General James Mattis - Before the HASC - 18 March 2009

Thank you for the opportunity to report on United States Joint Forces Command. As one of 10 combatant commands in the Department of Defense, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) oversees a force of 1.16 million Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. The command is uniquely structured to provide agile forces to geographic combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense to prevail in current operations and to ensure we are not caught flat-footed in future battles. The command works closely with other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and allied and coalition partners. We are as focused on coalition issues as we are on joint issues, and we provide a critical link to NATO through our co-location in Norfolk, Virginia with NATO's Allied Command Transformation, the only NATO Headquarters on U.S. soil.

My testimony will focus primarily on the future following a short update on accomplishments over this past year. I will do so with a dose of realism and a sense of urgency. I will present the way forward for Joint Forces Command as it supports the current fight and prepares the nation's military for future operations. The forward-looking emphasis of my remarks reflects the command's mission statement: To provide mission-ready, joint-capable forces and support the development and integration of joint, interagency and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.

Today, our nation is involved in major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it faces a number of threats and opportunities around the globe. For Joint Forces Command, we are focused on the current threat environment for two reasons. First, we are the Joint Force Provider for the Department of Defense. We must do as much as possible to support current military operations. The second reason addresses the focus of this statement: "the future of the joint force." Simply put, much of what we see in the cities of Iraq, the mountains of Afghanistan, and the foothills of southern Lebanon, I believe we will see again in the future. I say this knowing there is much we do not know about the future, and there is much more that will surprise us no matter how well we prepare .. How many people expected a conflict in Georgia would keep cartographers busy in 2008? That said, the conflict in Afghanistan, and other conflicts will sharpen USJFCOM's activities as we give traction to Secretary Gates' principle of balancing our force to fight conventional, irregular, and hybrid threats of the future.

We know the nature of future wars will not differ from current wars. History teaches us that the character of each individual war is always different and most certainly will change, but the enduring nature of war as a human endeavor will remain largely unchanged. Just like today, future enemies will force us to adapt as they adapt-and they will attack our vulnerabilities when and where they can. Just like today, they will attack our values and misrepresent our intentions in the "battle of competing narratives," theirs versus ours. Thus, in many respects, today's warfare is the future of warfare as demonstrated over the past 25 years since militant extremists first attacked our embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon. The "irregular" methods our enemies use today will be employed against us tomorrow. We are already facing many of the threats prognosticators once labeled as "future" threats - cyber war and economic terrorism being just two examples.

In the near term we have few direct threats in the realm of conventional warfare, but we must ensure that we maintain our current conventional superiority - and ad dress our vulnerabilities to indirect attacks. Right now, no one can match the United States Air Force in aerial combat, the United States Navy on the open seas, or the United States Army and Marine Corps in conventional land warfare. Our forces remain dominant in conventional and nuclear warfare. Enemies in the future, however, need not destroy our aircraft, ships, or tanks to reduce our conventional and even nuclear effectiveness. A well-timed and executed cyber attack may prove just as severe and destructive as a conventional attack. As technology becomes less expensive and more available, enemies have the ability to easily acquire increasingly lethal types of conventional and unconventional weapons. Overall, our future enemies are likely to confront us much as we are challenged by today's enemies-through indirect methods in wars of a "hybrid" nature that combine any available irregular or conventional mode of attack, using a blend of primitive, traditional and high-tech weapons and tactics.

As Secretary Gates emphasized, the defining principle for defeating both current and future threats is balance. At Joint Forces Command, we must balance doing what is required to prevail in the current fight while simultaneously preparing for an uncertain future. We must have balanced and versatile joint forces ready to accomplish missions across the full spectrum of military operations-from large-scale, conventional warfare to humanitarian assistance and other forms of "soft=E 2 power. Without balance, we risk being dominant but irrelevant-that is, superior in nuclear and conventional warfare, but poorly equipped to prevail in irregular contests.

