Focus on U.S. Africa Command
As a lead-in — to this much longer than usual SWJ Blog entry — I thought I’d post some recent news as well as recent and not-so-recent background / reference material on the establishment of our newest Combatant Command — U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and issues that will impact on AFRICOM’s mission.
Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right. Getting it right includes ensuring that AFRICOM receives the necessary resources (people and funding) and is enabled to pursue operations utilizing all instruments of national power — read interagency…
Please post to comments below (or on this thread at Small Wars Council) any additional relevant material (articles, studies, presentations…) for addition to the SWJ Reference Library — Thanks!
Introduction
On 6 February President Bush directed the creation of U.S. Africa Command. The decision was the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa, and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests of the U.S. and international community as well. Yet, the department’s regional command structure did not account for Africa in a comprehensive way, with three different U.S. military headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries. The creation of U.S. Africa Command will enable DOD to better focus its resources to support and enhance existing U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DOD coordination point to help address security and related needs.
On 10 July Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that President Bush had nominated Gen. William E. Ward for re-appointment to the rank of general with assignment as commander, U.S. Africa Command
The command will initially report to U.S. European Command, with initial operational capability scheduled to begin in October 2007. The command is scheduled to be fully operational by October 2008. The AFRICOM Transition Team is currently based in Stuttgart, Germany.
Two U.S. congressional committees conducted public hearings 1 and 2 August to discuss concerns related to the creation of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
Those testifying included senior U.S. government officials from the Defense Department, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as independent experts from the United States and Africa.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on African Affairs convened on 1 August to discuss “Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa.” The committee’s Website includes written witness testimony and opening statements by committee leaders, as well as a recording of the hearing.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health convened a 2 August hearing on “Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?” The committee’s Website includes written witness testimony and a video webcast of the hearing.
Special Video Report
Background / Research
Africa Command: Forecast for the Future — Commander Otto Sieber. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center for Contemporary Conflict, January 2007.
The creation of AFRICOM would change a U.S. policy that has relegated Africa to a lower level of importance in comparison to other world regions, changing a prioritization that has existed since at least the end of colonialism in Africa in the 1960s. For instance, until 1983 Sub-Saharan Africa was not included in any of the geographic combatant commands. Once it was finally included in the combatant command system, it simply became a much-ignored component of overstretched commands: United States European Command (USEUCOM) in the 1980s due to the Cold War and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) in the 1990s and early 2000s due to heightened tensions in the Middle East. Since 9/11, however, the DoD has recognized Africa as a key area for its counterterrorism operations, specifically against al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in various sub-regions within Africa. As a mark of this change, the DoD has stood up the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) in 2002 and 2005, respectively. Africa is becoming increasingly important to U.S. national security as a result of terrorist threats, disease proliferation, and valuable energy sources.
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa — Lauren Ploch. Congressional Research Report, July 2007.
As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability, military professionalization, and accountable governance. The command’s military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.A transition team has begun establishment of the new command, which is expected to begin as a sub-unified command under EUCOM by October 2007 and achieve full capability as a stand-alone command by October 2008. DOD has signaled its intention to eventually locate AFRICOM on the continent, and U.S officials are consulting with strategic partners in the region to identify a suitable location for the command’s headquarters. The transition team and the new command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany until facilities in Africa are secured. The Department of Defense has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent.
2 Aug 07 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Relations on Africa Command – Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations:
Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
Kurt Shillinger, South African Institute of International Affairs
Wafula Okumu, South Africa Institute for Security Studies
J. Peter Pham, James Madison University
African Command: The Newest Combatant Command — Paul Cale and the U.S. Army War College Graduating Class of 2005. US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.
African Command (AFRICOM) must be established as the newest Combatant Command in the Unified Command System. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) currently divides the Continent of Africa into areas of responsibility served by European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. This current division of Africa, within the UCP, has led to the creation of “seams” between the current combatant command boundaries. EUCOM’s focus is based on their expansion into the newest NATO countries on their Eastern border. CENTCOM’s focus for the indefinite future is on OEF, OIF, and the future of U.S. presence in the Middle East. PACOM’s focus has been and remains on the Asian continent. For these and other reasons that will be further developed the UCP must establish AFRICOM as its Combatant Command Headquarters on the African continent.
