Featured Articles
Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Wars -- Dr. Michael Vlahos
The "American Way of War" enshrines triumph through military "transformations." They are divine tokens of our superiority. Even better, "like-us" challenges from others are met by all-out U.S. out-performance. German combined arms innovation between the world wars led to "Patton beats Rommel." Ditto Japanese carrier aviation. Ditto Soviet atomic rock¬ets. Ditto too the Soviets' vaunted "military-technical revolution." How we outdid them! But our paradigm of military "revolution" is steadfastly both technology-driven and self-focused. The American way of war is all about "like-us" or "kin-enemies" also doing like us. We always win out in the end, and win big.
Today's transformation, however, has nothing to do with us, except per¬haps in how the new innovators take on our technologies—and target our vulnerabilities. The innovators here are emerging societies and alternative communities—not "kin-enemies" but aliens, "strang¬er-enemies." They drive this transformation of war.
The "Armed Reconciler": The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration Process -- Dr. Michael W. Mosser
The Process of reconciling a fractured and fragmented society after any conflict—or better yet before a conflict can erupt—is tortu¬ously complicated. It can take almost Herculean resolve to confront a past in which one or more sectors of a society have suffered at the hands of another, and then move that society forward. Sometimes, it may require military force to make that happen. And so, when the U.S. Government finds itself helping rebuild the social structure of a failed state, a "quasi-state," or some ungov¬erned space, it should consider using the military as a "forcing function" to bring aggrieved populations together.
The Law of Occupation and Post--Armed-Conflict Governance: Considerations for Future Conflicts -- Colonel David A. Wallace, U.S. Army
Before the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, occupation law occupied a rarely discussed, long neglected, and seldom trained place on the spectrum of support to military operations. Not since the end of the World War II had the U.S. military undertaken the immense responsibility of governing/administering an occupied territory for a prolonged period. Lack of familiarity with the concept and the responsibilities that go along with it led to great initial problems with the occupation. These problems were exacerbated when the government prohibited U.S. personnel from using the term "occupation" to describe the status quo (instead, occupation was referred to as "the Oword").
The Preemption of Nuclear Weapons -- Mr. Tim Bakkan
No legal doctrine allows any nation to use force against an adversary that is developing nuclear weapons. The question for the international community is whether this prohibition has increased the risk of war. The United Nations Charter allows a nation to use force only if defending against an armed attack, regardless of the attack's destructive potential. Yet, the danger inherent in Iran's or North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons probably exceeds the risks associated with an armed attack by a nation with only conventional weapons, the greatest threat when the UNCharter was adopted in 1945. Under an expansive reading of the charter, a nation might use force to resist an adversary's imminent attack instead of having to wait until being attacked, but neither the charter nor any traditional provision in international law would allow the use of force against any nation planning or supporting a more distant nuclear attack, regardless of the nuclear attack's potential destructiveness and certainty.
Armed Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: A Primer for Military Professionals - Colonel Daniel Rice, U.S. Army Reserve, and Major John Dehn, U.S. Army
Although the law of armed conflict adds an element of humanity to warfare while high-tech weapons with precision munitions add the perception of control, war is still armed conflict that causes both intended and unintended death and destruction. There¬fore, we ought to be cautious about when we think about using military force. This is particularly true when we consider undertaking missions or wars for humanitarian reasons.
This article examines the norms that govern when to initiate humanitarian intervention with military force. It also discusses accompanying consider¬ations. In doing so it reviews applicable international law as an aspect of contemporary international relations. A comprehensive review of interna¬tional relations and legitimate uses of military power could—and does— occupy entire books. This discussion, however, limits itself to reviewing international moral and legal norms and how they affect decision-making about using force to intervene. Readers will note that these norms are the subject of scholarly and political debate. As such, their practical implications are constantly undergoing refinement.