So the question becomes how will joint forces achieve and maintain balance in the coming decades? What capabilities are required? During the last year, Joint Forces Command examined some of these questions in The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2008. The JOE is the Command's "historically informed, forward looking" effort to assess trends, discern security threats and determine implications. While the JOE is not meant to reflect or be a statement of U.S. Government policy and is fundamentally speculative in nature, it provides a starting point for discussions about the future security environment. It concludes that we can expect a future of persistent conflict and global instability, greater adversary access to weapons of mass destruction, and the eventual rise of regional state and non-state competitors. It serves as the "problem statement" for the future joint force. Its companion document, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, or CCJO, articulates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision for how the joint force will operate and prevail in the future threat environment. Thus, the CCJO is a proposed "solution" to the JOE's "problem statement." The Chairman participated extensively with the writing team, emphasizing that the military's mission is to win wars, but also noting the requirement for a whole-of-government approach in our campaigns.

USJFCOM has already embarked on a fast-track series of limited objective experiments to test the validity of, and refine the methods outlined in the CCJO. The effort culminates this June in time to inform the Quadrennial Defense Review and subsequent budget decisions designed to carry forward Secretary Gates' direction for balance in our forces.

Historically, every military that has transformed successfully has done so by clearly identifying a specific military problem as we have done in the JOE, and then set out to solve the problem, as we have presented in the CCJO. Joint Forces Command recognizes that it cannot predict the future with certainty but it must do a better job than potential adversaries. We don't think we can forecast the future precisely, but we cannot afford to get it completely wrong either.

Based on current needs of the joint force, the findings of the JOE, and the guidance provided by the CCJO, Joint Forces Command will focus on six key areas during the next year: making irregular warfare a core competency of the Joint Force; enhancing joint command and control; improving as a joint force provider; accelerating efforts toward a "whole-of-government approach; building and improving partnership capacity; and joint training and education.

Making Irregular Warfare a Core Competency

USJFCOM will move swiftly to make irregular warfare (IW) a core competency of our military without losing conventional or nuclear superiority. Joint forces must develop a mastery of the irregular fight on par with our conventional and nuclear capabilities. Our forces must be flexible and adaptable enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict - this is not an "either/or" proposition. While we will maintain cadres of specialized forces (i.e. special operations and nuclear forces), we will aggressively and deliberately work to build IW expertise across our general purpose forces, making them adaptable to however the enemy chooses to fight. Many efforts are underway, yet much remains to be done.

As mentioned earlier, the changing character of warfare puts our nation's joint forces at risk of being dominant, but irrelevant to the threats we will most likely face. While we are superior in conventional and nuclear warfare, we are not yet superior in irregular warfare. Throughout history, the "paradox of war" reveals that thinking adversaries avoid strengths and gravitate towards areas of perceived weakness. In this tradition, our current enemies clearly voted "No" to conventional military operations in which they are unprepared to confront us. Instead they attack in ways we consider irregular or asymmetric, but are anything but asymmetric to them. If we do not develop a culture where leaders and capabilities are well suited for irregular or hybrid warfare, while simultaneously maintaining our conventional and nuclear prowess, then we embolden our enemies and our forces must improvise on the battlefield to make up for any failure to anticipate changing challenges.

To that end, we are working closely with U.S. Special Operations Command and the services to export traditional Special Operations Forces (SOF) expertise to our general purpose forces. Specifically, Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a role well-suited to general purpose forces and transitioning significant portions of the mission their way will help relieve pressure on our over-extended SOF.

These SFA capabilities are required to deal with the emerging security challenges and the growing number of weak or failing states. By increasing SFA activities and capabilities, we may be able to preclude or minimize conflict, or increase our own security, by providing weak or failing states with the tools, capabilities, and knowledge to protect themselves. The old adage, "give a man a fish - he eats for a day, but teach him how to fish - he eats for a lifetime" applies here. By strengthening indigenous security forces of like-minded partners and allies, we improve our collective security against future threats and security challenges. The ethical challenges inherent to this mission are understood and considered as we dispatch well-trained teams on these missions.

