Comments
I think France helping the United States in the Revolutionary war is interesting. I do not know the reasons France helped the United States, but I think it parallels the United States helping the Northern Alliance. The efforts were successful in part because interests aligned and the respective parties were motivated. In both cases, the natives took on the brunt of the fight. Is that happening in Afghanistan today?
In regards to the topic of the article, by the nature of our mission, our military is learning skills to act in a defensive manner. Our mission to keep peace, patrol for IEDs, diplomacy with natives, has many defensive aspects to it. Is that what a military should be learning?
It is one thing to help others, it is another thing to do it for them, does the later really help them?
Where are many of you getting the atrophied infantry skills portion of your argument? Have you read SSG Giunta's account of the ambush. His squad - not on its own in no-man's land as stated, but moving with the rest of the platoon behind it and a second platoon a ridgeline down - was caught in a near L shaped ambush by an enemy with fire superiority and suprise. Despite suffering two KIA and having every other man in the squad hit in some way, the squad rallied and gave out worse than it got, conducting its react to ambush battle drill perfectly. That's as hard as it gets and they did it with distinction, as scores of other infantry and Marine and scout and other units to every day in Afghanistan. I think our small unit skill level is fine.
Understood, Mr. Jones. Then I would, IMHO, submit for your consideration that in fact, our center of gravity should be those who are at the edge of the enterprise, so to speak. Those who are our Points of Contact and very often Troops in Contact, the last three feet of diplomacy. I submit that in network centric warfare that must be the case as it is the natural state of using a net. Have you ever fished with a throwing net? It must be weighted properly at the edges and then handled correctly when thrown or it will be knotted up, wrapped around you with you caught in your own net laying in the floor of the boat.
This should be nothing knew to us. Admiral William Owen wrote about it in 1996: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=AD… and then Admiral Cebrowski wrote about it in Jan. 1998 in his Proceedings essay on Network Centric Warfare. (I would link to that essay but it's behind the USNI paywall.) Reading his original essay you will see that he was not referring to the network as much as explaining what would be the networked affects of people networking.
This leads me to submit that what we have not empowered our troops at the edge with what is the ability to discover and add to the knowledge of our operations in a timely manner. The ability to discover and access what they need to know at the moment they don't know it would build tremendous agility in our operations. Our internal communication platforms are too inefficient and manpower intensive as they exist today.
Much of this was being teased around in the Future Combat Systems project but because of bureaucratic mismanagement and an inefficient and cumbersome contracting, acquisition, research and development process we lost the focus and then the funding. I also submit that we lost the focus because our strategic thinking atrophied which was compounded by our reduced focus on basic skills because of a misguided belief that technology would save us.
By itself it will not. It is an enabler. We must first possess superior strategic thinking and superior tactical skills. As Adm. Cebrowski wrote:
"Network-Centric Warfare derives its power from the strong networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a high-performance information grid, access to all appropriate information sources, weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of response, value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes--to include high-speed automated assignment of resources to need--and integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time to shooters and C2 processes. Network-centric warfare is applicable to all levels of warfare and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics. It is transparent to mission, force size and composition, and geography.
Speed of Command is the process by which a superior information position is turned into a competitive advantage. It is characterized by the decisive altering of initial conditions, the development of high rates of change, and locking in success while locking out alternative enemy strategies. It recognizes all elements of the operating situation as parts of a complex adaptive ecosystem and achieves profound effect through the impact of closely coupled events.
Self-Synchronization is the ability of a well-informed force to organize and synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up. The organizing principles are unity of effort, clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement. Self-synchronization is enabled by a high level of knowledge of one's own forces, enemy forces, and all appropriate elements of the operating environment. It overcomes the loss of combat power inherent in top-down command directed synchronization characteristic of more conventional doctrine and converts combat from a step function to a high-speed continuum."
We simply cannot push information as fast as someone can pull it even when he may not be sure exactly what he needs. He can do it on the Internet, he cannot do it on the SIPRNet.
