Theme: In the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, U.S. policymakers will look for new approaches to implement U.S. national security strategy. Security force assistance will attract a lot of attention and is likely to be a "growth business." But security force assistance is no panacea. Top U.S. policymakers will have to give their attention to some significant reforms if security forces assistance is to achieve its promise and avoid some of its perils.
Read the whole essay here.
Comments
Gulliver,
My handle is that transparent, and I was at the SFA conference in June, so we may have sat next to each other.
You are quite right about terminology. It is convoluted. I believe the current NSA referred to it as a "bureaucratic bowl of spaghetti" when he was in uniform. That was one of the reasons writing chapter 1 of FM 3-07.1 was difficult; however, it was necessary to establish what SFA is and what it is not. So far the SA and SC folks are happy with it, so it will do for the moment. I will say in hindsight that I wish we had just written a "big Army" FID book with SWCS, but thats a moot point.
SFA falls underneath stability with respect to full spectrum operations. Brigades with an SFA mission might be conducting SFA as part of their stability "box" while conducting other operations as part of the offense and defense "boxes." So 4/82d or 4/1 AD may have SFA as their primary mission, but they may have to do other things. The emphasis on retaining this capability was straight from the CSA.
You make an excellent point on the equipping portion of OTERA. My initial thought is that it is directly attempting to build the FSF capability and capacity, but it deserves some additional thought and discussion.
Thank you for your remarks on doctrine. Many like to take swipes at doctrine but do not really have a deep understanding of the role of doctrine, have no positive suggestions themselves, or disappear when it comes time to do some heavy lifting. The biggest challenges are using proper terminology, being consistent with ALL extant Army and joint doctrine, and marching in step with the direction of developing doctrine. And thats not even talking about multinational impacts.
Cheers!
Klugzilla -- Pretty sure I sat next to you at the SFA conference in June, assuming your handle here is as transparent as it seems! (And really, how many people could there be in the Army who refer to themselves as "doctrine wonks"?!)
I agree that the Army does not consider equipment sales to be SFA, which is why I noted that Robert's terminology was a bit confusing. (Why this should be so when the broader definition of SFA includes organizing, training, <strong>EQUIPPING</strong>, rebuilding, and advising is a complete mystery to me.)
Also agree that "U.S. units conducting combat operations are not conducting SFA," but somebody might want to tell that to the modular brigade(s) augmented for SFA. My understanding -- I think someone used these exact words -- is that 4/82 would "retain the capability for full-spectrum operations." Does that mean that they're just a combat brigade that does SFA some of the time?
And completely agree on the proliferation of terms and resistance to inclusion of BP language.
Rob and I have talked about this stuff offline a little bit, which is helping me to understand JCISFA's take on all this.
You doctrine wonks are doing good work, so don't I don't want you to think I'm criticizing here, just trying to clear up some things that seem like inconsistencies to me.
Gulliver,
Good points, but you woke up the doctrine wonk. A joint lexicon has yet to be settled upon; however, the forthcoming FID joint publication will take care of some of this. I would say that SFA can support SC, SA, FID, SSR, and several different other activities, programs, and operations. Trying to say one subsumes the other or one is a subset of the other often gets problematic. As long as we are trying to building the capability and capacity of a foreign security force, we are conducting SFA, although the context can vary greatly.
While the SFA proponent is focused on some of the key aspects of current operations, this does not mean that they limit SFA to mil-to-mil. I checked with them today, and they still subscribe to the Army definition of SFA. FMS training does qualify as SFA, but just selling equipment does not.
SFA supports FID and the military instrument of FID. FID includes programs across DIME, while the military instrument of FID consists of indirect, direct, and combat as Old Eagle mentioned (see JP 3-07.1, the current FID JP). Old Eagle is also spot on that U.S. units conducting combat operations are not conducting SFA. This is because they are not building FSF capability or capacity. If you have to play degrees of Kevin Bacon, it's not SFA.
While the BP assortment of term you mentioned is used within the policy realm, it has not and will likely not be included in joint or Army doctrine. The two doctrinal communities believe the existing terminology already does the job. Weve added too many terms as it is.
