A Primer on Counterinsurgent Warfare

A Primer on Counterinsurgent Warfare

Vince Tumminello

It is true that the success of the counterinsurgent is linked to the correct selection of approach, military capability and force composition, tactical and operational execution, available resources, and degree of popular and outside support.  However, it is important to acknowledge that counterinsurgency is simply an effort to counter an insurgency[i].  As such, the approach and nature of any individual insurgency must always inform the tailored approach of the counterinsurgent.  To be successful, the counterinsurgent must identify and subvert the advantages of the insurgent, while exploiting the weaknesses in his organization, composition, support, and capability[ii].  Notably, the nature of these efforts may not always be violent[iii].

Further still, the counterinsurgent is restrained- by his position as governor, by the opinions of his countrymen, and (most recently) the opinions of other nations.  Mirroring these restrains, the insurgent derives his support from the population and its resources- and is so limited.  Consequently, the three counterinsurgency approaches presented here (population-centric, enemy-centric, and punishment) mirror three insurgent approaches (guerrilla, conventional, and punishment).  The resulting asymmetries in approach selection lead as a success indicator[iv].  Thus, while this paper focuses on the actions of the counterinsurgent, the actions and decisions of the insurgent must also be kept in mind.

Population-Centric Counterinsurgency

The population-centric approach to counterinsurgency was developed[v] largely in response to the proliferation of Maoist-style insurgency[vi]. Rather than fixing the insurgent to physical terrain[vii] (as in conventional conflict) and destroying him in violent confrontation, the population-centric approach isolates by targeting the vital link between the insurgent and the population who supports or tolerates him[viii].  Implementation of this approach spans from the mild (“hearts and minds[ix]”) to the extreme (“Boer Camps[x]”).  Bottom-up[xi] practices focusing on building soft power (controlling the population) at the local level are often combined with top-down[xii] practices focusing on legitimacy, development, politics, and border control in more successful campaigns[xiii].

Despite the intuitive logic of this approach, population-centric counterinsurgency is very difficult to do in practice. As such, the historical record of population-centric campaigns is mixed.  Notable counterinsurgent wins include Philippines (Huk) 1946-1956, Malaya 1948-1955, Philippines (MLNF) 1971-1996, and Sierra Leone 1991-2002).  Notable counterinsurgent losses include Columbia (La Violencia) 1948-1958, Algeria 1953-1962, Angola 1961-1974, and Mozambique 1962-1977. 

Practitioners

Population-centric counterinsurgency, often viewed as the ‘enlightened approach’, is very seductive to ‘civilized societies’- those democratic powers that are answerable to its citizenry.  Rarely, however, is the population-centric approach used in non-colonial/occupation situations.  Ignoring a small number of outliers[xiv] (most of which were advised by Western countries), only the United States[xv], France[xvi], Britain[xvii], and Portugal[xviii] have implemented this approach with regularity.

This paradox can be explained in two ways.  First, population-centric counterinsurgency requires responsive government institutions[xix], sensitive to the needs and wants of its population.  Often, weak, oppressive, and unresponsive governments prompt insurgencies. Such a government, facing an insurgency, would thus have to completely change its character, nature, and function to implement an effective population-centric campaign.  In practice, even powers such as the United States, Britain, and France often pursued failed enemy-centric or “iron fist” approaches before switching to a population-centric approach. 

Second, population-centric warfare is often presented as the ‘softer’ or ‘kinder’ approach to counterinsurgency.  Protecting the population is a stated tenant of population-centric campaigns, a cause that resonates with Western liberal ideals.  The US Army Manual for counterinsurgency FM 3-24, stresses the non-violent facets of this approach: coalition building, economic growth, building legitimacy, understanding popular perception, and political development.  This idea of a “kinder war[xx]” is, of course, a myth.  Nevertheless, the softer perception of population-centric counterinsurgency lends much needed popular support to the occupying powers conducting the campaign.  Conversely, in cultures that value strength and force over the indirect approach, population-centric methods may be less appealing.

Core Requirements for Success

1. A large, dynamic, disciplined force- Since the population-centric approach is most often used against a disparate insurgent organization, spread across a large land mass in both rural and urban areas, the counterinsurgent force must necessarily be large[xxi].  Rather than focusing on air power[xxii], as in some modern enemy-centric campaigns, the focus is on a large ‘in-your-face’ ground presence.  Because contact with the population needs to be so close and intimate, the force is often exposed to both internal and external threats.  Attempts to mitigate these threats (armored vehicles, fortresses) only serve to further distance the population[xxiii].  The force must also be dynamic, disciplined, and intelligent- able to adapt to local customs and practice restraint against hit and run attacks (no ‘warheads on foreheads[xxiv]’).

