Behind the headlines about kidnappings, assassinations and shootouts, the escalating conflict in Mexico between drug cartels, gangs and the police is evolving into a kind of criminal insurgency.
Vying for domination of the lucrative drug trade, the cartels are seeking both market control and freedom from government interference. Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and other border towns are racked with violence. Mexico City itself is not immune. Corruption joins the extreme violence and helps fuel Mexico's downward spiral.
Drug murders in Mexico have more than doubled this year to nearly 5,400, with 943 occurring in November alone. On Nov. 30 nine decapitated victims of the drug wars were discovered in Tijuana. Within the past few weeks, Mexican "drug czar" Noe Ramirez Mandujano was accused of taking $450,000 in bribes from Sinaloa's Pacific cartel. Five hundred municipal police in Tijuana were replaced because of fears that they were corrupt. Mexico's liaison to Interpol, Ricardo Gutierrez Vargas, was arrested under suspicion of leaking information from criminal intelligence databases to the cartels. A newspaper office in Culiacan, Sinaloa's capital, was also attacked with grenades...
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Why do we need a “single concept or theory” that applies to widely disparate and generally dissimilar situations? Such theories are as likely to obstruct understanding as to advance it: once we adopt a theory we are reluctant to let it go, and we often insist on applying it where it doesn’t fit. That doesn’t help.
I’m not at all convinced that we are seeing “the same exact indicators” in Mexico and Afghanistan , unless we choose indicators that are so general that they apply in virtually any conflict environment. What are these “indicators” you speak of, and what is their utility?
The only meaningful common thread I see in these conflicts is on our side: in each case we are bogged down and spinning our wheels, and the primary common cause is bad policy on our part. Too many theorists focus on the antagonist, and come up with vague and inutile buzzwords suggesting that they are some sort of mysterious new enemy with vast new-generation powers, before whom we can only quake in disarray. Of course the corollary assumption usually seems to be that we can only save ourselves by running in search of a new theory and worshiping (and paying) those who purvey it.
I don’t think our antagonists are fundamentally all that different from those we’ve fought before, and I don’t think our problem is our antagonists. I think our problem is, consistently, ourselves and our bad policy decisions. Our problem in Mexico is not that the cartels are some kind of hitherto unseen super-empowered narco-insurgent supermen, our problem is that we keep pretending the problems and solutions lie in Mexico when in fact the problems and solutions stem from decades of grotesquely failed American drug policy. Our problem in Afghanistan is not that the Taliban are some kind of 9G jedi-insurgents but that our goals are impractical, ephemeral and inconsistent with the resources we’re prepared to apply, and that we’re pursuing those goals with tools totally unsuited to them.
I don’t buy the mantra that the world is becoming more complex; not at all. We impose our own complications by reactive impulse, by failure to accurately assess the environments we seek to influence, by adopting vague, ephemeral, and unrealistic goals, and by allowing the distorting lenses of pet theories to twist our vision. There's nothing inherently all that complex about the conflict environment's we're in today. The complexity lies in our uncertain and inconsistent goals, our clumsy attempts to balance foreign policy objectives with domestic policy constraints, our tendency to inaccurately assess and anticipate challenges, means, unintended consequences and will. If you bite off more than you can (or are willing to) chew, you can choke on it. If you don't look before you leap you can land in something ugly. None of this is in any way new. It doesn't require new theory, it only requires us to apply what we already know.
The only thing more important than knowing your enemy and their environment is knowing yourself. Before messing in a conflict environment we have to be absolutely clear on what we want to accomplish, and why. We have to realistically assess the challenges, our means, and our will: what resources we have are less important than what resources we're willing to apply, and for how long. We have to strip away the preconceptions and the theories and assess the impact that we have on the conflict environment, and the unintended consequences that intervention is likely to produce.
I think it is in this field, not in our understanding of our antagonists, that we have most often failed, and that failure is the primary source of the difficulties we're in.
Dayuhan---what is interesting about all these theories is that there is not a single concept/theory/thought that "points" us in the right direction in both "seeing and understanding" what it is we are seeing. Not COIN, not FM 3-24, and certainly not all the new theories of adaptive mission command/military decision making.
