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Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 9

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Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 9: Concerns About Potential Gang (PCC-Primeiro Comando da Capital & CV-Comando Vermelho) Influence on Upcoming Brazilian Elections

John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz and Robert J. Bunker

Brazil’s gangs are challenging the state and each other in a contest for power.  The powerful Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Command of the Capital or PCC) is at war with the Comando Vermelho (Red Command or CV) and its allies for control of the nation’s prisons, favelas, and lucrative criminal enterprises—including drug trafficking.  As part of this deadly competition, the gangs are alleged to wield corrupt influence over politics—funding elections and bribing political officials.  In the latest accusations, Wálter Maierovitch, a retired São Paulo judge and mafia scholar, raises concerns that the PCC is infiltrating political processes to elude state interference.  He is concerned that this mafia-or narco-politics (narcopolitica) will extend to interference in Brazil’s upcoming national elections in October.

Key Information: Flávio Costa and Vinícius Andrade (Arman Kazemi, Trans.). “The Power of Crime: Ties Between Drug Trafficking and Politics in Brazil.” RioOnWatch. 8 January 2018, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=40620:

“Drug trafficking finances electoral campaigns.”

Marcinho VP [a Commando Vermelho leader] likes to write. He claims to have been the target of “injustice” and, to defend his claim, he published a book titled “Marcinho Truths and Positions—Criminal Law of the Enemy” (Marcinho Verdades e Posições—Direito Penal do Inimigo) on October 21. The work was coauthored with journalist Renato Homem. The inmate recounts his career in the world of crime, denies the accusations against him, recalls his associates, weighs in on politics and Operation Car Wash’s corruption investigations, and attacks former governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral Filho of the PMDB party, for whom he claims to have given campaign favors in 1996. “He’s the head of the biggest criminal organization in Rio de Janeiro.”

 … “Drug trafficking doesn’t stop because it finances political campaigns in Brazil,” he claims. “Trafficking is dangerous and deadly, but corruption is Brazil’s most lethal crime.”

…“Whether intentional or not, crime plays a huge social role in the favelas. The UPP has simply been an occupying force. Everything that crime has offered these communities, the State will need to replace. For example, basic commodities, medicine, doctors, access to healthcare. All kinds of support. Crime fills a vacuum left by the State.”

…In 2006 he was thought to be one of the masterminds behind a series of attacks orchestrated by the Comando Vermelho against Military Police bases, offices, and other public buildings, which resulted in the deaths of 19 people. His transfer to a federal facility was a direct result of this case.

Marcinho blames Cabral for his transfer to Mossoró. Currently behind bars thanks to the ongoing Operation Car Wash investigations, the former governor is a constant target of criticism in the book. “He’s the biggest Judas I’ve ever known,” writes Marcinho VP, in one excerpt.

In the book, he claims to have given campaign favors to the politician in 1996 during the Rio municipal elections. “He was in my private venue box seated, eating, drinking, complimenting me. I helped him with a team of canvassers. I got nothing out of it,” he says. “I won him about 50,000 votes in Complexo do Alemão,” he adds.

Key Information: João Fellet, “PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição, diz ex-desembargador.” BBC Brasil. 11 January 2018, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-42643310:

Há décadas estudando a ação de organizações criminosas, o desembargador aposentado Wálter Maierovitch diz que o fortalecimento da maior facção brasileira, o Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), e o acirramento de conflitos entre gangues nos Estados podem impactar as eleições deste ano.

Em entrevista à BBC Brasil, Maierovitch diz que o PCC ainda não alcançou o peso econômico de antigos grupos mafiosos italianos ou de cartéis colombianos e marroquinos. Mas diz que a facção paulista vem expandido sua atuação e tem força suficiente para influenciar a votação em outubro.

Segundo o desembargador, há relatos de que o PCC patrocina eventos de igrejas na periferia de São Paulo. Afirma ainda que facções criminosas têm interesse em se infiltrar no poder político para costurar acordos que reduzam a repressão policial em certas áreas. Segundo ele, um acordo desse tipo já vigora na periferia de São Paulo…

…A preocupação de que facções influenciem o resultado da eleição deste ano já foi ecoada pelo presidente do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), Gilmar Mendes, e pelo ministro do Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência, Sérgio Etchegoyen. Ambos têm dito que o fim da possibilidade de que empresas façam doações eleitorais abrem espaço para que o crime organizado financie candidatos por fora.

