U.S. Joint Forces Command has released an irregular warfare vision designed to help develop joint forces that are as effective in conducting irregular warfare as they are in conventional warfare.
U.S. Joint Forces Command Commander Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis has released the command's irregular warfare (IW) vision.
The vision provides guidance on how USJFCOM will respond to the threats posed by irregular adversaries. The vision prioritizes specific efforts necessary to achieve the objectives and guidance of the Department of Defense directive on irregular warfare.
Mattis said the command is determined to lead the way in achieving a balanced joint force where IW is a core competency and will lead DoD in the collaborative effort to deploy joint forces that are as effective in conducting irregular warfare as they are in conventional warfare. USJFCOM will partner with interagency, multinational, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, services and intelligence community partners in order to achieve this vision.
The vision outlines a timeline and expectations from directorates and subordinate commands. Over the next six to 12 months the command will focus its IW efforts in concept development and experimentation, capability development/joint integration and interoperability, training and education, joint provision/global force management and external engagement.
Several areas of effort include:
• Work closely with U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the services to update the IW Joint Operating Concept to improve its relevance and utility to the general purpose force, interagency and our multinational partners.
• Standardize and optimize network enabled capabilities and services provided by DoD's Global Information Grid computer network in support of small units at the tactical edge conducting IW.
• Develop joint doctrine that guides and enables joint force commanders to plan and execute IW across the four categories of military activity: combat, security, engagement, relief and reconstruction.
• Identify tracking requirements for critical skills and experiences relevant to IW.
• Capture, analyze and disseminate IW lessons learned and best practices.
The vision states USJFCOM will work with its partners to identify the most important challenges the U.S. is facing in IW, develop concepts and evaluate capabilities solutions to address those challenges.
The Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) will prioritize efforts, proactively coordinate activities, provide subject matter expertise and collaborate closely with multinational and interagency partners in executing the IW vision.
The IW vision is available for download by clicking here.
Comments
The prerequisite knowledge, skills and abilities to teach such a course reside in the Army Special Operations community at Fort Bragg, NC. But because of inter-Service and intra-Army professional jealousies and rice bowls - and an unwillingness of the Army SOF community to promote itself/offer this service to the greater force, it is unlikely we will see an effective initiative. More likely is some useless "Joint" school run by an over-eager Admiral or AF General in a location that has no SO/LIC talent or credibility. Hope for the best - expect the worst.
Cheers.
<I>"So if nobody can come up with a list, then why are there COIN academies in Iraq and Afghanistan?"</I>
For a different reason that you went on to cite: "one of the benefits... is that you're not taught what to think, you're taught how to think." The COIN academies aren't teaching skills. They're teaching how to think through the theater specific COIN issues.
<I>"It's easy to train a soldier to not slap a detainee in front of his neighbors, but it's harder to both teach him why that's bad..."</I>
I think that fits in the category of interpersonal skills. I agree that those are learned, but they are generally learned long before the age of eligibility for service. You're not going to unlearn them in a 10-week course. If they are unlearned at all, it requires hands-on leadership, not classroom instruction. Those individuals need supervision and, lacking their ability to change, should be precluded from promotion into leadership positions.
<I>"...and, more importantly, to get him out of that mindset in the first place."</I>
That's a <a href="http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=66502&postcount=13">… issue</a>.
If, as per your original post, you want a COIN course that teaches skills - I think you'll get a better result through integration with unit training. COIN doesn't work unless the entire unit is doing it. Units are trained by leaders, not subject matter experts.
If, as per your second post, you want more of a leader-oriented course, then the current academies may already serve that purpose. Your assertion that this is inadequate may have some merit, but to verify that you may want to investigate the curricula, how well it is presented, find out how many people actually are being sent through, what impact they're having on their units, and what the effect would be of moving them academies stateside or duplicating them stateside.
I'm pretty sure that some members on this site were involved with at least one academy and could shed some light on those issues.
So if nobody can come up with a list, then why are there COIN academies in Iraq and Afghanistan? My point is that these are things that <i>can</i> be taught--to include languages, negotiation skills in Muslim societies, history, Islamic practices, <i>and</i> interpersonal skills. Nobody was born knowing how to act around others. It's a taught and learned skill.
Similarly, one of the benefits of Army leadership schools (maybe not RTB so much) is that you're not taught <i>what</i> to think, you're taught <i>how</i> to think. And that's what's still often not permeating down to the platoon level in terms of COIN. I've never been to one of the COIN academies and I don't know the curricula, but I'm sure they're great. However, I don't get the feeling that enough troops are being sent through, either way. It's easy to train a soldier to not slap a detainee in front of his neighbors, but it's harder to both teach him why that's bad and, more importantly, to get him out of that mindset in the first place.
I don't think that any such thing has been considered because I don't think anyone can come up with a list of "counterinsurgency skills" that aren't already ingrained in unit training -OR- are not trainable in the first place (interpersonal skills, etc). If such a program were proposed, I would suggest not selling the idea by comparing it to Ranger School. I've long struggled to come up with one instance on any of my deployments where I could think, "Ranger School sure prepared me for this." Still can't think of one. The only thing that Ranger School and any of my deployments have in common is that they were all good opportunities to save money and all ended with me about 20 pounds lighter and in horrible physical condition from which it took a few months to get back in shape.
There has been a COIN academy in Taji, Iraq for leaders (no language training, to the best of my knowledge) and I think there is a similar entity in Afghanistan. Considering the administrative annoyances involved in sending Soldiers to schools while stateside and maintaining those schools, leaving those academies in theater may be a good plan.
Does anyone know if anybody up top has suggested a COIN course like the one described <a href="http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,179952,00.html">
below</a>? It's from a piece I posted on Military.com. Ignore the "tab" idea. . .everybody thought that was stupid.
<blockquote>This course should be treated within the ranks much like Ranger School. All infantry leaders should be encouraged (or required) to attend, and a new "prestigious" Counterinsurgent Tab should be awarded to all graduates. It could work something like this: The course would be around 10 weeks long, five days a week. Four hours would be spent each morning in language training -- either Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Dari, or Urdu. That might not sound like a lot, but in terms of contact hours, it's equal to about four or five college semesters in a single language. Afternoons would consist of instruction in the tenets of counterinsurgency, to include area-specific cultural and civil affairs training.
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Like Ranger-qualified personnel, these graduates would be sprinkled throughout the infantry. This would free up units to focus on more traditional, force-on-force training on a day-to-day basis, while counterinsurgency skills would essentially become ingrained.</blockquote>