Take this following comment and then place it over say the exact concept being carried out by say Ansar al Sunnah in Baqubah or the Revolution 1920 Brigades in Buhriz in the timeframe 2004-2006. Guess what they are a perfect match. Just make a word substitution and fits perfectly events in Diyala 2004-2006.
All I am trying to say is that when two completely different environments (criminal/insurgency) are showing exactly the same indicators then one must say---Stop this is something to look at and let's see WHY? Just using history to explain the future has reached it's limits---mainly due to the ability to communicate locally and globally in milliseconds.
Heck I can sing the history of guerrilla warfare as I was taught by the best of the best in SF in the 60s (by those that had actually practiced it in the 40s (France)thru to the early 60s (Algeria/Viet Nam)---yes the techniques and tactics are the same as today, but the WHY is far more complicated than the COIN authors of the 50s through the 80s depicted---military units today are literally flooded with data---they cannot though even begin to "understand that data"---what I call the "seeing".
Example-- a guerrilla TTP in the 40s-60s would take months to migrate to new conflicts---now what---say 2 or 3 days via the internet---example the IAI placed a new cellphone initiator system being used in Iraq onto the web---two weeks later the exact same system was seen on a remote controlled rocket IED in RC-E.
So if two seperate environments are showing the exact same set of indicators then just maybe it is something worth discussing--the problem is that outside of Kilcullen's initial 2004 writings and those ideas of John Robb there has been not a single innovative thinker out there trying to answer the "seeing". Even Kilcullen has moved on to believing that quantum physics will provide the answer with his new company and Nexsus 7---he has even missed the mark and the problem the quantum side has is they never fired a single shot in anger, nor have never been face to face with a real insurgent.
"Children are involved in various forms including drug trafficking, kidnappings, extorsions, smuggling, piracy, corruptions, etc...The youngest ones work as vigilantes and the older ones work with the drug trafficking. Once they are 16 years old, they are usually hired as paid assassins. Girls are usually involved with the drug packaging."
This article of three years ago perfectly matches the current situation but only worse---so as a starting point of your and my conversation should be WHY are we seeing the same exact indicators in say the Iraqi/Afghan insurgency being replicated in two completely different environments (criminal/insurgent) SO there must be a common thread and WHY are we not ageeing on those common threads and if we did agree ARE those common threads replicatable--if there are replicatable then DO we have a common theory of the way we "see" things?
It goes back to "perception"---meaning what does the human think of the environment around him---and again the ecosystem gives the answer.
I have see the ecosystem up close and in person and it even taught an old dog some new tricks---
Make sense?
We don’t know everything, but we do know more than enough to manage these situations. Our problem lies in cutting through the morass of preconceptions, theories and concepts we’ve boxed ourselves into and actually using what we know. That doesn’t need overarching theories or concepts, it requires that we look at each situation as a unique environment and understand it for what it is. Any theory that tries to explain situations as diverse as those in Mexico and Afghanistan is going to be too general to be of any use anyway.
I didn’t say there’s no problem south of the border. I said the problems south of the border are symptoms of a problem that is fundamentally north of the border. We shouldn’t be worried about a Mexican problem spilling over and destabilizing the US, we should worry about an American problem spilling over and destabilizing Mexico, because that’s what’s happening. That should be crystal clear to anyone, and would be if we hadn’t dug ourselves into the decades-old rut of pretending that drug supply drives drug demand, instead of the other way around. Talking about “narco-insurgency” or trying to draw lessons from Iraq or Afghanistan achieves nothing and only advances the misconception that this problem can be addressed south of the border. Stopgap measures south of the border may be required, but are not going to have lasting impact unless we get serious about reforming drug policies to address the demand side of the equation.
No arcane theory or elaborate concept is required. This is organized crime, pure and simple: it’s just on a larger scale than we’re used to seeing it. That scale is a consequence of the overwhelming demand in the US for a product that the government has deemed illegal, and of a totally counterproductive strategy for addressing that problem. The cartels are not some superempowered megathreat; they’re just a natural reaction to our hopelessly inept policies. The problem is us. We can fix it, if we allow ourselves to see it.
