Looking Beyond the EFV

Bill R,

Wasn't saying it should be able to swim. Use LCACs or other ship-to-shore solutions like Marines use for their Abrams. We certainly never used Bradley swimming capability when it still existed. It wouldn't have worked in the strong currents of German rivers anyway.

Several sites say the Puma carries 8 dismounts and the German version for A400M transport weighs 31.5 metric tons or 69,300 lbs. Armor skirts and additional turret armor can be added raising weight to 43 metric tons, and enabling three Pumas to move using four A400M with one carrying extra armor. I prefer the solution of two C-17s to move 4 GCVs with armor brought later after closing more combat vehicle numbers.

Why do other countries with a tiny fraction of U.S. airlift (and fewer wordwide obligations) see the potential that we blow off? The same principle of adding armor to an early defend-the-port/airfield lighter version could apply to the GCV, instead of starting at 50 tons and adding weight to 70 tons.

$200 per mile, splitting the difference between a Bradley and Abrams, is helicopter territory. It still can't travel Afghan roads or cross their bridges. It wouldn't make it the 50 miles to Wanat from Jalabad in a half hour even if it could drive as the crow flies...and we have a lot fewer helicopters in a heavy division, and they cost a lot less than $10,000 to travel 50 miles. Have we added HET expense yet?

Uparmored Strykers weigh around 55,000 lbs and carry 9 dismounts? The FCS manned ground vehicle that carried 9 was closer to 30 than 40 tons even while overweight. An uparmored tiled Bradley is around 70,000 lbs and does a poor job of seating dismounts efficiently, and wastes space with a large engine. How much did the LAVs weigh that attacked Baghdad, and the M113s used on Thunder Runs?

The Marines requested 573 EFVs...the equivalent of about 1146 GCVs in terms of dismounts carried. That sounds like more than 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades going ashore, and the 573 EFVs would have required the equivalent of 41 LPD loads of 14 EFVs (when carrying normal 2 LCAC for other equipment).

The Army says it needs only 1874 GCV for many more heavy divisions. If the Marines bought about 600 GCVs and carried 20 per LPD etc. in place of longer EFVs and then used remaining monies for more ship-to-shore connectors for them, that would seemingly suffice when mounting a simultaneous C-17 airland operation in a neighboring country to divide enemy attention.

Just ideas. Does anyone really prefer the idea of sailing an LPD or aircraft carrier into the Black Sea, near Estonia, or inside the Persian Gulf while attacking Iran? Still haven't figured out how one gets into the Caspian Sea, and neither a GCV or EFV will get over those mountains in eastern North Korea.;)

This whole thing is reminiscent of the Army's FCS debacle. The very thought of merging the bones of FCS aka GCV and EFV into plus-size multipurpose infantry fighting vehicle that can conduct amphibious assaults, swim across rivers, defeat IEDs with that perfectly V-shaped hull, successfully integrate an Active Protection System and keep up with the M-1 Tank....oh my goodness, it makes me shudder with fear. Puma is a 40 ton vehicle that transport six soldiers, so I'm not at all sure that it is practical to double the troop load without creating a monstrosity.

"Move Forward" was another person making comments.

He or she makes good points, some of which I whole heartedly share. The biggest problem with the EFV was its pie-in-the-sky pricetag and what would need to be sacrificed to make it work.

That it took us this long to get to this point is lamentable, but it inevitably arrived. The mission, however, remains the same and we need to figure out some way to do that cheaper, with less weight and yet with a level of survivability that makes it possible.

Solving that is the real problem, not turning the Marine Corps into the Peace Corps.

Without going into some detail explaining why naval fires today are different from 1945, Carl, or how doctrinally projecting force from the sea has changed, I'll simply suggest that the USMC and USN currently have scalable task forces designed to do everything from putting a couple of MEBs initially on a beach to securing an embassy for quick extraction.

