This Week at War: The Navy’s Pacific Problem
My Foreign Policy column discusses how Australia will help the U.S. Navy with its challenges in the South China Sea. But the Navy has deeper problems to fix.
A March 26, Washington Post article discussed a new expansion of the military relationship between the United States and Australia. According to the piece, the U.S. Navy is seeking to expand its ability to operate in the Indian Ocean from Western Australia, which would require a major expansion to a naval base in Perth. The Pentagon also hopes to establish a long-range air reconnaissance base on the Cocos Islands, a remote Australian atoll midway between Perth and Sri Lanka.
This expansion of U.S. military capability into the northeast Indian Ocean quickly follows last year's agreement to permanently station a small force of U.S. Marines near Darwin on the north coast and to expand U.S. access to Australian bases and training ranges.
At the time, I noted that U.S. military power in the western Pacific is concentrated in Japan and South Korea (a legacy of the Cold War) while the emerging area of great power contention — the South China Sea — lies 2,000 miles to the south. The U.S. agreements with Australia, combined with a major expansion of military facilities on Guam, are an attempt to bolster the Pentagon's capacity to sustain a larger ongoing presence in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia.
The U.S. interest in the South China Sea is in maintaining free navigation through what is arguably the most important commercial shipping passage in the world. The agreements with Australia and the buildup on Guam are helpful in this regard but insufficient. Ultimately, the Navy will need to provide a sufficiently reassuring presence to the countries bordering the South China Sea in order to prevent various disputes over the sea from threatening routine commerce through it. It remains to be seen whether the Navy will have the capacity and realistic plans to accomplish this mission over the long run.
This week, the Navy sent Congress an update of its 30-year shipbuilding plan, which would continue the trend of an ever-shrinking maritime force. The new plan foresees an average of 298 ships operating over the next 30 years, down from last year's forecast of a 306-ship average. And the plan foresees the Navy buying fewer new ships per year, reinforcing another unfavorable trend. The Congressional Budget Office's evaluation of Navy shipbuilding found those plans underfunded and over-optimistic. A few years ago, the Navy had plans for a 313-ship fleet. The bipartisan Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel called for a fleet of 346 ships. There are no plans to reach either of these targets.
Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work, in a January 2012 speech to the Surface Navy Association, dismissed concerns about the Navy's shrinking ship count. Work asserted that the Navy's robust plans for long-range air reconnaissance, conducted by new aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon and a Navy version of the Global Hawk drone, will do much of the routine maritime patrolling previously done by ships. Bases in Australia, the Cocos Islands, and elsewhere in the southwest Pacific would support surveillance of the South China Sea. If ships were required to respond to problems, admirals could send them in as always. But under Work's assumption, fewer ships will be needed for routine patrolling. And with less routine steaming, the Navy will save money and keep its ships better maintained.
The question is whether more aerial maritime reconnaissance and fewer ships making fewer port visits around the South China Sea and elsewhere will provide the reassuring and stabilizing presence that the visible presence of Navy ships has heretofore provided. Work's air reconnaissance doctrine and the Navy's slumping fleet size combine to form a new theory for providing a stabilizing presence in global commons such as the South China Sea. We will know that this theory is not working if the leaders of U.S. allies increase their diplomatic hedging behavior. Regional arms races, another response to a perceived decline in U.S. military power, would be another indication of failure. China's ongoing annual double-digit increases in defense spending and a looming submarine arms race in the region are not good signs.
The Navy's task of providing a stabilizing presence in the South China Sea and elsewhere is further complicated the growing anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile threats. These threats are forcing the Navy and the Air Force to develop new ways of operating against adversaries from longer ranges, where ships and aircraft will be less vulnerable to adversary missiles. The missile threat is also encouraging the Navy and Air Force to rely more on out-of-sight platforms, such as submarines, and long-range stealthy aircraft, which purposely stay as hidden as possible. All of these trends work against the concept of a visible forward presence, which the Navy has used to deter threats to the global commons but which may increasingly become untenable due to adversary missiles.
