Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has challenged the Marine Corps to define its future - and this is especially important as the Corps' Commandant, General James Conway, is nearing retirement.
Gates has been quoted as unsure just where Marines would be asked to storm a beach in the future - especially as "potential foes continue fielding more and more advanced weapons". He has also been critical of the Marine's Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) stating the need "to take a hard look" at the practicality of such expensive acquisition efforts.
But Gates said that America "will always have a Marine Corps," and "we will need some amount of amphibious capability."
What say you?
The Marine Corps answered yesterday by conducting the largest amphibious landing exercise 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Navy's 3rd Fleet have staged since before 11 September 2001.
Comments
Anonymous said:
"However, there is a need for smaller projections of force or feints from the sea, and intervention into the littorals..."
For "feints from the sea" to be effective there has to be a perceived capability otherwise the target of the feint will not be deceived. Given our transparency, the only way for a "feint from the sea" to be effective is if we actually possess the real capability to conduct and amphibious landing. Otherwise we cannot make any plans that employ a feint from the sea because it will not be believed.
Xenophon,
First, a quibble, Proceedings is part of an outside organization as much as the Gazette is, USNI is not and official outlet. MCU tried to start up the Marine Corps University Quarterly about a year or so ago, along the lines of Parameters and Naval War College Review, I don't know how its going though because I haven't seen, a copy.
Things aren't much better on the "Blue" side of the Department of the Navy. Writing for Proceedings gets me the same funny looks. You're right that the Army has figured it out a little bit better, not great but better.
The problem is a cultural one as much as the promotion system, which means its a generational thing to fix. Selection and Promotion boards pick people that they know and identify with. Since Admirals and USMC Generals usually don't have advanced degrees (other than a war college if they are lucky, or a "distance learning EMBA," which are unique degrees) and haven't published anything more than a newsletter article they see those who have as out of the mainstream. They "left the yellow brick road" to promotion OZ in order to get the degree, so they took the easy way out. Education and ideas are not seen as "the hard job." There are a handful of exceptions, ADM Stavridis obviously, but they serve to prove the rule.
The only way to change it is for some folks to say: screw it, I'd rather chase the ghost of John Boyd than the ghosts of McNamara's Joint Chiefs.
Robert Coram wrote in his bio of Boyd of the famous "speech": Boyd would tell the junior officer that worked for him that a day would come when "you're going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go.'' Then he would point his hand to the left or right.
"If you go that way, you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.
"Or," he said, pointing in the other direction, "you can go that way and you can do something -- something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get good assignments, and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won't have to compromise yourself."
Certainly amphibious invasions are a thing of the past. However, there is a need for smaller projections of force or feints from the sea, and intervention into the littorals by a competently trained and correctly equipped force specializing in such (which will also include speedy and self-sufficient disaster relief operations).
Unfortunately, the Corps may not have the correct technology in surface and air platforms to execute their concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea, other than administratively, in a benign environment. Nor does the Navy seem to have the inclination to support such in some quarters with the necessary mix and quantity of amphibious lift, screening, mine clearing assets, and surface fire support.
Secretary Gates is an economy in management type of person among many of his attributes. He knows well what is necessary and what is just nice to have around. As stated, he has said their will always be a Marine Corps!
This is of course why the SecDef is concerned that the next position of CMC be filled by an individual capable of articulating the Corps' mission or redefining such and seeing his vision implemented.
A former Soldier from the Sea
<i>Maybe the Gazette, being an outside publication by the Marine Corps Association inhibits its influence. Maybe the Marine Corps needs a Parameters or a Proceedings. Maybe we need a service academy (although I doubt that would help). Maybe because of the culture of non-intellectualism that wouldn't even work.</i>
I'd add a Strategic Studies Institute to that list modeled after US Army War College's.
<i>By all means, please make the case for the assertion that USMC GPF are "more aggressive, reliable, faster, and cheaper than the Army's." I am sure the SEC DEF and Chief of Staff of the Army could use the facts to either reduce the Army or improve the Army. I suspect the point about being more reliable would be most useful.</i>
Oh, don't get all butt hurt. You know that's the argument that the Marine Corps has been making for decades. In fact, I take that back. I was out of line. You guys are the best. Happy?
<i>I agree. There are numerous "Pete Ellis's" in all the services. I guess my better question would be: How do we encourage and properly employ these "Pete Ellis's" so that they can make a difference?</i>
There's no easy answer to that. One thing the Army is great at is encouraging and allowing opportunites for outside education. The Marine Corps is very poor at that. But that won't fix it. It's a problem with the culture. Intellectual pursuits are not considered important in the Corps. My chain of command's reaction to me writing for the <i>Gazette</i> is "Why do you want to do all that extra work?" My peers' response is "Nobody reads that rag." The comment of anonymous above illustrates another problem: You can't openly criticize without people getting emotional. Nobody stops to think that maybe the criticism comes from a desire to improve things rather than tear them down.