Key Information:  “Desembargador diz que PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição.” AM Post. 11 January 2018, http://ampost.com.br/2018/01/desembargador-diz-que-pcc-financia-igrejas-e-pode-influenciar-eleicao/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork:

O desembargador aposentado Walter Maierovitch…, que se dedica a estudar a ação de organizações criminosas, afirma que o fortalecimento do Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) e o aumento de conflitos entre as gangues podem ter impacto no resultado das eleições deste ano.

Maierovitch explicou em entrevista à ‘BBC’ que o PCC – maior facção do Brasil – ainda não alcançou a importância econômico de antigos grupos mafiosos italianos ou de cartéis colombianos e marroquinos, mas vem expandido a sua atuação e tem força suficiente para influenciar as próximas eleições.

O especialista cita que há relatos de que o grupo paulista patrocine eventos de igrejas na periferia de São Paulo.

De acordo com ele, facções criminosas costumam se infiltrar no poder político para fazer acordos que reduzam a repressão policial, o que, segundo ele, já acontece na periferia da capital paulista.

Key Information: Pedro L. Macêdo, “A expansão da lei do silêncio.” DM/Cotidiano. 12 January 2018, https://www.dm.com.br/cotidiano/2018/01/a-expansao-da-lei-do-silencio.html:

A sombra do PCC e de outras organizações criminosas pode se firmar nas eleições

Organizações crimino­sas como o Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Comando Vermelho (CV) ou outras, mais ou menos conhecidas e influentes, podem ver as campanhas eleitorais deste ano como uma oportunidade ímpar para ex­pandir seu poder de influência e zonas de operação. O acirramento de conflitos entre essas organizações, observado em vários estados brasileiros, irão ditar e motivar tais facções a organizar suas estratégias, a fim de encontrarem apoio vindo dos poderes Legislativo e Executivo.

Key Information: Jefferson Ribeiro, “‘Temo pelo financiamento das eleicoes por organizacoes criminosas,’ diz Gilmar Mendes.” O Globo. 10 August 2017, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/temo-pelo-financiamento-das-eleicoes-por-organizacoes-criminosas-diz-gilmar-mendes-21922460:

Eu temo muito pelo financiamento das eleições por organizações as mais diversas, inclusive as criminosas. Já temos casos de países em que o crime financia as eleições, como o México. No Rio, temos o problema do tráfico, das milícias, que é notório. Para colocarmos urnas nas favelas precisamos de blindados da Marinha. Portanto, a liberdade do voto está fortemente ameaçada. Em São Paulo, já se fala que o PCC elegeu vereadores na Câmara da capital. No Amazonas, a calha do (rio) Solimões vem sendo utilizada pelos traficantes e se diz que algumas prefeituras foram tomadas por eles. No Maranhão, nós acompanhamos a situação de agiotas financiando as eleições, com dinheiro que viria do PCC. Tudo isso é preocupante e não podemos querer que o quadro da política no Brasil, que já não é exemplar, se torne ainda pior.

Key Information: Silvia Amorim, Tiago Dantas and Sergio Roxo, “Em São Paulo, ligação de facção com eleiçōes é apurada.” O Globo. 29 August 2016, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/em-sao-paulo-ligacao-de-faccao-com-eleicoes-apurada-20197706:

Em São Paulo, os primeiros indícios de que a facção criminosa que atua dentro e fora dos presídios do estado tentava expandir seus tentáculos para a política surgiram nas eleições de 2010. Até hoje, nada se provou sobre a influência do crime organizado em campanhas eleitorais, mas, a cada disputa, aparecem candidatos apontados por terem ligação com o grupo criminoso.

Key Information: Vladimir Platonow, “Rio: Ministro alerta para atuação do tráfico e da milícia na próxima eleição.” Agência Brasil.  10 July 2017, http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2017-10/rio-ministro-alerta-para-atuacao-do-trafico-e-da-milicia-na-proxima-eleicao:

A força do crime organizado em comunidades e favelas do Rio de Janeiro, incluindo o tráfico de drogas e milícias, será um desafio a ser superado nas eleições do próximo ano, avaliou hoje (6) o ministro da Justiça, Torquato Jardim.

