Small Wars Journal

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Now Posted

Fri, 05/16/2014 - 9:55am

Comments

Outlaw 09

Fri, 05/30/2014 - 6:43pm

In reply to by Bwilliams

No but the use of the Chechen Vostok BN with their ties to the GRU is and the use of the Russian Army drone shot down two days ago is as was the use of a Russian serial numbered MANPAD several of which have been already fired.

In addition the allowing by the Russian border guards the crossing of irregulars and weapons is as well.

Check the four phases and see where each of these fit in---it is not about the troops now it is about the Chechen irregulars and MANPADs and that is very much UW/IW.

http://inforesist.org/43-corpses-of-kadyrovits-have-been-buried-in-chec…

http://inforesist.org/80-militants-are-storming-the-border-service-depa…

http://inforesist.org/ukrainian-security-services-the-drone-which-was-s…

Move Forward

Wed, 05/28/2014 - 10:01am

In reply to by Outlaw 09

I continue to be impressed by your knowledge, but fear that you suffer from the "gotta hammer, everything looks like a nail" syndrome. SF is not the answer to everything. For all the great deeds you and yours performed in Vietnam, SF could not have held off the NVA or Viet Cong on their own, nor could they have stopped Tet, the '72 Easter offensive, or 1975 ground assault if our troops or airpower had still been around. Likewise, only heavy Russian armor could seize parts of Ukraine and other NATO countries. You greatly exaggerate the capabilities of Russian UW to change borders on its own when defended by NATO ground and air forces.

To illustrate, I've addressed each of your phases of new-generation war and how they might (not) work in west Ukraine.

<blockquote>The phases of new-generation war can be schematized as (Tchekinov & Bogdanov,
2013, pp. 15-22):
First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).</blockquote>How does any of this work in the rest of western Ukraine where election of a new leader, and actions to regain control in the East Ukraine, do not resemble a nation running scared or being overly influenced by a few Russian-separatist and/or supported troublemakers.
<blockquote>Second Phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.</blockquote>Such as proclamations that Russia was pulling back from the Ukraine border? Seems to me they tried that several times to an immediate U.S. response that implied that our satellites said otherwise.

<blockquote>Third Phase: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.</blockquote>Except that the new ruler is the chocolate king and an independently wealthy billionaire making him (unlike the previous clown) less likely to be influenced by a few scarce Russian dollars here and there.

<blockquote>Fourth Phase: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.</blockquote>Works in the east and maybe south. Not in the west where few Russian-separatists live. The discontent would result if pro-Russian folks and Russian forces took over west Ukraine starting a Ukrainian insurgency to counter the Russian one.

<blockquote>Fifth Phase: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.</blockquote> Here's one that NATO could squash if need be, particularly with F-22s and F-35s when fielded. They are the sole aircraft likely to survive Ukraine and Russian air defenses and SU-27 based aircraft. EA-18s might help other fourth generation aircraft to survive. Our and NATO's Navy could bluff and if needed threaten any blockade escorting ships to port.

Outlaw 09

Wed, 05/28/2014 - 9:04am

In reply to by Bill M.

Bill M---the new Russian strategy has two parts---the first is the core UW strategy expressed in their New Generation Warfare doctrine and the second piece which is really part of the UW strategy is the "parking" of a large scale well trained, equipped, and professionally led "full time" expeditionary army next to the border of the country selected in their view for a "political war" in order to gain whatever their stated end state is.

The stated end state right now is the reacquiring of the Crimea under a loose term of imperial ethnic nationalism and the same for eastern and southern Ukraine.

This form of imperial ethnic nationalism is defined by culture, language and history and could in fact be used to justify the same moves now or in the future towards the Baltics, Poland, Moldavia, and Georgia.

Via a portion of their new UW strategy they have in fact undermined the current Bulgarian government via corruption, oligarch business ties, and gas/oil. Why because it gives them influence on decisions made within the EU.

