... The decision to conduct a surge came out of an interagency review in the fall of 2006. By mid-December, as I was leaving the Pentagon, there was a rough consensus in the Defense Department that deploying additional combat brigades to Iraq was the right step. Some military leaders raised reasonable questions about the potential effectiveness of a surge, in part because of a correct concern that military power alone could not solve Iraq's problems. I agreed, and emphasized that a military surge would need to be accompanied by effective diplomatic and economic "surges" from other departments and agencies of the American government, and by considerably greater progress from Iraq's elected leaders.
During my last weeks in office, I recommended to President Bush that he consider Gen. David Petraeus as commander of coalition forces in Iraq, as General Casey's tour was coming to an end. General Petraeus and his deputy, Gen. Ray Odierno, had the experience and skill to recognize and exploit the seismic shifts that were taking place in Iraq's political landscape. And United States troops had the courage to win the alliance of Iraq's people against a common enemy - and the benevolence to win their friendship...
Two blogs we at SWJ keep tabs on took great exception to what they consider an attempt by Rumsfeld to revise the history of the turn-around in Iraq.
Peter Wehner at Commentary's Contentions cuts to the quick about the op-ed in his Rumsfeld Revisionism post:
... The real fault with the piece, in my judgment, is that what Rumsfeld writes is selective and misleading. By that I mean that the causal reader would come away from his op-ed believing that Rumsfeld handed over to General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Robert Gates a nation, Iraq, in which all the pieces had been put in place and that we were on the verge of a successful tipping point.
In fact, thanks in large measure to the policies pursued by Rumsfeld, Iraq was, in the latter half of 2006, in a death spiral. Violence, chaos, and a low-grade civil war were engulfing it. The insurgency and Shia militias were gaining strength. Sectarian divisions were deepening. Millions of Iraqis had fled the country. The economy was in shambles. In the words of the Iraq Study Group Report, "[t]he situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating." Reports are that General Casey himself privately acknowledged that Baghdad was "sliding toward chaos." Many people believed Iraq was so wrecked it was beyond recovery...
... what made the 2007 surge different than everything before it was not the increase in the number of troops but, much more importantly, a new mission that was based on classical counterinsurgency doctrine, meaning that it was focused on living with, securing, and winning the confidence of the Iraqi people.
The bottom line for Wehner (and we agree) is that there are a handful of individuals - including Jack Keane, Raymond Odierno, David Petraeus, Ryan Crocker, Fred Kagan, Stephen Hadley, and the President - who deserve credit for the turnabout. Rumsfeld is not one of them. Read the whole post here.
SWJ friend Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal also chimes in with critical commentary in his post Rumsfeld Peddles Revisionist History:
... Rumsfeld and his reports repeatedly talked of standing down as the people and Iraqi Army stood up, and the strategy wasn't one of counterinsurgency. It was one of a quick turnover and rapid drawdown. Saving the day had to rest on the shoulders of the enlisted men and those in the states who would support the campaign.
... Rumsfeld, who apparently never sat down in his office, would have done much better to park himself in a chair and study why his philosophy of rapidly turning over to an Iraqi Army was destined for failure; or perhaps he could have listened to General Eric Shinseki's recommendation that we needed more troops than called for under the current plan; or perhaps he could have prevented Paul Wolfowitz from making a clown of himself by publicly denouncing Shinseki's remarks to the Congress; or perhaps he could have paid attention to General Anthony Zinni's war-gaming of Iraq in which his team found that they needed 400,000 troops...
Read more at The Captain's Journal. For even more - The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 by Bob Woodward goes into great detail concerning the issues leading up to the new counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.
Comments
Rumsfeld had his faults -- who does not? However, he also had his good points.
Neither quoted author has the slightest idea what Rumsfeld actually recommended or did -- nor do I. The difference between us is that I am not assuming something occurred on little evidence and stating it as fact. Both are of course entitled to their opinions but I think their conclusions are drawn on the basis of bias as opposed to a thoughtful assessment.
for example, Wehner says:<blockquote>"In fact, thanks in large measure to the policies pursued by Rumsfeld...Many people believed Iraq was so wrecked it was beyond recovery."</blockquote>Was that a result of Rumsfeld policies or of him accepting the responsibility and shielding the Army and it do its job -- when it didn't know how to do that? For, as Wehner acknowledges:<blockquote>"Beyond that, Rumsfelds approach-which, it should be pointed out, was shared by key generals like the Ricardo Sanchez, George Casey, and John Abizaid-was the antithesis of the philosophy that animated the surge..."</blockquote>
Based on all I've seen and heard, I believe he has one thing right:<blockquote>"...A key goal for Rumsfeld, therefore, was to expedite the withdrawal of American troops rather than using them to increase security and order.</blockquote>I submit that was not a terribly bad idea. Unfortunately, It appears that Rumsfeld got over ruled on that score.
Not that we know -- all speculation. People can of course have their opinions of Rumsfeld but I suggest it's too early and we do not have enough information to pin a tail on him.
We got involved in a war based on bad intel and bad policy decisions When we got there, we made it all much worse by not knowing -- from Joe Tentpeg through most of the Armed Forces to E Ring to the White House -- how to fight it.
That is a lick on a good many people aside from Donald Rumsfeld.