There is a clear need for general purposes forces to operate in a disaggregated fashion to checkmate and destroy our nation's irregular enemies. Flexible, adaptive organizational structures and training environments are required to unleash the power of these high-performing small units. In IW, our military units need freedom of action to take advantage of fleeting opportunities under stressful conditions. This requires agile, configurable C2 systems that push decision making to the lowest appropriate level. These forces must retain the capability to rapidly aggregate for conventional operations when needed, and then disaggregate into small teams with the tactical cunning to confound small groups of enemy. To prepare our forces for these new realities, we must replicate the fast-paced, chaotic conditions of future battlefields in our training environments.

To meet this need, USJFCOM is developing the Future Immersive Training Environment (FITE) to provide ground units from all services the same level of realistic training we provide in our aviation and maritime simulators in those domains. Today, our ground combat forces suffer more than 80% of our casualties and we can provide them with high quality live, virtual, and constructive simulation capabilities to reduce this risk. Mixing brick and mortar surroundings with live actors and interactive virtual tools will provide unprecedented realism for our ground troops and better replicate the chaos of the "first fights" so our youngest warriors are prepared for the tactical and ethical demands of combat among non-combatants. Because FITE is also an approved Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, the outputs from this initiative will be highly visible to the services and positioned for rapid transition to their programs of record.

While the FITE initiative has a broad focus, it is just the first step in a larger small unit decision making initiative.

The irregular threats of today and tomorrow require a different approach to how we recruit, educate, and train leaders. The Small Unit Decision Making (SUDM) initiative will bring national-level attention to the problem and enlist the help of social scientists, psychologists, leader development experts, small unit leaders, and first responders. A series of forums hosted in 2009 will address performance under stress in small unit scenarios and culminate in a long-range plan to improve small unit performance.

Established in October 2008, the Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) is the command's catalyst and driving force behind establishing IW as a core competency for the joint force. The JIWC will work relentlessly across the DoD, interagency, and our multinational partners to increase interoperability and integration between our special operations and general purpose forces. The center is spearheading the FITE and SUDM initiatives and also is tasked with developing an IW professional development program for next generation military leaders and identify IW shortfalls across the joint force.

As we create a stronger competency in20IW, we must capture enduring battlefield innovation and lessons learned to apply them after swift and rigorous evaluation. The Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) leads the command's efforts in this area, and its observations are improving the quality of the mission rehearsal exercises that prepare joint force headquarters for duties in the Horn of Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan. USJFCOM also maintains deployed teams in

Iraq and Afghanistan to harvest lessons learned and best practices from the front lines, and then shares them with our allies and coalition partners. USJFCOM also has a close working relationship with the service lesson learned centers and constantly works to strengthen and improve its relationship and information sharing with NATO's Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre under my command as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation.

Above all, we must continuously assess the threat environment and work to maintain a proper balance between conventional and irregular competency and avoid overcorrecting to match the crisis of the day. We cannot afford a lack of vision or misinterpret our enemies' capabilities in an era where advanced technologies and weapons of mass destruction are increasingly available to an array of state and non-state actors. The recent Georgia-Russia conflict is a reminder of how quickly conventional war can come out of hibernation.

Enhancing Joint Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) is foremost a human20endeavor. U.S. military C2 must be leader-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision-making at the lowest level possible. While materiel solutions, processes, and engineering can enable decision making, command and control is not synonymous with network operations or the employment of advanced technology. Rather, it maintains the flexibility to exploit both. Consequently, our commanders must be skillful at crafting their commander's intent, enabling junior leaders to exercise initiative and take advantage of fleeting opportunities in the heat of battle, vice centralizing decision-making at high levels. This is particularly important in fast-paced conventional force-on-force warfare and during highly dynamic and decentralized operations that characterize irregular warfare.

As Admiral Mullen stated in the CCJO, the United States must be capable of projecting power globally in an environment where access to forward operating bases will become increasingly limited and our uncontested superiority in space will be challenged. Therefore, success of future operations will become more dependent on increasingly vulnerable space-based capabilities and sophisticated global networks. To compensate for these increased risks, it is imperative that the joint force develop and promote integrated, interoperable, defendable, robust, and properly structured command and control systems enabling joint forces to fight effectively in an increasingly hostile operating environment, including when our technical systems are degraded.