Ships assigned to "presence duty," for example patrolling the South China Sea and making port visits in the region, will be most at risk from missile attack at the start of a conflict. This fact will increasingly encourage the Navy to hold the most capable and prestigious surface ships, such as its aircraft carriers, out of sight of allies located within adversary missile range. As the missile threat matures, the Navy's new and modestly capable Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), a few of which will be stationed in Singapore, may perform the forward presence mission, showing the flag during peacetime and serving as expendable "trip wires" if shooting breaks out. Meanwhile, the main fleet and other long-range striking power will wait over the horizon and out of sight.
In this case, policymakers in Washington will be counting on the small, fragile, and lightly armed LCSs to inspire awe in U.S. military power. With the new expansion in its relationship with Australia, the Pentagon is groping toward a way to bolster its presence in the South China Sea. As it does so, it will have to figure out how to continue to provide a reassuring naval presence — something the Navy has done for decades — while the missile threat to that presence grows. Compounding the problem is a Navy shipbuilding budget under pressure and inadequate for even the now-reduced plans. The Navy's leaders are attempting to devise new tactics and new structures to adapt to a deteriorating situation. But will those measures be sufficient to reassure allies and deter potential adversaries?
I would be curious as to whether or not the Navy plans to screen any amphibious readiness group (ARG) out on float. . .or do they even care to?
Additionally, I found the phrase “modest capability” to describe the LCS amusing. . .tact once being described as a leadership trait to me.
The obvious answer is that if the mission has shifted south, to shift those forces dedicated to the northern, Cold War, missions south as well.
For the Navy to simply say the mission has grown and we need more ships is the wrong mindset. The Navy needs to go to Congress and the Administration and say “the mission has shifted south, and we need relieved of these obsolete requirements in the north.”
This is not a problem of inadequate Navy capacity, this is a problem of our inablility to free our minds of our Cold War mind-set.
The requirements for Naval Power in Northeast Asia are as great, if not greater, than ever. These security missions are not based on the Cold War, but on current and projected challenges to U.S. national and global interests. Obviously the current posture of U.S. forces in the PACOM region is largely based on Cold War missions, which is completely understandable. The U.S. is smartly exploring options for realigning that posture to better cover the entire area of responsibility which covers two oceans and numerous seas. It is very misleading to dismiss NE Asia as a legacy region, it is still the most strategic region in the world (the largest economies, the largest militaries, growing tensions), but rest the AOR is also important, so the challenge is finding the right balance. Obviously the math problem becomes more challenging when you’re asked to cover more area with fewer assets.
While the Navy is an expensive force to maintain, but no other service contributes more to securing our global economic interests. Reducing the number of ships without developing and employing the advanced technologies needed to mitigate the reduction in ships seems a bit risky.
A former Naval Officer who spent much of his deployed time in the Western Pacific (Westpac) area, both in the Northern areas, the South China Sea, and in the vicinity of Singapore region near the Straits of Malacca, I agree with the tenor of this paper and the commentary by Bill M.
To those comments I would first add that those who believe the Russian Navy will not rise again (as it did under Admiral Gorshkov in our post-Vietnam era) and that it no longer poses a someday to reappear geo-political threat to our interests are doomed to one future day see high seas history repeat itself. One should note that the Russians are resupplying Syria by sea as we debate this issue and remember that Putin has promised to aid China in the event of a naval clash over Taiwan. While the Chinese are probably not interested in his assistance and currently it is essentially a hollow threat—give the Russians time. In addition, from a maritime strategy perspective it would be foolish to disregard our naval commitment to the Mediterranean Sea area which of course is closer to the Russian Naval Base at Sevastopol. And don’t count on the Turk’s to have the courage or interest to block the Bosphorus on our behalf.
