Small Wars Journal

Lessons for Libya?

Mon, 03/28/2011 - 9:02am
Lessons for Libya?

Flawed Policy and the Inevitability of Military Failure: The Anglo-French Suez Expedition of 1956

by Brian C. Collins

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Thesis: The disastrous outcome of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was not the result of tactical incompetence, but rather a consequence of flawed policy.

Discussion: It is critical for policy-makers to not only understand the difficulties of armed intervention, but also the commitment of will required. If policy limitations preclude waging the type of war necessary to achieve strategic objectives, the pursuit of other options becomes imperative. Professional military members expend a great deal of energy to understand the relationship between politics and war. It would be wise for policy-makers to do the same so as to avoid the pitfalls experienced by the British and French in 1956. Tactically, the British and French - in concert with the Israelis - mobilized, deployed, and employed a diverse military force to compel the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egyptian government. Operationally, the campaign required a degree of coordination between not only national entities, but branches within the armed forces as well which had yet to be exhibited in an operation of such limited size and scope in the twentieth century. Strategically, geo-political influences and factors forced the withdrawal of British and French forces before ever achieving the purpose for which the military campaign was intended -- the removal of the Nasser. This paper examines the Anglo-French expedition to identify the root causes which lead to this tremendous failure in order to provide lessons for the national leadership of today.

Conclusion: The failure of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was clearly the result of flawed policy, not tactical incompetence. The political establishment's failure to anticipate reaction in the context of Cold War balance of power politics, their discount of options other than military action, and insistence upon planning to obtain limited objectives, all contributed directly to the ignominy which would follow.

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya?

Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Collins, USMC is the Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor at Headquarters, US Special Operations Command. The views expressed herein are his own.

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