The United States currently enjoys unmatched technological advantage over our adversaries in the area of C2, but we also must recognize that our space, aerial, surface and subsurface communication, computer, and ISR networks represent tremendous vulnerabilities as they most certainly will be subject to attack in the future by an adaptive and technically adept enemy. As such, we must ensure our C2 systems, and their associated networks, are resistant to attack and are robust enough to reconstitute quickly in the event of a successful attack.

Additionally, we must ensure our disparate C2 systems can interface seamlessly across the network to continue moving information during periods of degraded communications. We must guard against over-reliance on increasingly vulnerable space-based systems in favor of a "triad" blend of space, air, and surface capabilities that provide redundant and survivable C2 systems.

Likewise, despite access to sophisticated and ubiquitous C2 systems, our leaders must still be able to execute missions using decentralized decision-making consistent with their commander's intent in degraded information environments, so we are not paralyzed when network degradation occurs.

In May 2008, in our role as the Command and Control Capabilities Portfolio Manager (C2 CPM), USJFCOM promulgated a Joint C2 Vision outlining elements that make up an effective C2 network and describing the execution of responsibilities for joint command and control integration assigned to USJFCOM in the Unified Command Plan. This vision guides and directs our actions both within the command and on behalf of the Department of Defense as we promote an integrated portfolio of joint command and control capabilities. Many of the ideas and guiding principles contained in this vision are incorporated in the Defense Department's recently released Command and Control Strategic Plan that guides C2 transformation for the services and DoD agencies. In the coming year, USJFCOM will work with the Department to ensure these tenets of effective joint command and control are carried forward and expanded in the C2 Implementation Plan to be published later in the year. The command also is partnering with the Department's Chief Information Office to find and replace outdated and redundant C2 policies with unambiguous and coherent documentation. These new policies will foster enhanced information sharing among joint/coalition partners and better align existing policies with advances in technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The USJFCOM C2 Vision emphasizes and promotes further investment in the professional military education and training of all leaders to improve their ability to operate effectively in complex, chaotic, and hostile combat environments. USJFCOM will act as the central coordinator for creating and delivering effective training and education to support "leadercentric" C2. We will emphasize the fundamental interdependency between commander's intent and subordinate initiative; we will ensure the tenets of effective joint C2 are embedded in JPME courses and reinforced at the Capstone, Pinnacle, and Keystone Courses for Flag/General Officers and senior enlisted personnel. We teamed with the U.S. Strategic Command to develop new doctrine for cyberspace operations, and are continuing to evaluate and accredit standards for the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) training courses.

Under our C2 Capability Portfolio Manager responsibilities, USJFCOM will continue its operational sponsorship during the planned migration of the current joint and service Global C2 System (GCCS) family of systems into a service-oriented architecture through the evolving Net-Enabled Command Capability (NECC) program. Our overarching objective is to "do no harm" to warfighters by ensuring required C2 capabilities are not lost or reduced during this migration. However, delays in the fielding of NECC and cuts in funding are producing capability gaps placing the modernization of our C2 systems at risk.

To solve this problem, USJFCOM is working collaboratively with the services to address these shortfalls through the PR-11 and POM-12 budget process. Concurrently, USJFCOM is working with the services to accelerate the migration to a service-oriented architecture underpinned by a comprehensive data strategy that makes all data visible and accessible to all users. Lastly, we will continue to leverage capability enhancements by integrating our20efforts across the entire doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) spectrum. By taking this holistic approach to C2, we will avoid focusing solely on technological solutions. In the end, war is a human endeavor that requires we emphasize that human dimension over technology and ensure C2 capabilities are leader-centric and network-enabled.

