by Richard M. Wrona, Jr.
Download the Full Article: A Better, Bad Choice
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a modern-day nightmare. After more than a decade of conflict, the country's eastern region is known for its seemingly unending human misery. Mass murder, forced displacements, and the horrible distinction of being the world's "rape capital" embody Thomas Hobbes' description of life in an anarchic world, (i.e. nasty, brutish, and short.) Reports two weeks ago of hundreds of women, girls, and babies being gang-raped by rebels and tribesmen within miles of a United Nations peacekeepers' camp only serve as the most recent chapters in an epic tragedy ("Congo mass rape numbers rise to 240—UN," BBC).
Download the Full Article: A Better, Bad Choice
Richard Wrona is a U.S. Army officer presently serving as a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His previous assignments include command and staff positions with the 82nd Airborne Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade, as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy, and—most recently—as the Strategy and Policy Branch Chief with U.S. Africa Command. The views presented herein are his own, and do not constitute the policies or positions of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other government or non-government entity.
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Comments
Dear LPierson,
The argument of inneficiency of the Un peace keepers is rooted into african nationalism and UN Security Council balance of power. We can disagree on the rational of the cause but very few on its reallity.
There is a dream of having an effective UN force that would act by the spirit and the letter of the orders they are given. But it is not happening because they are only a soft diplomatic tool and not a combat force.
Troops agregated for UN contingents are chosen not only because their governments are willing to send them but also on their nationality, efficiency and capacity to actually do nothing.
I see the same coming with PMC used as peace keepers. The real issue is not the efficiency of the troops but rather the capacity of the security council to impose inside the group of 5 permanent members a real implementation of their resolutions. The comment of China on the group of experts for Suda is the perfect exemple: they want more objectivity. Basically they want a group of expert who would say what they would like to hear. With PMC, because of the contractual and business relation between the UN and the force commander this would be even easier.
On the contrary, MANY in the US and the west see what goes on in Africa as vital. If it weren't, would anyone have paid any attention to the carnage of Rwanda, Sudan and DRC?
The lack of a serious discussion regarding the core problem regarding the effectiveness of UN peace-keeping efforts is precisely why this article was written. Bottomline: In Africa they have not been effective. Additionally, ACRI, ACOTA and what have you, established as a replacement to external UN forces has brought little.
So does the wealth of the African earth doom its inhabitants to continued depravation and atrocity?
If the argument against the use of PMC'S is rooted in Afrcian Nationalism and an abject distaste for a repeat of "Mad Michael Hoare" et al, then the argument against is weakened. Those days are long past. The continued decimation of populations under the guise of "civil war" has no basis in morality.
Or perhaps would someone care to have the multiple division sized "PMC" from The People's Republic of China?
The comparison between PMC'S and UN Peace-keepers could be accurate if PMC'S only function as unregulated PSC'S (Iraq and Afganistan) or merely providing static security guards. Key phrase from above: well trained PMC'S. Well trained and REGULATED, (eg Executive Outcomes) PMC'S would not function similarly.
If there is to be serious consideration to using PMC'S, there must be CLEAR and significant regulation, precise oversight, and of course a mandate (not necessarily from the UN). And its targets must be dealt with ruthlessly, a diffent COA must have a different outcome.
And I am in full agreement no imbedding of US forces in PMC'S. Oversight and control, perhaps. Imbedding, unequivocally NO.
A rapid and short view of RDC, I must say, despite the fact that I do agree with most of what is said about DRC and the UN in this article.
The core problematic of the effectiveness of UN peace keepers troops is too lightly discussed. The main constraints for such aggregated troops are that they do not fight for a cause or under a national direct interest they can perceive. Changing the UN peace keepers for highly trained PMC will not change much in my opinion. The peace keepers are a kind like PMC troops. They go where they are paid to do the minimum. You cannot expect them to put them selves at risk for a country which is not theirs, a cause they do not understand and an administration they do not respond to directly.
The use of PMC has to be thought twice. Context as DRC are not Irak or Astan. Its low intensity war and indirect confrontation fought through atrocities on civilians. Would PMC be better than UN.
On the sex scandal: most probably. Would they be able to protect the populations and train an effective DRC army where all others have failed (as reminded quite rightly Tom Odom) there is some doubts.
On a brighter note, DRC had its success and the coming elections are one of them just like the end of the CNDP and other regionally supported rebel or insurgents groups.
Also, stability in Central Africa is may be seen as non vital by many US citizen but this, fortunately, does not match with reality. Central Africa and DRC in particular is rich in many raw materials. This is may be the curse of this country which the soil is too rich to be stable.
Moving from an Hobbessian environment to a stable environment is a long journey that cannot be achieve in a day and paved with population suffering...
Carl,
I do support you on this. PMC missions should (and could) be extremely short and target specific.
Bill M:
Regarding your comment.