Old Eagle -- <em>Dude! Don't muddy the water any more than it is already.</em>
I'm really not trying to!
I understand that SFA is a broad concept. I understand that it theoretically encompasses training and equipping, security sector reform, and mentoring all the way up to the minsterial/governmental level. I get all of that. But the way the Army is currently approaching it from a proponent's standpoint is basically limited to mil-to-mil training, as well as partnering and combat advising in the current operational engagements.
<em>On the other hand, security assistance refers only to those activities authorized under Title 22 USC (State Dept).</em>
Not true, at least not at HQDA. It may be the case in doctrine or certain official publications (I don't know if it is or not; can you show me something?), but in the security assistance community, this is not true.
<em>In Afgh, Iraq, and other locations, we needed authorities to equip foreign security forces (FSF) with non-U.S. equipment from a variety of sources not contained in security assistance.</em>
And we needed authorities to train and equip FSF with standard U.S. equipment, too, but on quicker timelines. And at the discretion of the COCOM, with more USG input than in a standard FMS case (even using FMF). I get it. But 1206 cases are still security assistance.
<em> Likewise, we needed to put combat advisors on the ground with units, which is also proscribed. We also needed to do it with domestic police forces, which is prohibited, except by exception such as sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act. In short, we needed a concept that was broad enough to encompass all of these requirements.</em>
I feel your pain here, and this is why I said "all this terminology stuff is a cluster." I think nowadays the vogue for SC, SA, SFA, advising, partnering, mentoring, etc -- at least at OSD -- is "BPC." Maybe they're intent on using the SFA concept, I don't know. Maybe JCISFA deals with all this stuff. But what I'm saying is that the SFA proponent, as of right now, pretty much seems to just care about the mission set of a modular brigade augmented for SFA -- which is to say, NOT security assistance.
I should note again that this is nitpicky kind of stuff, and it doesn't take anything away from Robert's article, which was an excellent summation of a lot of the challenges posed by security assistance.
Excellent article. This essay coupled with Rob's work on FM's and the discussions throughout SWC are helping to describe what SFA is and what it is not.
Rob- I haven't had a chance to read your recent work, but I'm hoping that y'all have a chance to better define the differences between mentoring, combat advising, and partnering.
One point of note. I've never seen this discussed, but our current model on SFA was GEN Casey and LTG Vines's plan back in the spring of 2005. I was a small member on the planning team. The concept was MiTT would train staffs, GPF would partner 1:1 or 1:2 with line companies, and SF would combat advise the batallion scouts. As the situation deteriorated from insurgency to civil war, the plan was shelved, and we took a more unilateral approach through "the Surge."
As we continue to send in more forces into Afghanistan, a point of discussion remains on how much work that American forces should be doing versus our counterparts.
Geofre Schoradt:
One thing I would have liked Mr. Haddick's article to touch on is the extent to which SFA is not always the most effective solution to a given problem.
Increased security may help prevent attacks and apprehend the perpetrators, but what happens when that political unrest is the result of social inequality, food scarcity, or an economic recession? SFA is not a panacea because it is not capable of confronting the socioeconomic issues that create these security challenges.
Personally, I would like to see the SFA defined a little better in terms of the CCJO 2009 and the combat, security, engagement, and relief/reconstruction elements. Cross-referencing IW concepts between the JOC and the CCJO can seem quite frightful at times.
@ Gulliver
Dude! Don't muddy the water any more than it is already.
According to Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, "Security force assistance is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, hostnation,
or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. It is integral to successful
stability operations and extends to all security forces: military, police, and border forces, and other
paramilitary organizations. This applies to all levels of government within the host nation as well as other
local and regional forces. Forces are developed to operate across the spectrum of conflict--combating
internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness; defending against external threats; or
serving as coalition partners in other areas. It is critical to develop the institutional infrastructure to sustain
security force assistance gains; host-nation security forces must have the capability to perform required
functions across the stability sectors. They must exist in sufficient numbers to have the capacity to perform
these functions wherever and whenever required. Finally, they must have the sustainability to perform
functions well into the future, long after external forces are no longer engaged. Successful security force
assistance involves thorough and continuous assessment and includes the organizing, training, equipping,
rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved."