Improving as a Joint Force Provider

As the joint force provider, USJFCOM is responsible for providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders in support of current operations and global contingencies. This critical mission area is the most relevant and has the most immediate and visible impact on joint force operations. During the past year, USJFCOM responded to more than 200 requests for forces from combatant commanders resulting in the sourcing of more than 437,000 personnel supporting several global missions. Likewise, in the coming year, USJFCOM is prepared to provide forces to support the recently announced troop increases in Afghanistan and continue to satisfy requirements in Iraq and elsewhere. To mitigate unpredictable events like those outlined in the Joint Operating Environment, USJFCOM, working with the Joint Staff and services, established a Global Response Force designed to respond to unforeseen crises either at home or abroad. This capable force provides the Commander-in-Chief with flexible options to respond to a variety of crises while simultaneously fulfilling our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the world.

Despite its successes and demonstrated responsiveness, the dynamic nature of Global Force Management (GFM) creates an enduring need for continuous process improvement. For example, we must improve our ability to respond quickly and efficiently to requests for joint forces and enabling capabilities by improving our information technology tools and data bases.

We also need to establish common training and readiness reporting tools and data bases that are transparent, accurate, and accessible to all involved in the Global Force Management process.

To accomplish this, USJFCOM teamed with OSD, the Joint Staff, service headquarters, and DoD to establish the Force Management Improvement Project (FMIP) providing process improvement across the GFM enterprise. Efforts to date have yielded the development and fielding of the highly successful web-based Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM) tool that provides senior DoD decision makers with the first consolidated database of all force requirements (Rotational, Emergent, Exercise, Individual Augmentation and Contingency Planning) generated by geographic combatant commanders. Improvements during the next 12 to 18 months include the seamless interface of this requirements tool with the adaptive planning tool (Collaborative Force-Building Analysis, Sustainment and Transportation) and the deployment execution tool (Joint Operations Planning and Execution System) to achieve a significant improvement in deployment process efficiency. The end result of this FMIP-driven accomplishment, and others like it, will be to provide combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense with accurate and timely information to facilitate risk-informed force allocation decisions.

A companion effort to the FMIP is development of the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) process that focuses on closing the gap between planning and execution processes, creating valid operational plans that can transition rapidly to execution with little or no modification. The APEX system, when coupled with the FMIP, will assist commanders in developing operationally and logistically feasible plans and execution decisions across the spectrum of conflict.

The cunning and adaptive enemy we face today is forcing us to change the way we do business and is placing unusual stress on "high demand, low density" assets which often requires unplanned or accelerated force structure changes, and in some cases new capabilities to be developed. You are aware that the demand for certain types of forces or capabilities outpaces supply. Persistent shortfalls exist in electronic warfare, civil affairs, engineering, military intelligence, military police, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The demand signal for these capabilities is expected to continue growing as we build a balanced force to confront conventional and irregular threats. In the short term, these shortfalls are mitigated by prioritizing requirements, assuming acceptable risk in certain areas, reaching deep into the National Guard and Reserve, use of ad hoc and in-lieu-of force options, and use of USJFCOM Joint Enabling Capability Command (JECC) enablers. Concurrently, new capabilities are being developed by the services to reduce reliance on ad hoc and in-lieu-of forces and to increase the physical numbers of existing capabilities that are in high demand. It is envisioned that these actions combined with the improved Global Force Management processes outlined above will help ease the stress on the force and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the process.

Accelerating Efforts Toward a Whole of Government Approach

As armed conflicts rarely require purely military solutions, security concerns continue to demand the attention of multiple facets of our national power. It is critical that our military leaders connect with civilian counterparts to leverage the diverse powers of our government before, during, and after times of crisis. We must employ to our advantage the power of both inspiration and intimidation, each in the appropriate measure, to confound our enemies.

Essential to a whole-of-government approach for applying all aspects of national and international power is the ability to share information and situational awareness among all partners. Interagency shared situational awareness is an FY09 USJFCOM experimentation project to create an interagency common operational picture. The effort is addressing technologies, processes, organizational structures, and policy change recommendations necessary for creating, visualizing, and sharing information across the military and civilian branches of the United States Government.

