Surge In Afghanistan Can Work, With Right Resources, Enough Time by John Nagl
There is an increasingly intense desire to transfer lessons learned from what appears to be a successful counterinsurgency effort in Iraq to America's long-neglected war in Afghanistan. The shift in attention is both laudable and overdue. While Iraq is increasingly secure and stable, Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever. We can certainly do better in Afghanistan than we have over the past seven years of war—but it will require a careful appraisal of what we're trying to accomplish and an appreciation for the resources required to get there. A strategic review must reflect an understanding of how to apply all the components of American power—not just the military—to achieve our ends. We need an Afghan surge—an increase of troops (including Afghan forces) to enable the application of a population- and oil-spot-security strategy. While additional U.S. troops are necessary, they are not sufficient to achieve success in Afghanistan...
More at U.S. News & World Report.
Afghanistan Surge Is Not Worth the Cost in Blood and Treasure by Andrew Bacevich
More than seven years after 9/11, the global war on terrorism—in Pentagon parlance, the Long War—is entering a new phase. Attention is now shifting back to Afghanistan, with President Obama seemingly intent on redeeming an ill-advised campaign pledge to increase the U.S. troop commitment to that theater of operations. Yet as the conflict continues, the correlation between American actions and America's interests is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. The fundamental incoherence of U.S. strategy becomes ever more apparent. Worst of all, there is no end in sight...
More at U.S. News & World Report.
Comments
Both very interesting perspectives on our nation's continued efforts in Afghanistan. Nagl makes a compelling argument about aligning ends and means and states what we all have known for some time now - Afghanistan is an economy of force. In my opinion, the previous adminstration defined Total War ends, but allocated Limited War Means. Having recently read Bacevich's Limits of Power, I feel he is spot on in his assessment of US foreign policy placing an over-reliance on military power to solve political problems. Further compounding this over-reliance on military means is the current operational environment. Afghanistan is no doubt much more complex than Iraq due to its terrain, tribal strucute, largely rural based society, the drug trade, general lack of education and as a result the lack of Afghan technical skill required to administer to the populace, not to mention the safehaven afforded AQ/Taliban fighters in the FATA. Bacevich also assails the policy of waging a global war that may be defined in decades or generations while asking so little from the American populace. Having just returned a few months ago from a year serving as a senior advisor to an Afghan National Army Infantry Kandak I have listed some of my observations for general purpose:
1.) The US has a hard time at recognizing the cultural aspects and history of other nations, oftentimes trying to build security forces in American images. This technique always fails.
2.) A "Sunni Awakening" type event is not possible in Afghanistan. The tribes rule, requiring a different approach to each village.
3.) The Training and Equipping of Afghan security forces must move to the forefront of any strategy on Afghanistan. Current end strengths and capabilities are not at the point of taking the lead in COIN. Furthermore, any growth in Afghan security forces, must also include an increased US effort to increase the number of combat advisors and increase their proficiency.
4.) We can not separate success in Afghanistan from the need to stabilize Pakistan.
5.) It is a decades long task to build government institutions in a country that has in effect never functioned in a state. The government has no reach and as such, even attempts to conduct projects to legitimize the ANA, and therefore the government, are next to impossible. This plays into the hands of the enemy.
6.) Negotiating with the Taliban may be a viable option. This option seems much more viable to me than the ability of the all volunteer force to sustain the pace of the war on terror, and for the current and future administration to sustain the will or at least the acquiescence of the American people to support the war, especially in light of the huge financial expenditures required to continue the fight in the current recession.
I have written about this over at my site. Basically this misses the point/counterpoint aspect of previous duels between Dr. Nagl and COL Gentile, in that the two conversations diverge from the very premise, that being the impact of Central Asia on national security. With Prof. Bacevich's tacit dismissal of that importance, the two articles are on related yet very different subjects.
Had Dr. Nagl's article been based on the argument that it was indeed worthwhile, the two would make a counterpoint to each other, but Dr. Nagl can explain very quickly what the importance is and goes on to discuss how to resolve the situation favorably. Prof. Bacevich spends his time dissecting the conduct of the GWOT to this point, Iraq-centric, and discussing the political aspect of why it's not in President Obama's best interest to continue to pursue any strategy in Afghanistan at all.
The two pieces diverged at inception and there was no true comparison of ideas.
Colonel Nagl makes a sensible case for aligning means with ends. But there are two questions that his comments raise.
First, he notes that the ratio of troops to population recommended in our counterinsurgency field manual would require a force of 600,000 troops in Afghanistan. In addition to the 30,000 US troops slated to be sent, he urges expanding the Afghan army at least to 250,000 with an unspecified additional expansion in the number of police. He also calls for clearing and holding key cities in the south and east while this buildup takes place.
However, the Taliban/al-Qaida have increased their own field strength in recent years (from a few thousand to maybe 10,000). Could the Taliban and al-Qaida increase this number by another one-half and sustain it at least for a while? Could they increase their numbers by more? As our side enlarges its zone of control, the other's should diminish. But the number of American troops required could be substantially larger at first if the enemy can grow in numbers more quickly than Afghan security forces can be expanded, particularly if the enemy can also draw fighters from outside Afghanistan.
Second, there is an apparent conflict between the goal of building an Afghan army and the conviction of Secretary Gates and other US leaders that we cannot do nation-building in Afghanistan and should narrow our aim to denying al-Qaida the use of sanctuaries. I don't see how we can build an Afghan army without building an Afghan government to support it. The alternative, a bargain with the Afghan Taliban, is doubtful and would not do anything about al-Qaida in Pakistan. On the latter we need to have a clearer signal from the government and army of Pakistan, much more clear than the backing that Musharraf gave us in 2001.
Colonel Nagl's argument for aligning means with ends is I think a warning to those who favor continued involvement. His argument raises hard questions that must be answered clearly and soon, both with respect to the US forces that may be needed in Afghanistan if we intend to prevent a Taliban comeback, and with respect to the intentions of the Pakistani leadership, military and civilian.