Hamid Karzai was declared winner of the presidential vote in Afghanistan on Monday after his challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew from the runoff. But questions concerning the Karzai government's legitimacy and corruption remain as unresolved as before.
The case of Ahmed Wali Karzai, President Karzai's brother, shows how difficult it is to deal with the government now in place. The Times reported last week that Ahmed Karzai is paid by the CIA to help recruit an Afghan paramilitary force that operates at the agency's direction. He has been linked to Afghanistan's narcotics trade and is the most powerful figure in the swath of southern Afghanistan where the Taliban's insurgency is strongest.
What should be done, if anything, about Ahmed Wali Karzai? Does his suspected connection to the opium trade make it impossible to achieve American goals in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar, where he is based? What does his political prominence say about the prospects for reforming the government?
Robert D. Kaplan, Center for a New American SecurityFrederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Brookings Institution
Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations
More at The New York Times.
Comments
Cross posting from Registan.net. This is somewhat facetious, but reflects my (varying) anxiety level about this situation:
The bottom line is that its a bad situation and its NOT going to get fixed by some accident. It can only be fixed by a very determined and very GOOD effort (good as in sports, an effort that delivers, not an effort that sounds good to X or Y). That good effort is not coming from the US. In fact, Obama seems totally clueless about this situation. Yes, I too have been thinking that Obiwan is playing some clever jedi mind trick, but if he is, then Jedi master sahib is cutting it mightly close. Everyone and his mother is hedging their bets already and its easier to lose credibility than it is to gain it. My friends in pakistan tell me the security establishment is openly saying "we told you so. The Americans are looking for an exit and we hold the door. We have always been right. Let us manage this and you go take 10% off the social support program and leave the serious business to us professionals". That may not sound ominous to you guys, but to someone from Pakistan it sounds very very scary.
Unless Black Adders "cunning plan" materializes in the next few weeks, we may soon be focusing on what happens AFTER the shit hits the fan... .
I would add that I dont mean there will be some sudden Tet offensive at the end of November. The disaster will unfold much more slowly, but it will become increasingly clear that we are headed to a new civil war and renewed proxy war between India and Pakistan and Iran and everyone will adjust accordingly.
And I am NOT saying the Pak army and the Pakistani taliban will be all hunky-dory next month either. They will kill each other (mostly foot soldiers) for a while before the next army chief appoints Hakeemullah governor of Waziristan and signs a peace deal with him. The ironic part is, Hakeemullah (or whoever is his replacement) will then shoot some generals just on "general principle".
Of course, as always, I hope to be proved wrong. But i do have increasing fears that things will not turn out well...
Pol-Mil FSO, I find your opening sentence to be spot-on. I suspect you have recent in country experience with the situation?
I'm constantly hounded for parallels between this war and our involvement in Vietnam. I generally state, I'm not Dr. Kissinger, etc.
However, one parallel we don't want to establish is: after Diem was "deposed," there was a succession of leaders and coups, that I personally don't think we ever recovered from, and lost whatever confidence the southern population had toward us as a whole.
Better to deal with the foibles of known personalties as opposed to worse alternatives.
Please keep guys like me, that are sitting this one out, abreast with your interesting perspectives.
I am puzzled as to why the pundits in Washington do not understand that we have to deal with the Afghanistan that exists, not the Afghanistan that we wish to exist.
There are three tribes in Kandahar that are the principal support for the Afghan Government: the Popolzai, the Barakzai, and the Alokozai. Recognizing this fact, the Taliban have targeted the leadership of these three tribes and have succeeded in severely weakening the Alokozai.
Ahmed Wali Karzai is the leader of the Popolzai in Kandahar and one of the most committed and most powerful supporters of the Kabul Government (presided over by his half-brother). He brings a lot of resources to the fight against the Taliban, including tribal intelligence networks. He is also number one on the Taliban target list and they have tried to assassinate him several times. Trying to remove him from the scene without having a viable replacement (which I doubt exists) is very foolish as it would create a power vacuum that would quickly be exploited by the Taliban.
The Barakzai leaders are Gul Agha Shirzai, the current Governor of Nangarhar Province who earned a reputation for corruption and brutality when he was Governor of Kandahar Province, and his brothers the businessman and the ANA Air Corps General. The Shirzai brothers are getting rich by milking the cash cow of Kandahar Air Field contracts but their other business dealings probably would not survive Western anti-corruption scrutiny. Just as in the case of Ahmed Wali Karzai, replacement of these individuals would have negative consequences for security in Kandahar Province.
We need to get our priorities straight and the first one should be to arrest and reverse Taliban momentum. Good governance has to follow security and it has to come from Afghans, not imposed by foreigners. There is an apt quote in MAJ Gant's paper on tribal engagement: "Even if you take a Pashtun person to Paradise by force, he will not go. He will go with you only by friendly means."
Tyrtaois,
Good points. Schmedlap has had me on a roll during the last week as he's blasted a lot of the current commentary on A'stan. I shouldn't mix my sarcasm with my analysis.
In the end, I fear that A'stan could prove to be the ultimate test of any of our theories of small wars- inhospitable terrain, corrupt government, xenophobic populace. I want us to get this right. I wish that I knew how.
Mike
MikeF - The Karzai brothers aside, at least the Taliban haven't achieved the broad support that the National Liberation Front (NLF) did in Vietnam.
At least we've that going for us when considering the "least-bad solution(s)." And incidentally, territories generally don't pay taxes so let's toss that one out?
NYT- welcome to the realm of small wars!!! Maybe we can now transcend past the false dilemma between CT/COIN and other foolishness. Any squad leader, platoon leader, or company commander worth his/her weight could have squared you away many years ago. Oh well, I guess it's better late than never.
Having spent some time practicing COIN, I can assert that one of the major limitations in the current theory is the effectiveness of the host nation. We assume that the host nation is alligned with our world view.
In reality, we are not conducting COIN, only the HN is. We have picked a side, and we are advising/assisting that side in governance and security.
Here are our current options:
1. Surge and unilaterally clear to help the HN in the hopes that they eventually "get" it.
2. Conduct FID/SFA to advice/assist the HN on a much smaller scale pushing/prodding/influencing them.
3. Denounce the current government. Occupy and settle Afghanistan as a US territory.
4. Leave.
There is no easy answer; we can only hope to choose the least-bad solution.
Mike