It is about as broad and comprehensive as possible. On the other hand, security assistance refers only to those activities authorized under Title 22 USC (State Dept). In Afgh, Iraq, and other locations, we needed authorities to equip foreign security forces (FSF) with non-U.S. equipment from a variety of sources not contained in security assistance. Likewise, we needed to put combat advisors on the ground with units, which is also proscribed. We also needed to do it with domestic police forces, which is prohibited, except by exception such as sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act. In short, we needed a concept that was broad enough to encompass all of these requirements.
FID consists of indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations. When U.S. forces conduct unilateral combat operations, they are not "organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising", hence not conducting SFA.
Robert used SA and SFA interchangeably, but most of us understood his point.
Cheers
Robert -- This is a really quite good piece, though I'd quibble with your use of the term Security Force Assistance. What you're talking about is <em>security assistance</em>, which includes the provision of equipment to foreign partners.
While I recognize that we don't have a unified lexicon across DoD and the Services, the Army SFA proponent considers SFA to be limited military-to-military training missions, which is to say training performed by green-suiters. FMS training (by TRADOC directive, this is currently sourced by contractors except in unusual circumstances) thus doesn't qualify, nor does materiel FMS.
All of this terminology stuff is a cluster, as I'm sure you well know (example: Building Partnerships, Building Partner Capabilities, Building Partner Capacity, and Building Partnership Capacity are all different things. One of those is BP, one is BPC, and the others apparently don't have acronyms. I can't sort it out). But "SFA" has always had at least something (conceptually speaking) in common with FID, which is about training and not equipment. So use of that term seems needlessly confusing here.
That:<blockquote>"...I see the continued requirement for the U.S. military to have the capability and capacity to conduct SFA when required by our masters. How they use it, I argue, is a separate issue."</blockquote>is certainly correct.
It is an easily affordable capability and it does not require dedication of a significant number of people or large funding; just some common sense in application.
Verily, verily, I say unto you, SFA is not a panacea. It is nonetheless a critical capability in the U.S. kitbag.
Critical because if we continue to get involved (of necessity or by choice) in counterinsurgencies and other forms IW, it is only when the local forces are capable of conducting their own missions that there can ever be any measure of success.
Critical because if we need to rely on coalition-based military operations to accomplish foreign policy objectives, we will need coalition partners who are capable of operating alongside us.
NOW -- the policy issues that Robert and Rob allude to will always occupy the forefront of when our elected officials decide to get us engaged in military operations abroad. Indeed we have an imperfect record of that engagement. Still, we need a robust SFA capability (across DOTML-PF) to be able to respond to those missions when they are assigned. Telling our political bosses, "sorry, but we really suck at this" hasn't limited their use of military force in the past, and is unlikely to do so in the future.
HENCE -- I see the continued requirement for the U.S. military to have the capability and capacity to conduct SFA when required by our masters. How they use it, I argue, is a separate issue.
I think the key issues that Robert brings up here are focused on the policy choices (and the associated possible implications and outcomes) we make about using our SFA capabilities to Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build and Advise toward developing a given Foreign Security Force's capabilities. This would be emphasis on "acceptability" aspect of scrutinizing our choice.
Who pays, be it SA $$ or SC $$ and what authorities preside over its implementation is really more emphasis on "feasibility" and "sustainability" of a given choice, and are issues that ultimately plague the implementation of that choice.
As Robert noted, the decision to support the development of capabilities that sustain the generation and employment of foreign security forces is no light undertaking, and at a minimum should be seen within the political context of how those forces will or may be employed both wrt the political problem at hand, and those that may face their authority in the future.
SFA then is not a panacea for every political problem that we face, and is the case with other ways to address political problems often gives rise to some new set of problems, hopefully ones that we prefer, or that are easier to tolerate.
Having said that, developing and institutionalizing the capabilities to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise FSFs on a scale that supports the capacity to address our strategic concerns - e.g. being able to do it when we need to do it, is I think smart, as it provides us other options to pursue owur own objectives. Knowing why you should do it, when you should do it and where to do it is I think, wisdom - as it aligns those capabilities with good strategy.
Best, Rob