The New FM 3-24: What Happens When the Host Nation Is the Problem? By Dr. Walter C. Ladwig III, Defense in Depth
Incorporating the experience gained in Iraq and Afghanistan, the new edition of FM 3-24: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies reorients American strategy towards supporting a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts rather than intervening in a conflict directly. This change recognizes both the prevailing political sentiment towards foreign interventions as well as an understanding of how the strengths of the United States can best be leveraged in internal conflict.
The new manual also addresses a critical error that plagued FM 3-24 (2006): the assumption that the U.S. and the local government it is supporting in counterinsurgency will share common goals, priorities, and interests in regard to counterinsurgency operations. Instead, FM 3-24 (2014) recognizes that the interests of the host nation government will not necessarily align with those of the U.S. nor may they be willing to address the “root causes” of an insurgency. Although the new COIN manual explicitly recognizes that it may be necessary to influence the partner government and shape its behavior, it significantly overestimates the ability of the United States to employ its tools of influence (financial inducements, moral suasion) to convince a local government to adopt the principals contained in FM 3-24…