I'll just suggest, mildly, that the USN won't be relying on Spruance-class ships to pave the way for the BLT and that no one will try to raise the Arizona so that we can exploit the battlewagon's big guns.

I can't believe that I'm having this discussion.

"Move Forward," that was my concern with the EFV (and the Army's platforms, too). Without getting into a long dispute between bean counters and infantrymen, some of us take DuPuy's notions seriously and would like to put as many members of self-contained units together in the same robust vehicle as possible, rather than have everyone trying to reconnect on shore or, as is the intended use of the vehicles, far inland as the beachhead breaks out.

This gets us back, however, to what we really want these vehicles to do. There are trade offs, which we're seeing in the procurement process for the new LAV, too.

Of course, if we follow the CNAS model, apparently we won't need them because there will only be a "small" capacity for projecting power from the sea and the Marines (name no longer applies) will be the Phase O curtsying "warriors" of the chai circuit.

I'm still a bit bemused that we've made the assumption that we don't have the ability to find solutions to area denial weapons and doctrine. Obviously, this is the very stuff of warmaking. There always are swings back and forth between offense and defense, and the efficiently creative service typically is the one that figures it out.

It's better to figure out some of this now rather than on the beach.

The big EFV disconnects were the need to be within 25nm of the shore when the Navy is newly concerned about Anti-Ship Ballistic and Cruise Missiles with far greater range. What, they won't target an LPD or LHA?

Also, it was dangerous to have a small rear door for 17 Marines to egress through under fire requiring 20 seconds. The transformer design violated the KISS principle leading to excess weight, cost, and power to support the 1% of time spent going up the middle in dangerous waters...when an end run to an unopposed beach would do. Zero chance of island hopping again, after all.

So what now?

Many options:
* Join or lead the Army on GCV showing that if you can build a 20-man EFV weighing 80K lbs, a 12-man GCV weighing the same is more than feasible once you lose the huge engine and transformer gear. 80K lbs is key to getting 2 aboard a C-17. Airlanding C-17s onto east Taiwan or Romania is far more viable than trying to assault a beach on Taiwan or Ukraine after their capture.
* Consider more LCAC-like ship-to-shore connectors or powered "sleds" that can carry two 80,000 lb vehicles...and return to the ship to pick up more. That's much smarter than spending all that money on water-propulsion for a one-way trip
* Uparmor the AAV and build an unpowered "sled" that can hold two AAV. Tow that sled like a water ski behind a LCS from the safety of 100 nm to 5 nm. Then the AAVs drive into the water and go the rest of the way under their own power. The catch? Make the AAV unmanned and have LCS drop them at multiple unguarded distributed locations and link up with them once on shore via MV-22 on LPD/LHA and MH-60s on the LCS.

Linking up by air allows you to add 5,000 more pounds of AAV armor by losing the 20 Marines and their gear that otherwise would be endangered going slow on the water.

That's my 2 cents to wet warriors who want to stay dry until they can excel on shore.

Citing Burton's perspective isn't exactly the game changer. His effort in Proceedings didn't exactly mark him as the next Mahan, did it?

Somehow, the Marines managed to hop across the Pacific and even Inchon without requiring 82nd Airborne to kick around some hedgerows.

Currently, the USN is the largest on the globe. There obviously are enough ships on hand to become the "armada" one might need to project power inland from the sea.

You seem to imagine that somehow the world's largest military won't be able to muster the jets to defeat an enemy's air force or the ships to bring the Marines to the fight and provide the naval fires necessary to put them on the beach.

We won't be able to do so if we decide not to do so, which seems to be Burton's larger point and creepy wish for "some" capability.

You need to have the capability necessary to do that job. Part of that job is understanding what will need to be overcome by technology, training and doctrine. Some of that means procuring landing craft, but much of it merely involves being willing to commit to a mission we've determined is vital to our nation's needs.

We as a nation have decided that it's important to project power from the sea and seize beaches. If that's a core mission of the Corps and the Navy, then the Corps and the Navy must find a means to do so, not argue that they would rather turn the Corps into a shooting PRT with a "small" capacity to project power from the sea.

