America's Afghanistan Problem: It's Not Just About Sending More Troops by Michael O'Hanlon, The National Interest
Reportedly, the Trump administration is considering adding several thousand U.S. troops—ideally accompanied by other NATO and foreign reinforcements too—to the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan. The current mission totals some 8,500 Americans, and roughly twelve thousand foreign troops in all, so the possible increase could amount to an augmentation of 30–50 percent in total personnel. In my judgment, this kind of increase would be sensible, for reasons discussed below.
Before examining the numbers issue, however, a few other quick points need to be made about our ongoing commitment to Afghanistan, now in its sixteenth year. First, those who have been saying for years that the United States does not have the strategic patience or political resilience to remain committed to a long and tough mission for many years have been definitively proved wrong. That is a good thing, not just for Afghanistan, but for what it says about America's strategic ability to stick with a tough job even when the results are mediocre and the stage lights have dimmed, so to speak. Second, the Trump administration seems to be implicitly accepting that it will remain in Afghanistan throughout much—if not all—of the president's first term. So there would be little purpose in talking about a buildup this year if our intention was simply to pull out next year, for example. Happily, there seems to be a good chance that the United States will end its annual policy reviews that consider zeroing out the U.S./NATO presence in the country, as happened in the latter years of the Obama administration. A mission that has been called Operation Enduring Resolve since 2015 may now fully deserve its name.
Beyond these subjects are the issues of Pakistan, Afghan political and economic reform, and the peace process with the Taliban, such as it is. On the first matter, many American voices on the Left and the Right are calling for a tougher U.S. approach to Pakistan—one of the top "frenemies" in American foreign policy today—due to its tolerance of Taliban sanctuaries on its soil, even as it cooperates with the United States over Afghanistan in other ways. Already we have cut aid to Pakistan considerably. We could cut more; we could designate Pakistani individuals and organizations supporting the Taliban and sanction them; we could strike Taliban targets within Pakistan with even less restraint than has been the norm to date. More positively, we could also eventually offer incentives—a free-trade agreement or increased aid—if Islamabad will restrict its support for the Taliban or cut it off altogether…
Comments
We occupied Japan, Germany, and South Korea for several years to maintain order and facilitate post-war reconstruction. We stayed for decades because of an external, existential threat to those countries, with popular concurrence from the populations and their governments. The political and economic successes in those places were facilitated by that security, but not driven by it. Had we continued as occupation troops, or to prop up unpopular or ineffective governments, I suspect the outcome would have been different.
Nor is taking over governance a good answer. We did this for specific Caribbean countries in danger of defaulting on debts...once that task was done, we left. Arguably, we did it in the Philippines as well, and fought a bitter guerilla war until a external threat worse than us turned up to provide a greater disaster.
If we're staying in Afghanistan to prop up a government the population either opposes or doesn't care about, it won't matter how many troops spend how many years there.
"Afghan units led by U.S./ coalition leaders..."
Morgan, that sounds similar to the old Philippine Constabulary.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Constabulary
Interesting concept, but obviously a little different from a governmental standpoint.
A troop increase in Afghanistan of 3000-5000….to do what? To what end? It seems that the new administration may be prepared to keep our forces there for a long time, which is necessary in order to help a country develop into one that can provide security for its people and contribute positively to those around it (or at least not threaten them in any way). We kept troops in Japan, Germany, & Korea for several decades…..look at their successes. But adding a few thousand of our forces won’t do much more than prevent complete collapse of the Afghan government. We need to make our few have a greater impact.
With that in mind, perhaps now might be the time to relook a concept discussed on SWJ some time ago…..Afghan units led by U.S./ coalition leaders (sort of a reversed KATUSA program, and I think USSF may be doing something similar already). Another idea that could be beneficial would be to place U.S./ coalition military and/ or civilians in their government….Ministry of Finance, Justice, Economy, etc… Both cases could be arranged with the Afghan government (assuming they were amenable to this) through secondment of U.S./ coalition personnel. This practice is used by the Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the British military (I believe the U.S. military may do something similar with regards to postings with the U.N. though I’m not certain). This type of effort would have to go on for at least a decade if not longer. But I think by doing something like this, we could demonstrate by example an effective (though not perfect) way of governing and protecting a country, eventually handing off all responsibility to Afghan leaders.
Should we be looking at Afghanistan (and everything and everywhere else for that matter) in the "one war"/"four-plus-one enemies" strategic context that I have outlined, in some detail, at the "Turkey: Ally or Albatross" thread earlier today?
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/turkey-ally-or-albatross
Herein, can we say that this (the "one war"/"four-plus-one enemies" strategic context) is exactly how CJCS GEN Dunford (and the rest of our national leadership?) is looking at Afghanistan (and everything and everywhere else for that matter) today?
BEGIN QUOTE
“It’s pretty clear to me that Afghanistan could possibly be a place where there are proxy wars with various regional actors, as well,” he said.
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http://usmclife.com/2017/05/decisions-weighed-number-troops-afghanistan/
Re: the "proxy wars with various regional actors," noted by GEN Dunford above, should we see (a) continuing U.S./Western support for the current Afghan regime and (b) recent Russian support for the Taliban in (c) exactly this such "one war" (to advance market-democracy)/"four-plus-one enemies" (who seek to prevent this from happening) strategic context?
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/04/24/russia-is-…
Thus, GEN Dunford (et al.) looking at both our specific and our general problems throughout the world today:
a. Not through some dangerously myopic "plus-one"/violent extremists lens alone. But, rather,
b. Through the "big four" (Russia, China, Iran and N. Korea) lens also?
Would we all be better served, thus, to -- likewise, accordingly and for the foreseeable future -- also look at the issues raised/the matters presented here in Small Wars Journal through something like this more-broad and more-all-encompassing "one war"/"four-plus-one enemies" strategic lens?
(Thus, in consideration of the "one war"/"four-plus-one enemies" strategic context offered above, and the apparently related "proxy wars" between the U.S./the West and Russia, et al., today, how do we feel about the suggested increase in troop strength in Afghanistan now?)