Third Generation Gang Analysis

Concerns that criminal gangs can corrupt and co-opt states are not new. Indeed, mafia-and narco-politics (narcopolitica) are contemporary concerns throughout Latin America.  These concerns have been characterized as criminal insurgencies and co-opted state reconfiguration (CStR).[1] Both the Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Capital Command-PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (Red Command-CV) have been considered in this context.[2] Most recently, these concerns have been raised by Wálter Maierovitch, a retired judge (in the Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo) and national antidrug secretary (Secretaria Nacional de Políticas Antidroga)

Maierovitch, a mafia scholar, warns that the PCC is becoming more powerful, embracing social activism (including funding church functions)[3] and potentially influencing Brazil’s upcoming elections in October. These concerns are shared by Gilmar Mendes, the president of the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) (TSE) and Sérgio Etchegoyen, minister of Institutional Security in the Office of the President (ministro do Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência).[4] In addition to these concerns, Marcinho VP, a prisoner believed to be a key leader in Rio’s Red Command (Comando Verhelo-CV) asserts that “Drug trafficking finances electoral campaigns” (“Tráfico de drogas financia campanhas”) and that “Corrupt politicians make up the largest criminal organization” (“Corruptos formam a maior organização criminosa”).[5]

The extent of criminal gang penetration in Brazil’s political processes are unknown.  Nevertheless, there are strong indications that it is a concern.  As noted by Ribeiro, funding for the upcoming elections is likely to include criminal sources and PCC-influenced legislators are suspected.[6] In São Paulo, the PCC has been suspected of expanding its reach from the prisons and streets into politics since at least 2010.[7]

Indeed, in 2010 the PCC attempted to place a candidate on the slate for deputy in the São Paulo Legislative Assembly.[8] That attempt was unsuccessful as were previous attempts dating back to 2002.[9] In addition to attempting to run candidates, the PCC has also been accused of using corruption and assassinations to influence political processes.  Links to corrupt police officers and a scheme to assassinate Governor Geraldo Alkmin in São Paulo were also uncovered in 2010.[10]

In 2014, gangs in Rio reportedly charged candidates to hang campaign posters or electioneer on gang-controlled turf.  According to an Al Jazeera report, “Candidates are routinely told they must pay for access. Depending on the size and influence of the favela, a politician might be asked to pay $4,000 to $20,000 to campaign there, up to $40,000 to do so exclusively or as much as $120,000 for the support of a gang leader, which can supposedly secure victory.”[11] Politicians that don’t pay the street tax are threatened. In the words of one candidate, Cidinha Camos a deputy in Rio de Janeiro’s state legislature, gangsters armed with assault rifles approached his campaign workers, who were replacing burned posters that had been ripped off the walls, saying “the area was owned and if they didn’t leave right away, they would set fire to our Kombi van with my campaigners inside.”[12] This intimidation is one factor in gang political interference. Violent attacks, corruption, and collusion are the others. 

There is increasing evidence that the gangs are aligning with Evangelical Christian sects to exert political influence. This trend where ‘Evangelical Bandits’ (bandidos evangélicos) have led to violent attacks reminiscent of Europe’s pre-Westphalian Wars of Religion in Brazil’s favelas.[13] According to a recent Financial Times article, some of these “attacks come as the evangelical churches are positioning themselves to be kingmakers in elections next year.”[14] Through personal conversation with one of the authors, two Evangelical ministers have said that they have not been approached by any criminal organization but they know that gangs are active in the churches since many pastors have an association with one candidate or another.  Likewise, the potential for disruption or the extent of corrupt influences on October’s election are unknown. Despite this uncertainty, Brazil’s Justice Minister Torquato Jardim believes that the strength of organized crime will be a challenge to the forthcoming elections.[15] This evolving situation warrants monitoring and assessment.

