by Deane-Peter Baker
Download the Full Article: Is the US intelligence community misreading the Shabaab-Qaeda relationship?
In a recent report at Long War Journal an unnamed senior US intelligence official is quoted as saying that "Al Qaeda's top leadership has instructed Shabaab to maintain a low profile on al Qaeda links." This, according to the same official, is because "al Qaeda is applying lessons learned from Iraq, that an overexposure of the links between al Qaeda central leadership and its affiliates can cause some unwanted attention." The official added that "al Qaeda is pleased with the double suicide attack in Uganda, but suggested Shabaab reserve future strikes at US interests in the region."
Perhaps access to the intelligence sources available to the unnamed official would make it obvious to any analyst that this interpretation is correct. From an outsider's perspective, however, there are reasons to suspect that the intelligence community might, perhaps, have misread matters in this case.
Download the Full Article: Is the US intelligence community misreading the Shabaab-Qaeda relationship
Deane-Peter Baker is Editor of the African Security Review, Journal of the Institute for Security Studies, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Leadership, Ethics and Law at the US Naval Academy and a 2010-2011 Academic Fellow of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. All opinions expressed here are his own and should not be taken to reflect the official position of any organization.
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Comments
You would know of course that up to this point S. Africa has not deployed any troops in support of AMISOM in Somalia and in view of that along with my final point that the Somalia refugee community may have shown reluctance to support Al-Shabaab, may have played a part in Shabaab deciding on making a statement within a country that provides the bulk of the force among AMISOM in Somalia?
However, I humbly acknowledge and accept the salience of your correction, and indeed that was on my mind, and I should have included that in my initial response as well with respect to your articulate article.
Thank you.
Tyrtaios, please allow me to make a brief correction. The final game of the FIFA World Cup was played at Soccer City (FNB Stadium) in Soweto, Johannesburg, South Africa's largest, most multicultural and least effectively (judging by the crime rate) policed city. Of course the Stadium itself would not have been an easy target, but hitting any one of the myriad hotels, bars, restaurants, or clubs at which foreign tourists were watching the final game (not everyone had tickets to the stadium) would not have been significantly more difficult than hitting the targets in Uganda that were, in fact, selected.
Suffice to say al-Qaeda has old plans that are taken off the shelf and dusted-off from time-to-time to study whether they have a good chance of succeeding or not. I am reasonably sure such a plan may in fact set on Qaedas shelf involving an event such as the World Cup. After all, it is the spectacular they are after. Would it also not be possible for them to pass such a plan onto Al-Shababb if only to study?
However, though I agree with Dr. Bakers statement, that "South Africas borders are notoriously porous, many of its officials are corrupt, and the tools of the terrorist trade are relatively easily accessible." The town chosen to host the recent World Cup was Phokeng, a small town comprised of homogenous neighborhoods, and though not remote, it is isolated enough to be policed quite efficiently. . .a former risk management types delight, and something probably not lost on Al-Shabaab nor Qaeda.
It might also be safe to say in addition to the unique circumstances I have mentioned that lent itself to security at the World Cup, along with good police work, it is also possible that the Somalia diaspora living in S. Africa also wouldnt shelter Shabaab during the most critical phase of reconnaissance, due to not jeopardizing their refugee status by getting, or being suspected of being, involved.
Thus Shabaab chose the softer of the two targets in Kampala, and in fact al-Qaeda was conveying a BRAVO ZULU after all to Al-Shabaab?
Yet one more example of why I believe the smartest way to look at AQ is as a non-state organization employing the information and travel tools of the modern age to wage a very state-like UW campaign.
Of course the nationalist movements they associate with put their own goals ahead of AQ. After all, AQ did not create the conditions that give rise to these organizations, nor did AQ create the organizations, nor are these organizations suddenly "AQ" even if they add that phrase to their name and agree to work together.
AQ has "interests"; and these many distinct insurgent movements they leverage have "interests" as well. Sometimes they are shared, sometimes they are not. This should not be surprising. The more AQ pushes for these organizations to address AQ interests over the interests of the organization they are engaging with, the more likely there will be friction, conflict and loss of AQ influence.
This is not unlike the US and here allies. We have interests, and they have interests; sometimes they align, and sometimes they do not. The more we push allies to support our interests to the detriment of their own, the more friction we cause and more loss of influence the US incurs.
The Intel community is treat-focused. It's what they are designed to do and they are good at it. The problem is that it mischaracterizes the nature of the dynamic in ways that really are not conducive to solving the problem effectively. Trite sayings like "Intel leads ops" don't help. We need a little more "strategy drives Intel" to get this back on the rails.