The Chinese Military's Strategic Mind-set - Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired
"Strategy" is Chinese military term with thousands of years of tradition and culture behind it. In antiquity, the Chinese classified strategists according to four concept-categories: power and stratagem, disposition and capability, Yin and Yang, and technique and skill. This strong emphasis on strategic concepts can still be felt. The 1997 Chinese Military Encyclopedia's index, for example, offers a comprehensive overview of strategic concepts. The word "strategic" is followed by other terms (pivot, thought, surprise, etc.) 78 times in the index while concepts associated with the words "strategic" or "strategy" were used 21 times. A2002 addendum to the encyclopedia added another 12 strategy-related items that resonate with idiosyncratic meaning often challenging to Western comprehension. But that does not mean that we cannot know how Chinese strategists think. By looking at several recent texts, especially The Science of Military Strategy (2001), we can arrive at some understanding of the Chinese military's strategic mind-set. It differs markedly from the methodology the U.S. uses to develop its strategic thought.
China's Pragmatic Rise and U.S. Interests in East Asia - Major Jin H. Pak, U.S. Army
Is Chinese foreign policy undergoing a profound change? During most of the past five decades of Communist rule, China's foreign policy reflected a strong tendency toward bilateral relations and a readiness, if not a predilection, to use force to assert its will. Even as recently as the mid-1990s, China used military power to bolster its claims in the South China Sea and to threaten political stability in Taiwan. However, while this sort of assertive use of power still remains in China's quiver of foreign policy options, Chinese diplomacy has become dramatically more prevalent around the globe, especially in East Asia.
Army Planning Doctrine: Identifying the Problem is the Heart of the Problem - Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Clark, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.
In 1968, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure, established problem solving as the bedrock of Army doctrine. In all subsequent versions of FM 101-5, its successor FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, and a wide range of other doctrine manuals, writers consistently framed professional competence in terms of solving problems. Military as well as civilian prob¬lem-solving models share one core concept—the first step is to identify the problem. Yet, neither Army doctrine nor professional military education cur¬ricula offer a problem-structuring methodology. Thus, for over three decades we have based our military doctrine on the indispensable capacity to solve problems, but without a clear method to satisfy the first requirement: how to synthesize critical facts and relationships into a problem statement that can guide planning and decision-making. To fill the gap in Army doctrine, this article offers a teachable problem-identification method.
The Future of the Uniformed Army Scientist and Engineer Program - Major John M. Thane, U.S. Army
Technology and innovation relevant to the field of battle have often been a key factor in gaining victory in combat. An often noted example is the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, around the advent of the rebirth of learning in the West we call the Renaissance. As the apex of King Henry V's campaign against France, the victory secured a temporary advantage for England in the later stages of the 100 Years War. During the fight, Henry V's Soldiers' used the English longbow, a weapon whose heyday began as early as 1250, but whose devastating effectiveness French nobility had yet to fully appreciate. Even though they had lost momentous battles to rustic English armies since Crecy in 1346, the French aristocracy did not grasp how technology had trumped their martial ardor. Henry's yeoman soldiers, wearing lighter armor than the French chivalry, dismounted, dug in, and directed their powerful archery at angles into the enemy's mounted frontal attack. To achieve England's success, Henry took advantage of French tacti¬cal inertia and obtuseness by matching it with technology, innovation, and a perspicuity untrammeled by chivalric arrogance. The relevant lesson for today's American Soldier comes from the calculated way the English used their technology to advantage.
The Strategic Plans and Policy Officer in the Modular Division - Major Francis J.H. Park, U.S. Army
The Army's transformation from a division-based to a mod¬ular-brigade-based force structure has led to a number of significant changes to the division headquarters. Under the modular design, the division headquarters is now a joint-capable organization that is a potential nucleus for a joint task force (JTF) or an Army forces headquarters. The division now executes functions previously done at the corps level, and the division's next higher headquarters may very well be a theater army or a JTF. These changes dramatically increase the division's scope and responsibilities. In light of the changes, this article describes the roles of the functional area (FA) 59 strategic plans and policy officer in the modular division headquarters, presents some lessons learned from the deployment of FA 59 officers to Iraq and Afghanistan, and looks at some future ramifications for FA 59 officers at the division level.
