Weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, a small team of Green Berets was quietly sent to the Philippine island of Basilan. There, one of the world's most virulent Islamic extremist groups, Abu Sayyaf, had established a dangerous haven and was seeking to extend its reach into the Philippine capital.
But rather than unleashing Hollywood-style raids, as might befit their reputation, the Green Berets proposed a time-consuming plan to help the Philippine military take on the extremist group itself. Seven years later, Abu Sayyaf has been pushed out of Basilan and terrorist attacks have dropped dramatically.
"It's not flashy, it's not glamorous, but man, this is how we're going to win the long war," said Lt. Gen. David P. Fridovich, the Army officer who designed the Philippine program.
Fridovich is part of a quiet but significant transformation taking place within the most secret of the US military's armed forces, the Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, which encompasses the Green Berets, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, Delta Force and similar units from the Air Force and the Marines...
Much more at The Los Angeles Times.
Comments
Sorry to have ruined your day, steven. I'll lighten things up a bit.
"If you want to save a species, simply decide to eat it. Then it will be managed - like chickens, like turkeys, like deer, like Canadian geese." - Ted Nugent
"Each morning I bow down on bended knee in reverence to the Almighty and pray for good bombing weather." - Ted Nugent (think Ted and Charlie Dunlap would get along?)
I think arguments could be made to support both of your positions, but it doesn't matter. We're not where we're at today based on our operational level shortcomings in 2001/ 2002. Despite those shortcomings, AQ was decisively defeated and routed from Afghanistan. Any initial shortfalls can be justified by the fact that SOF rapidly responded to the 9/11 attacks and dealt a telling blow against AQ while most in the Army were still waking up to the fact that we were at war.
Ken is right, it is a complex situation, but I think a few things that contributed to us getting to where we're at today. Foremost was our lack of understanding of COIN/UW/IW doctrine, and second was our failure to rapidly and effectively develop, train and advise HN security forces that would defend the population and to some extent address economic shortfalls. Our focus on find, fix, finish HVIs will always fail when that is the primary effort against a large social movement. Any old timer who studied UW/COIN would have been able to tell you that the Taliban would attempt a come back after a short cooling off period, so we needed to secure the key human terrain throughout Afghanistan to counter their return. We didn't do that, and we can't rewrite history now.
The point is if you bring more forces and employ them incorrectly, then it won't make a damn bit of difference.
It was our failure to follow basic doctrine such as addressing the basic security and economic needs of the populace that allowed the Taliban to make a telling come back. If conventional forces weren't doing that to begin with, then why do we need more now? What has changed?
This is one fight that needs to be handed back to Special Forces with conventional forces in a supporting role.
You called my "solution" (which is not what I called it) "armchair," rather than addressing any merits of my own or any other solution. You didn't address any aspect of my own narrative (which I also pointed out is consistent with what McNeill and McKiernan have requested - more troops). Not a single one. That's a formal logical fallacy. You have gotten your own feelings in the way of the argument, and for some reason (known only to you) have targeted the author rather than the prose. It's best not to take personal ownership of an argument, pro or con. They stand on their own merit. Last entry on this subject for me. I now have had to say the same thing about three times. You haven't listened a single one of them. Wow. This seems to be a pattern.
Don't think I attacked a person -- I did 'attack' the concept of offering simplistic solutions by anyone (myself included; thus none from me) for complex problems by anyone sans responsibility for the effort addressed as being not particularly helpful.
However, anyone is obviously entitled to do that to make themselves heard regardless of my opinion; they are after all just stating their opinion -- as I am stating mine.
As you said "<i>Finally, contra your idea of something being "pointless," every syllogism or immediate inference has a "point." You may not like it, but it has a point. If you disagree, you can make your own. That's the "point ... (ahem)" of a forum. Get the point?</i>" Why, yes, I did and do get the point; made one of my own about that, in fact.
I'll repeat that Afghanistan is not an insurgency. :D
You're best to stick with the facts and logically / historically / doctrinally critique rather than attack what you perceive to be the authority (or lack thereof) of the individual proferring a solution (or not). Attacking the source is a formal logical fallacy (genetic fallacy), one that loses points in formal debates, and you should stive for better than that. Also, I didn't offer an "armchair solution." We've already covered this gound. I offered an alternative narrative, one that is consistent with two commanders in sequence (McNeill and McKiernan) publicly begging for more troops. If you think you know better than they, then offer up a solution rather than wasing time attacking a short narrative I may offer to counter the notion of over-reliance on SOF v. infantry (or alleging that a short paragraph of mine is intended to be so comprehensive as to be taken to be a "solution"). I'm sure McKiernan would love to hear from you. Finally, contra your idea of something being "pointless," every syllogism or immediate inference has a "point." You may not like it, but it has a point. If you disagree, you can make your own. That's the "point ... (ahem)" of a forum. Get the point?
Again, attacking the person loses points. Offering up argument wins points. At any rate, that's the way it's supposed to work.
This summary might very well have read thusly:
Weeks after the Set. 11 attacks, a small contingent of special forces operators were sent to the seedbed of the terror, Afghanistan. They employed satellite uplinks, JDAMs, gizmos, gadgets, thingamajigs, money, CIA operatives and shady deals with tribes who would undercut our efforts. It was flashy, brilliant, and the brain child of leaders who wanted to win without deploying many troops. We called it by many pedantic names such as force transformation, "rationalizing the force structure," etc., to make it sound oh so very smart.
Months later we have learned that we let UBL escape, and years later we learn that the Taliban are stronger than ever, the government in Kabul is weak to the point of irrelevance, the campaign is in horrible shape, we don't have enough troops, NATO ROE prevents many of the troops from firing a shot in offensive operations, and Pakistan is the unfortunate beneficiary of the Taliban displaced by our failure to interdict the border when they were driven from Afghanistan.
Thus do we learn that special forces operators can be sent on missions to capture or kill HVTs and treat the war as a counter-terrorism operation, but deployment of infantry must be done to defeat full blown insurgencies. Hard lesson indeed, with more than six years wasted on the former strategy rather than the later.