This unique amphib mission of the Corps is written into law. Congress has not sought to change it. SecDef should follow it, or Congress should find out why he doesn't.

"Mr. Burton didn't advocate eliminating the ability to make an opposed landing, he said we should not have too much of it because a big opposed landing in the face of modern weapons would be so difficult. We should have some but not too much. That seems sensible to me."

But that, itself, makes no sense.

A. If it's impossible to do, then it shouldn't be tried and we should make no effort to procure the weapons or create the training necessary to make it so. Spending billions of dollars to do the impossible might be a Beltway tradition, but it's not a good one and it's one that might be ended.

B. If it's prohibitively expensive in terms of blood and treasure to do, then one must ask whether it need be done at all. If it doesn't, then revert to "A." If it still is vital to our policy goals to land at key points of the global ocean commons and control them, then we must find means not only of doing so but arrive at solutions that would mitigate the risk of NOT being able to complete the mission. That might include some ship-to-shore technology like the EFV or Osprey, but it might be something quite different.

C. Regardless, if one is going to land, one is going to need more than "some" capacity to do so. In reality, one will need a great capacity to do so because it's a complex operation. We're not talking about rowing canoes to shore or zipping about in Zodiacs, but rather of putting many thousands of trained Marine combatants ashore and supporting them with naval fires. This isn't something that you can halve. As they say in the Corps, "If you go, go big." At least, it makes for good liberty briefs.

D. Of course large Marine forces exist. Just because the FMF is scalable down to a MEU doesn't mean that whole divisions won't be thrown into a landing on a hostile shore, because they might be. History is funny in this regard. In 1916, a less inspired mind might have argued that after Gallipoli the notion of amphibious landings seemed antiquated. The capability of going big nevertheless came in handy during the following wars. Following the British debacle in Turkey, the USMC ensured that their innovations in seaborne force projection from would help the US defeat enemies. Quaint notion, that.

E. A dunderhead like me might point out that the USMC uniquely can target nearly all of the global commons with their highly complex form of warfighting and institutional culture. Why we should rebalance this already strategically balanced capacity to turn the Corps into a butch sort of Peace Corps is beyond me, but I don't have the subtle intelligence of CNAS fellows. All I can do is point at a handful of points on the map whereat naval engagements seem often to be fought throughout history, point then to where our allies and enemies tend to live, and glance toward where our naval forces often operate to police the global lines of communication. Several of those vital nodes might need to be occupied in order for us to achieve geo-strategic goals and win wars, and having "some" capability to do that ain't gonna feed the bulldog. We need a great deal of capacity to do some of those missions.

F. I'm a bit perplexed that in this polemic about rebalancing USMC capacity we don't note what potential Great and Lesser Power rivals might be doing in this regard. China, for example, seems somewhat interested in creating a more robust amphib capability, and not merely for Taiwan but perhaps because PLAN realizes that some of those global chokepoints would tend to choke some oplan by PLAN. I'm not persuaded that PRC quakes with fear at night thinking that we have sent advisory companies to Vietnam to teach the Vietnamese army generals what they already know quite well. Vietnam is interested in securing a strategic relationship with the US because of our Navy and Marine Corps traditionally do, not because 0311s might prove useful at pacifying a bunch of ass-scratching goat herders who are handy with long rifles.

G. For all the blather about pop-centric warfare, no one seems to realize that much of these global populations live near the sea or along waterways upon which the populations navigate. I guess we can't get bogged down umpiring endemic civil wars with the USMC if we can't kick in the door first. Having "some" capacity to do this isn't the same as guaranteeing that you can do it, within reason of course.

H. There's a moral argument to this debate that's disturbingly missing. Going "small" when one could go big to secure a beachhead will lead to many, many dead and the likelihood that the mission won't be achieved, which could mean more being thrown into the fight, leading to their untimely deaths, too. While many good Marines and sailors might perish nevertheless seizing a hostile shore, at least they seized it and fewer died than might have because we had the adequate equipment, doctrine and training to ensure that they got ashore. This is the difference between taking Omaha Beach and "taking" Dieppe.

