Small Wars Journal

Trends, Threats, and Expectations

Fri, 03/20/2009 - 1:35pm
Trends, Threats, and Expectations

By Dr. Steven Metz

I've just returned from a Department of Defense symposium which discussed the future strategic environment twenty years out. This was a useful window on official thinking and expectations, but it reinforced my feeling that American security strategy is careening forward on flawed assumptions. Specifically, we have not grasped the magnitude of the revolution underway in the strategic environment and the nature of security, and hence have not adjusted.

A few years ago symposia and documents dealing with the future strategic environment were dominated by discussions of "the long war," "GWOT," terrorism, proliferation, and Islamic extremism. For the past two years, the focus has been on "hybrid threats." In the event I just attended, those things were almost wholly absent from the discussion. Everything centered on technological change, economic turmoil, culture, demographics, and climate change.

Two things about this jumped out at me. First, there was very little discussion of exactly what the U.S. military is going to do about these trends and the threats that they generate. The unspoken assumption seems to be that the primary military mission over the next few decades will be stabilizing collapsed states. I don't buy this. I think it is a misreading of Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if things turn out well in those two places, I'm convinced that future political leaders and strategists will conclude that the costs (economic, political, and human) outweighed the benefits (in terms of greater security).

Second, I was convinced that the U.S. military and strategic community have not fully grasped the extent and depth of change underway in the strategic environment. At the symposium everyone nodded when a speaker said that the threats of the future will be dispersed, non-state entities, but few seemed to understand that this obviates the very essence of American strategy and the current focus of the military. Put simply, our strategy seeks to reverse history--to strengthen nation states so that they can "control ungoverned spaces" when trends are toward the devolution of economic, political, and economic power AWAY FROM national governments.

Because we are a big Dutch boy, we have been able to keep our finger in the dike of history for a few years but eventually must pull it out.

I was aghast when people talked about future missions like controlling the vast slums of Lagos or Karachi, both because I don't think those who made this point understood the magnitude of such a task, and because I don't think doing so would promote American security. None of the architects or implementers of 9/11 were motivated by the lack of jobs or emerged from a teeming slum. On 9/11 we were attacked by a dispersed, non-state entity but in a perfect illustration of the idea that when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail, we did what we knew how to do: we overthrew two national governments. But--and this is the important part—because there were no subsequent successful attacks on the United States, we assumed this was the right approach. I non-concur.

In the coming decades we're going to have to re-address the basic assumptions of the post-9/11 strategy. We've skated by with flawed assumptions for the past five years, but the day of reckoning is near. I think this revolutionary shift in the strategic environment will be particularly momentous for the Army. The Army's core function has always been to seize and control territory. That made sense during all of human history to this point since threats were geographic in essence. They arose from an identified place, and if we could control that place, we destroyed or minimized the threat. But if you buy the notion that future threats will not be linked to a particular piece of geography--enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere--then seizing and controlling terrain will no longer be the essence of security. This led me to predict at the symposium that 20 years hence, the U.S. Army's role in promoting American security will decline precipitously.

Comments

Professor Sir Michael Howard, in his excellent, and prescient, book "The Invention Of Peace" not only makes the point that peace is an invented human situation, but points out that only Nation States have the capability to both conduct the negotiations that make peace possible and enforce the intent of peace treaties on their own population.

Anything, including the power of transnational corporations and global "movements", that weakens any nation state is therefore a danger to peace, in that the more bellicose, for whatever reason, components of their populations cannot be controlled, hence the danger of "failed states". Perhaps less obvious are the unintended consequences of our deliberate actions. Is Turkey going to have an ongoing problem with Kurdish separatists who have been "emboldened" by our removal of Saddam Hussein? If Iran is destabilised by covert action, what are the spill over consequences for Afghanistan? What are the likely consequences of a weakened Mexico? Venezuela? Bolivia?

I think we have seen a taste of the future in the Mumbai attacks. Now imagine a landscape composed of groups with global reach that garner resources from host populations that share their worldview, who train and arm themselves in the "No mans lands" existing in failed states, then infiltrate into their target area in an unsuspecting Third country.