2. Robust intelligence collection effort[xxv]- This approach requires a robust intelligence collection effort, beginning from the outside with technical and atmospheric intelligence- in an attempt to identify key population centers, key leadership, social structures, and insurgent causes.  In time, with a successful campaign, the people must become the source of intelligence.  This will, in effect, help to solidify tangible gains on the soft power progress of ground forces.

3. Integration of a broader political strategy- While population-centric COIN at the tactical level is the crux of the effort, it must be paired with a broader political strategy to undermine the cause of the insurgent and increase legitimacy of the government.  Further still, the counterinsurgent must gain the support of neighboring countries and cut off external support to the insurgent cause[xxvi].

4. Responsive and legitimate government institutions- Governments must be willing to make concessions and reform to undermine the cause of the insurgent.  Often, these reforms will only be made if forced through leverage of an outside power.  Governments are rarely compelled through force to make reforms and an existentially threatened authoritarian regime will often escalate violence rather than capitulate on reform.

5. Deep understanding of religion, culture, and society[xxvii]- The insurgent has a natural advantage in that he lives among the population. He understands the religion, culture, and society of the people that support him.  An outside power will never reach this level of understanding, but must always attempt to further his understanding and apply it to his strategic thinking.  This can be very difficult for younger, less-educated forces to achieve.  At the end of the day, it is not the general who conducts real tactical COIN, but the private. 

6. A long commitment[xxviii] – Population-centric counterinsurgency is not an efficient approach.  It is costly- in both manpower and money.  It takes a very long time, especially for an occupying force, to make the requisite progress and gain the trust of the population.  Even then, the relationship between counterinsurgent and population is very fragile.  Democracies are especially vulnerable to this long timeline- popular support back home will only last so long in the face of rising costs and mounting casualties.  This issue becomes less of a problem when the counterinsurgent is the home regime and their survival depends on success.

7. Ample financial, technical, and military resources- Finally, the population-centric approach is very resource intensive[xxix].  Weak governments with few military assets and fewer financial resources will find it very difficult to run an effective counterinsurgency in this manner.  As such, backing by foreign powers is usually necessary.  This, however, can have the effect of further undermining government legitimacy.

Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

The enemy-centric approach reflects a preference of dealing with the enemy force rather than the civilian population or underlying causes of an insurgency.  In this approach, the counterinsurgent channels most of his resources towards decimating the military capability of the insurgent, rather than protecting the population.  Isolation can also be sought in this approach, but only as a means to force a conventional showdown between the government and insurgent forces[xxx].  The typical asymmetries of counterinsurgent versus insurgent favor the counterinsurgent in decisive confrontations[xxxi].

Enemy-centric counterinsurgency has four main manifestations- all of which would be considered ‘direct approaches’ and variations on conventional warfare.  The first is described as ‘decapitation[xxxii]’- targeting the leadership and core support mechanisms of an insurgency to destroy it from the top.  This method is most effective against insurgencies with more concrete command and control structures[xxxiii].  It is often less effective against disparate, linear insurgencies.  The second manifestation is described as eradication, whereby the counterinsurgent seeks to root out and destroy insurgent elements from the ground-up. The third is ‘isolation’.  The counterinsurgent seeks to cut off the insurgency from the population, by isolating its core into rural, unpopulated areas (like a jungle or mountain)[xxxiv].  The counterinsurgent can then conduct cordon and clear operations to eradicate the insurgency.  The fourth manifestation, ‘indiscriminate annihilation’, attempts to crush an insurgency through sheer firepower and force.  This method often causes high civilian casualties but can be very effective[xxxv].  Notably, this method has significant overlap with the third counter-insurgency approach: ‘punishment’. In all cases, enemy-centric counterinsurgency employs the language of violence to get results (at least on paper) and to manage costs (much more efficient than population-centric COIN).

With the enemy-centric approach comes the realization that, in dealing primarily with the enemy forces, the counterinsurgent largely ignores the large recruiting and support base of the population.  Thus, in targeting the insurgent he risks 1) legitimizing him, 2) increasing his recruiting base by playing into the repressive narrative, 3) increasing support for insurgent causes due to indiscriminate use of force, and 4) sewing seeds of discontent that can manifest in future conflict (i.e. short term solution).