And Mr. Dayuhan, the question is not about tolerance for casualties but about the fact that our enemys perception of our vulnerable center of gravity is having the desired effect and that our strategy should consider it. If they are having their desired effect then their strategy and focus must be correct. IMHO, I would also submit that it is not democracy that is our greatest asset but liberty. Liberty to make the choices you desire enforced by a democratically elected republican (little r) form of government.
Ok, so that may be 2 bucks worth depending on your valuation.
<i>"From Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh to Osama bin Laden, all our enemies have recognized that our vulnerable strategic center of gravity is dead Americans." </i>
Why should that be the case? Americans have a quite substantial tolerance for casualties when they believe the cause being fought for is vital: WW2 might serve as an example. They are notably reluctant to see lives and wealth expended in pursuit of causes they believe to be less than vital, which is quite understandable. In that sense one might say that America's greatest strategic asset - democracy - is also its greatest vulnerability. It provides great strength and great resilience, but it also makes it difficult for leaders to sustain efforts that are not compatible with the populace's perception of its own interests. I'm not sure I'd want to have it any other way.
Jack,
One-word answer to your final question: "Influence."
Ok, I realize this isn't the book solution, but one can make a strong case that the US COG is Influence. What makes up US influence? It is a combination of our military and economic strength; our global reputation for how we approach problems domestically and abroad; the principles we proclaim and how well we hold ourselves to the same, and how willing we are to allow others to seek their own destinies within those broad parameters.
The entire GWOT has been a tremendous exercise in deficit spending when it comes to this rare, critical commodity of "Influence." Actually, we have arguably been deficit spending since about 1950, but the burn rate cranked up considerably since 2001. Strategies of Containment are expensive that way. We can print money, but you can't print influence, you have to earn it.
But when one has it one can deter threats and rally the support of allies on all types of issues. It allows one to lead in a manner that encourages, rather than demands, following. I for one think we should make the preservation and development of American Influence our top priority; this is the existential risk to America.
Making the preservation and development of the Karzai regime can only take us farther from where we need to be in that regard.
Mr. Jones, Mr. Haddick and Mr. White are all correct. Focus must be concentrated on the basics; basic infantry skills and basic strategic thinking. IMHO, our infantry skills and strategic thinking have both atrophied and one possibly because of the other.
"We prepare for war so that we may live in peace." George Washington
"Strategy without tactics is the slow road to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." Sun Tzu
"In combat, the important things are very simple and the simple things are very difficult." Carl von Clausewitz
IMHO, failure to renegotiate goals and adjust strategy as evidenced by failing tactics is a failure of leadership.
We don't fight to "win," we fight for peace.
My 2 cents
The post by Publius above reminds me of something that's often struck me while reading detail-focused discussions here. We have infinite debates over the range of various small arms, MRAP vs helicopters, body armor, tactics, armaments, generations of warfare, open sources and swarms, ad infinitum. While many of these factors merit discussion, these discussions overlook what seems to me to be a fairly obvious reality: our problems in Afghanistan stem not from any of these details, but from the policy-level decision to try and impose centralized western-style governance on a place that is notoriously not amenable to such imposition. Some of the discussion on tactics and strategy seems to overlook the rather desperate need to reassess policy: is this really something we need or want to do? Is this something we have the capacity to do?
If our goal is to ride a unicycle up Mt Everest, we don't need a better unicycle. We need to reassess the goal.
It is interesting to note that way back in 1939 Gen. Skeen writing in "Lessons in Imperial Rule" did have much confidence in the ability of aircraft to spot ambushers on the Indian frontier. He gives several examples of the planes not being able to spot anything in areas where there were a lot of tribesmen lying up or there was a lot of fighting going on. The planes were flying quite low too.
Since Revolutionary War references seem to be popular it should be added that the plucky Minute Men's efforts would have been for naught if they had not received a whole lot of help from the great big powerful Kingdom of France. Concord and Lexington references too would be more apt if we were to imagine Canada had still been French and all the leading lights of the Patriot cause had been living in Montreal along with a lot of those farmers.
IMO, this shallow and emotional piece is a waste of valuable op-ed space. Ken white's note on Scales's deeper treatment of the topic at AFJ is noted; however, AFJ is an insider publication, read primarily by those who have a good idea of what he's talking about. OTOH, the WaPo is read by a mostly civilian audience and I wouldn't be surprised if most come away muttering, "Huh?" From where I sit, to paraphrase Gertrude Stein, there is no there there. Exactly what are these guys trying to say?