Some gleanings of what such a world might be like can be found in works of science fiction from over Thirty years ago, and probably many more since then. The scenarios posited even then included such things as corporate terrorism and murder as a business strategy against competitors and worldwide environment groups attacking infrastructure, not to mention the religious and political extremists or what would be worse, an unholy mixture of all Three, all enabled, of course, by the latest advances in technology.

To me at least, this suggests an increasing requirement for a major infrastructure protection task.

Bill M.

Sat, 03/21/2009 - 11:25pm

I'm happy to see Dr. Metz challenge the underlying theme of our national security. The focus on helping to prop up failing states to preserve our state based global system seems overly idealistic, but then again we do we have viable alternatives?

In response to the Army's decreased role, I suspect that forecast will be incorrect if we pursue the objective of propping up failed states, but his question/comment remains valid. There is a requirement for a SOF and interagency actors to be granted new authorities to deal with this emerging threats that are not tied to a particular piece of turf that we can take.

His most important point in my opinion was that maybe we should focus on preparing our military to be flexible, instead of redesigning it for only one projected future.

DDilegge

Sat, 03/21/2009 - 6:39pm

Just a point of order as Steve's post gets legs on the 'Net.

All because an attendee at a DoD-sponsored symposium mentions or otherwise uses an occupation of Lagos as an example <i>does not mean</i> that the Department is planning or even contemplating such a move.

Elsewhere, Dr Metz argues that "complex internal conficts" will be hard to ignore as they "generate other adverse effects: the destabilization of regions, resource flows, and markets; the blossoming of transnational crime; humanitarian disasters; transnational terrorism; and so forth."

He advocates US involvement in a failed state as part of a multinational force - or, if international consensus is lacking, containment and the creation of 'safe havens' within that state.

I am finding those prescriptions hard to square with my reading of this piece - that meltdown in Lagos or Karachi will be something the United States can easily stay out of.

Propping up nation states may be a futile task (the jury is still out on that), but it doesn't seem inconsistent with an attempt to control "dispersed, non-state entities."

At the moment at least - to borrow from Kilcullen's recent book - threat seems to result from the intersection of globalized and local forces.

So the death of geography? Maybe not yet...

Bill Jakola

Sat, 03/21/2009 - 8:47am

"Second, I was convinced that the U.S. military and strategic community have not fully grasped the extent and depth of change underway in the strategic environment... when trends are toward the devolution of economic, political, and economic [sic] power AWAY FROM national governments."
Okay, if thinkers at the Department of Defense symposium are wrong, as Dr. Metz points out, and future war as well as nation state security will exist in a radically different strategic environment that shifts power away from the United States, then it seems likely that America's military mission would increase and not decrease.
Dr. Metz states: "The Army's core function has always been to seize and control territory. That made sense during all of human history to this point since threats were geographic in essence."
Although, controlling territory may be a core function of any army, it is not the only function; and, it is not the mission or purpose of an army. Americas Army exists to defend the United States and the nations interests, thus controlling territory is a secondary function that may not necessarily achieve this end. Defense can take many forms beyond territorial control and focusing on the geography distracts from the most important factor in war, the enemy. The U. S. Armys most critical core function is to impose Americas political will on the enemy.
Therefore, if the future "trends are toward the devolution of economic, political, and economic [sic] power" then increasing military power is likely to fill the void, because some form of power will always fill such vacuums.

Dr. Robert J. Bunker (not verified)

Fri, 03/20/2009 - 6:20pm

"Second, I was convinced that the U.S. military and strategic community have not fully grasped the extent and depth of change underway in the strategic environment."

Dr. Metz has many dead-on comments in this essay.

Ive been concerned about this issue for many years now. Few in these communities want to face the potential rise of challengers to the nation-state form and actual transnational and networked "nation-state" killers emerging. Now that these epochal changes are well underway in Mexico and much of Central America with loose networks and confederations of 3GEN Gangs, cartels, and mercenaries challenging national governments the U.S. leadership had better recognize how much the security environment has and will continue to change.