The Navy is one branch of the military where both the number and technical quality of its assets count. All the strategic thinking, deployment strategies, technical advancements, etc. are not a substitute for numbers of ships. The sea is large and deep providing an enemy so many places to appear and reappear, it would exhaust and doom a smaller force should they need to contest opponents (especially those submarine based) in multiple areas at once.
Remember what happened to the Russian Navy during the Russo-Japanese War. Pre-war, they had strategically elected to maintain most of their naval forces in their Northern European and Black Sea ports and had stationed few ships in their Pacific ports. As a result they had to hurriedly transfer fleet assets into the Pacific Ocean area where an awaiting enemy sunk their transiting ships. This is the day and age of the very quiet electric diesel submarine. There are only so many transit points to a distant theater, even if one has bases along the way.
If the Argentinians had possessed just a few of today’s electric diesel boats, they could have quietly positioned them between the Falklands and the British advertised use of the Canary Islands staging area. Even if sacrificed, they only needed to sink a few ships on which the British relied upon to transport their troops and supplies and that conflict would have had a different result. Further, if the Argentinians had concentrated their land based air power and simultaneously sent large numbers of those bomb and Exocet missile carrying planes against the English fleet off the Falklands they could have overwhelmed the Royal Navy and again it would have only required the loss of several key supply and transport ships and their Aircraft Carrier to have defeated the British effort in that war.
You can rest assured our enemies (current or potential) have studied that conflict and learned lessons from it.
Given our need for Middle-Eastern oil (as the currently controlling political party refuses to exploit our actually massive oil reserves), our economy’s dependence on manufacturing goods from China and Southeast Asia, our need to insure stability on the Korean Peninsula else Japan will go nuclear for self-protection, our commitment to Taiwan the loss of which would make us look even weaker to our enemies (real or potential) around the globe, our need to secure access to the Middle East from the Mediterranean Sea to at least secure Europe’s access to oil, our need to insure that Israel is never placed in a position where they feel a need to use their large and far ranging nuclear weapons resources requires we have a strong naval presence over the globe.
Littoral Combat Ships pose little threat, if any, to our enemies. They are the equivalent the gunboats and monitors of the 1800’s or the Yangtze River gunboats of the 1930’s when it comes to force capability, and every Naval Officer realizes that fact. They will be basically useless in any future conflict. They are to small with too little fire power.
This country is faced with the same naval force situation / Maritime Strategy dilemma that the Royal Navy faced at the end of the Nineteenth Century. To secure their country against the rising Sea Power of several continental nations, especially Germany, and to secure their trade routes with their worldwide colonies the British required a large fleet. During the mid to later 1800’s England had been an industrial nation, whose output generated large sums via taxation for their government, thereby providing adequate funds for the Royal Navy’s ever more costly ships. Naval ships were undergoing major technological advances in size, engineering, and firepower at that time. However, by the late 1800’s Britain’s industrial might had declined and her economy was becoming / would become a services / financial based. As a result, Britain was losing her industrial capacity which was negatively affecting that nation’s ability to design and build warships technically or structurally adequate for their mission. In addition, that nation’s ever shrinking tax base was depriving it of the funds needed to build sufficient numbers of ships required to successfully compete with the types of naval vessels (surface and submarines) the Royal Navy’s enemies were constructing and deploying. Strategically and economically the Royal Navy faced the same conceptual problem faced by the U.S. Navy today. See “Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Studies in Maritime History)” by Nicholas A. Lambert (Aug 1, 2002) for an excellent treatment of this RN dilemma. Britain’s eventual failure to solve its economic problems and its strategic elections would eventually lead to the almost impotently sized Royal Navy Fleet of the current era and end Britain’s position as a world power. This country is headed in that same direction.
A 298 ship fleet cannot adequately complete the missions that require a 500+ ship fleet, regardless of the allegedly brilliant strategic thinking of those in the Pentagon—who now find themselves in the unenviable situation that once faced Admiral Sir John Fisher. This nation’s future as a world power hangs in the balance and the outlook is not one that is positive.