Russia has as well expanded the same type of UW strategy also against Slovakia and Romania using the Bulgarian model also to gain a disguised voice at the table in EU decisions. Which if one watches the EU sanction decisions Russia has been effective in neutering these three countries decision making abilities inside the EU meetings and coupled with the high level of dark funds flowing into the UK and Austria there Russia was to a degree also successful in countering EU decisions.

What makes this UW strategy actually quite powerful is that it is coupled to their national decision making and their foreign policy decision making---something we seriously lack.

Basically if one looks at the SF FM 3-05 there is a good start at least from a UW/IW perspective. What needs to happen is a thorough review of exactly what the new Russia UW strategy looks like doctrinally and what is for real playing out in the Ukraine/Crimea as the Ukraine is demonstrating the full range of the new Russian UW doctrine in full view via videos, news reports, actual photos and first hand accounts of those on the ground plus all the political events that are very open to analyze.

In fact if we do not fully understand that then we will never catch up to their level of UW.

Secondly, in this new type of UW US Army SF must take lead as the counter UW element on the ground---a lot of the fighting on the ground now in the east and south can be handled by well trained CUW US/Host Nation teams to "recover" buildings, kill or capture "senior leadership", and allow the national governance to function again as well as engaging the irregular forces and "war tourists". It is this form of CUW that fits perfectly with SF DA/CT missions---but here in this environment the total protection of the "radicalized population" is the utmost goal ,meaning SF DA/CT mission must be ultimately civilian causality free which takes DA/CT missions into a new realm for SF as these DA/CTs mission while eliminating irregular fighters and "war tourists" with as low as possible civilian loses greatly enhances the host nation in their direct dialogue with the population.

Together with these SF DA/CT mission sets must be a heavy old style SF Psywar support in the daily messaging aimed at the "radicalized population" both in TV/radio and print media---just as the Russians to it daily with their "so-called" journalists accompanying the irregular fighters and then releasing battle videos that are one sided and often total falsehoods.

Where the host nation is weak because their regular army was neglected for the last 23 years SF together with their special forces and ie internal security forces that have remained loyal can actually be the tipping point needed to "quieten down" the irregular side in order that the host nation can get into a dialogue with the "radicalized" population.

A BCT is a heavy hammer needed to be held in reserve as it is the force needed to keep an expeditionary army "parked" next door in check as well as sealing border areas to restrict the flow of arms and foreign fighters as a BCT has the man power to achieve this as a "blocking force".

By maintaining the "check" on the expeditionary army next door one takes a strong element of the Russian UW off the table giving the host nation a chance to recover and dialogue with the "radicalized population".

A BCT as well could provide their MP elements of which they really only have one company --actually via then COIN FM 3-24 assist in the rebuilding of the local police forces which have virtually disappeared out of bribes, corruption or fear giving another leg in the pyswar fight and providing the host nation also another chance to dialogue with the target population.

To do all of this requires an urgent review of the Russian UW strategy---my fear is that the new FM 3-24 will be used as a be all end all fig leaf cover going forward and it absolutely does in no way answer what we are seeing daily in the Ukraine.

There is currently no BCT in the Army active or reserve inventory trained to drop into an Ukrainian/Russian style UW environment as they to focus only on FM 3-24 because that is all they have been trained for and automatically will try to make it fit the Ukrainian UW environment--they simply do not know that FM 3-05 exists.

By trying to place a BCT into this new form of UW environment which is defined in the new FM 3-24 as an "insurgency" because the new FM forgot UW and IW--- is like trying to play pool with a jack hammer.

Example---here is a link to a poorly done Russian dis-information media report---just how would a BCT under the concept of a "whole of government" COIN approach get a response into the target population the same day that the Russians released their report---would never happen with our current IO military structures after we eliminated the SF Pyswar abilities due to COIN because the Army felt we would never be in a UW/IR environmet and COIN was the glowing light at the end of the tunnel going forward.

http://inforesist.org/russian-media-fabricating-evidence-again-accuses-…

Example---there were initial reports from last week that Chechen "fighters" from a right wing nationalist grouping which is actually fascist in nature was moving into the Ukraine---largely ignored by western media then presto they "arrived" by the truck loads (over 100) and they did not even bother to hide there faces or the fact they were carrying AK105s which is a truly Russian SF/GRU issue claiming to be the "defenders of the beat up on ethnic Russians" and they stated for Russia local media reporters on video that they were from Chechnya and five other Russian areas.