Fairness? Do the billions we pour into Afghanistan to prosecute a small time campaign against a rag tag, albeit very well motivated and effective adversary equate to a level playing field? Are we playing with one hand tied behind our backs? C'mon, generals. If you think we should do something about the refuge in Pakistan or that we should do away with the hearts and minds schtick, then why don't you just say so? Or is it your position that we're throwing the game?
Ken White notes what appears to be a need for more tactical training. As someone who's been retired for years now, I'm always loath to throw stones at today's leadership, but I am struck by what kind of appears to be high school-level work by the self-proclaimed greatest military ever, which one would like to think would have graduated to a higher level after nine years in the same AO. This old Vietnam guy can't help but wonder. Especially when he thinks of all of the expensive hardware--e.g., AH-64, Marine wonder tilt-rotor deathtrap thing, etc., we've bought over the years, none of which seems to matter at all. Given the dollars invested and the relative levels of troop quality, one would think that, fair or unfair, this would be a no-brainer.
And speaking of wondering. Although he dances around the subject, Robert Jones is wondering. He's wondering, just as I am. Why? Jones references those fellows at Concord. The "good" insurgents we honor. Can tons of money and the "finest military ever" defeat dedicated and smart people fighting on their home turf for something in which they believe? How'd that work out for King George?
If we "win" in Afghanistan, what do we win? Do we get to turn off the full body scanners at airports and get rid of the overwhelming security state we've erected at home? Do we get to close down Guantanamo and do other things to erase the stains on our reputation? Do we get to stop spending ten times what the rest of the world combined spends on the miitary? Will we get to celebrate an "End of Terrorism" day?
The second-to-last paragraph of MG Scale's AFJ article has hypothetical question's with answers being tested in El Paso. He must know that and may see the danger that it, too, will get trampled in the current budget environment.
IMHO, Brigade Combat Team modernization was inadequately advertised when it was FCS, inconsistently supported by many in the very armor community trying to articulate O&O requirements, and is only slightly better advertised now because the news is better, the O&O and its absence of engineers and screen/guard terms is thankfully gone, and most remaining systems are infantry-oriented which step on fewer M1 commander toes.
Points:
- Unattended ground sensors and SUGVs very well would have precluded the enemy from sneaking up to within meters of Soldiers at Wanat in both COP and OP.
- Unattended urban sensors might have warned the same platoon that the enemy was preparing to engage Wanat troops from a nearby hotel and bazaar.
- Class I UAV launched just prior to stand-to might well have seen infiltrating enemy and would have been far easier to control at very slow speed to a hover. It would have been distributed down to platoon level. Perhaps SSG Giunta may not have had his chance to excel because a slow-and-low flying UAV controlled from the COP and matching patrol speed would have been more likely to locate enemy than an Apache at altitude in mountains...which would have seen the low-slow UAV's video INSIDE THE COCKPIT to facilitate attack before ambush.
- XM-25 25mm rounds might have allowed engagement of enemies firing from beyond 500 meters and hidden behind cover during the attack of COP Keating
- A ground fired Joint Air Ground Missile launched from Camp Blessing 5 miles away or OP Fritsche above COP Keating easily could have reached both objectives without the 500 meter danger close restriction of 155mm
- We see special forces riding around on ATVs. Why can't we build an optionally-two-manned armored ATV for infantry forces?
- The Marines seem to have no problem funding $70 million MV-22 that can't hover carrying much in mountains yet Army OH-58D are expected to hover there and a $12 million replacement that actually can never gets funding.
Which is a bigger threat. Army rejection of technology and homegrown airpower or USAF LTG (ret) Deptula's article in this month's AFJ citing that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance are inseparable. Could your attack reconnaissance battalion or ground reconnaissance squadron end up working for the CAOC ISR section? No way you say? Yet who do you think tells the Reapers/Predators where to fly and wants a joint ISR infrastructure and stateside intelligence analysts?
