Small Wars Journal

The Persian Gulf Military Balance

Tue, 04/27/2010 - 12:57pm
Anthony Cordesman recently posted his report The Gulf Military Balance in 2010 at the CSIS website. This report (still in working draft form) is a graphical data dump and narrative discussion of conventional and irregular warfare capabilities and trends in the Persian Gulf region.

Some of Cordesman's conclusions:

1. On the charts, Iran records an impressive "bean count" of conventional military hardware. But Cordesman notes the ancient vintage of these systems, their poor state of repair, and inadequate soldier training and concludes that Iran's conventional military capability is limited and dwindling.

2. On the other side of the Gulf, U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and others have been on hardware spending sprees. Yet in spite of constant urging from U.S. officials, Cordesman notes that defense cooperation among the Gulf Arab states remains much less than what it should be. This lack of cooperation diminishes significant mutual defense synergies these countries could achieve in areas such as air defense, missile defense, sea control in the Persian Gulf, and offensive deterrence directed at moderating Iranian behavior.

3. Cordesman asserts that the Iranian government seems to be directing its attention at high-end asymmetric (nuclear plus theater-range ballistic missiles) and low-end asymmetric (revolutionary subversion, terror, sabotage) capabilities at the expense of funding for conventional military capabilities. Iranian decision makers may have concluded that Iran possesses a comparative advantage in these "asymmetric" capabilities while at the same time concluding that conventional military capabilities are not nearly as useful for projecting power or creating intimidating effects.

Not displayed in Cordesman's charts are U.S. Central Command's military capabilities. This is an appropriate omission. In the long-run, Iranian power will need to be contained and deterred. Best from a U.S. perspective that this be done by America's local Arab allies. Regrettably, as Cordesman notes, although the Gulf Arabs states will have the capacity to contain and deter Iran on their own, such regional deterrence and containment will be in short supply as long as the Arab states squabble rather than cooperate. The result will be a major U.S. military presence in the Gulf, long after the U.S. has scaled down its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.