Today their Chechen leader claimed in Russian media his "fighters" are not in the Ukraine---but nine dead bodies in the local Donetsk morgue had IDs on them from Grozny---why was that not immediately beamed back into the "radicalized population"? As a "see" who is shooting up the neighborhood and terrorizing the local population and causing death and destruction---are they really you "defenders"? No one at least in the western media has taken notice of the issue of Chechnyians.

The use of "ethnic Russian foreign fighters and war tourists" is right out of the new Russian UW doctrine.

JMO----

Bill M.

Wed, 05/28/2014 - 5:01am

In reply to by Outlaw 09

Outlaw,

I haven't made it as far into the FM as I would have liked to by now, so I can't answer your questions on whether it provides enough context to enable a conventional unit and its leadership to plan and execute effective operations against the form of conflict we're witnessing in the Ukraine. My suspicion after reading the strategic context section is it won't, since it is largely based on colonial wars and our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is trite, banal, and lacking so far, but to be fair I'll read through it, because no doubt there will at least be some jewels of wisdom in the FM.

To be fair, SF grasps how the U.S. military conducts UW in accordance with its doctrine. Other nations and organizations are not obliged to follow our doctrine. For years SF and SOF in general have opposed embracing counter-UW as a core mission, which left the mission to the conventional force, and as you correctly point out most don't understand that form of conflict and are not the idea force to take the lead. I think we're beginning to witness a significant shift in the character of warfare in ways that will further limit us in responding with traditional military power. It is still a bit too new to describe it accurately, but certainly UW is a piece of it.

In your opinion, putting the COIN FM aside for now, do we have the doctrine necessary to counter Putin's operational approach to achieving his end in Ukraine (assuming we have the policy support to counter it), or does it need to be developed?

Outlaw 09

Tue, 05/27/2014 - 4:54pm

In reply to by Bill M.

Bill M---does anyone else find that this FM does nothing to address the issue of say the current Russian UW campaign in their political war with the Ukraine?

It does not really go into in any depth on irregular warfare other than a definition, nor really does it go into unconventional warfare with no definition thus in many aspects then how does it function as a doctrine to be used by a deploying BCT to say the Ukraine or the Baltics if needed to face a UW strategy being driven by an "equal adversary" not a "near peer" opponent.

From FM 3-24
Insurgency
1-3 page 1-1

Elements of a population often grow dissatisfied with the status quo. When a population or groups in a population are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they often initiate an insurgency. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself (JP 3-24).

Is this definition in fact what is occurring in the Ukraine? So is the ethnic Russian population an “insurgency” or in fact a “radicalized revolutionary population”---"radicalized" by an outside adversary using an UW strategy?

So just how does a BCT dropped into a true pure UW environment with a heavy dose of IW in this "radicalized environment" in say the Baltics with an "equal adversary" parked within 60kms of the border actually use this FM? Does this FM in that case even make sense?---can it in fact be even used and does the term COIN even apply to this scenario?

OR should in fact FM3-05 be considered as the led FM in UW scenarios not FM 3-24 or is big Army unprepared to follow US Army SF lead in say the Ukraine or the Baltics?

Fifth Dynamic—External Support
4-62. Historically, insurgencies are less likely to succeed without some form of external support. This support can be in the form of—
 Moral support.
 Political support.
 Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, training, and foreign fighters.
 Sanctuary, such as secure training sites, operational bases over a border, or protection from
extradition.

Irregular warfare mentioned five times in the FM.

1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s) (JP 1). Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Because of its irregular nature, U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency demands a whole-of-government approach. Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and military efforts that address both assisting the host-nation government in defeating the insurgents on the battlefield and enabling the host nation in addressing the root causes of the insurgency. Moreover, after large scale combat or in an ungoverned space, there may not be a functioning host-nation government. In those cases, U.S. forces must work with population groups in the area and enable them to build governmental capacity.

