During a recent trip to Afghanistan, I met with senior American and Afghan leaders to discuss the challenges of the present war. I found top coalition commanders are, for the first time, in agreement that the outcome will be decided primarily by local leaders, not by equipment or money or enlightened methods. The new head of the NATO training mission, Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, has made Afghan leadership quality his No. 1 priority. This mindset change is crucial.
It does not, however, ensure success, for determining what to do in counterinsurgency warfare is easier than doing it. Gen. Stanley McChrystal and others told me that one of the biggest obstacles is risk aversion within the U.S. military and government. The Pentagon and Congress are eager to send vehicles with better improvised explosive devise (IED) resistance and stronger blast walls in the interest of minimizing casualties, but are slow to send American officers with the right expertise and talents...
Much more at The Washington Times.
Comments
For Anonymous FEB 28, 2010, 8:43 AM:
I would respectfully counter that the CIDG was not focused solely on the Montagnards. The Montagnards were the first and the most famous and probably most written about was the so-called Buon Enao experiment. But the intent was to keep all the ethnic minorities from falling under VC control. Furthermore, although an American project, the intent was always to make it a Vietnamese project and again, though problematic, Vietnamese Special Forces were involved throughout the program.
"The purpose of the program was to extend government control into areas where it was lacking and to generate in the local populace a more favorable attitude toward the government. It should be clearly understood that the United States initiated this program and encouraged it. The Vietnam government participated by employing the Vietnamese Special Forces, but the program was essentially an American project. In the beginning the local Vietnamese province-sector officials were less than enthusiastic."
The local populace was not limited to Montagnards.
<i><a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cidgprogram.pdf">Civilian Irregular Defense Group: The First Years, 1961-1967 (Vietnam)</a></i> - Eugene G. Piasecki, <i>Veritas</i>
Dave Maxwell - Respectfully, one nuance I might point-out differentiating the Marine CAP and the Army SF CIDG is the CAP worked with Vietnamese, the latter CIDG with Montagnards, a distinctly differant race of people, not then, nor even today fully accepted by Vietnamese society. The simple point being: no Montagnard was likely to be fighting an extended family, or tribal member on behalf of the U.S. government. However, both are models for what completely dedicated people can accomplish and I understand why the CIDG program in the Highlands is worth mentioning.
I know everyone likes to tout the CAPs in Vietnam. I am curious as to why we tend to overlook the CIDG program. Below is the link to COL Francis Kelly's monograph on SF in Vietnam with much detail on the CIDG program. it was not perfect as COL Kelly outlines and recognizes below but it is worthy of study. I do not think the CAP program was on anything along this scale.
http://www.history.army.mil/BOOKS/Vietnam/90-23/90-23C.htm
Excerpt from the Preface"
"...In 1957 some fifty-eight Vietnamese soldiers were given military training by Special Forces troops. Ten years later the Special Forces were advising and assisting over 40,000 paramilitary troops, along with another 40,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces soldiers. This monograph traces the development and notes the progress, problems, successes, and failures of a unique program undertaken by the U.S. Army for the first time in its history. It is hoped that all the significant lessons learned have been recorded and the many pitfalls of such a program uncovered..."
FRANCIS JOHN KELLY
Colonel, Armor
15 September 1972 Washington, D.C.