The situation in Brazil is indicative of the growing political power of gangs that is currently manifesting itself globally. In states with low levels of political capacity—many of which are clustered in Latin America—such entities are increasingly transitioning from solely a law enforcement issue to a full-blown national security concern as they directly challenge sovereign prerogative and authority. Weak institutions of statehood are being targeted and co-opted with a mixture of violence and corruptive influences by a bewildering array of belligerent (and well-armed) non-state actors—gangs, posses, bands, brigands, commands, militias, et. al. This phenomena has been analyzed by a growing cadre of international security researchers—including Martin van Creveld,[16] Max Manwaring[17] and Ioan Grillo[18], as well as some of  the authors of this note. It is indicative of the rise of power-seeking 3rd generation gangs (such as the PCC & CV) and the criminal insurgency form associated with them and the Mexican cartels.[19] Ultimately, it is representative of epochal change (e.g., the transition from a modern to a postmodern international system) which portends the privatization of public goods such as security, state fragmentation, and the outbreak of warlordism within weak political capacity states as the Westphalian model of statehood becomes increasingly challenged as an archetype of social and political organization in the early 21st century.[20]       

End Notes

[1] See John P. Sullivan, “How Illicit Networks Impact Sovereignty,” Chapter 10 in Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Eds.). Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013; pp. 171-187, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf and Luis Jorge Garay-Salamanca and Eduardo Salcedo-Albarán. Drug Trafficking, Corruption and States: How Illicit Networks Shaped Institutions in Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. Bloomington: iUniverse, 2015, https://www.amazon.com/Drug-Trafficking-Corruption-States-Institutions/dp/1491759178.

[2] Hal Brands looked at the criminal insurgency potentials in Brazil—specifically the case of the PCC. “Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America.” Small Wars Journal. 4 July 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-and-criminal-insurgency-in-latin-america. For background on the interaction between Brazil’s gangs (especially the PCC and CV) and the state, see Bruno Wilhelm Speck, “Brazil: Crime Meets Politics” in Kevin Casas-Zamora (Ed). Dangerous Liaisons: Organized Crime and Political Finance in Latin America and Beyond. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013; pp. 42-75.  Recent explorations of criminal insurgency specifically in Brazil are found in Jan Daniel, “Criminal Governance and Insurgency: The Rio de Janeiro Experience.” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies (CEJISS). Vol. 9, Issue 4, 2015, http://www.cejiss.org/static/data/uploaded/1450197947898139/Article%2003.pdf; and Claudio Ramos da Cruz and David H. Ucko, “Beyond the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: Countering Comando Vermelho’s Criminal Insurgency.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. Vol. 29, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 38-67, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1404772 which takes an in-depth look at the CV.

[3] For a recent discussion of gang and church interaction in Rio’s favelas, see Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan and José de Arimatéia da Cruz. “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 6 - Holy War in Rio’s Favelas: Bandidos Evangélicos (Evangelical Bandits).” Small Wars Journal. 15 November 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-6-holy-war-in-rio’s-favelas-bandidos-evangélicos-e.

[4] João Fellet, “PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição, diz ex-desembargador.” BBC Brasil. 11 January 2018, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-42643310 ; “Desembargador diz que PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição.” AM Post. 11 January 2018, http://ampost.com.br/2018/01/desembargador-diz-que-pcc-financia-igrejas-e-pode-influenciar-eleicao/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork; and “Desembargador diz que PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição.” AM Post. 11 January 2018, http://ampost.com.br/2018/01/desembargador-diz-que-pcc-financia-igrejas-e-pode-influenciar-eleicao/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork.

[5] Flávio Costa and Vinícius Andrade (Arman Kazemi, Trans.). “The Power of Crime: Ties Between Drug Trafficking and Politics in Brazil.” RioOnWatch. 8 January 2018, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=40620 and Flávio Costa e Vinícius Andrade. “O poder do crime.” Brasil OnLine (BOL). n.d., https://noticias.bol.uol.com.br/especiais/marcinho-vp/index.htm#o-poder-do-crime.

[6] Jefferson Ribeiro, “‘Temo pelo financiamento das eleicoes por organizacoes criminosas,’ diz Gilmar Mendes.” O Globo. 10 August 2017, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/temo-pelo-financiamento-das-eleicoes-por-organizacoes-criminosas-diz-gilmar-mendes-21922460.