I. One might argue that as we morph from the "American Century" to the "Asian Century," we might recall how US forces have been used in winning wars in Asia. I don't know many that were settled by a "rebalanced" Marine Corps of chai-sipping trainers and I can't imagine many in the future that will be, too. With our Marine Corps we currently have a unique technological and doctrinal edge over our potential rivals for Asian power. Why we should wish to diminish that more than we already have is beyond me, but I'm not a Beltway defense intellectual, having actually spent some time doing the defending and not musing about how it might be done.

Agree that we don't need a huge amount of opposed landing capability, but I believe our current capability is only two brigades at any one time. That's... paltry to say the least. If the AAV is not replaced, that capability goes down to zero.

I mentioned this in another thread, but speculation on the demise of the EFV rests on the motivation for its cancellation.

Cancellation based on the program's mismanagement and expense, with the intent of seeking a different solution sometime in the future, makes a lot of sense. If this is the case, this is mostly the Corps' fault.

But the other possibilities: that we'll never assault beaches again or that anti-access technology makes it irrelavent are foolish. If we're going to have a global, forward deployed Navy, they're need to be able to project power ashore. That's patently obvious. If enemies produce viable anti-access technologies, then we shouldn't just cede the field to them. We develop technologies and methods to supercede them. The EFV (or a similiar program) is part of that evolution.

Relegating amphibious assault to the historical scrap heap because our enemies are prepared to make it difficult would be like accepting British rule because a revolution would be too hard. That's not what we do. This eventuality would be partly the Corps' fault for not clearly articulating our purpose and unique capabilities, but mostly the DoD's fault for lacking strategic and operational vision.

SWJ, please accept my humble apology for the double posting (Im doing this from the hospital).

Probable cancellation of further development and acquisition of the EFV may be a blessing in disguise, as argued by the author.

What looked back in the 1980s to the sitting CMC as a viable technologically advanced platform to replace the aging AAV-7A, may no longer be the case in 2011, even if it had come on line earlier as planned (anyone rember "that thing" the Ontos?).

Perhaps the Corps has not done a good job articulating the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), and the image that still lingers in many minds, possible including the authors, of a slow combat build-up on the beach with its logistic trail, and ships lingering off shore?

As we know, warfare evolves, and so was always Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) intended to also, by finding solutions in technology and new methods in doctrine, organization, tactics, and training.

Possibly the Corps has been distracted these past ten years, and depended on the Navy too heavily for finding solutions to its own Littoral Warfare concepts that OMFTS is intended to work in conjunction with, which would have allowed the EFV a second wind (just as the V-22 Osprey seems to have gotten). That obviously hasn't been the case.

If the sea offers those that control it, not only strategic and operational mobility, but also tactical advantage, than our Navy needs to step forward alongside its sister service and help find those solutions.

If the Marines cannot prosecute OMFTS due to the newer and evolving threat, and lack of technology to defeat it, than I also have to question the Navys abilities also.

But, I have faith in the Corps' historic ability to arrive at innovative solutions to problems.

This is unserious.

The essay wasn't well argued, failed to discuss the doctrinal debates within the USMC during the 1930s on these very subjects and takes no account whatsoever of how this democracy wants Marines to be used.

It reveals only the institutional kink CNAS seems to have developed for counter-insurgency. Perhaps the buried lede isn't what the younger hands at CNAS believe the USMC should be but rather what CNAS, itself, should morph into once we move past these wars amongst people who don't want us to war amongst them.

I can't believe it's going to be more of this. If it is, then perhaps we can scrap some prototype EFVs and offload them along Pennsylvania Avenue so that CNAS wonks might putter about NW DC.