Everyone likes to bash the LCS. Yet it eventually will be able to counter subs, small boats, and mines…three primary threats described in the article and owned by realistic threats. At a small price per ship in crew and dollars, it can thwart pirates and terrorists in the vicinity of Yemen and Somalia. It can prevent both near the Straits of Malacca. It can assist the coast guard in countering drug runners. Most of all it can be part of the advertised “force for good” that is more likely than any repeat of Midway. When was the last major ship-on-ship battle? Compare that to how many major earthquake tragedies there were in the past decade?
What is neglected in all this talk is that few country’s even attempt to compete in the air or sea with us because they cannot win and cannot afford the air/sea assets. In addition, Cold War threats like North Korea remain a threat that air/sea power could not thwart alone. In fact, while some measure of normalcy exists between the U.S. and Russia/China, that is anything but the case with North Korea. How will AirSea Battle bomb key infrastructure of a nation that has none? How will they bomb unseen infiltrators? Only South Korean and U.S. ground forces can battle infiltrators in the south without extensive collateral damage.
The few nations that can afford air/sea assets and missiles in substantial numbers are deterred by MAD or gross overmatch in conventional capability (Iran and DPRK). So why are Russia and China going to launch those A2AD missiles when it might start WWIII? Add to the deterrence the simple reality of mutual dependence for trade and open sea routes for oil and manufactured goods. Who’s trade ports are more at risk of mining and bombing if the Chinese start launching missiles? Whose oil supplies are more at risk of being stopped? How long would the week long traffic jam be if we bombed a few Chinese highways and rails at night?
Now consider the cross-domain effects offered by stealthy F-35s launched from big and small carriers. These aircraft can use JSOW to sink any ship well before any surface ship detects them, if ever. They can do the same to any missile assets or air defenses launched from close to coasts. They can sink amphibious ships attempting to cross to Taiwan, and any supply ships that go there if they do get forces on the island.
We know we can use the F-35 because we are selling it to allies. Have we used the F-22 yet? No, perhaps because of perceived loss of secrecy regarding signatures. So if we decide to replace all our B-1s and B-52H with B-3s, will we ever use them or will it become another closet asset that we are too afraid to use. We already saw what happens when we use stealth UAS over bad guy territory. Do we want to risk losing such technology found on a B-3?
As for A2/AD, in a recent analysis, numerous quotes of the Chief of Naval Operations stated that he was not overly fearful of the DF-21D ASBM. Nobody can dispute that our subs and counter-sub capabilities far surpass any other nation. Having a trip wire like the LCS has benefits if it exposes only 75 instead of 200 or 300 on a frigate or destroyer. It can launch the same number of helicopters as either larger surface ship. It can be more places with the same numbers of sailors. It essentially is the Combat Outpost of the seas, able to be cued by aerial assets like P-8 and BAMS to areas where subs or surface ships/piracy may be a problem.
It also has great potential for future upgrades. It very easily could support SOF at a fraction of the cost of a Virginia class sub while providing air access for SOF helicopters not available on a sub. I liked Bill M’s idea of a semi-submersible that could raise up higher in the water to allow helicopters to use it as a lily pad for island hopping. Use the cross-domain ideas of the Joint Operational Access Concept…and don’t leave out the ground component. Predators/Gray Eagles/Reapers could launch from the Cocos Islands and Philippines at a fraction of the cost of a BAMS or Global Hawk. The Army has a history associated with the Philippines and would be less susceptible than Naval or Air Force assets on those islands.
I agree with Carl’s succinct responses including the concluding paragraph’s perceptive statement that: “There really isn’t anything new here. We just have forgotten what sea fighting actually entails.”