[7] Silvia Amorim, Tiago Dantas and Sergio Roxo, “Em São Paulo, ligação de facção com eleiçōes é apurada.” O Globo. 29 August 2016, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/em-sao-paulo-ligacao-de-faccao-com-eleicoes-apurada-20197706.

[8] Marcelo Godoy, “Comando buscava lugar na Assembleia Legislativa.” Estadão. 12 October 2013, http://sao-paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,comando-buscava-lugar-na-assembleia-legislativa-imp-,1084819.

[9] Charles Parkinson, “Brazil’s PCC Attempting to Enter Politics.” InSight Crime. 14 October 2013, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/brazils-pcc-attempting-to-enter-politics/.

[10] See Marcelo Godoy, “Governo prepara combate a policiais corruptos após achaques ao PCC.” Estadão. 12 October 2013, http://sao-paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,governo-prepara-combate-a-policiais-corruptos-apos-achaques-ao-pcc,1085036 on the corruption investigation and Marcelo Godoy, “PCC planeja matar o governador Geraldo Alckmin, revelam escutas.” Estadão. 11 October 2013, http://sao-paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pcc-planeja-matar-o-governador-geraldo-alckmin-revelam-escutas,1084657 about the assassination plot.  A succinct summary is found at Charles Parkinson, “Brazil’s PCC Attempting to Enter Politics.” InSight Crime. 14 October 2013, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/brazils-pcc-attempting-to-enter-politics/.

[11] Matt Sandy, “Gangs, militias set campaign rules in Rio favelas ahead of elections.” Al Jazeera America. 3 October 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/3/gangs-militias-setcampaignrulesriofavelas.html.

[12] Ibid. “Gangs, militias set campaign rules in Rio favelas ahead of elections.”

[13] See Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan and José de Arimatéia da Cruz, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 6 - Holy War in Rio’s Favelas: Bandidos Evangélicos (Evangelical Bandits).” Small Wars Journal. 15 November 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-6-holy-war-in-rio’s-favelas-bandidos-evangélicos-e.

[14] Andres Schipani and Joe Leahy, “‘Drug  traffickers of Jesus’ drive Brazil slum violence.” Financial Times. 27 October 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/b5096a18-b548-11e7-aa26-bb002965bce8

According to the Schipani and Leahy, “The evangelical bloc in congress, which includes lawmakers from virtually every party, is one of the biggest in the national parliament with 198 members of the 513-seat lower house.”

[15] Vladimir Platonow, “Rio: Ministro alerta para atuação do tráfico e da milícia na próxima eleição.” Agência Brasil.  10 July 2017, http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2017-10/rio-ministro-alerta-para-atuacao-do-trafico-e-da-milicia-na-proxima-eleicao.

[16] Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

[17] Max G. Manwaring, Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in Uncomfortable Wars. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010.

[18] Ioan Grillo, Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields, and the New Politics of Latin America. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2016.

[19] Claudio Ramos da Cruz and David H. Ucko, “Beyond the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: Countering Comando Vermelho’s Criminal Insurgency.” See also Christian Vianna de Azevedo, “Criminal Insurgency in Brazil.” Small Wars Journal. 22 January 2018, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/criminal-insurgency-in-brazil.

[20] Works related to this phenomena include Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, “The modern state in epochal transition: The significance of irregular warfare, state deconstruction, and the rise of new warfighting entities beyond neo-medievalism.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. Vol. 27. No. 2, March 2016: 325-344, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129168?tab=permissions&scroll=top and Robert J. Bunker (Ed), Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War. London: Routledge, 2012.            

Sources

Silvia Amorim, Tiago Dantas and Sergio Roxo, “Em São Paulo, ligação de facção com eleiçōes é apurada.” O Globo. 29 August 2016, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/em-sao-paulo-ligacao-de-faccao-com-eleicoes-apurada-20197706.

Flávio Costa and Vinícius Andrade (Arman Kazemi, Trans.). “The Power of Crime: Ties Between Drug Trafficking and Politics in Brazil.” RioOnWatch. 8 January 2018, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=40620.

Flávio Costa e Vinícius Andrade. “O poder do crime.” Brasil OnLine (BOL). n.d., https://noticias.bol.uol.com.br/especiais/marcinho-vp/index.htm#o-poder-do-crime.

