SFA in the Pacific

Like Dave I think the authors made several valid points on the utility of the U.S. Army Pacific conducting SFA as a supporting role to USPACOM's strategy, specifically its Security Cooperation efforts throughout the theater to build and strengthen relationships with our partners; however, it seems a illogical to replace JSOTF-P with a GPF BDE for a lot reasons I won't belabor here beyond stating it JSOTF-P is an appropriate SOF mission enabled with a wide range of joint force enablers. This opinion piece in my opinion points to two much serious perception issues that we need to address.

The first is the perception that Special Operations Forces only does counterterrorism, which unfortunately is a perception partially pushed by many members in the SOF community. SOF conducts special operations in support of a wide range of missions, CT only being one. The fact that a GO and a MAJ are writing that a BDE should replace the JSOTF so SOF will be freed up to conduct CT elsewhere indicates how ingrained this misleading perception has become throughout the military. Americans have invested heavily in building a world class SOF capability, to limit them to CT takes away many viable SOF options for our GCCs to support the larger regional strategy.

The Army, my Army by the way and while I love it I'm also one of its biggest critics, thinks the answer to most of our strategic challenges is putting a BDE in a country and conducting SFA. This isn't creative or logical thinking, and it appears to be an attempt to replicate the current approach in Afghanistan globally. I think the Army will find this approach is not desired in most areas of the world, and assuming this approach ever gets approved, which I doubt, it could actually be detrimental to our strategic aims. I think the Army will find there is little appetite throughout SE Asia and S. Asia for BDE level Task Forces conducting SFA in their nations, while on the other hand there will be a heavy demand for smaller level niche capabilities.

I hope the Army backs off this approach as "the" approach for Army engagement. They should sit down with PACOM leadership to learn what their challenges are and develop "appropriate" Army strategies (truly out of the box and futuristic capabilities in some cases) that are value added. From a U.S. security perspective the PACOM region is understandably Navy centric (half the surface of the world, most of it water), but most nations in the region are Army centric, so the importance of the U.S. Army in the region for building and strengthening relationships with our partners can't be overstated. I would offer the best way to do that isn't to replicate what the Army is doing in Afghanistan.

With all due respect to the General and the Major but the mission of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines is Foreign Internal Defense. It is more than just training. I think much of what they write below is useful and appropriate for general purpose forces but the question should be asked as to what is the appropriate force for the OEF-P mission in the Philippines. We worked very hard to overcome the perception that the Philippines would not become the second front from Afghanistan and be "invaded" by the US military similar to Afghanistan. The deployment of Brigade Combat Team (some 5000 Soldiers?) to replace the JSOTF (some 500+ Soldier, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines) would give the appearance of an invasion (and I am sure the counter to this will be that the the entire BCT would not be deployed – but I would venture that there are not 500 people in the BCT who possess the skill sets and discipline found in 500 people in the joint force that makes up the JSOTF). Furthermore, the notion that the main focus of SOF should be on counterterrorism is a misunderstanding of the application of Special Operations Forces conducting Special Warfare. I agree that SFA is an appropriate mission for general purpose forces throughout the Pacific and I would submit there is enough work for them which has been outlined below. But I think it is a mistake to say that a BCT can or should replace the JSOTF. Furthermore it is time to evolve the mission of the JSOTF and begin to transition to long term sustainment under the Joint US military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) (though I would like to see the JUSMAG transition to the Joint US Military Advisory and Assistance Group (JUSMAAG) and operationalize its mission, but that is another discussion.)

I do think that the Regional Aligned Force (RAF) in the Army has a lot of utility. From what I have learned of late it has a lot of potential. But it is not a replacement for SOF. And a BCT amy not be an appropriate force for the type of mission for OEF-P even if it does possess a number of useful capabilities.

One last point. The subtitle is correct – we need a better strategy. There must be a nested strategy from the national level, through the regional "commands" and "bureaus" (both DoD and DoS) to the Chief of Mission's mission strategic plan. But SFA is just one small part of that strategy, it is not a strategy.

One last, last point. The JP 1-02 definitions of FID and SFA are below. Note that the guiding reference is JP 3-22 which is the joint manual for Foreign Internal Defense. Although the manual is very specific that FID is not "superior" to SFA or SFA is not "superior" to FID I think from the definitions below the differences in focus and scope can be discerned and I think it is illustrative that there is not a separate Joint Pub for SFA but that SFA is included in the FID manual. My thoughts on Security Force Assistance are in a paper at this link http://db.tt/yAtVcBJL (but they are from 2008).

From the 2010 Joint Forces Quarterly the description of JP 3-22 is summarized:

"As our awareness and understanding of security cooperation (SC) continues to grow, the importance of JP 3–22 will become even more critical to understand. This JP is the source document for SC and will provide the foundation for how we interact as a joint force in the future, especially in areas such as the Middle East. Today, each Service has its own view on what SC really is and USSOCOM has reached out to the Services and combatant commands to ensure that this publication is clear, cohesive, and enduring. The publication addresses specific sources of U.S. power (financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) applied through the instruments of U.S. national power and introduces a discussion of security force assistance into joint doctrine."(http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-56/31.pdf)

foreign internal defense — Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

security force assistance — The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (JP 3-22)