Is this not what the Ukrainian ethnic Russian “radicalized revolutionary population” is engaging in?

Unconventional warfare is mentioned six times and all reference FM 3-05-no explanation in the FM 3-24.

In this case, the insurgency is part of an adversary’s overall strategy and policy. (See FM 3-05, chapter 2, for more information on unconventional warfare. It provides a U.S. perspective on enabling an insurgency.)

Russian New Generation Warfare Phases---is not the current Russian activities in the Ukraine in fact an extension of their new UW strategy?

The phases of new-generation war can be schematized as (Tchekinov & Bogdanov,
2013, pp. 15-22):
First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).
Second Phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.
Third Phase: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.
Fourth Phase: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.
Fifth Phase: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

Bill M.

Tue, 05/27/2014 - 3:41am

In reply to by Bwilliams

1-2 In those cases U.S. forces must work with population groups in the area and enable them to build governmental capacity. (Maybe, maybe not, it depends on our objectives, the deals made prior to the combat operations, etc.)
1-14 Commanders must understand the effects actions and priorities of the U.S. force have on an operational area. (It would be nice, but probably not doable prior to operating and gaining that understanding largely in hindsight)
Commanders and staffs must assess the possibility of an insurgency in any operational environment and take actions to prevent one from occurring. (looking forward to seeing what the FM recommends on what actions the commander and staff must take to prevent an insurgency from starting)
1-30 the insurgency must be viewed from the perspective of the population experiencing those acts and not an outside perspective (yet our focus may ultimately be on an outside actor)
1-37 COIN forces must work with and share risks with HN forces (in some cases this is counter productive, but is relevant to OIF and OEF-A, so Bing is right the book focuses on OIF and OEF-A)
1.38 they must be able to shift operational tasks from capacity building to combat and back again in days, or even hours. (This very much depends on the situation, in fact we can train their forces in the U.S., Europe ore elsewhere outside the combat zone. The book constantly jumps between the U.S. doing COIN and conducting FID, so I can never quite tell the context)
1-83 To establish legitimacy, the affected government must strive to transition security activities from military authorities to HN law enforcement authorities as quickly as possible. (Really? One size fits all and all countries must do this? Even if their police is hopefully corrupt? Even the Army is the institution the people respect and trust? Even if the HN can't afford to beef the police up to address this task in addition to conducting law enforcement?)

Jumping ahead

7.47 Networked insurgencies must be understood and attacked. (What does this even mean?)

10-11 The population must identify with and trust their government. (uncomfortable for us, but insurgencies have been defeated by governments that elements of their population don't trust or identify with)

Table 11-1 A host-nation security force must be committed to the peaceful
transition of political power. (To what end? Not to defeat an insurgency, but to??)

I did a word search, the FM uses the word "must" 363 times. That seems out of the norm for a doctrinal manual, but I'll need to compare with others.

Bwilliams

Tue, 05/27/2014 - 1:53am

In reply to by Bill M.

What "thou shall" do you object to? I see a lot of "mays", but very few "thou shalls".

Bill M.

Mon, 05/26/2014 - 2:47pm

In reply to by Move Forward

MvF, My criticism of this particular chapter extends well beyond my comments above, and in many ways are a critique of our overall doctrinal approach. For example, the discussion on center of gravity was doctrinally correct, but of little relevance to COIN, and in my opinion of little relevance to most types of conflict. What it describes as direct and indirect in my opinion are both direct methods (one is faster than the other if it works), and assumes our objective is always to defeat an insurgency. We didn't defeat the insurgency in El Salvador, we prevented the insurgency from ousting the pro-U.S. government. Over time the USSR withdrew support from the FMLN and even then they ultimately achieved power through legal means. We don't necessarily have to defeat an insurgency to achieve our objectives if they're limited.

