- what d'ye call 'em? -- trireme in the Mediterranean, ordered suddenly to the north; run overland across the Gauls in a hurry; put in charge of one of these craft the legionaries, -- a wonderful lot of handy men they must have been too -- used to build, apparently by the hundred, in a month or two, if we may believe what we read. Imagine him here -- the very end of the world, a sea the color of lead, a sky the color of smoke, a kind of ship about as rigid as a concertina -- and going up this river with stores, or orders, or what you like. Sandbanks, marshes, forests, savages,--precious little to eat fit for a civilized man, nothing but Thames water to drink. No Falernian wine here, no going
ashore. Here and there a military camp lost in a wilderness, like a needle in a bundle of hay -- cold, fog, tempests, disease, exile, and
death, -- death skulking in the air, in the water, in the bush. They must have been dying like flies here. Oh yes--he did it. Did it very well, too, no doubt, and without thinking much about it either, except afterwards to brag of what he had gone through in his time, perhaps. They were men enough to face the darkness. And perhaps he was cheered by keeping his eye on a chance of promotion to the fleet at Ravenna by-and-by, if he had good friends in Rome and survived the awful
climate. Or think of a decent young citizen in a toga--perhaps too much dice, you know--coming out here in the train of some prefect, or tax-gatherer, or trader even, to mend his fortunes. Land in a swamp, march through the woods, and in some inland post feel the savagery, the utter savagery, had closed round him,--all that mysterious life of the wilderness that stirs in the forest, in the jungles, in the hearts of wild men. There's no initiation either into such mysteries. He has to live in the midst of the incomprehensible, which is also detestable. And it has a fascination, too, that goes to work upon him. The fascination of the abomination -- you know. Imagine the growing regrets, the longing
to escape, the powerless disgust, the surrender, the hate."
Dr. Gurman,
I disagree with the comparison of MAJ Gant and Gen Lansdale. I do not think that there is much to compare there. I am well aware that MAJ Gant's paper argues that tribal engagement is the best way to achieve success but I also think that his paper was also written (perhaps as your paper) to stimulate debate. We are not going to see MAJ Gant's tribal engagement concepts executed as written. We have already seen variations and incarnations of his paper dating back to 2002. We have seen the Afghan Public Protection Program, the Community Defense Initiative, the Local Defense Initiative and now Village Stability Operations. What MAJ Gant's paper did was bring to the mainstream efforts that many have advocated for a long time but for which there was little to no support. So he has moved the ball down the field in a positive way in my opinion. But I think he will be the first to say that none of his concepts will have any value unless they are part of a larger, broader and more holistic campaign plan supporting a coherent strategy. Despite what he wrote in his paper his concepts are not a stand alone strategy. MAJ Gant wrote passionately from his experience and because of that passion and his operational experience he was able to influence the debate.
I also do not think that it is fair to compare him to Lansdale either. Although both are/were advisors, they were operating at two very different levels e.g., tactical versus strategic.
As I have noted in my previous comments, I believe that the "romanticization" of COIN has caused us some problems and that the US unilateral execution of COIN really falls into the realm of pacification. I believe we should only be supporting the COIN efforts of friends, partners, and allies otherwise we subvert the host nation legitimacy that we are supposedly striving for as per FM 3-24.
I guess my real beef is the use of MAJ Gant as your foil to argue your point. I think that MAJ Gant's concepts can play a role in supporting Afghanistan's counterinsurgency operations (iwth US support) but they cannot be totally wrapped up in the tribes. Sometimes we will have to substitute village or district for tribes and even when dealing with tribes there are likely to be significant differences in how to support operations. I do not think that MAJ Gant's concepts illustrate the problems we have with COIN doctrine and in fact actually have the potential to better support local COIN operations, e.g., those of the host nation than any unilateral pacification operations.
I would argue that Hannah's piece seems to implicitly accept the modern, or postmodern, idea that the exercise of power by one group of human beings over another is intrinsically morally wrong, defining power as the ability to inflict pain, suffering, and anguish on other human beings. Why must we accept this? Why are imperialism, colonialism, conquest, intrinsically wrong, regardless of time, place, and where one stands? Imperialism and colonial influence bring both benefits and costs to the peoples subject to them, and have throughout history. If one takes this point of view, then whether or not our actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else are imperialistic or colonialist are unimportant. The only relevant question is whether our interests are served by them.
