The PRT paved road through the Panjshir valley features gorgeous scenery contrasting with rusted hulks of Russian vehicles -- memorials to the Russian failure to control Massoud's Panjshir valley. The Taliban learned this lesson and didn't even challenge Massoud for control of Panjshir. Today, Panjshir is one of the most secure and peaceful provinces in Afghanistan. But the anger and impatience with Kabul is on the rise. Where is Massoud's successor as the leader of Afghanistan? The joke in Panjshir today is that Massoud died as a warrior but all Massoud's lieutenants became fat and rich.
Having met with many American officials in the early portion of my trip, the remaining days in Panjshir and Kabul focused on the perspectives of the Afghans themselves, from Governors to senior Karzai advisors to leading Kabul businessmen.
The lack of a political leadership or strategy in Afghanistan was obvious from both US and Afghan sources. The reconstruction effort has essentially created a corrupt welfare effort, with little political responsibility. The leadership on the Afghan side has been negligible. In my meetings, one Afghan governor went on for twenty minutes about how ineffective Karzai had been. Karzai's doesn't seem to take a strong position on anything. Meanwhile, US aid has been given out with no more strategy or conditionality than more the merrier" creating essentially a welfare economy rife with corruption and with no Afghan having much incentive to take responsibility or initiative. One former government official and Kabul businessman told us you have turned Afghanistan into a nation of conniving beggars."
Ambassador Holbrooke, so effective in applying leverage to chart a political course in the Bosnia and Kosovo, must apply a similar approach in Afghanistan. This means applying US and international leverage to demand much more from the Karzai government and Afghan political officials in terms of taking responsibility, countering corruption, and countering Taliban influence in eastern tribal areas. We must single out or sideline those Afghans that are content to milk the reconstruction effort and not challenge militant influence in their areas. We must challenge substantive corruption that threatens key political objectives in reconstruction. And we must view the application of force primarily in political terms, not military terms.
None of this is to suggest that the US choose the next President of Afghanistan. When one Afghan politician advised me that the US choose more carefully than they did with Karzai, I firmly noted that it was the responsibility of the Afghans themselves to choose their leadership. No American anointed President can hold credibility or legitimacy in Afghanistan.
The blame for this political ineffectiveness in Afghanistan lays with both Karzai and the Bush team. Both have neglected their responsibilities in Afghanistan over the past six years. Obama's enhanced focus on Afghanistan is apparent, but it is too early to see effects. State has outlined a broad enhancement to the civilian capacity both in Kabul and in the field. The elevation and/or reshuffling of political and now military US leadership in Afghanistan is the clearest indication of both higher priority and a new direction. A new strategy is in play in broad strokes but the application in the field is not underway substantially.
Others are also thinking strategically about Afghanistan. Perhaps the most stunning and visual construction effort in Panjshir is Massoud's tomb - a massive undertaking impressively perched on a mid-valley promontory. This project, a worthy memorial for Afghanistan's fallen hero, is funded by Tehran for pennies compared to the US reconstruction effort.
Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.