Para 1-4 is fairly well written, but could be improved. Instead of options to defeat an insurgency, I think options to contain, deter, disrupt, reduce the violence (peace operations or something along those lines) or even a non-doctrinal term such as alter the insurgency. As the text points out repeatedly it depends upon our ends. Throughout the text it isn't clear if this is a COIN or FID text, and this paragraph adds to that confusion. I got it, the threat at the end of the day is an insurgency, but there is big difference between the U.S. being in the lead (OIF, OEF-A at least initially) and our more common operational approach of providing support to an existing government (FID), where they remain in the lead. I think chapters (and perhaps the FM does this later) that separate these operational approaches would be useful for clarity, and help those who have experienced nothing beyond Afghanistan and Iraq how we support states manage (vice counter) an insurgency.

1-5 touches on this but the transition in this chapter frequently isn't clear.

1-6 is where I have serious concerns, because it tap dances around the necessity to form a military government after major combat operations. Ultimately we want to transition to an indigenous government, but in the vast majority of cases, if not all cases, after major combat operations where we remove the adversary government it is impossible for the effected nation to establish a government in the midst of chaos. We shouldn't shy away from our legal mandate to establish a military government and establish control, which gets after the requirement for the military to conduct shaping operations that help prevent the formation of an insurgency in the first place.

At the end of the day the answer always depends, and while the authors have said this, they then undermine this wisdom by implying thou shall throughout the following paragraphs. This chapter should be half its current size with a focus of understanding policy guidance, the operational environment, and the requirement to conduct a net assessment before conducting planning that is subordinate to policy, instead of misapplying supposed lessons from OIF and OEF-A.

Move Forward

Mon, 05/26/2014 - 11:41am

In reply to by Bill M.

Here are paragraphs 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, and 1-5 that Bill M mentioned:

<blockquote>1-1. Any decision by the President to commit United States (U.S.) forces must be understood within the larger sphere of U.S. policy. Soldiers and Marines must first understand the strategic context that the U.S. is acting in to best plan, prepare, conduct, and assess a counterinsurgency operation to protect national interests. Countering an insurgency should incorporate previous or continuing security cooperation efforts and other activities, U.S. and host-nation objectives, and U.S. and host-nation whole-of-government efforts to address the root causes of the conflict. (For more information on root causes, see paragraphs 4-14 through 4-22.) Despite its irregular nature and generally less intense level of combat, counterinsurgency may be just as critical to U.S. vital interests as conventional warfare.

1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s) (JP 1). Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ
the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Because of its irregular nature, U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency demands a whole-of-government
approach. Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and military efforts that address both assisting the host-nation government in defeating the insurgents on the battlefield and enabling the host nation in addressing the root causes of the insurgency. <strong>Moreover, after large scale combat or in an ungoverned space, there may not be a functioning host-nation government.</strong> In those cases, U.S. forces must work with population groups in the area and enable them to build governmental capacity. In either case, U.S. civilian and military participants in counterinsurgency cannot compensate for lack of will, acceptance of corruption, or counterproductive behavior on the part of the supported government or the population.</blockquote>

In para 1-1, not sure it is incorrect to state that both military and civilians authorities must address the root cause of the insurgency. That's why Iraq failed after we left. The Sunni-Shiite divide was never addressed fully. Maliki thwarted attempts at a coalition government with Sunnis.

Likewise, the light footprint initially in Afghanistan due to Iraq force commitments allowed the Taliban to make a quick comeback. The last sentence of para. 1-2 rings true for both "the government or the population" because the Pashtuns accepted the presence of the Taliban. The sentence that I bolded illustrates that the option of kicking booty and declaring victory is likely to fail because chaos and lack of any government or host nation military often follows the defeat. If we don't provide stability, the nation falls apart as we see now in Libya where we simply bombed and said "have a nice day."