Ian: I agree that there is real anxiety amongst many strategists regarding the imperial/colonial implications of COIN in Afghanistan. And I agree that MAJ Gant/Lansdale represent just one, albeit illuminating, manifestation of COIN. The central theoretical question I posed here is whether or not it is possible to transcend the contradictions inherent in the doctrine and history. I do think it's worthwhile to unravel this question in a longer and more detailed study, the details of which may be more revealing than the conclusion. But that probably wouldn't change the short answer to the question posed above. While I might disagree with his policy recommendation, I actually think that MAC's framework is correct.
Ian, I think we might be talking apples and oranges. From my reading, Hannah was discussing the philosophical arguments behind COIN, and maybe a slippery slope where she thinks it inevitably leads (I'd find the latter part of that argument unconvincing without substantially more evidence than we have here). When I make note of how many times high-level and widely respected counterinsurgency strategists draw analogies to Imperial Rome, that's what I'm making note of--not that at a practical level a company commander is thinking, "What Would A Roman Centurion Do?"
In fact, if you recall back to my response to Kilcullen's 2008 post on the Imperial imperatives behind road construction, I was strongly critical, and you agreed strongly with that criticism. Don't put words in my mouth.
"All policy has a cultural foundation and fantastical lay anthropology was a key part of the foundation of colonial policy. I juxtaposed them because they are actually associated."
Lay anthropology happened, in fact, to be a key part of colonial policy in some instances, I don't dispute that; that does not necessitate, logically, that it is in all instances. That is my point about your juxtapositions.
I think a serious examination of the position of many political and military decision-makers--even self-professed counterinsurgents--would uncover a deep anxiety, a strong majority dissenting view, of long-term occupations. Not even the most adamant counterinsurgent wants to see patrols in Kunar past 2016. I mean, Josh, do you really think a downrange captain thinks about the Roman empire as he goes about his daily routine--really? Maybe he reads Galula before his deployment, but it hardly implies the intellectual baggage you're talking about. (As opposed to people whose untethered intellectual flights of fancy sell books and garner high-paying consultancies, like Kilcullen, let's face it--he makes money off these wars with his "Roman empire" and "tribal triads" or whatever.)
Hannah, you're in an extremely good position to do just such an examination of this anxiety of imperial influence, judging by what I found of your academic background. Which is why I find it somewhat infuriating that you've done a surface job here, using throwaway words like "imperialism" and "occupation" in place of a bit of heavy lifting, which would have revealed some more interesting analysis of the individuals and groups working the bureaucratic levers trying to prevent the nightmare scenario you're describing (American empire, supplanting local interests with our own in Paktika.)
Otherwise, I think you and Major Gant make the same mistake--one anecdotal case presented as somehow exemplary or typical.
The question is not how tribal engagement departs from the colonial/imperial model since it doesn't. The question should be why all the noble efforts of the modernizationists are failing in Afghanistan?
Modernization theory, the basis for our COIN doctrine, assumes that there exist a number of social and behavioral patterns, regardless of cultural context, which if tweaked correctly, will lead inexorably to a modern democratic behavior. The theory further assumes that there also exists a single, unilinear path of social development, which culminates in a system that looks like a Western democracy... All that is needed is a technical blueprint to change Afghanistan's social makeup. How is that theory working for us? How much closer are we to achieving our goals of a democratic state that respects human rights, women, children and pets? Ten years and counting ... how much longer for the social work approach for imposing a Western form of governance or defeating the Taliban to finally work?
Maybe the reason why lay anthropologists of the more fantastical variety such as Major Jim Gant and me might embrace the colonial/imperial model is that it actually resonates with the locals and the modernizationist/social work approach to "fixing" Afghanistan does not. There is nothing romantic about the colonial/imperial approach nor should it be since there is nothing pretty about frontier warfare. If you want romance, read Karl May (Old Shatterhand).
The popular press and the more enlightened intellectuals among us explain that all that is needed to win this war is for the Karzai government to eliminate corruption, distribute basic services and administer the rule of law equitably among all Afghans. Sounds easy but why can't we make it work? Now we are hearing from some of the very same folks who embrace the idea of an Afghan welfare state recommending we remove Karzai for the good of the Afghan people. What has failed here? Karzai the man or the ideology we seek to impose upon his country?
Show me the successes of the modernizationists and Ill be more than happy to back off my colonial/imperial -divide, defeat and depart approach... but I wont hold my breath.
There are no long-term solutions in Afghanistan and since we are unable to impose our convictions are left with a mother-may-I approach against strategists who will cut your throat to gain a political advantage. President Karzai trembles at our recommendation that he be a better tyrant to his people. He appears to have options... we don't.