Maybe the <i>Gazette</i>, being an outside publication by the Marine Corps Association inhibits its influence. Maybe the Marine Corps needs a <i>Parameters</i> or a </i>Proceedings</i>. Maybe we need a service academy (although I doubt that would help). Maybe because of the culture of non-intellectualism that wouldn't even work.
for Xenonphon - you said:
"And I think the Marine Corps has plenty of Pete Ellis-caliber thinkers, they're just wasting away in B-billets and in a culture where getting published in the Marine Corps Gazette is cause for derision rather than applause."
I agree. There are numerous "Pete Ellis's" in all the services. I guess my better question would be: How do we encourage and properly employ these "Pete Ellis's" so that they can make a difference?
We need to encourage these risk takers to become experts in the operational areas and allow them to identify future risks and trends and then allow them to present their ideas and most importantly make the bureacracy listen to them (a pipe dream perhaps!)
Xenophon;
By all means, please make the case for the assertion that USMC GPF are "more aggressive, reliable, faster, and cheaper than the Army's." I am sure the SEC DEF and Chief of Staff of the Army could use the facts to either reduce the Army or improve the Army. I suspect the point about being more reliable would be most useful.
I don't think anyone can reasonably say that we don't need amphibious capabilities, or that having experts who can train other forces for amphibious ops is important. But the question is whether that needed capability by itself justifies an seperate branch.
What the Marine Corps needs to do, in my opinion, is think about itself after the amphibious assault. Once the door is kicked in and the beachhead is established, what next? <i>What do we do now, Sir!?</i>
What do we bring to the fight once we're ashore? What can we provide that the Army cannot once we're through the breach? (Or, what can we do better than the Army?) As far as I can tell, we're only augmenting Army combat forces at that point. That's not a good enough answer for me as a Marine, so it's definitely not a good enough answer to policy makers. Yes, we can make an argument that Marine General Purpose Forces are more aggressive, reliable, faster, and cheaper than the Army's, and as a Marine I would LOVE to make that argument, but that's also not good enough. The same capabilities, just slightly better and with far better looking uniforms is not a good enough justification for existence.
I may be off base, but I've been turning that question around in my head for a couple of months and not coming up with any solid solutions.
And I think the Marine Corps has plenty of Pete Ellis-caliber thinkers, they're just wasting away in B-billets and in a culture where getting published in the <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> is cause for derision rather than applause.
What we need to know is: who is today's "Pete" Ellis in the USMC?? (and the broader question for the entire military - will we ever again allow this kind of regional and subject matter expertise to develop in both our Officer and NCO Corps?)
Excerpt from his bio below relevant to this discussion (his whole bio is worth reading at the link below from the Arlington National Cemetery Web Site if you are not familiar with him - I would also note that today we might call him a "Full Spectrum" capable officer due to his broad experience in WWi France, early Philippines, and Dominican Republic while foretelling the Japanese WWII strategy - in today's world where would he fall - in the "COIN camp" or in the "Major Combat Operations camp"? He demonstrated the ability to think and work in both camps - of course maybe that is why is was also such a heavy drinker as well!!)
Start Excerpt:
"Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis was a brilliant planner and a principal staff officer to General John A. Lejeune in World War I, who forecast the amphibious struggle for the Pacific more than 20 years prior to World War II. Believing war with Japan was inevitable Ellis, traveled among the Japanese in the forbidden Carolines and died there under mysterious circumstances, on 12 May 1923.
................
Colonel Ellis died at the age of 43 at Parao (Palau), Carolina Islands on 12 May 1923, and his remains were returned to the United States for burial. He had died at the moment when his last and greatest military-intelligence task was almost complete. For fifteen years he had studied the development of Japanese power in the Orient. He had come to certain conclusions and he had not been reticent about voicing them. Requesting to be sent out to Latin America and Japan on intelligence missions, Colonel Ellis was granted a leave of absence from Headquarters Marine Corps and in the next few years, he visited Australia, Philippine Islands, and Japan. He studied methods and formulated war plans for the Marine Corps in the event that the Japanese should strike.
In 1920 he foretold the course of the war in the Pacific and that Japan would strike the first blow with a great deal of success. He also reported what the success would be and planned the action necessary for Japan's defeat. Twenty-one years later, his prophecies became reality."