"This all begs the question, even if we did fund a PMC to address the security concerns in the DROC, to what end would they conduct operations? What is the political objective."
I think use of a pmc would work only if they had a simple objective. In this case it would be the destruction of the FDLR. When that was completed, the unit disbands and goes home.
I'm very supportive of funding PMCs to conduct UN business. If it there is a mandate, and UN oversight (almost laughable) then you have legitimacy. I would not embed U.S. military into their ranks for multiple reasons, but simply make them accountable to an approved political body, and then get out of the way.
I hope Wronga's ideas are seriously considered, but I'm confident the lawyers and politicians just don't have the nerve to try something that may work, they're much more comfortable being ineffective, but protected by a facade of legitimacy. Of course Bangladesh, Pakistan, and others would lose out on thousands of dollars.
I think Lance also has many valid points, the DROC has long been considered a World War with multiple nations involved pursuing their own interests, not to mention corporations pursuing their own interests, and all possibly linked to a specific militia or two. This all begs the question, even if we did fund a PMC to address the security concerns in the DROC, to what end would they conduct operations? What is the political objective.
In other locations, as validated in Sierra Leone, PMCs can be very effective. Much more so than forces provided by different States to the UN, all with different mandates and ineffective ROE.
The paper presented is quite provocative, in that the DRC isn't just a backwater locale for a civil war. It is providing a significant "battle ground" for US interests vs. the PRC. Copper, gold, cobalt and etc., are healthy incentives.
Less than two years ago, the PRC laid 9 billion dollars (US) on the Kabilla regime to insure first-in-line access to several mining concessions. It seems apparent the 9 billion also has allowed for the Kabilla government the luxury to "re-look" other concessions (coincidentally held by US/Western mining outfits,) to insure "compliance" with DRC law. One must consider the likelihood of PRC mischief as one of the dynamics prolonging the civil war.
Neither is it beyond the pale of imagination that US mining interests may be equally active.
So what could we see in DRC in terms credible security architecture? Is it outside the realm of feasibilty that the PRC turns one, or two, of its 100+ infantry divisions into a "PMC", and said newly minted "PMC" be employed in the DRC? Now what would that do for having DRC moving up in locales of importance?
Thus, should it be beyond reason for the US/West consider a well regulated PMC option for DRC?
Interesting read. I wonder if concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of PMCs hired by the USG could be mitigated somewhat by embedding active US military (advisors?) into the PMC formations to oversee operations....? The active US military advisors could also serve as informational cadre for US forces that might be potentially deployed into the DRC or any other area in which PMCs are employed.
Actually, using a PMC would be an excellent idea. The example for such a thing is what Executive Outcomes had done in places like Sierra Leone.
Today's PMC's could do the job as well, and the UN is using these types of companies (directly and indirectly) for all sorts of work. Here are some links to provide proof that the UN uses PMC's.
Direct
http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un_embraces_private…
http://www.amazon.com/Outsourcing-Peace-Security-Military-Companies/dp/…
Indirectly
And then there are missions with UN approval, like the AU's AMISOM, which the logistics is a DynCorps show.
http://www.dyn-intl.com/cs-somalia.aspx
It is also interesting to point out that the UN actually approached EO to help deal with the Rwandan Crisis in the early nineties. Kofi Anan asked for EO to submit a price, EO responded and the UN declined due to it costing too much. In turn, the UN ended up trying to do the operation itself and responded far too late with too little forces. The mission did not save lives, and the genocide is now an ugly reminder of UN and world inaction.
The UN mission also cost more than what EO originally offered after all was said and done. I highly recommend reading this article in Counter Terrorist Magazine, and go to page 40 for the specifics on EO versus UN cost effectiveness.
http://digital.ipcprintservices.com/publication/?i=29671&p=6
Finally, I wonder what is worse? Using professional private forces to do the job, or having to use corrupt, criminal and poorly trained military forces that were contributed by a third world country? Why is this force morally, ethically and physically better than a private force?
If for example a country took all of it's prisoners, threw them together as an army and offered them up, would the UN take that force over a private military company? Who knows, and maybe it has already happened? lol
I guess my point is, is that private industry, if used correctly, can be a force multiplier and can certainly offer value.
Boy if something like Mr. Wrona's idea could be done it would be a dream come true. An effective force that would actually do something, just imagine. It could not be seconded to UN command though or they would make sure it wouldn't do anything.
I can't ever believe the US gov would pay for a private military force though. One mention of the word "mercenary" and that would be that.
This is sort of a half serious idea but what if some billionaire somewhere could be talked into supporting a Congolese unit to take care of things in the east. The unit would be Congolese in name only and be composed of foreign troops and officers and would not be supplied or under the authority of the FARDC, a private military company under a false flag. I wonder if that or some variation of that would work.
I am very glad to see some US soldiers giving some thought to the poor old Congo.