Deeply concerned about the prospect of failure in Afghanistan, the Bush administration and NATO are conducting three top-to-bottom reviews of the entire mission, from security and counterterrorism to political consolidation and economic development, according to American and alliance officials.
The reviews are an acknowledgment of the need for greater coordination in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, halting the rising opium production and trafficking that finances the insurgency and helping the Kabul government extend its legitimacy and control.The article, in drawing a comparison with last year's Iraq review, stated the likely outcome of the Afghan reviews would not be the infusion of additional combat troops as there are none readily available to fill the void. Rather, the likely recommendations will include the appointment of an "international coordinator" to oversee synchronization of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations and adjustments in ISAF's counterinsurgency strategy to include "soft power" that addresses problems in security, governance and economic aid.
While a "new Afghanistan strategy" will not likely include a surge in combat personnel comparable to the increase seen earlier this year in Iraq, the Washington Post reported Monday that U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan are looking for several additional battalions, helicopters and other resources to confront a resurgent Taliban movement.
Another problem that will hopefully be addressed by the renewed emphasis on Afghanistan operations, and one that could decrease the requirement for additional U.S. military personnel beyond those reported by the Post, is the caveats many NATO countries have placed on their ISAF forces. Various sources have reported that up to a quarter of ISAF's forces maintain up to 50 caveats that seriously restrict missions deemed acceptable and limits the areas of operations these forces will deploy to. The most common complaint is the restrictions these caveats place on locking forces into irrelevant missions in the relatively peaceful north while ISAF forces in the south fight a steadily growing and capable insurgency.
While national caveats are almost impossible to eliminate in any multi-national operation -- it would be nice if ISAF nations could see fit in adjusting the limitations that have placed most of the counterinsurgency burden on U.S., Australian, British, Dutch, and Canadian forces. At the 2006 NATO Riga Summit member nations agreed to lift caveats in a time of emergency, however what constitutes an emergency remains an item of debate.
Hopefully, the reviews will also make recommendations on increasing non-military capabilities essential to any successful counterinsurgency campaign to include those needed to address the governance and economic problem areas mentioned above. While intended as a temporary, transitional asset and often comprising a military component, any increase in the capabilities of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program would be welcomed. That said, just as there are limits in available U.S. military forces that preclude a significant Afghanistan buildup, shortages in personnel and resources limit a major surge in non-DoD department and agency capabilities.
Turning to COIN blog Abu Muqawama -- AM rightly believes that improvements in resources and strategy are only part of the equation. What brings it all together is a leadership that understands counterinsurgency, ensures subordinates understand, and provides the structure to implement COIN best practices.
While SWJ has little-to-no knowledge concerning the current leadership climate concerning COIN in Afghanistan (and would be reluctant to pass arm-chair generalship opinion even if we did) we do agree with AM on this:
If the senior leadership -- specifically, the senior commander on the ground -- understands counterinsurgency, units on the ground stand a much better chance of executing a coherent COIN strategy. The reason the U.S. military has been able to develop an effective COIN strategy in Iraq -- regardless of whether or not that strategy ends up being successful (it all depends on how the domestic Iraqi political process plays out) -- is simply because Petraeus "gets" it. In David Petraeus, George Bush has found the first capable field marshal of the War on Terror.
Concerning subordinates - from commanding general down to squad leader - we offer up the following quote on why success depends on more than just the guy at the top "getting it" and more than merely getting it at all levels.
"[This] is a political as well as a military war...the ultimate goal is to regain the loyalty and cooperation of the people."
"It is abundantly clear that all political, military, economic and security (police) programs must be integrated in order to attain any kind of success."
- Gen William C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, MACV Directive 525-4, 17 September 1965
The quote, swiped from a briefing given by former Petraeus advisor Dr. David Kilcullen using our Vietnam experience as a vehicle for discussion, emphasizes that understanding by leaders is not enough; everyone needs to understand, and we need a framework, doctrine, a system, processes and structures to enact this understanding.
On recent operations in Afghanistan as well as a summary of U.S. expectations -- particularly in regards to NATO we turn to Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal. On the recapture of Musa Qala Smith asks -- okay, now what?
While it is a positive sign to win back Musa Qala, the operation required heavy air power, and the city was deserted of families after the battle. The battle for Musa Qala is a poster child for the Afghanistan campaign, with the British having entered into a gentleman's agreement with tribal leaders to prevent the return of the Taliban (in agreement for British force departing the area), when the tribal leaders clearly lacking the means to enforce their end of the agreement. Adequate troops didn't exist to perform reconstruction or constabulary operations for Musa Qala, and the question remains how either Afghanistan or NATO will now have the forces necessary to maintain order in Musa Qala when they did not before.
On U.S. expectations:
Defense Secretary Robert Gates sharply criticized NATO countries Tuesday for failing to supply urgently needed trainers, helicopters and infantry for Afghanistan as violence escalates there, vowing not to let the alliance "off the hook."
Gates called for overhauling the alliance's Afghan strategy over the next three to five years, shifting NATO's focus from primarily one of rebuilding to one of waging "a classic counterinsurgency" against a resurgent Taliban and growing influx of al-Qaida fighters.
"I am not ready to let NATO off the hook in Afghanistan at this point," Gates told the House Armed Services Committee. Ticking off a list of vital requirements - about 3,500 more military trainers, 20 helicopters, and three infantry battalions - Gates voiced "frustration" at "our allies not being able to step up to the plate."
More at The Captain's Journal - Review and Analysis of Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Campaign.