The Taliban commander was back in the village. Our base roared to life as we prepared to capture him. Two Chinook helicopters spun their blades in anticipation in the dark. Fifty Afghan commandos brooded outside, pacing in the gravel. I was nearby, yelling into a phone: "Who else do we need approvals from? Another colonel? Why?" A villager had come in that afternoon to tell us that a Taliban commander known for his deployment of suicide bombers was threatening the elders. The villager had come to my unit, a detachment of the United States Army stationed in eastern Afghanistan, for help. Mindful of orders to protect the civilian population, we developed a plan with the Afghan commandos to arrest the Taliban commander that evening before he moved back into Pakistan. While the troops prepared, I spent hours on the phone trying to convince the 11 separate Afghan, American and international forces authorities who needed to sign off to agree on a plan. Some couldn't be found. Some liked the idea, others suggested revisions. The plan evolved. Hours passed.
The cellphone in the corner rang. "Where are you?" the villager asked urgently. The Taliban commander was drinking tea, he said. At 5 a.m. the Afghan commandos gave up on us and went home. The helicopters powered down. The sun rose. I was still on the phone trying to arrange approvals. Intelligence arrived indicating that the Taliban commander had moved on. The villagers were incredulous. This incident is typical of what I saw during my six-month tour in Afghanistan this year. We were paralyzed by red tape, beaten by our own team. Our answer to Afghans seeking help was: "I can't come today or tomorrow, but maybe next week. I have several bosses that I need to ask for permission." ...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
Cole,
That is a good list of considerations. Those considerations, and others, are indeed factored in when weighing the credibility of a source and whether to act upon intel. The answer to your last question is, "it depends."
It is refreshing to see your clear-headed thinking on the matter, particularly in light of your disclosure that you have not been there. If more people who have not been there (the vast majority) demonstrated the ability to think through things rationally - as you just did - then the American populace might be able to discuss Afghanistan in terms other than sports analogies or "killing terrorists" or "untying our Soldiers hands" or other mindless blather. Many still think that a typical day in the life of our troops in Afghanistan resembles Black Hawk Down.
Never been there and done that so take this for its worth. But please consider:
* Ganjgal elder's claimed desire to reconcile followed by an ambush
* Olly North's embed with Marine Special Ops that ending up killing lots of civvies via AC-130s in west Afghanistan
* Any other situation where one tribe, family, ethnic group, or business competitor plants false info to get us to take out his enemy
How sure were you about the info's reliability and was one guy worth risking 2 helicopters and all those ANA in a potential ambush...or slaughter of civilians with the acompanying information ops advantage for the bad guys?
Couldn't a Predator have been dispatched to follow said leader to where all his other men were camped out or to do the deed via Hellfire?
But IMHO you are sure right about 11 release authorities being way too many.
When I read the draft future capstone concept for the US Army to 2028, one of the concepts that did strike me was the identified need to develop responsibility and decision-making down to the lowest level. Reading between the lines this is a response to the anticipated asymmetric attack against US networked advantages, enabling commanders (at any level) to make decisions based upon commander's intent, training and doctrine, and application of ethos and culture. People often have a bit of a snigger at that last one but more and more we are being reminded that this is what guides an individual's decision processes when the heat/pressure is on.
So I'm with Morgan in his second paragraph above: don't just empower the troops on the ground to make decisions but also ensure that they have the training, supporting doctrine and culture to make the right decision that contributes to higher objectives.
I think it was Jerry Pournelle who said in one of his books (Lucifer's Hammer?) that the hardest course of action is probably the right think to do. That's a quality that can rarely be developed on the fly and should be something developed from Day 1 of getting off the bus for recruit/officer training.
The most important question regarding the war is Islam here is a list of articles you should consider.