If the Army ground Soldier won't recognize the potential of technology leap-aheads, it makes it easier for other's with misplaced visions to say there is nothing wrong with distant CAOC or J2 controlling aerial and ground ISR, stateside DCGS reachback (instead of forward-deployed Army DCGS), and Creech, etc. flight of UAS...effectively creating a permanent class of exposed and non-exposed...deployers and nondeployers...aware of the battlefield and local commander's scheme of maneuver vs. temporary supporters for a few hours before supporting someone else manana.
Sorry, just read this month's AFJ article and it got me steamed.
Ken White said: "Unfortunately, I believe the 30% must be well underway before the culture will allow the 70% solution to be applied."
Yes I agree and to achieve this one needs IMHO to do two fundamental things. One make sure everybody agrees and accepts that there is room for improvement in the basics and this is improved radically by training in the pre-deployment period back in the US and followed up with in country (Afghanistan) training in a custom established "battle camp" environment on arrival and before combat deployment.
Secondly (as we have discussed elsewhere) the tour lengths which some smart guys want to shorten even more lead to the US (and Brit militaries) rotating their troops out of Afghanistan just when they are approaching operational competence. Troops develop confidence in a particular theatre in direct proportion to their battlefield experience over a period of time.
They will tell you when they are ready to operate in independent squads or fire teams and this will be the product of more than just company/platoon/squad (section) training but also as a result of the hot emphasis on the individual skills of each soldier and the combined confidence of individual skill at arms and combat experience (in that particular theatre).
Operationally this will ultimately translate into greater terrain coverage (if that is what is needed) when instead of a (one) company stumbling around you can deploy 30 odd fire teams. Instead of a (one) platoon stumbling around you can deploy 7-8 fire teams (independently). Give these guys guaranteed fire support day/night and in all weather and you will be onto a winner.
They would need old hands like you to reset the basic training standards because there seems to have been some drift in the younger generations in terms of standards. You be up for the challenge?
In fairness to the two General Officers, they may have been caught by deadlines, editors and the WaPo philosophy. The Op-Ed appears to a condensation of a far better article in the AFJ by Scales titled <a href=http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/10/4757970> "<u>Small Unit Dominance</u>."</a>
That article is excellent. A hat Tip to <b>Tequila</b> for posting a link on the Council board.
With reference to <b>Slapout 9's</b> pertinent comment re: solving a low level tactical problem. Indeed it was but Mr. Jones <i>never</i> lets lack of applicability impede his message... ;)
<b>Robert Haddick's</b> question deserves answers. My answer is 30% improved training (in the works, albeit too slowly), 70% less risk avoidance and interference and more delegation to allow aggressive units the latitude to initiate contacts rather than respond to them. Unfortunately, I believe the 30% must be well underway before the culture will allow the 70% solution to be applied. The potential capability exists and is relatively easily obtained, all that's required is to unleash it.
Surely someone here has a better idea and a faster solution...
A brilliant solution to the wrong problem is of little value.
It is better to do the right thing poorly, than the wrong thing very well.
Currently we are doing the wrong thing about as well as can be expected. Better training and equipment may make us better at the wrong thing, but that hardly solves the problem.
I'm reminded of Ranger school, and an RI screaming into my sleep glazed eyes, "Are you as F'd up as you want to be Ranger?!" As we all, know, there is no good answer to that question, so you just continue on to the Ranger Objective as best you can.
This isn't Ranger School though. Sometimes in real life quitting is the right thing to do. We need to quit looking at this operation like a giant ranger rotation and stop to consider what the real issues at stake are and how to best address them.
For my money, it is time to stop trying to do the wrong thing better, and start muddling along at trying to do the right thing instead. This means late nights for our policy boys in DC, and late nites for those dealing with Karzai's poor governance that we are currently enabling as well.
I posted this on another thread. It want solve everything the using Armor wherever possible can not hurt. Link to article.
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/19/afghanistan.tanks/?hpt=T2
At the end of their essay, Scales and van Riper say:
"We hope policymakers watched Tuesday's ceremony at the White House and paused to reflect on Giunta's story. They should be asking why the richest nation on Earth could not have done more to help this small infantry unit spot the enemy ambush from the air and defeat them with overwhelming killing power."