In Afghanistan… how much theory does it take to anticipate that an invading army or a military occupation will provoke resistance and anger? How hard is it to anticipate that a foreign-installed puppet government will be opposed, or that those opposing it will gain support from much of the populace? What’s amazing is not that things haven’t worked well, but that anyone seriously thought the US could go to Afghanistan and, at gunpoint, install a "functioning democracy" that suits our objectives <i>without</i> provoking intractable insurgency. Trying to come up with a new theory to explain why that went wrong is like jumping in the water and looking for a theory to explain why you’re wet.
Why go looking for new theories when existing knowledge and extended experience provide perfectly viable explanations… unless of course you’re looking to sell a new theory to the credulous?
We don’t know everything, but we do know more than enough to manage these situations. Our problem lies in cutting through the morass of preconceptions the theories and concepts we’ve boxed ourselves into and actually using what we know. That doesn’t need overarching theories or concepts, it requires that we look at each situation as a unique environment and understand it for what it is. Any theory that tries to explain situations as diverse as those in Mexico and Afghanistan is going to be too general to be of any use anyway.
I didn’t say there’s no problem south of the border. I said the problems south of the border are symptoms of a problem that is fundamentally north of the border. We shouldn’t be worried about a Mexican problem spilling over and destabilizing the US, we should worry about an American problem spilling over and destabilizing Mexico, because that’s what’s happening. That should be crystal clear to anyone, and would be if we hadn’t dug ourselves into the decades-old rut of pretending that drug supply drives drug demand, instead of the other way around. Talking about “narco-insurgency” or trying to draw lessons from Iraq or Afghanistan achieves nothing and only advances the misconception that this problem can be addressed south of the border. Stopgap measures south of the border may be required, but are not going to have lasting impact unless we get serious about reforming drug policies to address the demand side of the equation.
No arcane theory or elaborate concept is required. This is organized crime, pure and simple: it’s just on a larger scale than we’re used to seeing it. That scale is a consequence of the overwhelming demand in the US for a product that the government has deemed illegal, and of a totally counterproductive strategy for addressing that problem. The cartels are not some superempowered megathreat; they’re just a natural reaction to our hopelessly inept policies. The problem is us. We can fix it, if we allow ourselves to see it.
In Afghanistan… how much theory does it take to anticipate that an invading army or a military occupation will provoke resistance and anger? How hard is it to anticipate that a foreign-installed puppet government will be opposed, or that those opposing it will gain support from much of the populace? What’s amazing is not that things haven’t worked well, but that anyone seriously thought the US could go to Afghanistan and, at gunpoint, install a "functioning democracy" that suits our objectives <i>without</i> provoking intractable insurgency. Trying to come up with a new theory to explain why that went wrong is like jumping in the water and looking for a theory to explain why you’re wet.
Why go looking for new theories when existing knowledge and extended experience provide perfectly viable explanations… unless of course you’re looking to sell a new theory to the credulous?
Dayuhan:
"Observing that both crime syndicates and insurgencies learn and adapt is about as relevant a correlation as observing that both criminals and insurgents breathe and excrete."
Dyauhan---then if that is the case that we already "know everything" just where is your solution to the problem?---all I see is talk and comments---show a concret methodology/concept/set of theories for approaching the current situation in Mexico or are you one of the "believers" that there is no threat and all is prefectly well south of the border.
For that matter, explain any methodology/concept/set of theories that explains why if COIN is being partially successful/successful in Afghanistan just why do Afghans place Taliban ringtones on their cellphones to make it safely through Taliban checkpoints---why are there still a majority of the districts in Afghanistan under a shadow Taliban government even after the massive JSOC kill or capture surge this year.
Explain if you can what methodology/concept/set of theories currently gives a reasonable explanation of the current Afghan conflict ecosystem--heck we now have Kilcullen, Nexsus 7 and millions of DARPA dollars with their theories in Afghanistan and we still do not have reasonable explanations-- but we do have COIN and FM 3-24.
Make sense to you?
Talk these days is cheap ie the discussion on COIN--people are still getting killed/wounded on a daily basis and yet the debate goes on---Mexicans are getting killed/wounded on a daily basis and yet the talk goes on.