I think Burton might appear almost swashbuckling leading a Lilliputian armada of CNASties to storm Brookings or AEI, a service perhaps more vital to defense debates than penning essays about the need to fight wars mature democracies likely have learned now to avoid.

What was said in Burton's essay about EFV has long become conventional wisdom and more chatter contrary to the prevailing opinion isn't going to make the purchases in this era of austerity any more likely. So on that he's merely piling on.

But someone also should mention that there is no way Congress is going to turn the USMC into a gaggle of CAPs or a harder, tougher version of Nagl's Phase O Advisor Corps. This has nothing to do with internal bureaucratic bigotry within the Corps or wooly simpletons who "don't get" the "graduate school of warfare" but rather what we, as Americans, want our Marines to be.

This isn't based on some sentimental notions of WWII, but rather on a commonsensical understanding that wars often are won by taking seaside property, even at great cost. The monument to the Corps at Arlington, for example, doesn't show a Lance Corpral sipping chai with a brace of sheikhs in their mandresses or training Uzbeki dirt farmers to point their rifles toward the enemy.

I find it odd that we're left with an essay that suggests -- apparently with some seriousness -- that a Marine Corps that's been fighting two small wars since 2001 needs to rebalance itself to better fight small wars or prevent them.

The very capability Burton believes is the USMC's old-fogeyish strategic raison d'etre is that which has suffered most over the past decade. Indeed, the USMC has grown heavier during these conflicts, making their former mission of fighting from the sea that much tougher, just as the cheaper amphib equipment that could be expended on some foreign shore has been ground up in Iraq.

Something is going to need to replace it.

There's also no mention of strategic risk. If the US fails at a relatively unimportant stability or security operation, we face no shift of the global balance of power, no existential threat to our security or international commerce.

But an inability to project power ashore -- especially if that capability became vital to securing a key point of the ocean commons during major naval operations -- could very much harm the ability of the US to achieve crucial policy goals in important regions worldwide.

The USN might value a partner who is a muscular Peace Corps -- rereading their Sorley and pontificating over tea about how they might convince a village to return to milking goats and not sniping at the fat PRT honcho -- but the admirals don't need that sort of buddy.

They and this democracy require someone who can take a beach and hold it because that kind of power projection in this world actually matters.

In the 1930s, a much smaller but no less intellectual Marine Corps came to the same conclusion. They wrote the Small Wars Manual but also prepared a Corps that would win WWII, with a little help from the other services.

The same bright officers who became adept at understanding irregular conflict would lead Marines ashore in the Pacific.

American sea power today rests partially on that smart balancing, with a heavy finger on the scale to ensure we can project force ashore. And whether anyone buys a single EFV or not, that ain't going to change.

Cancellation of further development and acquisition of the EFV may in fact be a blessing in disguise as put forth by the author.

What looked back in the 1980s to the sitting CMC as a viable technologically advanced platform to replace the aging AAV-7A, may no longer be the case in 2011, even if it had come on line earlier as planned.

Perhaps the Corps has not done a good job articulating the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), and the image that still lingers in many minds, possible including the authors, of a slow combat build-up on the beach with its logistic trail, and ships lingering off shore?

As we know, warfare evolves, so was always Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) intended to also, by finding solutions in technology and new methods in doctrine, organization, tactics, and training.

Possibly the Corps has been distracted these past ten years, and depended on the Navy too
heavily for finding solutions to its own Littoral Warfare concepts that OMFTS is intended to work in conjunction with, which would have allowed the EFV a second wind (just as the V-22 Osprey seems to have gotten). That obviously hasn't been the case.

If the sea offers those that control it, not only strategic and operational mobility, but also tactical advantage, than our Navy needs to step forward alongside its sister service and help find those solutions. Because if the Marines cannot prosecute OMFTS due to the newer and evolving threat, and lack of technology to defeat it, than I also have to question the Navys abilities also.

But I have faith in the Corps' historic ability to arrive at innovative solutions, and again, the probable cancellation of the EFV, may just prove to provide the jump start for that forward thinking.