The generals are obviously unaware that SSGT Giunta's patrol was supported by AH-64s (President Obama mentioned this during the MOH ceremony). The Apaches did not spot the insurgents assembling the ambush, did not warn the patrol about the ambush site, and could not provide supporting fire during the worst of the ambush.
I naturally agree with Ken White that the best thing we could do to improve infantry performance is to improve infantry training.
But national policy has put us in a war of attrition against an experienced enemy with a significant home court advantage. More air support and brilliance at patrolling technique will improve performance but obviously won't eliminate risk.
We're fighting on the enemy's terms and haven't figured out how to make these small unit engagements "unfair." Scales and van Riper have identified the problem, which remains unsolved. Any good ideas out there?
For what its worth, I didn't catch any digs at our Airforce brothers, as this is not a mission they can really help with, even if they did have the right type of platforms for this fight. Fly low and slow over the rocky ridges of southern Afghanistan, and that is exactly what you see: barren, rocky, forbidding ridges. No signs of life, and surely no signs of the enemy. Roll a small unit up the valley dominated by those same ridges, and suddenly the ICOM radios start to light up the net, and sophisticated, well-coordinated attacks materialize from nowhere.
The air gods can't find this enemy, and when they do find people who may well be the enemy, they have no way of really confirming that fact. The families traveling to the nearest market look the same as the fighters traveling to the nearest fight. Often they are largely one and the same. Often they are not.
No, the real solution lies in addressing why we are there patrolling that valley in the first place. Why are Afghan security forces made up of men who know little more about these remote areas than the Westerners do?
I have said it before, and I will continue to say it. Such insurgent-based conflicts as this are fought by lean, hard young men in the rural areas; but they are ulitmately won or lost by fat old men in the capital. I have the greatest faith and confidence in the lean, hard young men of both sides. It is the fat old men who scare me.
At first glance, this article appears be aimed square into the heart of the Air Force, the traditional occupiers of the high ground and the typical punching bag for the infantryman under fire. However the budgetary pressures within the Beltway are being felt by all. Dozens of potentially useful aircraft are being retired just to make ends meet. The service-on-service squabbling for money will reach a fever pitch soon enough, and the fine words spoken of Sgt Giunta will belost in the din.
General officers, not the politicians, set the priorities for equipping and training of Infantry.
I have great respect for MG Scales, but it has taken an actual infantry war for both services to do something about what should have been obvious deficiencies. The fault lies squarely on the men who wore the stars.
Infantry combat is not going away and we owe the troops more than they're now getting, on that score I totally agree with the Authors. However, I have to disagree with Robert Haddick, I'm not at all sure the Generals are on to something. I totally agree with their premise, that we should not be "fighting fair" but I strongly disagree with their solution. Not least because aside from espousing technological solutions to what is emphatically a people problem, they include a budget oriented plea that essentially indicates business as usual. We can do better.
The American tendency to constantly attempt substitution of technology for training is a far more significant problem than most seem to realize. Comments I receive from persons now there or who have been there recently, news reports, videos and photographs all tell a tale of too many units who do not do the basics well.
The Army's Asymetric Warfare Group was designed to, among other things, improve the minor tactics and the training of the US Army. It has been successful in doing that in a good many cases. It has failed to achieve as much success as it could have due to being fought on many issues by the Army bureaucracy which strongly prefers business as usual.
The VanRiper and Scales plea for sustaining the ground force in size is IMO the wrong approach. Sustaining the infantry force in both services at size is eminently possible in an era of reduced budgets -- provided a concomitant reduction in the tail ratio is made and that is possible, desirable even -- though it does entail deciding what's really important and then breaking a rice bowl or two...
The issue of not fighting fair is not one of providing more techno solutions and improved individual weapons -- though those are more than desirable and are long overdue -- it is rather using superior training and tactical agility to prevail in infantry combat. The troops are well taken care of in the combat zone, perhaps too well. As Erwin Rommel said, the best form of welfare for the troops is first class training. He also said:<blockquote>"Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, and brains saves both."</blockquote>Our training is probably better today than it has ever been in some respects, in others, it is less so. Many years of peace have taken a toll on what's important and have led to a restrictive view of what the troops can be allowed to do. Most units are capable of doing more than they are permitted to do...