MAC
Thanks for the posts re: occupation, sovereignty, and colonialism: Joshua, EJR and Dave. You each make the point better than I do.
Incidentally, the fact that Dave mentions Lansdale and Magsaysay as a possible alternative to the earlier coercive days of US-Philippines relationship suggests that my allusion to this episode was not just "easy fruit," as Carl Prine suggests. Thanks, Carl, for your other insightful comments.
Schmedlap: you joke, and i get it, but pathology metaphors are not actually so irrelevant or innocuous (pardon the pun). They were used all the time by Cold Warriors to defend an expansive and untenable interpretation of containment doctrine and the same could be said here with respect to COIN.
Truth in lending, I wrote the following last year here on Small Wars Journal:
"A Few Random Thoughts on COIN Theory and the Future" (or A Partial Response to the Small Wars Journal Weekend Homework Assignment!!!)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/a-few-random-thoughts-on-coin/
"However, the perception of the US military being in charge has led to sometimes counter-productive activities or actions by military forces and causes further conflict.
When US forces take the lead role using todays COIN theory and doctrine in actuality they are not conducting COIN since the insurgency is "not theirs to counter" because the responsibility to counter it should belong to the sovereign nation that is faced with insurgency. While the US can and must support the activities by correctly applying applicable COIN theory (adapted and adjusted for the unique culture and traditions and the conditions that exist in the conflict area) to support that sovereign nation, when the US takes the lead and pushes the host nation to a secondary role in its own country then the US takes on the role of occupier. They are conducting "pacification operations" causing the perception of being an occupying force more along the lines of the Captain Pershing in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th Century. The calls to read Brian McCallister Linn and his works on the Philippines perhaps have led some astray. The "Pershing model" in the Philippines is somewhat ironic because one of the goals of an insurgency can be to rid a nation of an occupying power and certainly by not granting the Filipinos their independence as had been promised made the US an occupier and the Philippines a US colony. This turn of the 20th Century model must be considered for updating and possibly replaced with a new more modern model for supporting the conduct of COIN by a sovereign nation vice the US conducting COIN in a sovereign nation. And perhaps we should be looking for a balance between Pershing at the turn of the century and Lansdale and Magsaysay in the middle of the 20th Century."
Kilcullen also compared insurgents and counterinsurgents to infections and antibodies, so I guess it's also not a stretch to say we've been compared to a hospital or large pharmaceutical company. And CNAS titled a paper "triage." Given these comparisons, I don't think anyone else would be entirely off in making allusions to a worldwide health care initiative.
I think we are a bit too sensitive about the use of "occupation." It should actually a pretty value neutral term and I think we should try to see it that way if we are going to understand what we are doing there and how we are seen by the Afghans.
Perhaps our "occupation" in Afghanistan is less robust than our days of the CPA in Iraq, but really how can we not say that our actions and presence--no matter how benign (or not) and well intentioned--does not in some way diminish the sovereignty of the GIRoA?
When I think back to some of my early days in Afghanistan, it would have to take a serious failure in imagination to fail to see how some Afghans for personal, political or other reasons could see us as occupiers.
We pretty much did whatever we wanted. I recall one pretty disturbing incident in which a district sub-governor of an unofficial district in the south was pretty much ousted in what can only be described as a USSF coup. Our guys orchestrated the whole event. The Provincial Governor was nominally in charge, but you could read the humiliation in his face as the old guy was run out and the new guy was brought into the Governor's office.
This was obviously an extreme case, but even now we have a great deal of freedom in what we do. Even if we don't want to stay there and even if we want the Afghans to take over, we have to understand that our dominating presence is going to bring with it some costs and generate some ill-will even if we are benign "occupiers."
Ian,
Just to muddy the waters a bit, I don't think Hannah is entirely off in making allusions to Empire building. After all, big thinkers the SWJ crowd admires, and who advise high-level policymakers on strategy and operations, men like David Kilcullen, have <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/political-maneuver-in-counteri… compared</a> our efforts in Afghanistan to Imperial Rome.
<blockquote>Like the Romans, counterinsurgents through history have engaged in road-building as a tool for projecting military force, extending governance and the rule of law, enhancing political communication and bringing economic development, health and education to the population...</blockquote>
Etc., etc. No mention on Kilcullen's part of the horrendous human costs involved in such endeavors, but that horse has been beaten to death already. Point is, the idea is certainly evident in a lot of thinking about COIN.
Perhaps this dispute could be settled, COL Maxwell, if we concede that the personal motivations of Gant were not limned.