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2008/05/counterjihad-vienna-2008.html
http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/006854.html
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2006/10/recommendations-for-west.html
http://www.vdare.com/Sailer/060813_disconnect.htm
http://townhall.com/columnists/DianaWest/2006/07/14/connecting_the_dots…
great additional comments found (as usual) at Global Guerrillas
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2009/12/journal-fi…
I think the US is really not that good at this sort of thing. Unless there is some miracle plan on the anvil, you have to figure that the taliban will be back in southeast afghanistan in 18 months and a new civil war will start as American troops leave (with ISI covering their ass so there is no disorderly liftoff from the embassy).
After that, things will be easier. The US can pay and support local proxies and pressurise Pakistan to "do more", outsourcing the war to local allies not constrained by this bureaucracy. Isnt that the direction in which the world is moving?
On the other hand, as a "local", I am still praying for a miracle because I think the local phase of the war will be far bloodier than the American occupation phase and I really wish Pakistan could get out of this whole dirty business and play cricket and watch bollywood movies and make snide remarks about Indian poverty instead of the current blood soaked mess and the bigger mess to come....
<b>Oldpapajoe:</b>
Far more importantly, if only half of what he contends is remotely correct we are in deep yogurt...
As for him, InfO assigned to an INA OMLT located next to a SF FOB who got sick or wounded six months into a tour. All sorts of possibilities other than that. The issue is not him, it's the wrongdoing he's alleging.
<b>Omar Ali:</b><blockquote>"I think the US is really not that good at this sort of thing."</blockquote>Unfortunately, you're correct. We do not like to do it, therefor we try not to think about it and hope it will go away. Plus we aren't mean enough and we don't do devious all that well. Add to that that we do not train as well as we should and there you have it...
There are alternatives to doing "this sort of thing" but we never explore those because that would require thinking ahead, not a strong suit of the US of A...
Commander-on-the-Ground becomes Commander-on-the-Hill as Gen. Stanley McChrystal testifies before Congress today.
A few questions, just to break the ice:
Q: Sir, you wrote the following the folllowing in your initial Afghanistan assessment:
A more forceful and offensive StratCom approach must be devised whereby INS are exposed continually for their cultural and religious violations, anti-Islamic and indiscriminate use of violence and terror, and by concentrating on their vulnerabilities. These include their causing ofthe majority of civilian casualties, attacks on education, development projects, and government institutions, and flagrant contravention of the principles of the Koran. These vulnerabilities must be expressed in a manner that exploits the cultural and ideological separation of the INS from the vast majority of the Afghan population.
Could explain how you arrived at this statement, that any such such acts are in "flagrant contravention of the principles of the Koran"? What principles of the Koran are you referring to? What are the names of the scholars or individuals you consult on Islamic doctrine?
Or maybe this:
Q: Sir, you have repeatedly emphasized the need to shift to population protection at the expense of force protection. How do you look your men -- and their families -- in the eye?
Q: At what point do attacks on ISAF forces directly by Afghan forces, or likely caused by Afghan forces -- we have seen a disturbing number already, most recently the murders of five British soldiers by an Afghan policeman, and in August, the death of a Marine LCPL very possibly by an Afghan-tipped ambush -- cause you to revisit this policy, which also orders ISAF forces into close proximity and fighting conditions with Afghan forces?
Q: Following up, sir: Indeed, you have written also that ISAF forces have been "preoccupied with force protection," and must change this "manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people they seek to protect" as a means of winning support from the Afghan people.
Where do we look in history for any victorious precedent for this strategy?
Q: How does the military maintain morale among troops asked to hold fire, or not call in fire, in dire circumstances?
Q: What progress has been made in the investigation into events at Gunjgal where three Marines and a Navy Corpsman were killed, according to reports, because they were not approved for supporting fire because they were too close to a village?
Q: If, after eight years of pouring men and materiel into Afghanistan, we have not yet won the "support" of the Afghan people, why will the addition of 30,000 troops will make the difference?
Q: Are you familiar with the Islamic doctrine of jihad, of taqqiyya? And, finally (DRUM ROLL): How can tell us that you are doing your duty in devising a military strategy that doesn't take into account the war-fighting doctrine (jihad) of the enemy?
