US Drone Attacks in Pakistan Backfiring?

In my hands-on experience, tribes still exist in FATA (and southeast Afghanistan)... with enough relevance and authority to make a significant difference when decisions are made about who/what to fight for or against. They can and do come to agreement as a group, sometimes after seemingly endless discussions. Which isnt to deny its a crowded field struggling for power at the moment, with some degree of gain and loss.

In talking with the tribal elders (who are not all elderly, by the way), it was clear that they were supporting the colonial-era governing system and looking to strengthen their place in it. As maliks, they serve as authorized intermediaries between their tribes and the government and are given an annual allowance to do so. What they advocated were checks and balances to mitigate the current near-total authority of the political administrator. This goes against popular calls for changing to a representative system of governance, reported in recent studies like "Mainstreaming FATA" and "Understanding FATA." It was interesting that the religious scholars also endorsed cooperation with the government, particularly in light of the consultation with Hafiz Gul Bahadur. But the sample was small (though influential), and there are scholars in North Waziristan who no doubt wouldnt consider having such a discussion with a Westerner. At any rate, various maliks, religious scholars, and high-level Taliban leaders seemed able to have a straightforward conversation that resulted in agreement that development was valuable. Of course, its a complex place, and motives are difficult to fully understand.

My short opinion is that maliks will be around one way or another for a long time, and it would be valuable to strengthen their capacity to govern and - especially - to manage aid funds, as these will comprise chunks of the public budget for the foreseeable future. This is a multi-billion-dollar business, and wed do well to recognize this now (as in Afghanistan) and provide appropriate technical skills. Theres a woeful tendency to overlook this when livelihood programs are designed. But Id also leverage access of others to that same skill-building, seizing the opportunity to widen the leadership pool.

I do think that aid actors need to be circumspect about automatically considering traditional leaders illegitimate. Theyre sometimes simply dismissed as elitist and unrepresentative, ignoring that there are those who are well-respected and function as effective leaders within the context. Allocating development resources with their involvement - as with the government writ large - does bolster their credibility. I say its important to do this consciously, recognizing we genuinely wield power when we sit to talk about projects with "someone" in a village or local government. Sometimes we fail to understand this when we go about "helping the people."

Regarding anti-western feeling, people in Pakistan are in an angry, blaming mood. But Ive found tribal people to be pragmatic, which is fine with me. In the places Ive worked, people have learned to track power from their mommas milk. I dont think this is such a finely honed western trait. Im confident we can all work well together, once we agree on some principles, ground rules, and good practice. Not hard, but too often an undervalued step.

By the way, I think "Waziristan" as shorthand for the two agencies (North and South) is limiting. They have different types of leaders and relationships between the tribes and sub-tribes, among other things. As one of the religious scholars pointed out during interviews, "In South Waziristan, one group would say dont support another group. In North, we dont have these kinds of problems. All should be able to receive assistance."

Mr. Payson,

Hmmm ... this has a certain ring to it, notably for me, like tribal elders who talk like they still want to be important players in a region where tribe has effectively ceased to exist. Those who resisted Baitullah Mehsud (S. Waziristan) have been brutally dealt with - like the 600 elders who spoke out against him in 2005 and were, according to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, each sent a needle, black thread and 1,000 rupees with which to buy some cloth to stitch their own shrouds; all of them were then killed. Baitullah Mehsud decides what goes on in Waziristan and among the TTP.

I look forward to learning much, though, from your upcoming paper. Please make sure that you inform us of its publication.

M Payson,

You made a grand entrance with your insightful post, and I hope we continue to see more. Please join the discussion board where you can introduce yourself, and once you're signed up we can contact you via private posts to exchange e-mails. There are several who follow the SWJ who be interested in reading and discussing your report. Welcome to SWJ.

Schmedlap, thanks for the clarification, you're back in form now :-). Although, if M Payson's comments are correct, then maybe there isn't as much underlying anti-western bias as we assume?

Bill

Bill,

<I>"All they have to do is keep showing, and reshowing the photos of the young kids that were killed..."</I>
But they can do that with or without drone attacks. Staging photos with fake casualties and childrens' toys as props - it's relatively simple and it's nothing new.