I think it's fair for Hannah Gurman to hear the obvious echoes of some of Gant's words from colonialist best practices in small wars.
But I also think it's fair for someone who knows Gant to indicate how different his enterprise is from eons ago.
Upon saying that, however, would not the cachet from his immersion in tribal culture fail to be selling point when he offers policy choices to commanders such as McChrystal?
Even if we assume, as I do, that MAJ Gant sincerely believes that the bottom-up tribal security option is more attainable than the larger nation building adventure, does not his personal story help us believe it to be so? It certainly did with Lawrence.
With Lawrence, the ultimate strategy was the confection of a regional union of Arab tribes, a project later shelved so that colonial cartography could win out.
With Gant, the problem is more complex because we end up with two policies in a duel at 12 paces: McChrystal's maximalist goal to create a new liberal democratic government and market economy that's guaranteed by a federalized military and constabulary alongside tribal and other sorts of "security" elements that -- one might suggest -- conspire by their very existence against the larger goal.
In other words, a strategic muddle. This wasn't something that plagued the colonial project because the operational arts inherently supported imperial strategic goals.
I don't know Gant, but I know those who do and they swear to me that he's a decent, highly competent and genuinely good person. I have no reason to doubt this, and I certainly won't here.
But I think we must be careful about a tendency for many of us to resist questioning the motives of those creating policies, including our friends.
The COINdinista social scientists have no problem using the tools of their trade (many of which also invented during the era of colonial exploitation) to trace motives through a people amongst whom our military wages war against guerrillas, but dislike it when similar questions are posed to them.
But what could be more important than tracing their influences, connecting the dots of their linked networks, charting their financial or professional or intellectual ties to our counterinsurgency projects overseas?
While I believe MAJ Gant would stand up to that scrutiny -- he's really just applying FID best practices to non-state actors -- are we so sure about others? What about far above his paygrade, in the think tanks and Pentagon offices and ranks of the generals and their advisers, some of whom being corporate consultants?
It's not as if we haven't encountered this phenomenon before. This essay picks easy fruit with Lansdale, but there were many other neo-colonial "warrior-scholars" of Vietnam vintage who appeared to critics then to be, in the words of Eqbal Ahmad, "men who play with the lives and future of the masses in the manner of obsessed gamblers intent on a final win.
"There is much emphasis in their rhetoric on 'realism,' 'rationality,' and 'objectivity,' but they are rarely influenced by these characteristics in rejecting the realities that threaten the presumption of success.
"Their rationalizations lie more in the realm of political pathology than of 'objective' analysis. They tend to explain away their failures by pointing at flaws which underscore the need for 'greater effort' -- lack of execution, paucity of trained personnel, sabotage by politicans or conventional generals, and finally the failure of public will in the metropolitan country to sustain a protracted struggle."
Looking beyond Gant, could we apply some of Ahmad's trenchant criticism today to a few of the architects of US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan? Or is this considered out of bounds? Why should this be so? Is it her tone or her bonafides that disqualify Gurman from these topics?
If friends at SWJ or defense intellectuals in general won't ask hard questions about the style or motives of those proposing war policies, then it seems to me that you shall default the turf to historians,cultural critics and political scientists such as Hannah Gurman.
While I dispute some of what she writes (especially about Gant), much in her essay isn't exactly earth-shattering news, is it?
Ian:
Thanks for your post. I wanted to address your frustration with the fact that I associate the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan with occupation. Your argument relies heavily on the premise that we don't want to occupy Afghanistan. Therefore, it makes no sense to call it occupation.
I completely agree that no senior policy-maker/president wants to get stuck in Afghanistan. But therein lies the rub. At both the strategic and tactical level, population-centric COIN is premised on long-term occupation. And I think you actually hint at this when you argue that the US will pull away from COIN soon in AF-PAK. Isn't this partly because it isn't willing to follow through with a full-scale, long-term occupation?
Regarding analogies, I have to say I don't really understand the problem with juxtaposing lay anthropology and colonialism. All policy has a cultural foundation and fantastical lay anthropology was a key part of the foundation of colonial policy. I juxtaposed them because they are actually associated.
In terms of how this connection relates to US policy, it is important to point out that I am only responding to analogies that COIN doctrine itself stresses. In other words, I'm not inventing the connection between past and present counterinsurgency, but just responding to the connections that FM 3-24 etc makes and pointing out some of the less sanitized and self-serving aspects of that connection.
"Misguided action is almost always worse than inaction."