Ken White

Fri, 03/20/2009 - 5:48pm

<blockquote>"Everything centered on technological change, economic turmoil, culture, demographics, and climate change."</blockquote>Well, I guess that proves the vaunted media have more power than I give them credit for...

Actually, since those are the topics of the day with many, it is disappointing but not terribly surprising that those things were discussed. Thus, that does not particularly concern me -- nor does this:<blockquote>"...there was very little discussion of exactly what the U.S. military is going to do about these trends and the threats that they generate."</blockquote>Mostly because they currently are concerned with Afghanistan and Iraq and aren't going to get into navel gazing over the future. This, though was bothersome:<blockquote>"I was aghast when people talked about future missions like controlling the vast slums of Lagos or Karachi, both because I don't think those who made this point understood the magnitude of such a task, and because I don't think doing so would promote American security."</blockquote>I very much agree. I'm not only aghast, I'm disappointed. Such missions should not and more importantly, need not, be a part of our future.

Looking at the comments above, I believe Zenpundit's final paragraph is correct and I agree with Schmedlap on all three points -- particularly his first. If he and I are correct, I think that has broad strategic implications. Quite broad...

Schmedlap

Fri, 03/20/2009 - 3:48pm

<I>"On 9/11 we were attacked by a dispersed, non-state entity but in a perfect illustration of the idea that when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail, we did what we knew how to do: we overthrew two national governments."</I>
Is that really correct? I think our goal in Afghanistan was eradication of al-Qaeda. It just happened that ousting the Taliban was seen as a necessary step. I think regime change in Iraq was a goal that pre-dated 9/11, but we simply did it because the President was able to whip up sufficient political will to do it.

<I>"But--and this is the important part--because there were no subsequent successful attacks on the United States, we assumed this was the right approach."</I>
Is that really true? Perhaps in the world of campaign rhetoric and political speeches. Among more serious thinkers, I think the lack of subsequent attacks has been viewed as a the result of much broader counter-terrorism efforts (that benefited from some intelligence sharing and operational effects in Iraq/Afghanistan) and a little bit of luck.

<I>"But if you buy the notion that future threats will not be t linked to a particular piece of geography--enemies can mobilize resources and undertake operations from almost anywhere--then seizing and controlling terrain will no longer be the essence of security."</I>
It seems a bit too ambitious to say that "future threats will not be linked" rather than "<B>most</B> future threats will not be linked" to a piece of geography. So long as we recognize the sovereignty of states who lack the power and/or will to exercise it, non-state actors will exploit that power vacuum on those particular pieces of geography.

zenpundit

Fri, 03/20/2009 - 2:38pm

Dr. Metz wrote:

<b>"This led me to predict at the symposium that 20 years hence, the U.S. Army's role in promoting American security will decline precipitously"</b>

Yes - especially if the Army's structure and conceptions of mission - and society's definition of "military" missions - remain static and traditional. The DoD's share of the national security pie will inevitably diminish in favor of intelligence and law enforcement agencies and private contractors.

This scenario may or may not be a good thing. However,why should this outcome be the case?

It is possible that the Army will remain as it is. Organizational evolution, ad hoc and by design, in response to emerging changes in security environments is a second possibility and I would argue, a necessity, if the armed forces are to remain relevant in addressing major national security threats.

Not wholesale structural changes - as when horse cavalry disappeared and planes or nuclear weapons were invented - but changes on the margin with select units or new kinds of units. It may be more convenient for reasons of international law for certain branches of the U.S. military to acquire capabilities to function more as a clandestine intelligence agency, a police-investigative agency, a scientific-engineering lab or even as an independent economic actor in the market.

Or more likely, some role that is entirely unforseen when the nation's leaders demand that the Pentagon "do something" about a previously unknown problem that has become a crisis.

Perhaps we should be thinking how the military can acquire the most adaptive "flex" as a whole system instead of committing ourselves irrevocably to one potential future that may not ultimately be the major threat in 2030.