<I>"What is B.S. is that the people have already chosen sides. That simply isn't true, the tribes, just like the towns and villages in Iraq are constantly shifting alliances based on what they perceive is best for them in the short and long run."</I>
Bad wording on my part. I was referring to the anti-western thing. I don't think anyone is mulling over whether or not they like the west. They don't. But they're pragmatic enough to shift tribal alliances whether they like us or not. And that is what I was getting at with my comment that we need to get over our obsession with being liked. Whether we're liked is irrelevant. All that matters is that we manage to turn those tribes and villages. I think that whether they like us or whether they are pro- or anti-western is not even factored into their decisions. They want what is in their interests, not their likes.

None of that is to say that drone attacks are right or wrong. I just think the reasons given for objecting to them are off base. That's partly because the data doesn't pass the straight face test, partly because if there is no grievance of drone attacks then there will simply be a grievance about something else, and partly because the public relations angle is, imo, irrelevant.

I agree with David Kilcullen that there are "other ways to do it" aside from drone attacks. And so do a number of influential tribal and religious leaders in North Waziristan, a well-missiled part of Pakistans tribal areas.

I led a recent field study that probed their thoughts on development, and much of what they said challenged common perceptions of North Waziristan as impenetrable and its tribes as hostile to assistance and unwilling to engage with Westerners.

They openly invited foreign assistance to help them address the needs of their people. They also condemned drone strikes, speaking of extensive destruction and growing anti-foreigner sentiment generated by the attacks. They emphasized the Pashtun tradition of granting sanctuary - even for "murderers of many" - and pointed repeatedly to negotiation as the path to resolve any issues.

Tribal elders:
"Drones are creating the biggest problem. Stop this, we want dialogue." "There is strong hatred... " "Foreigners never kept their words. We dont hate you, we feel betrayed." "If the U.S. stops bombing and begins negotiating, things will get better in a matter of days." "We are extremely religious and hospitable. Nothing can be taken by force, just negotiation. We wont yield sheltered people. If honored, we will do anything."

Religious scholars:
"US personnel used to visit every corner of North Waziristan and they were invited with open hearts and never a hand raised. Now people are against them as a result of drones (which are based on false information), thats where grievances and concerns come from." "If a murderer of many in a big city runs to North Waziristan and asks for shelter, we will give it to him, thats our tradition."

Both tribal elders and religious scholars insisted that the government be included in development, though they heavily criticized its past performance and expressed serious concerns about corruption. They also accepted UN and NGO involvement in delivering aid and pledged to provide security - but they rejected the Pakistan Army as an option, pointing to clauses in the 2008 Waziristan Accord to support their position. They also appealed for increased participation, transparency, and accountability in the use of funds and urged moving ahead rapidly with a pilot program to test the reliability of all involved and provide the population with a tangible show of commitment.

These are just some of the findings. Both sets of participants expressed similar, though not identical, stances on many points. The study grew out of the initiative of a respected North Waziristan family that sought my advice on development. They tracked me down in Islamabad after relatives in Khost, Afghanistan recommended they get in contact. (Id worked on development programming in Khost and Logar provinces from 2003-2006.) Several participants reported they briefed North Waziristan Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur on the study before meeting with an American, and he was said to have readily agreed.

An article on the above is published in the May issue of Monday Developments, put out by InterAction. It will be posted on their website soon. In the meantime, Im happy to provide a copy and discuss findings and recommendations with anyone interested (though Im not clear on SWJ rules about posting email addresses).

Ive followed SWJ for some time and appreciate the frank discussions and varied viewpoints. Im a development practitioner with 15 years experience leading aid programs in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This is my first time commenting on a blog. Thanks for the opportunity.

I can't recall if the author said 700 civilians or 700 others, but he clearly stated that only 14 high ranking folks were killed. The others were a combination of lower ranking militia and innocent civilians. I doubt that anyone has an accurate count, but then again it isn't a numbers game. All they have to do is keep showing, and reshowing the photos of the young kids that were killed, thus magnifying the effect.