Brigade Headquarters for National Guard Civil Support Teams: A Homeland Security Imperative - Lieutenant Colonel James D. Campbell, U.S. Army National Guard
In May 1998, after a series of presidential decision directives and con¬gressional actions, President Bill Clinton announced the formation of 10 weapons of mass destruction—civil support teams (WMD-CST) within the National Guard. The original 10 teams were located 1 per Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region to coordinate with federal agencies and synchronize training and operational responses to terrorist incidents region-wide. Since their formation, the number, structure, and missions of these units have evolved. There are now 55 CSTs, 1 in each state and territory except California, which has 2. Each unit has the same table of distribution and allowances and basic mission, but disparities have developed over time in functional organization and some equipment. And as the units have matured, each has developed a new mission focus and skill set suited to its local or state geography and threats. For example, the 2d CST, in New York, developed an ability to work in the urban environment of New York City, while the 93d CST, in Hawaii, cultivated strong maritime contingency skills.
It would be natural to think that these units, with their deeply important state and federal roles, would have their training and operational cycles closely coordinated. Further, it is almost a military truism that there should be robust operational oversight of these functions with a strong interface between the CSTs and the critical federal agencies they will assist in the event of a terrorist incident. And it is logical to assume that given the regional nature of most threats the CSTs might face, there would be a regionally based command structure ensuring that the teams are interoperable and mutually supporting, and that response planning occurred that not only maximized the capabilities of the region's CSTs, but ensured that this important capability was linked with response planning at the regional and federal levels.
Contest Winners
1st Place: 2007 DePuy Writing Contest
S.W.E.T. and Blood: Essential Services in the Battle between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents - Major Erik A. Claessen, Belgian Armed Forces
In December 2006, the U.S. Army published a new field manual, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (COIN). This FM identifies "the ability to generate and sustain popular support" as an insurgency's center of gravity. Consequently, the FM emphasizes the importance of providing essential services (ES) to the population as a way to attack this center of gravity. To focus efforts concerning ES, the operational design for COIN includes a logical line of operation (LLO) dedicated entirely to the provision of ES (hereafter called LLO ES).
This article researches the characteristics of activities along LLO ES in the case of a particular type of insurgency that involves the Islamic religious duties of zakat and jihad. It defines what has been called zakat-jihad activism; analyzes it by using recent examples from Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq; and derives the most important implications for COIN operations along LLO ES. Finally, this article lists a number of precautions to take when conducting COIN operations along LLO ES against zakat-jihad activists.
2nd Place MacArthur Writing Contest
Becoming an Adaptive Leader - Major Harold H. Whiffen, U.S. Army
Many Army officers know the story of Lieutenant Colonel Nate Sassaman. Even if they do not recognize his name, they probably remember a New York Times article about him, "The Fall of the Warrior King," which tells how Sassaman, a rising star in the Army officer corps, resigned after Soldiers under his command pushed two Iraqi civilians into the Tigris River for violating a local curfew. One of the Iraqi civilians survived; the other either drowned or escaped and went into hiding. When Sassaman learned of the incident and its impending investigation, he suggested to his subordinates that they tell investigators the entire story of their detention of the Iraqi civilians, except for the part where the Soldiers pushed the Iraqi civilians into the Tigris River. Army investigators eventually uncovered the entire scheme. Several Soldiers were punished, and others, including Sassaman, left the Army.
This is not the only example of leadership failure in Iraq. Others include the widely publicized Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal and reports of unnecessary killing of civilians or the unjustified destruction of private property. These were isolated incidents, but students of military leadership must question what causes military leaders, especially proven ones like Sas¬saman, to foster a command climate that supports illegal acts and endorses unethical behavior that clearly runs counter to Army values.