No wonder Mr. Vacarro wasn't successful in nabbing the miscreant. He didn't establish the proper contacts at the proper bases; someone to short out the airconditioning, Dominoe's, and Baskin Robbins refrigeration units. Create a REAL problem requiring an IMMEDIATE response. This would have tied up the Tommy Franks types thus allowing Mr. Vaccarro to react in an IINTELLIGENT and TIMELY manner and bring much glory and perhaps a medal or two to those who perservered on the field of battle in the face of unprecedented [ O'Bama's word]hardship.
Looks like this guy is an ODA team leader and I'm surprised, given my experience in Iraq, that he didn't have more autonomy to go after bad guys and distro pre-approved PSYOP product/messages. I'm not sure about his contention regarding "multi-month authorization procedures" for CERP projects either as we were sometimes able to get projects approved and funded in about a week (depending on command emphasis, of course).
Maybe these constraints only pertain to OEF, I'm not sure. But for my unit in OIF, a regular infantry battalion, and our brigade, we had staff systems--albeit not perfect, but effective--in place that allowed for a decentralized, lowest-level approval process. Company commanders could develop their own targets and action on them--with battalion approval--as appropriate. We developed and scoped enough CERP projects throughout our AO to have a steady and targeted drip of effective non-lethal outputs.
Regardless, if Vaccaro's gripes are true, it seems like the staff systems weren't in place within the AO he operated. Seems strange given we're in--what?-- year 8 of OEF.
Matt --
You are correct, these constraints are only for ISAF/OEF.
There are PSYOP materials available. They are lame and largely irrelevant to anything we are trying to accomplish on the ground.
He is absolutely correct about multi-month approval for projects. CERP is essentially non-existent. You have to get the idiotic PRT to come poke around (a feat in and of itself), deliberate for a few weeks, start a series of subsequent meetings, contractor bidding, yadda yadda yadda.
These issues aren't restricted to his AO. They are RC-East-wide.
Kabul is full of US field grades doing next to nothing while collecting their tax-free, combat pay for their 6-month rotation in a "combat zone" (laughable in Kabul) in order to get a combat patch. How much oversight do we really need? How many levels of "headquarters" BS are really necessary? Perhaps if we got rid of division HQs, joint HQs, military MWR coordinators, advisors to the ANA band, etc...we might have more people to put into the actual fight.
How about this......platoon leaders need to be junior captains, company commanders are majors, battalion commanders remain LTCs, and all are given wide latitude and authority in executing our war against these insurgent scumbags....? Less bureaucracy and less focus on "force protection" and maybe more scumbags would die in rapid fashion were this to take place.
If something "politically incorrect" takes places (like killing the bad guys), the couch-potatoes in the rear can man up and explain to the weak-willed politicians and overly pampered public that we are in a war against people that have no problem torturing innocents, throwing acid into the faces of little girls, and cutting off heads....? I think they like flying planes into our buildings, too.
That's my rant for the evening.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=Y2M0OWI4NDYwMmQyNTZiODkyM2NmZGE1ZD…
In his heroic service to our country, Pete Hegseth has forgotten more about warfare than I could ever hope to know. But his NRO article on Monday, offering -- in rebuttal to my column from last week -- a defense of President Obamas political decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, is ill-informed. Hegseth caricatures my views, and he fails to address -- much less to answer -- most of what I actually did say.
He also attributes to me an assertion Ive never made and to which I dont subscribe, claiming that I believe "counterinsurgency is nothing more than glorified nation-building." He purports to quote me as having written that the strategy of surging troops to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare is a "nation-building, soft-power strategy." He doesnt link to anything Ive written in which that quote appears (it certainly does not appear in the one column of mine to which he directs readers). I dont recall ever saying such a thing, and word-searches through my articles and Corner posts at NRO do not turn it up. I can say for sure that I dont think COIN is a soft-power strategy and that Ive written things about COIN that are the antithesis of Hegseths portrayal of my position.