You'll find me in complete agreement with this statement. Where I think you'll lose people here (as I admit I have) is that your insistence on calling this an occupation, which kind of elides the history of the conflict which is so well-known to even the most casual observer.
The issue in your last response is that it disavows a key section in your paper: that "the current counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan" has "blatantly colonial aspects" (p. 4) and must be the result of Afghanistan being an "object of imperial desire for centuries" (p. 5). I view these claims as completely inaccurate. And I interpret your making the "action" ideology somehow equivalent to your own as an implicit acknowledgment that you've come to this with a strong bias.
You make connections between lay anthropology of the more fantastical variety, such as that of Gant and McCallister, and colonialist policies by putting them in the same sentence. Adjacency is not an argument, and ethical problems don't necessarily arise because of your decision to juxtapose these things, or, in the case of your comment, your decision to mention U.S. policy and Jim Gant in the same breath. One might say that you are making the same error of analogy across time and space that the objects of your critique do.
Before I respond to the criticisms posted above, I want to address the issue of community--not in terms of Afghanistan, but in terms of the people who read and contribute to SWJ.
Coming from the "one of the rarefied bastions of academia on Manhattan," as SFex put it, it might have made more sense for me to publish this piece in The Nation, Huffington Post, or some other venue where many of the readers share my views.
I submitted this post to SWJ because I think it is important and productive to talk across ideological and experiential differences.
I have no illusions about transcending these differences, but I do hope that it's possible to exchange ideas with a degree of mutual respect. Otherwise, there's no point.
Along these lines, I acknowledge the comments (from Ian, zenpundit, and SFex) that underscore my own ideological assumptions about colonialism, American imperialism, and the history of counterinsurgency. Without dismissing these critiques, I would like to clarify a bit. My main point is not that the U.S. seeks empire in Afghanistan, as Ian suggests, but rather that strategy we are following is based on a colonial/imperial model that is replete with many of the contradictions that characterize colonial governance. So, even if the U.S. (and Gant) don't have colonial aspirations, they reproduce some of the same practical and ethical problems that plagued counterinsurgency operations of the past. I argue that these parallels suggest a deep conceptual flaw and blindness in the strategy of counterinsurgency. Except for Dave Maxwell, none of the comments posted above even attempts to argue how tribal engagement departs from the colonial/imperial model or divests itself of the terminology and assumptions of that model.
Finally, so long as we are talking about entrenched ideologies, I think it is important to point out that the "action" bias is also ideological. Yes, I take stabs at Gant and all US policy in Afghanistan without actually offering an alternative or doing anything to improve the situation myself. Fair enough. Obviously, the US needs to have some policy toward Afghanistan. But, when the stakes are so high, as they are in Afghanistan, it doesn't make sense to judge the merits of a critique on the basis of the alternative. Misguided action is almost always worse than inaction.
This point applies not only to U.S. policy overall but also to Gant as an individual. While we can applaud Gant for being an innovator and a do-er, we should not confuse doing with doing good. Also, I don't think it is a minor point that Gant is a commissioned officer, not an elected official or political appointee. Given the emphasis of COIN on good governance, this lack of protocol and transparency should give us caution.
I'll stop there, hoping that this post generates some more discussion...
Contra Foust, I believe the important message to spread is that tribal favoring is a good foundation for mission success like the San Andreas fault is a good place to build a large city. I'm sorry Major Gant runs into issues over it, but there's a ton of evidence for not trying to reinvent the tribal wheel in Afghanistan.
But, can you really say that we run the risk of becoming a Avatarian colonial empire in Kamdesh or Nimruz (what with all of those valuable resources we could extract there!)
Perhaps it is time to provide my comments.
There is nothing new under the sun. COIN, FID, and small wars are nothing new. They are just new to the Regular Army. Special Forces have been intertwined and in between these measures for years.
For the past five years, I've directly engaged with the SF community. I'm an Armor Officer. Although I've spent significant time partnered with foreign indigenious forces, I do not claim to hold a Special Forces Tab.
That said, Special Forces have done a poor job of articulating and promoting what they do. Right after 9/11, GW Bush gave them main effort status in the GWOT with full command and control. USSOCOM's reply was timid if not passive proclaiming that they were merely an organizational force not a deployable one.
On the ground level, the SF achievements from UW in the initial invasions in Iraq/A'stan and the FID endeavors from the ISAF BCT, Hillah Swat, MOI Commandos, and A'stan militias are hereculian; however, these stories are undertold.