We can do better and efforts are being made to do that. That improved training should be long enough to thoroughly embed cognitive basic combat skills, train muscle memory, <u>encourage</u> initiative, best practice and decentralized planning and execution. It should emphasize the fostering of trust and delegation while penalizing excess risk aversion.
Robert C. Jone above is correct in saying the troops are doing far better on the ground than is apparent to most. However, they can do even more if truly competent in the basics of the trade of infantry combat and are then trusted.
And if they are not kept on a too short leash...
Mr. Jones,
We share similar views with respect to the source of our "enemies" motivation, and the comparison of "on the road to Concord"is a good one. Our strategy in Afghanistan is at odds with reality; the "people" of Afghanistan have steadfastly resisted a centralized national government (on this point I sympathize with them), and we lack the means and will to coerce them into submission, for such "coercion" would require a level of brutality at odds with our values.
If we took the time to look around the world at these traditionally "tribal" peoples, and found ways to work with them instead of attempting to convert them, we may have more success. As far as I know, there is only one book that deals with this approach seriously and that is The Law of the Somalis.
From Somalia, to Chechnya, to Afghanistan, resilient peoples and customs are exacting a high cost for marginal gains---there is a better way, and they will be found only if we do what you suggest, elevate the debate---within the scope of reality.
I will note this news release from the Department of Defense, issued two days ago:
=======
The Department of Defense announced today the deaths of five soldiers who were supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.
They died Nov. 14 in Kunar province, Afghanistan, when insurgents attacked their unit with small arms fire.
Killed were:
Spc. Shane H. Ahmed, 31, of Chesterfield, Mich.
Spc. Nathan E. Lillard, 26, of Knoxville, Tenn.
Spc. Scott T. Nagorski, 27, of Greenfield, Wis.
Spc. Jesse A. Snow, 25, of Fairborn, Ohio.
Pfc. Christian M. Warriner, 19, of Mills River, N.C.
They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky.
======
Maybe Scales and van Riper are on to something.
It seems as though the authors think that if we occupy all the high ground in Afghanistan (impossible) and have constant ISR overwatch (improbable) that infantry units will never be caught unawares (also impossible).
Even if this was possible, and no infantry unit was ever again ambushed, the authors decry the M-16 class of rifles. IF I was on the high ground all the time and IF I always knew where the enemy was first, the M-16 would be preferable due to its greater accuracy at long range.
There are problems with how we fight. But I don't think taking more high ground and depending on high tech solutions is the answer.
I have a tremendous respect for MG Scales, so I clicked onto this article with some interest. Based on my own experience in Afghanistan I know exactly how "unfair" our advantages are in a firefight there, almost always ending in a very bad day for the enemy and typically low, to no casualties on the friendly side. So I was curious where this was going to go.
What I found was a great deal of hyperbole, talk of not having adequate body armor 7 years ago, and not occupying all of the high ground in Afghanistan. There are great points to be made about the situations we put our soldiers in Afghanistan, and how we could be more effective with lower risks. Unfortunately this article didn't seek to take those issues on.
We do not fight a "fanatical" enemy in Afghanistan, but our guys do regularly engage with a brave, dedicated opponent that is willing to match two guys on a little red motorcycle armed with a PKM up against a team of SEALs supported by ISR and attack helicopters on a regular basis. As I said, it typically ends badly for the enemy.
Why are these guys willing to come out day after day to engage our forces in the face of such odds? One could ask the experts on ideology; or the experts on COIN. One would probably get a better answer, however, if they could talk to one of the 2-300 farmers or shop keepers who stood, untrained and ill-equipped on the road to Concord to face the hot lead and cold steel of 700 British Regulars.
No, I think this editorial missed the mark. The problem is not how we fight, the problem lies more squarely in the reasons we fight, our strategic assessments of how to best address U.S. interests in Afghanistan, and the very policies that shape and prioritize those interests. Issues of body armor and high ground are easily resolved. It's time to elevate the debate to the larger issues in play.