Col. Robert C. Jones however raises some interesting points in his queries. At the tactical level, should a battle between naval forces take place ships like aircraft and armored vehicles have some degree of vulnerability and some may be to a successful attack. It is a mathematical fact of naval warfare. Conceptually, therefore, escort vessels protecting a Task Force’s most valued assets such as aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, supply ships, etc. will be optimally assigned in numbers needed to protect all points on the compass with back up accompanying escorts to replace those lost, at least in the ideal situation—rarely met given the scarcity of resources generally impacting all branches of the armed forces.
Surface fleets are only “insanely” vulnerable to diesel subs and air launched missiles when they lack sufficient destroyer or cruiser type escort vessels carrying standard defensive weaponry for combatting submarines, attack aircraft, and incoming missiles. A dilemma exemplified by the small size of naval task force was that sent by the Royal Navy against the Argentinians during their Falkland’s War. An undersized task force that would have been vulnerable to massed air attacks or submarines during transit had the Argentinians been perceptive enough to employ their resources in that manner.
Submarines have been the weapon of choice for weaker nations lacking the industrial base to build large numbers of ships. Subs have been use to challenge larger and more capable surface fleets since World War I, yet despite some initial tactical successes against unprepared opponents they have never succeeded in driving surface fleets from the oceans.
One of the U.S. Navy’s primary missions is Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). Rarely discussed outside the Navy major emphasis is placed on developing and improving the technical capabilities and tactics used to hunt down and destroy submarines. It is technical and systematic warfare, major parts of which are / or at least were kept secret. Absent a local commander’s lack of preparedness or plain stupidity diesel submarines will be on the losing end of that game.
Shore based anti-ship missile platforms are simply the technically improved coast artillery of the 21st Century. Just another technical challenge that will be nullified using combinations of ECM, high speed radar, computer power for tracking and targeting of the incoming missile and its launch platform, and a combination of defensive and offensive weapons systems all located on the same ship.
For anyone interested there are a series of lengthy articles concerning the capabilities and controversies of the LCS provided by Defense Industry Daily. Each article has links to additional articles. See http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/#controversies. From a detailed and technical prospective, the operating controversies surrounding this class of ship is well documented in this free article.
If the LCS is meant to be a replacement for MSO’s (Mine Sweepers capable of crossing the Ocean) and FFG’s (Frigates previously called Destroyer Escorts used primarily for ASW and smaller volume Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) for ground forces, and if they are stable platforms when operating on the Ocean—a much rougher ride than many realize, that is one thing, however, if they are intended to be a replacement for Cruisers and larger destroyers that will prove to be a serious problem.
Finally, it is impossible for a nation to sustain a strong navy without a strong industrial base. This country’s industrial base continues to be moved offshore and that spells disaster for our being able to sustain a capable navy over the long term. Too many components of the LCS are provided by foreign sources. First Lord of the British Admiralty, Sir John Fisher faced that same problem at the turn of the previous centuries and realized that if England’s industrial based continued to wither away (move elsewhere) they would someday not be able to build the ships the RN needed. He also realized that England’s tax base benefited substantially from Industry and the replacing financial and services businesses would not provide the amount of funds for the level of expenditures necessary to maintain a strong navy. He also faced a parliament whose members had lost interest in funding their Navy’s worldwide missions. This country is entering / has entered into that same economic and political dilemma. Manufacturing and its payroll provided the funds needed not only for our country’s social programs, but for all components of our military as well as providing employment for the engineers and scientists we need to develop our rather advanced weapons systems—whether they be ships, nuclear submarines, fire finder radar driven artillery, the laser based targeting system on the M-1 tank, the F-22, anti-missile defense components, etc. After losing its homeland located industrial base England went from being a world power to a third rate power at best despite the competency of their servicemen. This country is traveling down the same road. Will this nation restore its manufacturing base or will it resize downward its military, their missions, and change our relationships with many so called current allies. However, that question obviously is outside the scope of the Small Wars issues?