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/ehellis.htm
I hate the EFV. What a Rube Goldberg device.
I am pretty sure we won't see another Tarawa. But, EFV notwithstanding, I think there is a lot more to the Marine Corps than amphibious assaults.
The strategic versatility of expeditionary operations, operational maneuver from the sea, and ship to objective maneuver (OMFTS / STOM) is a key enabler for future action.
Much of which of any consequence is predicated on mass enabled by a gator navy that does not seem to be in the cards, unfortunately.
Hi BJ, thanks for the fix and good article. I knew General Gavin and have a book he autographed for me and had a personal guided tour at Arthur D. Little Corp.(he worked there after retirement from the Army)that he arranged for me, so I am pretty familiar with the concept of Air Cavalry. Lt. General Hal Moore (from the Ia Drang valley) is retired and lives in Auburn,Al. about a 80 miles or so from Slapout,Al. I am fairly familiar with Maneuver Warfare concepts thanks to Col. Eric Walters and some others at the SWC.
I certainly agree with you Amphib. groups are important but they have to be shown in a different light than simply storming the beach at San Diego.
Also the Army wasn't really that slow to develop Helicopters. If you can find an original copy of the Howse Board Study and go to the back you will find a time line. Somewhere between 1962 and 1963 the Army was going to deploy a ducted fan VTOL aircraft(similar to the Osprey) to replace many of it's helicopters but a thing called Vietnam got in the way.
The Marine Corps should always retain at least a residual amphibious capability that can be expanded in the future should circumstances so dictate. The USMC trained my dad's 97th Infantry Division on amphibious operations at Coronado in 1944 but the German offensive in the Ardennes caused the division to be sent to Europe instead of the Pacific as had been planned. It's important to have a service with expertise in that area.
In 1998 I attended a pre-proposal conference at a USMC office in Woodbridge, Virginia for a Marine Corps amphibious fighting vehicle. I got the unfortunate impression that the USMC acquisition guys were getting too much like the big spenders in acquisition in the other services.
Sorry, the link is trying to use the close parenthesis as part of the address...
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/armstrong.html
Article only addresses early adoption of heliborne vertical envelopment...Coram's bio of Boyd has some great chapters on the USMC/maneuver warfare in the 80's.
I still stand by my article "The Navy's Gators," the USN needs more amphibs for both amphibious operations and irregular warfare...both should/shall involve our Leatherneck brothers.
Those who say amphibious operations are dead are ignorant and don't understand maneuver warfare from the sea. The argument goes like this..."we will never launch another Normandy, so we don't need an amphibious capability." Well, I hate to tell you, but the Marine Corps and Navy decided half a century ago that we would never launch another Normandy style assault. I'll save you the history (you can read some in my article "Reaching Translational Lift" http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/armstrong.html ) but with "Landing Force Bulletin 17" in 1955 the USMC adopted heliborne vertical envelopment which changed everything. Trace that through the Boyd inspired USMC development of maneuver warfare in the 1980s and todays amphibious operations are not Normandy or the island hopping campaign in the Pacific. Why do you think the USMC bought the Osprey? To cross 25 miles to the beach and drop troops off? Don't think so.
The USMC suffers from a similar deficit as the USN, an inability to explain what they do and why its important. Yes, we have a focus on OIF/OEF, and should, but that doesn't mean global deployments and operations of the sea services have stopped. They have continued unabated for 235 years. Unless we can explain this fact, and why it matters, we are going to have a problem in the "austere" budgetary environment driven by a COIN/Army view of the world.
And Slapout...if you don't think the amphibs were ready to roll into the Gulf...well, USCarriers.net lists USS WASP as having arrived at Mayport, FL from Norfolk , VA on May 3rd for "2nd Fleet Exercises." Now why would a ship leave Norfolk for the waters around Florida at that time? Someone sent them home a couple days later.
When the new JOE(Joint Operating Environment) I said that the most dangerous threat was an international Corporation and we should be preparing to fight them! Think about BP! The Marines/Navy would have done better by showing how they could capture a Corporate Oil rig or Tanker and how they could protect a civilian beach from HAZMET contamination and capturing a Corporate headquarters and bringing the executives to justice when they are hiding in International waters. Demonstrating Marine capabilities by attacking our own (US) beach???? Very sad since much of the orginal history of the Marine Corps (soldiers of the Sea)dealt with similar incidents. Might want to be looking at that 4GW stuff written by TX Hammes the second smartest Marine. Good luck and All The Way....that's Army Airborne for Semper Fi!