USJFCOM is prepared to support the recent DoD establishment of an expeditionary civilian workforce. Working with military forces when needed, expeditionary civilians will provide new perspectives and expertise to complex challenges our military leaders are tasked to solve. This visionary effort is the most direct application of the whole-of-government approach to date, and it hopefully will spread to other departments. Sourcing of expeditionary civilians over extended periods through multiple rotations requires the attention and support of our civilian government counterparts.

To encourage interagency participation in military efforts, USJFCOM publishes the "Partnership Opportunity Catalog," a listing of DoD exercises and training events that provide our government and non-government partners with opportunities to integrate and train. The FY09-10 catalog contains summaries and contact information for more than 300 service and combatant command exercises, training events, and demonstrations supporting interagency integration.

Building and Improving Partnership Capacity

In this emerging threat environment, it is clear America's endurance will be reinforced with support from nations that share our vision and our values. No nation can go it alone and our friends can provide critical support. Mitigating risk will require building and maintaining relationships with capable partners - including our North American neighbors, fellow NATO members, and other nations. U.S. Joint Forces Command is working to strengthen partnerships through engagement with DoD and NATO, via Allied Command Transformation, and representatives from 24 other nations assigned to the command. USJFCOM directly supports DoD's Building Partner Capacity Portfolio Manager by leading the Building Partner Senior Warfighter Forum. As intended, this forum helps partner nations counter terrorism, promote stability, and prevent conflict. This effort has also increased information sharing capability among respective U.S. combatant commands - an unintended but positive outcome.

The USJFCOM-led Multi-National Experiment (MNE) 6 is a two-year, multinational and interagency effort to improve coalition capabilities against irregular threats through a whole-of- government, or comprehensive approach. Participants include: military and civilian sectors of 16 NATO and non-NATO nations; NATO's Allied Command Transformation; and U.S. Special Operations Command. MNE 6 builds upon the whole-of-government work in MNE 5, completed late last year, and seeks to further integrate civil and military engagement in areas of information strategy, strategic communications, assessment, and coalition logistics.

In addition, whole-of-government approaches, military level cooperation, and shared education and training develop bonds in peace that become invaluable in time of war. For example, USJFCOM is working to add a Foreign Liaison Officer from Pakistan with the intent that this relationship will improve our nation's ability to conduct operations in southwest Asia. At present, the command has permanently-assigned liaison officers from 22 different nations. In addition, through Allied Command Transformation, the command has access to the 31 National Liaison Representatives from NATO nations and Alliance partners.

The sustained efforts of a balanced, cohesive coalition force have historically proven more effective than a single nation's efforts to erode an enemy's support base among local populations. U.S. Joint Forces Command remains committed to gaining increased representation from coalition and partner militaries to grow balanced relationships founded on mutual understanding, trust, and common operating concepts. This will assist us in better integrating international partner capability and capacity in our fights against common enemies.

Training and Education

A military is only as capable as its professionally-trained and educated officers and senior noncommissioned officers allow it to be. A trained warrior may perform acceptably in a conventional operation, but irregular and hybrid wars demand highly-educated warriors to prevail. We must continually educate our leaders to think, and not just to do.20Special emphasis must be placed on human, cultural, language, and cognitive skills. A "cognitive" warrior knows how to acquire knowledge, process information from multiple sources, and make timely, accurate decisions in complex, ethically challenging and ever-changing environments.

We must place greater emphasis on the study of history, culture, and language. These three elements are being more broadly incorporated into training and exercise scenarios, including those employing the latest modeling and simulation technology. It is not enough to know your enemy or the culture of a region in which you are engaged. One also must inculcate understanding and respect for our partner nations as well.

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that joint education must be incorporated at the tactical level among junior officers and our senior NCOs. These extended campaigns also revealed the need to translate "lessons learned" more quickly from the battlefield to the classroom. To accomplish this, USJFCOM routinely incorporates battlefield lessons learned into Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) and senior leader education programs like the Pinnacle, Capstone, and Keystone Courses. However, more must be done to institutionalize this example into the broader education and training process. Right now, it takes almost three years to bring lessons learned from exercises and operations through the doctrinal process and curriculum certification period. This delay is un acceptable and we are taking specific steps to translate battlefield adaptations into institutional change more rapidly. Outdated PME does not prepare our forces and hurts the credibility of our schools.