<blockquote>1-4. Counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy. When counterinsurgents attempt to defeat an insurgency, they perform a range of diverse methods intended to counter an insurgency. Commanders must
effectively arrange these diverse methods in time and space to accomplish strategic objectives. The U.S. can use a range of methods to aid a host nation or group in defeating an insurgency. The various combinations of these methods with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range of strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses to enable those ways. (See paragraphs 1-10 through 1-13 for more information on strategy.)</blockquote>

<blockquote>1-5. There is a spectrum of involvement in countering an insurgency. The U.S. could enable a host nation by not providing forces that are directly involved in securing the population or attacking the insurgents. For example, the U.S. could provide training or intelligence support to a host nation. Moreover, even if the U.S. is directly involved in defeating the insurgency, its primary role can be only to enable a host nation. A host nation may be capable of providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a force into the host-nation’s efforts that provides a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or field artillery. U.S. involvement can range from a modest and supporting commitment to a major ground force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation forces become better able to take on that role themselves.</blockquote>

I'm not really seeing much wrong with paragraphs 1-4 or 1-5. If we aren't supporting the host nation, the new host nation<strong>s</strong> through creation of new states in old borders ala Balkanization, treaty commitments, or responses to terror or WMD-dangers it will look to the world like U.S. imperialism.

My initial critique of Chapter 1 FM 3-24 “Understanding the Strategic Context”

This chapter very much clung to the wrong to many of the wrong lessons from 10 plus years of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Everything in this chapter could be correct in some situations, but it is too often written as declarative in tone. The value of higher learning for our officers is it improves our ability think critically, not conform to group think or political correctness. The way this chapter is written it doesn't encourage the reader to think critically about policy, context, and an operational approach, but to more or less accept the principles in the previous version of the 3-24.

Paragraphs 1-1 implies we or the host nation must address the root causes of the insurgency. We should never automatically assume this is something we must do. Instead we should conduct an analysis of the situation, analyze our policy guidance, and conduct a net assessment of all the actors to include ourselves before we even start thinking about determining what we must do.

1-2 is bothersome because it assumes we don’t need a whole of government approach for all forms of warfare, not just irregular warfare.

1-4 correctly states there may be a number of ways to defeat an insurgency, but in the next para it states if the U.S. is directly involved in defeating the insurgency then its primary role is to enable the host nation. This is false logic, the government may be beyond enabling, and we generally conduct COIN to defeat or contain an insurgency that threatens our interests. Why get involved if it didn’t? If it threatens our interests and the government if beyond being enabled, then we should consider other options. Furthermore, Table 1-1 assumes our end is always to defeat an insurgency. This may be generally true, but I think another option is to simply protect (avoid letting it fall) the government we want to see stay in power. That simply means containing the insurgency so they can’t win, which can be much less resource intensive than going for the big win.

The part of this chapter that most concerns me is what the authors boldly called strategic principles.

1.78 states legitimacy is the main objective? The insurgency already implies the government is legitimate to a segment of its population, but unless it is mass uprising that segment is generally less than 15% (enough to present a serious insurgent threat). Again it depends on our policy aims and what higher strategic objectives our COIN effort nest with, but I would wager that legitimacy is always desired, but seldom required.

1-80 Intelligence drives operation is another trite saying not unlike it takes a network to defeat a network and we must build partner capacity. Intelligence frequently drives missions for targeting specific individuals, but that is far from driving all operations. The force will conduct broader stability operations, CA, and MISO, and stability patrols, etc. These will be ops driven and inform the intelligence community.

A lot of other concerns with prevention, surging, etc.

Bwilliams

Sat, 05/24/2014 - 4:00pm

In reply to by Bill C.

That is a rather self centered means to see every insurgency in the world. Many insurgencies have absolutely nothing to do with us. Nagaland, minus the role of Christianity, has nothing to do with us. However, policy makers could decide India's stability is in the interests in the United States. We have many capabilities (Counter threat finance, intel capabilities, etc) that we could use to enable India and that are low risk for the United States.

Bill C.

Fri, 05/23/2014 - 7:04pm

In reply to by Bwilliams

I do not wish the JP or the FM to make policy decisions.

What I am suggesting is that we may need different JPs and FMs -- re: insurgencies/counterinsurgencies -- to adequately accommodate, for example, the two classic policy decisions, to wit:

a. "Expand the Franchise" and

b. "Hold What Ya Got."

