Saving Afghanistan: Why the Iraq Strategy isn't the Answer - Dan Green, Armed Forces Journal
Last fall, I returned from a six-month deployment to Iraq with the Navy, in which I worked as a tribal and leadership engagement officer in the Fallujah area. By the end of my deployment, Fallujah had changed from an area rife with al-Qaida's presence and upward of 750 security incidents a month to one where al-Qaida was on the run and security incidents were down to about 80 a month. I saw what was needed to convincingly defeat an insurgency as we worked with local tribes and Iraqi security forces to clear and hold each of Fallujah's 10 neighborhoods and numerous surrounding villages.
As security became the norm in the city, the educated middle-class re-asserted its leadership, and the men with guns who had so long dominated politics in the post-Saddam era transitioned to a civilian-controlled police force. By the end of my tour, engineers, architects, teachers and doctors were dominating the city council's meetings, asking for more power and authority from US forces to administer their affairs as we began initial planning to draw down our forces.
As much as it heartened me to witness the positive changes taking place in Fallujah, it also saddened me because it demonstrated just how inadequate our efforts are in Afghanistan and how far away we are from victory. It also prompted me to reflect upon my time in Afghanistan, where I worked as a political officer with the State Department for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2005 and 2006 and on the strategies that are now being talked about to stabilize Afghanistan...
Much more at Armed Forces Journal.