America's national security structure is designed to confront the challenges of the last century rather than our own...
We can and must do better. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, the national security community continues to devote the vast majority of its resources to preparing for conventional state-on-state conflicts, but "the most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland—for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states." For that reason, Gates has been a vocal advocate of increasing the resources devoted to accomplishing U.S. objectives abroad without relying on military power. In what he describes as a "man bites dog" moment in political Washington, he has argued outspokenly for reinforcements for his comrades in arms in other departments, including Justice, Agriculture, and Commerce...
Much more at The Wilson Quarterly.
Comments
Good comments both. I said this was a good one mostly because Nagl focuses on the policy issues and not on the Army advisory element issue which is a dead and smelly horse. To me, that's progress.
Hopefully we will implement Option 2 presented by The Project on National Security Reform <a href=http://www.pnsr.org/> (LINK)</a> and that will help with issues both Rob and Bill raise. As Nagl and both comments above illustrate, what occurs in the next few years really depends upon the WH and Congress...
Bill, out of all the "lenses" I've seen that we might use to consider this, I think yours seems most useful to me (although hat tip to John Nagl for good content to build the discussion around).
This brings up some useful questions about national level direction, integration and coordination (can the NSC be more useful? What internal policies and authorities need to be reconsidered, etc.?)- and also perhaps the need for a strong international coalition whose members see this and other threats (and problems) at least similarly as we do - e.g. enough to build policies and extend resources in support.
As Gray noted - the challenge is how to integrate this into a grand strategy without appearing malevolently hegemonic - or said another way incurring resistance through building too much on the fears, honor and interests of others as opposed to using their fears, honor and interests to gain their support. As Ken remarked abut Gray's enumeration - the key is remaining adaptable and flexible at all levels - there is no one size fits all - and each "partner" will likely have, create or require some changes in the conditions and our approach.
I think this must be laid out in the NSS with respect to authorities and integration. I know the released NSS has typically been vague on certain items, and often uses imperative type language due to broad interests, and other reasons - but I think there is room to frame this better and tie it other security interests/objectives under a grand strategy.
We need some guidance at the top I believe on how we want certain things to relate to each other outside of Defense - after that it can be nested on down - NDS to NMS to specifics.
Best, Rob
Overall good article by a dedicated patriot, but I remain skeptical of many of its underlying arguments:
1. Nagl: the most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.
This simply is not true. The 9/11 plot was not conceived because the planners had the luxury of working in a failed state, they could have planned their attack anywhere, and they did, to include in the nations of Germany, Malysia, Philippines, and the U.S.. Numerous European left wing terrorists came from the Middle Class. Tim McViegh planned and executed his terrorist attack on the OK Federal building in the U.S.. Numerous terrorists from throughout the Middle East emerged from their middle or upper class of society. Unfortunately we're seeing a growing number of home grown middle eastern terrorists throughout Europe, but especially in England who come from middle class neighborhoods. It is complete folley to think that international terrorists emerge primarily from failed states. How many transnational terrorists have emerged from the Congo, Cambodia, or Haiti? Failed states present an obvious danger, but they are not the cause of terrorism, and removing them (if this is even possible) will not remove the threat of terrorism.
2. Nagl: Gates has been instrumental in leading the Department of Defense to adapt to a world in which the most serious threats to America and the international system come not from states that are too strong, as was the case in the 20th century, but from those that are too weak to control what happens inside their borders.
Really? Is the DROC a greater threat to us because they can't control their populace than Iran? Perhaps it would be more accurate to state the "most likely" threats will come from weak states, but that remains speculation, and an expensive speculation at that if we feel compelled to assist all the world's weak or failing States in an attempt to prop them up.
3. Nagl: Our overly militarized response to Al Qaedas attacks, the global war on terror, could be more sensibly recast as a global counterinsurgency campaign. Insurgency is an attempt to overthrow a government or change its policies through the illegal use of force; Al Qaedas stated objective-- to expel the West from the Islamic world and re-establish the Caliphate-- can be usefully conceived of as a global insurgency. It would then take a global counterinsurgency campaign to confront this challenge.
Another false argument that is over played in some circles. We'll set aside the "fact" that the world has other threats to our national interests than AQ and its network, and simply focus on AQN for now. AQN is not implementing a global insurgency per say, they are implementing a global special operations strategy, in which insurgency is one component.
They do encourage and sponsor Islamist insurgencies (their version of unconventional warfare) when they feel it is in their interest, especially in areas that they desire to convert back into their caliphate pipe dreams. They are also darn good at it, so I agree 100% Nagl's bottom line that we have to get better at COIN, but that is far from the whole fight. AQN also successfully employs psychological operations through various means ranging from sosphisticated websites, video productions, night letters, religion manipulation, to armed propaganda. They conduct civil affairs with their NGOs to gain access to target areas and to help shape perceptions of target population groups. They even have their own IMET equivalent program, but they don't send foreign officers to their schools, they send young kids to their schools in Pakistan and Saudi to thoroughly learn the ways of hatred (they take a long view). Outside the desired Caliphate boundries they conduct special recon scouting targets they may want to attack to influence the behavior of nations that they see as a threat to their goals. In time these turn into direct action missions such as 9/11, the embassy attacks in east Africa, the Bali bombings, the London Bombings, the Madrid Bombings, etc. This isn't an insurgency, it is strategic level terrorism.
In short, the entire world cannot be defined by the challenges we're facing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, while many of Nagl's arguments are correct, it remains speculation that our COIN doctrine will actually work, even if skillfully applied. While it seems sound in an academic setting, the results in the real world are what count. None the less, what cannot be argued is the point that we are facing increasingly dangerous irregular threats, and we must adapt quicker and more effectively to respond to this threat environment.