First, let us consider where Nagaland looks best to "fit" re: these different scenarios.

Nagaland, it would seem, looks to best fit under the (primary?) "Expand the Franchise" category. This, because Nagaland, it appears, has never actually been "transformed" along modern western political, economic and social lines.

This makes Nagaland an "outlier," to wit: an entity that (in the eyes of the governments of both India and the United States) requires further "transformation" along such modern western lines.

In this scenario (Expand the Franchise), the job is often seen as one of (1) holding the population down so that (2) the present, more-independent way of life of the population (tribal; homesteading; agriculture) can be marginalized and (3) the population made to become more dependent upon our modern way of life (thus, made to become more dependent upon the state, manufacturing, trade, commerce, services, etc.).

[In the alternative Scenerio Number Two (Hold What Ya Got), the portion of the population that is rebelling -- generally speaking -- is one that, long ago, was significantly "transformed" along modern western political, economic and social lines.]

Thus, and as to your thoughts above, I hope that my discussion here -- re: Nagaland -- helps answer these questions.

Bwilliams

Thu, 05/22/2014 - 11:06pm

In reply to by Bill C.

What about the current FM does not meet your alternative? What about the FM would disallow supporting India in Nagaland, for example? Would not, in supporting India in Nagaland, the likely goal be stabilization and partnership with a possible essential player in the the region and the world and have little to do with the transformation of the world?

You seem to want the FM to make policy decisions. The guys you elect do that. However, the military should have some framework for dealing with what policy makers decide is in American interest. There can be a wide range of reasons why they could decide defeating an insurgency is in the interest of the United States.

Scenario One: (We'll call this the "Expand the Franchise" scenario):

If the West, led by the United States, continues to be embarked upon a worldwide campaign to transform "different" states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines,

And if men and women inside these outlying states and societies continue to be determined to not allow such foreign (and, in their eyes, essentially profane) changes to take place,

Then, within this context:

a. What is the cause of the resulting global/networked insurgency?

b. Who are the insurgents/the aggrieved parties?

c. Who are the counterinsurgents (the parties responsible for addressing the grievances of these insurgents)?

With the above as our starting point, now let us write JPs and FMs which will provide us with broad guidelines needed to deal with such 21st Century insurgencies.

Scenario Two: (We'll call this the "Hold What Ya Got" scenario):

If the West, led by the United States, has -- for the time being -- abandoned the idea of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines,

And has opted (due to various constraints), instead, to adopt a more Cold War-like approach to its foreign policy (contain the bad guys/retain as many of the states and societies that it have already been transformed as is possible),

Then, within this context and scenerio:

a. What would most likely be the cause of insurgency?

b. Who would, most likely, be the insurgents/the aggrieved parties? And

c. Who, in this instance, would be the counterinsurgents (to wit: the party[ies] responsible for addressing the grievances of these insurgents)?

With the above alternative scenario as our starting point, now let us produce JPs and FMs which will provide us with the broad guidelines needed to deal effectively with such -- alternative -- 21st Century insurgencies.

Outlaw 09

Mon, 05/19/2014 - 6:58am

In reply to by Bwilliams

Bwilliams---one of the more serious issues with the FM is the following---while you mentioned one might stretch the FM to cover "irregular warfare" the FM actually does not take into consideration exactly what "irregular warfare" (IW) really is all about.

From COIN FM page 1-1 the following;

1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s) (JP 1)

If you then compare that statement to the US Army SF (2008) FM for Irregular Warfare there are inherently then two distinct definitions which to be me is not a good thing.

3-79. In contrast, IW focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Ultimately, IW is a political struggle with violent and nonviolent components. The struggle is for control or influence over and the support of a relevant population. The foundation for IW is the centrality of the relevant populations to the nature of the conflict. The parties to an IW conflict, whether states or armed groups, seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility. They seek to physically and psychologically isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.
3-80. IW operations also employ subversion, coercion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a relevant population.

