Remembering what we (mis)learned in Bosnia

In 1995, NATO forces, led by the U.S. Army, conducted a large-scale armed intervention into Bosnia in order to enforce the Dayton peace accord. The hoped for "end state" was an ethnically and politically-reconciled Bosnia, managing its own affairs. 14 years later the country is still under international supervision.

We should pause for a moment and consider what effect the U.S. experience in Bosnia had on policymaking and war management this decade. The seeming ease with which the U.S. and NATO appeared to pacify Bosnia (after the previous disastrous mismanagement by the UN) led policymakers, analysts, and military officers into complacency and overconfidence when they contemplated armed interventions at the beginning of this decade. Generals may or may not prepare to fight the last war, but policymakers clearly make their decisions based on the last experience, whether relevant or not.

When considering military policy, the U.S. political system places enormous weight on the most recent experience. In 1991 it was very difficult to get the U.S. Congress to pass a war resolution to liberate Kuwait. Memories of the Vietnam War's casualties and the discredited Gulf of Tonkin resolution haunted the Congress. The Senate narrowly approved the war only after the UN Security Council gave its approval. In October 2002, recalling the quick and easy victory in 1991, Congress approved another war against Iraq with hardly a debate.

Stung by the "Blackhawk Down" fiasco in Somalia, President Clinton mightily resisted U.S. intervention in Bosnia's civil war. Based on lessons learned from Somalia, he reasoned that U.S. intervention in a civil war would benefit one side, creating an armed opponent of the other side. Possessing savage combatants, sympathetic and fearful populations, abundant weaponry, a history of insurgency, and rough terrain, the former Yugoslavia seemed an excellent location for "guerilla warfare."

At the time (1996-1999), I feared U.S. military forces in the Balkans would receive the treatment they would later receive in Iraq and Afghanistan. What were policymakers, analysts, and military officers to conclude when the U.S. suffered nary a combat death in the Balkans? The ease of the Balkan pacification no doubt influenced Kenneth Pollack's The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, a book which provided important cover, and comfort, for policymakers.

U.S. Army colonels and generals in Iraq in 2003-2004 were company and field grade officers in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Kosovo they recalled that the arrest, by targeted raid, of a few troublemakers seemed to be enough to prevent an insurgency. In the winter of 2003-2004, they must have concluded that similar such nighttime raids in Iraq would also solve any incipient problems.

So what are today's lessons? First, a surge worked for Iraq, so it must be the prescription for Afghanistan. I'll leave it to others to discuss the differences between the two wars, a topic which will no doubt get much more airing in the weeks ahead.

Second, how will policymakers and lawmakers now assess the risks of large-scale armed interventions, whether for humanitarian, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stabilization, or any other reasons? They will naturally have a much more cautious view than they did after the Balkans operations. As a consequence, there will be more reliance in the period ahead on Phase Zero security force assistance, wars by proxy, and tactical and strategic raiding. Since I find much merit in these approaches, I will be pleased with this outcome, should it occur.

But the theme of this post is humility and that applies equally to me. If recent sour experiences have ruled out a long list of elective military operations using general purpose forces, what risks does that create? If we can't figure out the answers now, we will experience them eventually.