For much of the 20th century before the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was a peaceful country living in harmony with its neighbors. There was a king and a real government, which I witnessed in the 1970s when I frequently traveled there. Afghanistan had what I'll call a minimalist state, compared with the vast governmental apparatuses that colonialists left behind in British India and Soviet Central Asia.
This bare-bones structure worked well for a poor country with a small population, few natural resources and a mix of ethnic groups and tribes that were poorly connected with one another because of the rugged terrain. The center was strong enough to maintain law and order, but it was never strong enough to undermine the autonomy of the tribes. Afghanistan was not aiming to be a modern country or a regional superpower. The economy was subsistence-level, but nobody starved. Everyone had a job, though farm labor was intermittent. There was a tiny urban middle class, but the gap between rich and poor was not that big. There was no such thing as Islamic extremism or a narco-state...
More at The Washington Post.
Comments
What I like about the article is, first, it states that Afghanistan has had a viable national government in the past, contrary to assertions so often heard. It didn't look like ours but it worked for them and worked for the rest of the world in that they didn't bother anybody.
Second, it shows what that government looked like so it gives us an aiming point, as suggested by Dave above. If we pull this out, I wonder if we will bumble our way to this aiming point even if it doesn't look impressive in a power point presentation. I believe most of our successful small wars in the 20th century didn't immediately result in the creation of little Switzerlands so maybe there are precedents.
This Pakistani journalist just outlined a Foreign Internal Defense operation that is founded on the basic fundamentals of COIN and most importantly, knowing and understanding the culture, traditions, conditions, and politics of the area:
Deny the terrorists/insurgents sanctuary.
Deny the terrorists/insurgents mobility.
Deny the terrorists/insurgents access to resources.
Separate the population from the terrorists/insurgents.
Most importantly it rests on the fundamental fact that only the Afghans can be successful, that the Afghan government has to be legitimate (if minimalist!!), and that outside aid can only be in support of the Afghans. The above requires the right amount of capturing and killing of bad guys (through good intelligence work, and precise military and police operations) while at the same time providing the necessary capabilities to support the population in order for the population to support the government . It is not a one or the other proposition - either kill bad guys or protect the population and provide goods and services - there has to be the right combination of killing, arrests and support to the population through legitimate and function institutions (a truly holistic "Yin-Yang" approach). For those who like the science of war and want a mathematical equation to solve the problem it looks like this:
There are only 3 main elements to the equation:
The terrorist/insurgents (bad guys)
The population (the battlefield of human terrain) (neutral guys or fence sitters)
The counterinsurgent/counterterrorist (e.g., the full spectrum of the governments security forces; military, militia, home guard, intelligence services, and police) (good guys)
A sub element of the counterinsurgent/counterterrorist is external support to the legitimate government. That is where we come in, we are a supporting piece of this equation not the main effort. Unless we approach our operations from that strategic view point we will make life difficult for ourselves, the people of Afghanistan and the government of Afghanistan. My apologies that I could not provide a mathematical answer with the above equation e.g., if we just have 1 security element for X number of the population we can solve the problem. Searching for that kind of mathematical solution is counter-productive but remains the American Way of COIN/War as we believe that Mass will solve everything (as Napoleon said: "God is on the side of the biggest battalions") and that we know best and that by us being in charge we will be successful.
Mr. Rashid lays out the argument well below but I am doubtful it will be heeded (how could we take advice from a Pakistani journalist? :-)) he even lays out the strategic aim we might want to consider:
"There is no alternative but for the United States to remain committed to rebuilding a minimalist state in Afghanistan. Nothing less will stop the Taliban and al-Qaeda from again using Afghanistan and now Pakistan to wreak havoc in the region and around the world."
It might be ironic that the situation in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) is so complex that only a "simple" or minimalist solution might be what works. However, any "strategy" that takes this so-called "minimalist state" approach is likely to be condemned by those who think that we can and should solve every problem and can do that by creating security forces and institutions in our image (e.g., the American Way of COIN). It will be condemned as a disguised "cut and run" course of action.
V/R
Dave