To be released this month - Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War by Dr. Janine Davidson.
Counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are only the most recent examples of the U.S. Armed Forces fighting insurgents, building infrastructure, enforcing laws, and governing cities. For more than two centuries, these assignments have been a regular part of the military's tasks; yet until recently the lessons learned from the experiences have seldom been formally incorporated into doctrine and training. As a result, each generation of soldiers has had to learn on the job.
Janine Davidson traces the history of the U.S. military's involvement in these complex and frustrating missions. By comparing the historical record to the current era, Davidson assesses the relative influence of organizational culture and processes, institutional structures, military leadership, and political factors on the U.S. military's capacity to learn and to adapt. Pointing to the case of Iraq, she shows that commanders serving today have benefited at the tactical level from institutional changes following the Vietnam War and from the lessons of the 1990s. Davidson concludes by addressing the question of whether or not such military learning, in the absence of enhanced capabilities and capacity in other U.S. government agencies, will be sufficient to meet the complex challenges of the 21st century.
"Lifting the Fog of Peace is a captivating study of an agile and adaptive military evolving through the chaos of the post-9/11 world. In what is certain to be regarded as the definitive analysis of the reshaping of American combat power in the face of a complex and uncertain future, Dr. Janine Davidson firmly establishes herself as a rising intellectual star in government and politics. A thoroughly captivating study of organizational learning and adaptation—a 'must read' for leaders in every field."
---LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General, NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan
"In Lifting the Fog of Peace, Dr. Janine Davidson explains how the American military has adapted itself to succeed in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that are the most likely future face of combat. The book is informed by her experience of these wars in the Department of Defense, where she now plays a critical role in continuing the process of learning that has so visibly marked the military's performance in today's wars. Highly recommended."
---Dr. John A. Nagl, President, Center for a New American Security
"Janine Davidson's Lifting the Fog of Peace is a superb, concise, and well-written book that makes important contributions in three areas. It advances our knowledge of organizational learning in the Armed Forces. It also accurately captures the rich post-Vietnam operational and doctrinal history of the Army and the Marine Corps. The simplistic cartoon of dim-witted generals fixated on the Fulda Gap is replaced here by a more accurate version, where engaged senior officers studied the security environment, absorbed important lessons, and began to improve the learning capacity of the military services. Finally, Lifting the Fog of Peace assesses the state of contemporary stability operations and what must be done to further prepare our Armed Forces for modern war on the low end of the spectrum of conflict. It will be a 'must read' on the E-Ring of the Pentagon and in security studies programs across the nation."
---Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Professor, National War College, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
Dr. Janine Davidson, a former Air Force pilot, is a professor of national security at George Mason University, currently serving in the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans.
The views presented in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or its Components.
Comments
Xenophon - I was the original anon post to Col. Gentile, that nuanced the Marine's service in Nicaragua. However, I might also add: early Haiti not only saw Marines keeping the peace by fighting cacaos and bandits, but further involved the Marines with public works projects, building roads, jails, and the like.
Many moons ago, I had a rare opportunity to speak at length with an elderly retired Colonel by the name of Bill Lee, an early Chesty Puller protégé after my first tour in Viet-Nam, who introduced me to the Corps Small Wars Manual, and emphasized when not on patrol, there were no idle Marine hands to become the devils workshop.
Additionally, in reviewing my original response to Col. Gentile, one can infer that the Marines success in establishing and training the Guardia Nacional in Nicaragua, ended-up having adverse consequences by becoming the Samoza family's personal, and repressive power base, resulting in issues for the U.S. continually into the 21st century (a similar pattern in Haiti).
Toujours Fidele
Gian:
One of the ways the Marines built the Guardia was to have Americans fighting in and leading Guardia units. That practice may not have exactly mirrored the Vietnam CAPs but idea was exactly the same.
Just my opinion but I think that during the 80s the big dumb Army did forget all the lessons learned about small wars. One of the things that convinced me of this was when in 2003 or thereabouts I read a newspaper article about a unit using H&I fire in what I remember as being Baghdad or the vicinity.
I also don't think the US military was rescued by any secret corps of COINdenistas waiting in the wings to emerge and saved the day. Just my civilian opinion again, but I don't think there was any COINdenista corps. The lower ranking officers on the spot had to figure it out for themselves and it took a while.
"new age Coin"! You are falling into the rhetorical trap I fall into often, using a great phrase because it is a great phrase. The Small Wars Manual isn't quite new age.
<i>The Marines in CA in the 20 and 30s were not doing population centric coin. They were doing things like hunting down and trying to kill folks like Sandino. They produced a good amount of tactical innovation, especially with regard to close air support, but any notion that they were anticipating CAPS and hearts and minds is folly.</i>
This is pretty spot on, sir. For those looking for a non-population centric method of foreign internal defense, it's right there. A lot more providing security through combat actions, and a lot less trying to buy the populace public works.
However, there were more than just tactical innovations. The Marines built from scratch several militaries to maintain security once they left.
Projections of America's future abroad have been wrong before, and it would be unwise to make assumptions. Certainly we have to improve our capacity to operate in "environments other than conventional high tech peer-to-peer combat", but that shouldn't mean surrendering the capacity for the conventional. I'd suggest that we also need to learn a bit more about why, when, and where we get involved in "environments other than conventional high tech peer-to-peer combat", and perhaps to use a bit more restraint in choosing our involvements.