Jim Gant is the only one to break the mold. Y'all have no idea know over the criticism that he receives in his field for voicing his truths. I am proud of him.
It is time for the SF community to start telling their story. Jim Gant has shown the way. Now, y'all must show everyone else the other alternatives besides the stupid debate between enemy centric and pop-centric COIN.
Mike
From one of the rarefied bastions of academia on Manhattan comes a full scale assault on a mere Major with "low status in the military hierarchy". One would think that Prof. Gurman would go after more lofty targets. Alas, she can use Major Gant as her whipping boy for a sordid tour of the latest in neo-COIN, based on neo-colonialism, based on good old fashioned, pre-deconstructivist colonialism by the usual suspects. Prof. Gurman presumes to to know all about Major Gant and his ideas, as well as his supposed obsession with being the next "Lawrence" with a side dish of Native American warrior worship thrown in. Look, Major Gant has proposed some ideas about how we might engage some of the people in Afghanistan in some parts of the country. It appears to me that he has never claimed to offer solutions that are applicable in all places at all times. His belief that trust and personal engagement will make a positive difference, where none currently exist are based on sincere feelings and actual experience on the ground. Without offering a single suggestion about alternatives to what we are currently doing rather poorly, she readily skewers Major Gant and others for embracing the "Noble Savage" motif. This begs the question that if Major Gant and his ilk were complete ugly Americans, she would probably have taken issue with that as well and said that they needed to be more "engaged" with the culture. It is a no win situation with her. Don't be colonial, but then again, don't try to be someone with a sincere interest in the Afghan people because, er...you're now just neo-colonial, anti-(Edward)Saidist, lay-anthropologists. Major Gant, ignore the nay-sayers and just give it your best, as I am sure you will. By the way, give Sitting Bull my regards.
The good professor could have shortened the article to a statement that said "Any US policy in Afghanistan is imperialism!" and saved us all much time.
You don't need to have "tribes" to build local COIN self-defense forces. In some nations, identities will be tribal, in other places not. Which identity is less salient than having one at all as an organizing principle. What matters is if the locals are willing to fight to defend their autonomy against Taliban rule if they are trained, advised and armed.
I am really curious about her project to "(re)institutionalize counterinsurgency in the US military and foreign policy establishment."
Although I agree to a certain extent with Joshua Foust's comment about the allure of the whole "avatar-esque" statement, I would also take some exception to it. I agree that some have made COIN romantic and the notion that COIN and Security Force Assistance and Building Partner Capacity (and all the other new buzzwords and phrases) as ways to make others fight for us is a misleading one. What is in our interest and what we do need to strive for is to be able to assist our friends, partners, and allies to be able to defend their nations against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism and help them bring the right development and governance to under-governed or un-governed spaces that can provide sanctuary to insurgent and terrorist organizations. The operative word is to assist because we cannot do it for them. And most importantly, our friends, partners, and allies must do it for their own interests and not for US interests. To think we can get governments to commit to fighting for US interests is really a misunderstanding of the world. This is the essence of the Foreign Internal Defense mission and one we should consider, rather than trying to conduct unilateral COIN in a sovereign nation. I kind of think that that is what the SECDEF and Joe Collins were getting at but which Dr. Gurman also criticizes.
I was JUST about to leave a comment about my name, until you pointed it out.
I think, too, despite the assumption about occupation, that Hannah is correct to critique the allure of the whole Avatar-esque "round up the tribes and make them fight for you"idea as romantic and misleading. That's an important message to spread.
The problem with this sort of analysis is that the author has decided beforehand that the Afghanistan effort is an "occupation," thereby leading her to sniff a colonial conspiracy under every line about counterinsurgency. Yes, it's true that France and Britain in Algeria and Malaysia are the forerunners here, to say nothing of America in Vietnam. And yes, those were cases where colonial territory was deemed vital to the colonizing empires. But I think you'd be hard-pressed to find many at the Pentagon or the State Department who really view Kunar or Helmand as territory that needs to belong to American patrols in the long haul. So, it's a little different, even though there's a "dark history" behind us, and despite the academic Jedi-mind-trick claim that American imperialism in 2010 is supposedly a repressed corner of our unconscious. Oh, naturally.
In actual fact, the reason you can tell no one wants to be there is because every policymaker or CNN pundit now talks about what a "complex region" Afghanistan-Pakistan is, and you know no one likes complexity. We'll be out soon, don't worry, Professor Gurman.
Also, since we're sticklers for the academic apparatus, you spelled Foust's name wrong.