A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan — Richard Catoire. Parameters article, Winter 2000-01.
Because of the increased U.S. engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, and because the current regional unified commands are principally focused elsewhere, the time has come to rethink the Unified Command Plan as it regards Africa. The current plan cannot effectively protect America’s security interests on that continent. It is unlikely to realize the articulated policy objectives of the United States in the region, and it should be revised to better secure those objectives.
Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa — Dr. Donovan Chau. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2007.
Domestic and international terrorism aside, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are vying for influence over African governments and people. Not unlike the Cold War, the primary means of exerting influence in Africa is through the use of nonviolent instruments of grand strategy. The author considers one nonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular, political warfare. He suggests that the PRC has used political warfare as its leading grand strategic instrument in Africa and offers a concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa in four of its nation-states.
Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions – Colonel Thomas A Dempsey. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, April 2006.
Terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa failed states have demonstrated the ability to avoid the scrutiny of Western counterterrorism officials, while supporting and facilitating terrorist attacks on the United States and its partners. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes terrorist groups operating from failed states especially dangerous. U.S. counterterrorism strategies largely have been unsuccessful in addressing this threat. A new strategy is called for, one that combines both military and law enforcement efforts in a fully integrated counterterrorism effort, supported by a synthesis of foreign intelligence capabilities with intelligence-led policing to identify, locate, and take into custody terrorists operating from failed states before they are able to launch potentially catastrophic attacks.
Refining American Strategy in Africa — Dr. Steven Metz. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute book, February 2000.
The author provides a broad overview of the African security environment as a basis for recommendations on the refinement of American strategy in that region. He assesses both the opportunities for positive change which exist today, and the obstacles. While only Africans themselves can determine the future of their region, an American strategy which discourages proxy aggression, encourages private initiatives in the economic and political spheres, and uses the U.S. military, particularly the Army, to engage its African counterparts could pay great dividends. American defense strategy calls for using the military to help shape the global security environment, preempting and deterring conflict and building regional mechanisms for security. This is a particularly wise approach to Sub-Saharan Africa.
Funding Defense: Challenges of Buying Military Capability in Sub-Saharan Africa – Colonel Daniel Henk and Dr. Martin Revayi Rupiya. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, September 2001.
Martin Rupiya, Director of the University of Zimbabwe’s Centre for Defence Studies, and Daniel Henk of the Air War College provide one of the first comprehensive studies of defense budgeting practices in Africa. They assess both the problems with these practices and fruitful avenues of reform. By doing so, they provide a solid roadmap both for African leaders and for Americans concerned with the development of greater security in the region.
Why the United States Should Robustly Support Pan-African Organizations — Francis Crupi. Parameters article, Winter 2005-06.
This article presents a rationale for why it should be the policy of the United States to robustly support pan-African sub-regional organizations that seek to have Africans help themselves. To do so, it analyzes one sub-regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), using the furtherance of stated American policy for peace in the region as a litmus test. The guiding principles of ECOWAS and its record of accomplishment are highlighted relative to the U.S. goals for Africa as promulgated in the National Security Strategy. The article argues that it is in the United States’ interest to support sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS as a viable way to promote a self-sufficient Africa. A stable and prosperous Africa provides the conditions for political and economic growth and counters the incidence of “failed states” which can serve as terrorist breeding grounds such as in the Sudan.
A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force — Mike Denning. Parameters article, Winter 2004-05.
The current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) addresses the African paradox. The strategy describes Africa as a land of “promise and opportunity,” but also as a land beset with “disease, war, and desperate poverty.” The NSS goes on to say that the current situation in Africa poses a threat to a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and to a strategic priority—combating global terror. As a result, the National Security Strategy makes a bold commitment: The United States “will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.” That said, Africa remains at the bottom of any list of America’s vital interests. Does the evidence justify this low priority?
Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda — Thomas Odom.
Marine officers are taught that the two most important components of any operations order are the commander’s intent and mission statement. Above all else, each statement should be clear and concise so as to leave the recipient with no doubt as to what must be accomplished. In 1994, at the height of a humanitarian crisis in Goma, Zaire, US Army LTC Thomas Odom, an Africa Foreign Area Officer, was told by his superiors — “We must stop the dying,” and thus tasked to “stop the dying.” Though clear and concise, these provided little true guidance as he tried to assess the needs of over one million Rwandan refugees escaping violent retribution in front of the steadily advancing Rwandan Patriotic Front as it consolidated its victory in the Rwandan Civil War. Did his superiors really want him to provide humanitarian assistance to the former Rwandan Army that had just been defeated, yet was still heavily armed? Was he to provide relief to the Interhamwe or Impuzamugambi militias and their collaborators who had just raped and murdered in excess of 800,000 Rwandans? Was he required to disarm the groups as a precondition to assistance? And finally, how was he to complete his mission without creating the perception of providing aide and comfort to thousands who just committed genocide? In his book Journey Into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, Thomas Odom provides a first-person account of the planning difficulties and selected courses of actions associated with Operation Support Hope (Goma, Zaire 1994) and follow-on operations associated with the Rwandan Genocide.
Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and ends to Successful Strategy — Richard Taylor. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute paper, August 2005.
The following conclusions and recommendations are offered to further facilitate national military policy success. Four conclusions, linked to the essential elements of analysis and the thesis at large were found to be of value. First, tribes are not explicitly considered in the National Security Strategy or the National Military Strategy of the United States as a tool of military power. Some implicit linkages can be assumed. Second, tribes offer value in all bands of the spectrum of military operations—from pre-crisis access to conventional warfare. Third, when considering tribal alliances as a tool for success, recognize and evaluate thoroughly the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing tribal resources. Finally, throughout history, both past and present, tribes have delivered functional capability (intelligence, security, combat arms, etc.) to successful military operations. In light of the conclusions offered, three recommendations are provided. First, make tribal partnerships an explicit tool of national security policy. The example of the Northern Alliance during Operation Enduring Freedom provides a historical example of success. Second, use tribes across the full spectrum of military operations. The successes tribes have shown in various bands of the spectrum of military operation indicate further potential for tribes as a force multiplier. Finally, use tribes across the continuum of military campaign phases, from Phase I (Deter and Engage) to Phase IV (Transition). Tendencies are to use tribes in one phase of military campaigns.
U.S. Army Foreign Military Military Studies Office – Africa Page (analytical products)
Global Security – Africa Search Page
News Resources
Africa News — Africa News Directory
Africa News — Topix Africa News Directory
Africa Newspapers — African Newspapers, Magazines and News Sites
All Africa — Africa News Directory
The Australian — Africa Page
Australian Broadcasting Corporation — Africa Search Page
BBC News — Africa Page
Christian Science Monitor — Africa Page
Globe and Mail — Africa / Mideast Page
Google News – Africa Search Page
London Times — Africa Page
Los Angeles Times — Africa Page
National Public Radio — Africa Search Page
National Post — Africa Search Page
New York Times — Africa Page
New Zealand Herald – Africa Search Page
Sydney Morning Herald — Africa Search Page
Toronto Star — Africa Search Page
Washington Post — Africa Page
Yahoo News – Africa Page
General Background Resources
Africa Country Studies — U.S. Library of Congress
BBC News — Country Profiles
Bureau of African Affairs — U.S. Department of State
CIA World Factbook — U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Country Background Notes — U.S. Department of State
Flags of the World — U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Diplomatic Missions – U.S. Department of State
SWJ United Nations – Links
Reference Imagery — Google Earth
Reference Maps — U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Reference Maps — National Geographic Map Machine
Reference Maps — Relief Web
Reference Maps — United Nations
Reference Maps — University of Texas Perry-Castaí±eda Library
World Clock — Time Zones