What is B.S. is that the people have already chosen sides. That simply isn't true, the tribes, just like the towns and villages in Iraq are constantly shifting alliances based on what they perceive is best for them in the short and long run. There was an excellent special on T.V. recently on Pakistan (it may have been a Frontline special) that clearly pointed out how the Taliban were using the drone attacks to recruit additional fighters. The focusd wasn't on the drone attacks, that was simply one small piece of a well done report.

Your comment that we need to get over our obession with being liked would indicate that you are more keen on pursuing a direct action counterterrorist strategy in Pakistan, versus a counterinsurgency strategy. Just an opinion, but I don't think it will work based on what I'm reading. We don't have to be liked, but we can't be hated either. If we are that will lead to the populace mobilizing against us. We must be seen as the lesser evil (and that may be the best we can hope for). Obviously things are not moving in a direction we desire in Pakistan, so that may be an indicator that our current strategy isn't working?

Ask a tribesman the following questions:
1. The individuals killed, were they civilians?
2. The individuals killed, were they combatants?

It would not be unusual to get a "yes" response to both questions. The rationale is, the guy is a civilian, but he was willing to work for the Taliban for a little bit of cash or due to coercion, thus making him also a combatant.

I'm skeptical of the data that suggests we've killed 14 bad guys versus 700 civilians. The only reason that I am not prepared to shout "BS" is because Kilcullen cited it and I suspect that he's got a little more brain mass than I do.

From the article:
<I>"The drone strikes play into the hands of insurgents, who cite them to stir up anti-Western and anti-government sentiment."</I>
I think the bad guys reached the point of diminishing returns on that issue a long, long time ago. How many people who are not anti-western today will become anti-western due to a few more drone attacks? I suspect not many. This fight was been going on for nearly 8 years. People have chosen sides already. We need to get over our obsession with being liked.

This article IMHO illustrates one instance where we possibly have competing strategies (strategies that undermine one another).

The first issue is the battle of the narrative, since as the author states these attacks can be perceived as cowardly, and I would add perceived as were indifferent to civilian casualties, they can undermine our proposed narrative that were focused on providing security and good governance to the people from the terrorists and the Taliban. Is it cowardly to launch missile attacks from drones? I'm sure that is one perception, and perhaps in some cases that perception has some merit, but this article didnt address the practical reasons to employ armed drones, such as they are also a potent psychological weapon against Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, and they provide a method to respond quickly to time sensitive intelligence over a large area. I disagree with the authors point that we could do the same thing with hunter-killer teams on the ground. The reality is that teams on the ground (especially in mountainous terrain that is partially controlled by the enemy) a team on the ground will have to move relatively slowly over a potentially large area, and if they are responding to time sensitive intelligence, then this option is simply not feasible.

Another issue with the battle of the narrative (if that author's facts are correct that we killed 14 AQ senior level members and 700 others, then I think Kilcullin is correct. What some in our ranks dismiss as "acceptable" collateral damage is not perceived that way in the minds of those affected by these events. Emotions are not based on math equations of what is acceptable. If you kill three terrorists and the only so called collateral damage is that you killed my six year old son, then I'm coming to get you, because it wasn't acceptable to me or my family. Metrics are always misleading in these situations. Our leaders to a large extent must make decisions based on intuition, which is based on less than imperfect intelligence to determine if the value of the drone attacks outweighs their undesired impact on the populace.

Part of that is to determine what type of war are we fighting in Pakistan? Is it a counterterrorism or a counterinsurgency effort? Counterinsurgency operations are generally primarily focused on influencing the population, while CT operations are generally focused on neutralizing the threat. Once determined then we need to get the entire interagency and multinational community to the extent possible to support a common strategy, and not support competing strategies that undermine each others efforts. Pakistan is one of the many examples of wicked problems we're faced with in this global conflict. To the Pakistanis and many in the U.S. government the conflict in Pakistan is a counterinsurgency, but some elements of the U.S. are focused on counterterrorism efforts, and the efforts of each tend to undermine one another. The CT targeted killings tend to undermine the efforts of winning over the populace, while the COIN focus on the populace provides temporary safehaven to AQ terrorists because it is a slower approach. Since the safehaven facilitates terrorist training and planning to conduct activities that could be catastrophic there are no easy answers.