Sherman as a Counterinsurgent by Thomas E. Ricks, Best Defense
I know, it sounds like a joke -- the idea that General William T. Sherman's march across Georgia in November and December of 1864 was a classic counterinsurgency campaign. I can hear you mutter, What's next, the leadership tips of the Emperor Nero?
But, seriously: The more I read Sherman's memoirs and letters, the more I came to believe that in that campaign he consciously was practicing what should be called counterinsurgency. Now, it wasn't the caricature of COIN we sometimes see, of a hearts and minds effort to indiscriminately protect the people. I call that stuff "Rodney King COIN," in which the commander haplessly pleads, "Can't we just all get along?" I believe that Gen. Peter Pace, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, kind of took a step down this road in his handling of Iraq, when he said that what we needed was for Iraqis to love their children more than they hated each other…
Comments
Lincoln, Grant and Sherman, it would seem -- unlike many of our civilian and military leaders recently -- were under no illusion re: the "universal" appeal of such things as "Northern" values."
Likewise these 19th Century American leaders (unlike their contemporary counterparts) would also seem to have been under no illusion re: the "universal" appeal of the North's "shining house on the hill."
Accordingly these folks (Lincoln, Grant and Sherman -- as opposed to their counterparts today) would seem to have been under no illusion as to what it would take to bring the South to its knees and, thereby, begin the state and societal transformation process that it (the North) desired/required re: the South.
Thus, the "hard hand" tactics, etc., which the North employed re: the South in America's Civil War.
(These being, shall we say, as effective at eliminating the need for counterinsurgency operations as were the "hard hand" tactics, etc., of the United States -- re: Germany and Japan -- in World War II? Again, based on "no illusions" re: ourselves and/or our enemies?)
Thus, the need for counterinsurgency operations then as now to be understood as the abject failure -- of one's national leaders -- to:
a. Understand themselves, their own country and their own population.
b. Understand the enemy, its country and its population.
c. And, accordingly, to understand what it will ACTUALLY take -- to achieve one's political objective -- in light of "a" and "b" above.
(A "rose-colored glasses" approach, and a subsequent unanticipated requirement to conduct massive counterinsurgency operations accordingly, to indicate that the requirements of "a" and "b" above were blatantly ignored, carefully avoided or simply not done.)
It wasn't exclusively Sherman's idea. ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, on page 2-3 has the following quote:
...........................<strong>Grant’s Orders to Sherman, 1864</strong>
In a letter to MG William T. Sherman, dated 4 April 1864, LTG Ulysses S. Grant outlined his 1864 campaign plan. LTG Grant described MG Sherman’s role:
“It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the Spring Campaign to work all parts of the Army together, and, somewhat, toward a common center. . . . You I propose to move against Johnston’s Army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their War resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of Campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute in your own way. Submit to me however as early as you can your plan of operation.”
MG Sherman responded to LTG Grant immediately in a letter dated 10 April 1864. He sent Grant, as requested, his specific plan of operations, demonstrating that he understood Grant’s intent:
“ . . . Your two letters of April 4th are now before me . . . That we are now all to act in a Common plan, Converging on a Common Center, looks like Enlightened War. . . . I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan in which I am to Knock Joe [Confederate GEN Joseph E.] Johnston, and do as much damage to the resources of the Enemy as possible. . . . I would ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against you or [Union MG Nathaniel P.] Banks.”
The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 10: January 1–May 31, 1864, by Ulysses S. Grant, edited by John Y. Simon. Ulysses S. Grant Foundation. ©1982. Excerpt from pages 251 through 254, used by permission.