Notable enemy-centric counterinsurgency wins include: Iraqi Kurdistan 1961-1975, Northern Ireland 1969-1999, Jordan 1970-1971, Baluchistan (1973-1978), Peru (1980-1992), and Turkey (PKK) 1984-1999.  Notable losses include: UK in Palestine (Colonial) 1944-1947, Laos (US-assisted) 1959-1975, Nambia 1960-1989, South Africa 1960-1975, South Vietnam (Phoenix Program, US-assisted) 1960-1975, Guinea-Bissau (Colonial) 1962-1970, Yemen 1962-1970, and Afghanistan (Anti-Soviet) 1978-1992. 

Practitioners

There is a simple logic to enemy-centric counterinsurgency.  As such, the asymmetrically advantaged often favor it.  As discussed, there are different manifestations of enemy-centric counterinsurgency, each requiring different levels of competency, technology, intelligence, and vision.  Accordingly, the chosen manifestation often mirrors the government- unless outside support of more advanced nations is available.  In sum, almost every government facing an insurgency will implement some form of the enemy-centric approach- at least in the early phases of their counterinsurgency efforts.  If the chosen approach does not yield results, governments must then decide whether to escalate the violence or refocus their efforts on the population.

The enemy-centric approach is particularly useful for governments that do not wish to reconcile the interests of the insurgents/population with their own.  In this regard, there is great incentive to escalate the level of violence to deter present and future opposition (of course, oppression can often lead to an escalated insurgency in the long run[xxxvi]).  This approach also provides quantitative progress- an important aspect in continued support for foreign occupiers.  For casualty sensitive counterinsurgents, the enemy-centric approach focuses on force protection over population protection.  Thus, a nation that is able to compartmentalize civilian losses and manipulate the perception of the campaign may find continued support for their actions[xxxvii].

Core Requirements for Success

1. Military Superiority and Mobility- In enemy-centric COIN, military superiority is tantamount to success.  Superiority may be numerically (eradication, isolation, annihilation) or in capability[xxxviii] (decapitation).  Mobility is also crucial.  The ability to move and consolidate forces quickly is key in creating conditions for decisive engagements.  Mobility must also be achieved in different terrain[xxxix].  Forces must be equipped to fight in mountains, jungles, and deserts.  Often, the insurgent will select the place of engagement and the counterinsurgent must be prepared for anything.

2. Intelligence Gathering, on a spectrum- Intelligence is important to any counterinsurgency effort.  It is most vital in the decapitation approach[xl] but becomes less valuable as the counterinsurgent moves closer to the annihilation method.

3. Battlefield Asymmetry- The counterinsurgent must always maintain battlefield asymmetry- specifically in battlefield technology and weapons systems[xli].  A conventional victory by insurgent forces can do great damage to the legitimacy of government forces[xlii].  The insurgent will typically attack in areas where the government forces are weak- thus the ability to reinforce quickly (i.e. mobility) is also paramount to maintaining asymmetry[xliii].

4. Approach Flexibility- The counterinsurgent must always be willing to reassess his approach through clear-headed analysis. He must not fall victim to the quantitative trap[xliv], mixing political rhetoric (i.e. PowerPoint to Congress) and actual battlefield progress[xlv]. 

5. Border Control- In an enemy-centric campaign against a guerrilla enemy, eradication of safe havens, logistics lines, and external support becomes crucial[xlvi].  In addition, religious and even some nationalist causes attract foreign fighters from abroad[xlvii].  If the counterinsurgent cannot control the borders, then his efforts will become futile. 

Punishment Counterinsurgency

In the punishment approach, the counterinsurgent again turns his attention away from direct encounters with the armed insurgent and focuses on the population.  His focus, however, is not in protecting the population but making it pay the cost (in blood, property, quality of life) for the insurgent.  The punishment approach, also known as barbarism, involves the systematic and deliberate targeting of non-combatants to achieve four possible objectives:

1. Decrease civilian morale and drive the population to actively oppose the insurgency  (or actively support the regime)
2. Eliminate the insurgent base of support (supplies, food, arms, and shelter) through sheer destructive force
3. Escalate the violence in such a way that the insurgent and the population cannot possibly view continued resistance as desirable.  This, in turn, will compel the insurgent to stop fighting and surrender.
4. Undermine the ability of the insurgent to govern

While the outcome may be similar, the punishment approach differentiates itself from both ‘annihilation’ and other wartime atrocities (rape, murder, theft, collateral damage, etc.) because of the existence of a deliberate strategic objective. The punishment approach can manifest in both air (strategic bombing) and ground (destruction of property, targeting of civilians) campaigns, where the potential actions of civilians are specifically tied to the pain inflicted. While there is no denying that a decimated population can no longer support an insurgency (loss of lives, personal resources), the logic of the punishment approach is severely flawed for three primary reasons (placing ethics aside):

1. The punishment approach poisons prospects for a post-conflict political settlement, re-integration of the insurgent forces, and long-term national stability; it also sews seeds for future internal conflict.
2. Rather than lower the morale of the population and turn it away from the insurgent cause, it often hardens the resolve of the insurgency and increases popular support.  This, in turn, decreases the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of those not directly involved in the campaign.
3. Due to the proliferation of technology across the globe, punishment approaches cannot be kept away from international eyes.  Barbarism tends to push coalitions into action against the counterinsurgent, manifesting in covert action campaigns to support the insurgent or outright military/economic/political action.

