The North Korean Threat: Where Do We Go From Here? By Dave Maxwell, Vocativ
Here is the bottom line: The only way that we will have an end to the nuclear and missile programs as well as the human atrocities and crimes against humanity being perpetrated against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family Regime is through a unification process that leads to a united republic of Korea.
That is a tall order. Unification is the only way to settle the “Korea Question.” Unification will be hard and will most likely be achieved after the expenditure of much blood and treasure from the Republic of Korea, the United States and regional powers. It will be complex because the path to attain it is uncertain and fraught with danger.
There are four paths to unification: peaceful, regime collapse, war or internal regime change that results in new leadership that seeks to peacefully unify. Each of these paths conflicts with the single vital national interest of North Korea: survival of the Kim Family Regime. Everything the regime does is focused on this objective. It overrides all other considerations to include the welfare of the Korean people living in the north. It also explains why the North Korean nuclear and missile programs are so important and why the regime will never negotiate them away…
Comments
My concern with the North Korean criminal sovereign state is that the growing financial vulnerability of the Western, Chinese, Russian, and Saudi led GCC economic blocks provides growing potential for North Korean geopolitical extortionist activity.
While North Korea's "Hydrogen bomb" was both a figurative and literal fizzle, it is still within the capability of North Korea to conduct activity specifically designed to disrupt and undermine regional and global economic confidence at time of fast growing economic vulnerability.
For example, Japan's unprecedented negative interest rate environment leaves Japan with limited monetary policy options to respond to an economic confidence shock.
If North Korea can develop credible "clearly short of war" activities specifically designed to target economic confidence in Japan it may be able to negotiate a larger monthly extortion retainer.
Rising strategic extortion risk due to rising economic instability.
Unintended consequences of poor fiscal/monetary policy.
I suspect that while effective policy directed at North Korean to solve that problem is well overdue, we will continue to see further extortion/"insurance" behaviour and payments as it's the lowest cost option for a short election cycle western economic world already overwhelmed by not just the aforementioned economic vulnerability but other higher ranking domestic and global priorities.
Does the West, Japan, China, Russia have the OODA loop bandwidth and political/economic/military capacity to effectively manage even an "easy" permissive-ish North Korean intervention?
East Germany re-integration went "well", but at what total cost in 2016 dollars?
What are the cost estimates for a permissive re-integration of North Korea?
What are the cost estimates for a semi-to-non-permissive re-integration?
Can stakeholders afford the cost?
Is cost affordability rising or falling?
I'm not overly concerned about North Korea using a nuclear weapon in a kinetic war, but I am increasingly concerned about North Korea using a nuclear weapon(and/or other capabilities) as part of a "clearly short of war" economic warfare attack.
Red teaming this, if in the role of North Korean senior leadership I would be focused on:
1)developing credible and targeted "clearly less than war" near offshore economic warfare capabilities leveraging it's existing arsenal.
2)expanding and diversifying its illicit revenue streams and negotiate extortion payments for reduced performance
3)shifting military posture to irregular/defensive, maybe a "shooting revolution" version of the Baltic Singing Revolution designed to enhance nationalism and support for the regime while increasing risk to external stakeholders considering support for regime change.
4)open back channel dialogue if compelled in the future to negotiate for immunity/safe harbour.
Will a criminal state under increasing stress drop conventional sovereign state pretence and shift to behaviour more akin to a nuclear armed Tony Soprano?
Where diplomacy is replaced almost exclusively by clearly articulated extortion negotiation.
Ultimately, I think the geopolitical equation for North Korea is something like my very rough amateur equation to solve below:
((NK minimum operating costs < maximum acceptable $ payment for external political stakeholders) / arbitrary 1% extortion premium for deterred NK economic damage value) < $ of NK caused economic disruption and/or re-integration intervention