“Desembargador diz que PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição.” AM Post. 11 January 2018, http://ampost.com.br/2018/01/desembargador-diz-que-pcc-financia-igrejas-e-pode-influenciar-eleicao/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork.

João Fellet, “PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição, diz ex-desembargador.” BBC Brasil. 11 January 2018, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-42643310.

Pedro L. Macêdo, “A expansão da lei do silêncio.” DM/Cotidiano. 12 January 2018, https://www.dm.com.br/cotidiano/2018/01/a-expansao-da-lei-do-silencio.html.

Vladimir Platonow, “Rio: Ministro alerta para atuação do tráfico e da milícia na próxima eleição.” Agência Brasil.  10 July 2017, http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2017-10/rio-ministro-alerta-para-atuacao-do-trafico-e-da-milicia-na-proxima-eleicao.

Jefferson Ribeiro, “‘Temo pelo financiamento das eleicoes por organizacoes criminosas,’ diz Gilmar Mendes.” O Globo. 10 August 2017, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/temo-pelo-financiamento-das-eleicoes-por-organizacoes-criminosas-diz-gilmar-mendes-21922460.

Additional Reading

Kevin Casas-Zamora (Ed.), Dangerous Liaisons: Organized Crime and Political Finance in Latin America and Beyond. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.

Jan Daniel, “Criminal Governance and Insurgency: The Rio de Janeiro Experience.” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies (CEJISS). Vol. 9, Issue 4, 2015.

Claudio Ramos da Cruz and David H. Ucko, “Beyond the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: Countering Comando Vermelho’s Criminal Insurgency.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. Vol. 29, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 38-67.

Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan and José de Arimatéia da Cruz, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 6 - Holy War in Rio’s Favelas: Bandidos Evangélicos (Evangelical Bandits).” Small Wars Journal. 15 November 2017. 

John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 4: Brigands, Bank Robbery, and Brazilian Gang Evolution at Ciudad del Este and the Triple Frontier.” Small Wars Journal. 26 May 2017.  

About the Author(s)

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is an Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College and Adjunct Faculty, Division of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University. He holds university degrees in political science, government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history and has undertaken hundreds of hours of counterterrorism training. Past professional associations include Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; Futurist in Residence, Training and Development Division, Behavioral Science Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico, VA; Staff Member (Consultant), Counter-OPFOR Program, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center-West; and Adjunct Faculty, National Security Studies M.A. Program and Political Science Department, California State University, San Bernardino, CA. Dr. Bunker has hundreds of publications including Studies in Gangs and Cartels, with John Sullivan (Routledge, 2013),  Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training, with Stephen Sloan (University of Oklahoma, 2011), and edited works, including Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies: Dark Renaissance (Routledge, 2014), co-edited with Pamela Ligouri Bunker; Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War (Routledge, 2012); Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge, 2011); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (Routledge, 2008); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (Routledge, 2005); and Non-State Threats and Future Wars (Routledge, 2002).

Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz is a Professor of International Relations and International Studies at Georgia Southern University, Savannah, GA. He also is an Adjunct Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, and a Research Fellow of the Brazil Research Unit at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington, DC.

John P. Sullivan was a career police officer. He retired as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. He is also an adjunct researcher at the Vortex Foundation in Bogotá, Colombia; a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks; a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST); a Global Fellow at Stratfor (2018); and an instructor at the Safe Communities Institute at the Sol Price School of Public Policy at the University of Southern California. He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010) and co-author of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency: A Small Wars Journal-El Centro Anthology (iUniverse, 2011) Studies in Gangs and Cartels (Routledge, 2013). Most recently he co-edited The Rise of The Narcostate (Mafia States) (Xlibris, 2018). He completed the CREATE Executive Program in Counter-Terrorism at the University of Southern California and holds a Bachelor of Arts in Government from the College of William and Mary, a Master of Arts in Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis from the New School for Social Research, and a PhD from the Open University of Catalonia (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya) in Barcelona. His doctoral thesis was “Mexico’s Drug War: Cartels, Gangs, Sovereignty and the Network State.” His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and other countries.