Notable punishment counterinsurgency wins include Tibet (1956-1974), Syria (Hama) 1982, South Africa (Boer) 1899-1902, and Iraq (Kurds) 1975.  Notable punishment counterinsurgency losses include Indonesia (East Timor) 1975-2000, Vietnam (Rolling Thunder) 1965-1968, Indochina (French) 1965-1975, Yugoslavia (Nazi intervention) 1941-1943, Afghanistan (Soviet intervention) 1979-1989, and China (Japan-intervention) 1937.  A recent and notable mixed outcome is the Israel campaign against Hezbollah and Lebanon in 2006.  Ongoing punishment counterinsurgency campaigns include Syria 2011-2015 and Yemen (Saudi-coalition) 2015.

Practitioners

One might posit that the nature of the punishment approach might constrict its modern practitioners to oppressive authoritarian rulers.  However, this is not the case. Both strong democratic and authoritarian actors have, at times, partaken in a punishment strategy[xlviii].  In addition, the punishment strategy is often seen as the logical escalation of violence for threatened regimes- those looking to do anything and everything to keep their regime in power (and keep their lives). 

While the pursuit of the punishment approach, or barbarism, is less common today in more developed nations- several ongoing campaigns could be classified as ‘punishment’.  This approach, often using ‘strategic bombing’ campaigns[xlix], can be attractive to the counterinsurgent because it lowers risk to his own forces.  At the same time, counterinsurgent governments can point to quantifiable progress to project the perception of positive momentum and retain public support (while denying civilian casualties or non-combatant objectives).

Core Requirements for Success

1. Air superiority- Strategic bombing campaigns require air superiority and freedom of movement in the air to succeed.  As such, punishment campaigns might first have to take a more conventional approach to defeat anti-air capabilities before a successful air-based punishment campaign can be initiated[l].  Further, air capabilities must be sufficiently advanced to be able to identify strategically important civilian targets. 

2. “Special Forces” or “Paramilitaries” for ground action[li]- Barbarism (the act of committing violent action against civilians) can have a very damaging effect on the morale and psychology of normal combat forces.  As such, the counterinsurgent might seek to create “Special Forces” or use paramilitary elements to do the work of barbarism[lii].  The modern application of this could be considered ‘grey zone’ tactics, where the individuals committing barbarism are not directly attributable to government forces[liii].

3. Willingness to escalate to extreme barbarism- Data compiled by Ivan Arreguin-Toft[liv] suggests that barbarism campaigns often have the effect of lengthening insurgencies, rather than ending them quickly.  Only in cases where the strong actor committed to acts of extreme barbarism, was he successful in shortening the conflict. 

4. Compartmentalization of activities- When governments proceed along a course of barbarism, global public opinion may quickly turn against them as images of violence are broadcast over Twitter, Facebook, and news media.  Thus, it may be desirable to attempt to compartmentalize these activities by shutting down communications and Internet access in areas where barbarism occurs.  These may only have a short-term positive effect; however, and eventually reports of these activities will be released into the public domain.  Thus, it becomes a race to secure victory before public opinion can shift momentum against your cause.

5. Patience and Large Financial/Military Reserves[lv]- Some punishment campaigns may take a long time to coerce the population.  As such, the counterinsurgent must be patient and carefully analyze the effects of his campaign to ensure maximum effectiveness.  Large financial reserves may be required if opposition nations impose economic sanctions.  Military aid may also be cut due to public opinion shifts.  As such, large financial and military reserves may be necessary.

6. Ironclad Economic/Military Alliances[lvi]- Conversely, if the counterinsurgent has complicit nations taking part in the punishment campaign, they may be relatively immune to the damaging effects of public opposition (assuming the ally is economically and military strong enough to support the counterinsurgent).

7. Nuclear Weapons- As a punishment campaign progresses, coalitions of nations may begin to formulate plans for external intervention (even regime change).  If the counterinsurgent has nuclear weapons (preferably multiple in areas that cannot be readily identified through conventional intelligence gathering means), he may deter such intervention[lvii]. 

End Notes