Show me for all the words-- a theory or concept that explains or provides "some understanding of the data being seen" then you will get my attention.
There is no silver bullet in this business---currently there is nothing even close to getting us into the "game" of "understanding".
What I was simply pointing out was---three years later the same thing could in fact be reported again just with a new date on the report--nothing has changed-just getting worse and yet theories are being thrown all over the place---insurgency yes/no---criminal activity yes/no---Iraq/Afghanistan experiences can help in understanding yes/no.
Make sense to you?
Of course criminal organizations and insurgencies both learn and adapt. Virtually all human organizations do... businesses, non-violent social movements, governments, even religious organizations. They all learn and adapt, albeit in different ways and at different speeds. The US government or the US Army is as much a "complex adaptive system" as any insurgent group. None of this is in any way revelatory, though it's occasionally proclaimed as such by those who enjoy selling old wine in new bottles.
Observing that both crime syndicates and insurgencies learn and adapt is about as relevant a correlation as observing that both criminals and insurgents breathe and excrete.
Again back to this article for those that do not think that DTOs can act and think like an insurgency ---it is all about evolution and how the criminal system interacts with the state/counter insurgent.
Reference the below as an example of how little we are paying attention to southern developments---when this TTP became known I am betting there was at first an Interagency fight as to whether it was an Air Force (lack of a flight plan/airspace violation) issue or a CBP issue (lack of an entry visa). Privately some even said the flights were not a big issue---heck what is 150 or 200 lbs in the grand scheme of things until it was pointed out that what are they carrying back since they were going back empty and the DTOs would quickly pick up on that.
Criminal organizations learn and evolve just as do insurgent systems--and they in some cases even have political objectives. 2M USD plus per flight is not chump change.
"Mexico’s federal Public Security Agency reported that criminal cartels have adopted the use of ultra-light aircraft to smuggle drugs into the United States.
These aircraft have a 100 kilo payload and can land in unpopulated or vacant areas where they are awaited by other persons. They can also fly at heights that preclude both visual and radar detection.
The cost of the aircraft is relatively small in comparison with the price of drugs, so they are sometimes abandoned within the U.S. A kilo of drugs increases in value from 8,000 dollars in Mexico to 30,000 after it crosses the border, thus resulting in a profit of more than 2 million dollars per 100 kilo load.
It doesn't look like an insurgency, it doesn't act like an insurgency, it doesn't meet the definition of an insurgency, and it isn't insurgency. It's organized crime, plain and simple, just organized crime on a larger scale than what we're used to seeing. Multiple criminal activities, extortion, bribery of police and officials, political influence, territorialism, violent competition with other gangs and law enforcement, intimidation... all of these are characteristic of organized crime.
The term "criminal insurgency" is not only wrong, it's extremely dangerous. If we call it insurgency we're likely to fall into the rut of thinking that it's a fight between the cartels and the Mexican government, and that COIN tactics are called for. That just distracts us from the reality that what's really needed are policy changes in the US. Thinking that what's happening in Mexico is a threat to our security is backwards: what's happening in the US is a threat to Mexican security. Anything done in Mexico is only going to be a transitory band-aid, the real changes needed are in the US.
It is interesting that it has been exactly three years since this article was released and the correct term used then "criminal insurgency" has only deepened and expanded.
It is no longer only about drug smuggling--it is now control of human smuggling, taxation of any product being shipped north of the border, random taxation on the streets, total corruption of local police/federal police and now military personnel, diversion of oil and petroleum products to north of the border, terrorizing/intimadation of the local population via IO, driving Mexican residents away from US border regions, exporting cartel expansion into the US heartland with shootouts with DEA in ambushes.
This article was the harbinger of serious a development that we have not wanted to confront---US assistance is in fact there, but limited not deep in order to avoid looking like "we want to takeover additional Mexican territory"--actually not sure we really know how to address the problem.
So whatever the name is---if it looks like an insurgency, fits the definitions of an insurgency, acts like an insurgency---who cares if it is criminal in nature-it is an insurgency. It really is all about the "conflict ecosystem" regardless of the name given to describe it.