I'd also have to question the focus on defeating insurgency. Insurgency is often a natural part of an evolutionary process: think of it as internal regime change. Unless there is an overpowering reason to take sides, we have to consider the possibility that these domestic conflicts are not our business.
Some quotes -- that may be of interest -- and may have some relevance -- to the issue(s) addressed by Dr. Davidson's in her new book:
Dr. Davidson noted in her introduction to the U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual (University of Michigan Press Edition - 2009):
"It is not the military's job to determine when, where, or why it is asked to fight wars, enforce the peace, or save lives around the world. Such decisions are the perogative, rightfully and jealously guarded, of elected civilian officials. Rather, it is the job of military leaders to determine how best to accomplish the tasks that it is most likely to be called on to conduct... To the extent that, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has argued, our future conflicts are likely to look like our current ones, it is high time we stopped muddling through and got serious about learning how to operate in environments other than conventional high tech peer-to-peer combat."
General Caldwell, in his foreword to this same manual, noted that:
"America's future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire. Instead, we will work through and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide humanitarian aid to the suffering. Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we generate "soft" power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world... It postures the military to perform a role common throughout history -- ensuring the safety and security of the local populace, assisting with reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public services."
COL Gentile:
Your predictions made (and are still making) me laugh. Time rather than budgetary predictions preclude me from preordering (or, more accurately, reading) the book, but I will be most curious to see (or hear, or read) how closely its narratives conform to the one you presented. Thanks for your reply, both in re the book itself and in re the "banana wars" (thanks as well to Anonymous).
ADTS
Let me modify, rather than correct, Col. Gentile's opening paragraph concerning the Marines in Central America - primarily Nicaragua.
The Marines actually did more than just hunt down guerillas - please read on, there is an ironic twist!
Marines supervised the 1932 presidential election and the inauguration a year later of Liberal Pres. Juan Sacasa. Sacasa had been the popularly elected v.p. in the 1926 elections, whose opposition to the Conservatives takeover of the government had sparked the civil war that instigated the second U.S. intervention to include reintroducing the Marines.
The speculation has always been that the entire civil war and Sandino's insurrection could have been avoided if the U.S. had supported Sacasa's efforts to prevent the Conservative takeover in 1926.
The ironic tiwst was that the Marines also did an excellent job of building the National Guard to replace them when they left, while at the same time our ambassador pushed for, and got Sacasa to designate Anastasio Somoza (who was Sacasa's nephew) to be designated as the National Guard commander.
Somoza then subverted and developed the Guard as his power base, consolidating his control over Nicaragua to begin the forty-odd year family dynasty - creating ill will that is still felt toward the U.S. by many Nicaraguans today.
ADTS:
Let me take a stab at your posts and do some building on them too.
The Marines in CA in the 20 and 30s were not doing population centric coin. They were doing things like hunting down and trying to kill folks like Sandino. They produced a good amount of tactical innovation, especially with regard to close air support, but any notion that they were anticipating CAPS and hearts and minds is folly.
I have not read Dr Davidson's book, although I will preorder it in the next few days so that I can, but may I be so bold and state that I believe I already know what the argument will be. It will turn on the following propositions:
1. The Army has a long tradition of doing small wars of Coin, but alas after each one forgets the lessons and has gone back to its knuckledragging ways.
2. In Vietnam the Army pursued its conventionally minded focus but was saved (or almost saved if you dont by Sorley but accept Nagl and Krepinevich) by a better General who carried out a population centric campaign.
3. But alas, again, in the 80s the big dumb army forgot these crucial lessons of coin and Vietnam. Fortunately, however, there were a few enlightened ones in the 80s who "got it" and started the ball rolling so to speak that would come together after 9/11.
4. The Army continued in its conventional ways well into the 90s with the misguided notion of network centric warfare. But the corps of young turks remained, waiting to emerge after 9/11.
5. And so they did, especially after the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. But of course for the first three years of the war the Army didnt get it, was making the same mistakes as in Vietnam and was pursuing a conventional war strategy in the face of new age Coin. But then, just like in Vietnam, the Army was rescued by a better General and his band of young turks who produced a new Coin doctrine for the ages which ended up transforming the American Army in Iraq during the Surge.
6. The rest of the story is naturally history. Now that the Army finally gets it, the rest of the DOD team needs to get on board too.
This I speculate is the essence of Dr Davidsons argument. I may be wrong, but based on the description of the book on this post, along with the Coin Experts who provided jacket cover endorsements, I am fairly confident that I have her argument about right.
I will read the book soon to see if I am.
gian
COL (and Dr) Gentile):
If one accepts the Sorley "Better War" thesis (which of course by now I know you don't), could one can accept the stylized facts herein presented? The US military achieved success in population-centric COIN, then withdrew from Vietnam to Europe, where it transitioned to preparing for high-intensity conflict, the efforts of which were validated by the 100-hour ground war of Desert Storm. There are a number of caveats and disclaimers that need to be stated, acknowledged and dealt with - that even post-1968, American units in Vietnam were fighting the NVA rather than what remained of the VC; the VC didn't require much of an effort with respect to population-centric COIN; the Army of the 1970s was a hollow Army (and it's this caveat that I imagine you'll latch onto most) - but I think it's at least a tentative response to your query.
Respectfully
ADTS
I wonder if Dr Davidson might answer the question of whether it is possible for an army to learn and adapt its way OUT of doing population centric counterinsurgency, or is that not allowed by the rules?
Or is it simply not worth posing such a question if Dr Nagl is correct in saying that the face of future war is more Iraqs and Aghanistans.