To improve JPME and ensure it is aligned properly with current realities and future challenges, USJFCOM is partnering with the Defense Science Board, National Defense University, and service schools to conduct a thorough evaluation of the entire JPME program.

From this analysis, we will generate recommendations to transform JPME, making it more efficient and relevant to meet the demands of both the present and future operating environments. The JOE and CCJO will help frame our way ahead in this area.

USJFCOM also continues to improve its Joint Knowledge Development & Delivery Capability (JKDDC) that provides distance and distributed education programs for joint and coalition forces. The Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Portal hosts more than 170 courses, including 80 developed by coalition partner nations to build partner capacity through sharing information and security related training. The portal also offers basic language training and tailored pre-deployment training for Individual Augmentees (IAs) and coalition partners participating in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The resources found on the JKO Portal also are available to interagency, international and non-governmental organizations.

In our role as Joint Force Trainer for the U.S. military's joint force headquarters, MRXs continue to improve and stress the decision making skills and cultural awareness of our deploying command elements. The recent MRX for the 82d Airborne Division, for example, incorporated 12 partner nations and a record level of interagency participation. The exercises remain tightly linked to our joint and NATO lessons learned processes, and feedback from the field continues to shape the scenarios and operational problems that train and evaluate deploying commanders and their staffs.

USJFCOM has a unique responsibility in managing the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) which provides a nationally interconnected training environment, through the U.S. Joint Training and Experimentation Network JTEN, linking together 42 Combatant Command and Service training programs. This capability enables Joint Forces Command, in coordination with the Services and COCOMS, to establish joint context at the tactical level so we train exactly like we fight today in theater. We have also established a national Information Operations (IO) Range connecting over 40 sites. The IO Range provides a dynamic new capability to fully test and train on computer network and influence operations. Additionally, USJFCOM is managing the establishment of the Virtual Integrated Support for the IO Environment (vision), which provides a planning and assessment capability that brings people, processes, and technology together to continually enhance warfighter IO capability.

As part of a larger initiative to increase collaboration with Allied Command Transformation, USJFCOM is working closely with our NATO partners, specifically the Joint Warfare Center, Joint Forces Training Center, and the NATO School, to prepare forces enroute to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. USJFCOM also is working with NATO to connect the JTEN with the NATO Training Federation. This link will improve the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of training by providing a common core of realistic training capabilities to all Alliance nations.

Conclusion

On behalf of the military and civilian men and women of U.S. Joint Forces Command, I thank you for the opportunity to report. I look forward to working with you to ensure the continued security of this experiment in democracy we call America.

As we move forward, we will face tough choices. Our resources are not unlimited and there are inherent risks and tradeoffs in everything we do. As we expect persistent conflict in the coming decades and complex threat environment, we also can expect our enemies to continue challenging us where they believe we are vulnerable. So, we must be prepared to think the "unthinkable," using our study and imagination to help us defeat the enemy. In times of economic stress, there is a temptation to step back from world affairs, to focus on the pressing issues at home. History shows that this is a mistake - isolation did not work in the 20th Century and it is unlikely to work today or in the future. We must remain active and engaged with the world, and our military must be prepared to do so effectively and efficiently.

As Secretary Gates made clear, the guiding principle behind our efforts to prepare for an uncertain future will be balance. Balance will enhance the agility and capabilities of our joint forces as we work to make irregular warfare a core competency. War remains fundamentally a human endeavor that will require human solutions. Technology is a key enabler, but it is not the solution. We will embrace a whole-of-government approach to bring all of our nation's resources to bear, while continuing to build alliances and enhancing our international partnerships. And finally, we must remain focused on the long-term security of our nation, and avoid being captivated by short-term distractions. As General Omar Bradley said, "We need to learn to set our course by the stars, not by the lights of every passing ship."