If we now look at the Ukraine then using the COIN FM's definition of IW then could we even be sent into a Ukraine like scenario to conduct COIN or better is the COIN doctrine and it's FM even relevant to Ukrainian like scenarios.

I would argue that the "new republics" at least held an election so therefore their actions could not really be defined as "violent" as they would argue they are "legally" breaking away from the existing government which they feel does not any longer represent them.

So under the new COIN FM how could in fact the US deploy a BCT into a so called COIN environment if there is no violent activity being directed against the government ie armed "new republic" self defense groups are attacking either the government on government soil or attacking the government's army/security units or supporting an armed insurgency on the actual soil of the existing government when one excludes the "new republics" who held in their eyes "legal" elections as being under the definition of an "insurgency"?

Thus if there is no "insurgency or violent IW" can a BCT be deployed to a Ukrainian like environment---no not really.

The "new republics" would and are actually today arguing they are defending themselves from attacks by the government on their own territory/soil after they declared themselves to be independent and it is the government that is the aggressor/insurgent acting violently on their own soil.

How could a BCT then using the FM fight an IW where there is both violent and non violent actions in play if the FM's definition of IW is so vague and weak?

Example---an self defense attack team is caught by the national military attempting to fire a MANPAD against aircraft at a local airfield and there are two Russian "journalists" filming the action---both are evidently military aged and fit and do not appear to be your normal run of the mill "journalists" rather potential GRU or SOF into officers working in civilian colthes.

Now the Russian government via their Foreign Minister is shouting "release our journalists as it is a violation of international rights and defeats the purpose of freedom of the press" and have asked the OCSE to get involved in the release of "journalists".

How is that BCT then under the FM to act as now they have irregular fighters from an "independent via fair elections" republic, MANPADS, "journalists" and the Russian foreign Ministry creating an international uproar? for that matter why are they on the soil of the "new republics" since "free and fair elections were held"?

Yes we tend to do something similar (but nowhere close) in say a DATE training scenario but never to the degree of that actual event which occurred yesterday involves.

Defining doctrine in ways that do not fit got us into trouble in Iraq and AFG and it seems everyone wants to make COIN be an end all be all doctrine.

Right now the Ukrainian scenario should be a wake up call yet I do not see that happening as it directly challenges our preconceived success ideas around COIN based on our 13 years of war.

Outlaw 09

Sun, 05/18/2014 - 3:50pm

In reply to by Bwilliams

Bwilliams---are you really sure that the FM truly addresses really what is being seen in the Ukraine ie irregular warfare not an insurgency which the FM is targeted against.

If we now look at that Robert Jones writes here about a "revolutionary population" the ethnic Russian population has been as part of the Russian UW strategy "radicalized" and thus is responding to outside influences as a population inside that population are now irregular fighters, "war tourists", mercenaries and active Russian SF and GRU types.

So in fact while Putin in the article "appears" to be pulling back--really look at the first five phases of the Russian New Generation Warfare and you will see that pull backs are a given if necessary as it is the end state Putin wants and he will not give up the end state as he voiced it himself "New Russia".

One thing that is a given Putin does not misspeak himself when he gives a public speech.

One also has to realize that if he does not continue to "fulfill" the ethnic nationalism that grips right now his own population he runs the risk of going down in Russian history as a failure for not bringing back into the "empire" all ethnic Russians or as he states "New Russia".

He has already started the process of telling his population that they will isolated and he will blame the West for everything they will be going through including economic hardships if needed.

Why is this not understood in DC?

Read the last paragraph and you will notice an intense similarity with the Russian New Generation Warfare eight Phases.

"The ancient Sun Tzu is more relevant today; although battles should be won, “winning 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill; defeating the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” There is more than one way to compel an enemy."

“This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origins-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him…it requires in those situations where we must counter it…a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.”1
-President John F. Kennedy, 1962

USASF FM Irregular Warfare

3-79. In contrast, IW focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Ultimately, IW is a political struggle with violent and nonviolent components. The struggle is for control or influence over and the support of a relevant population. The foundation for IW is the centrality of the relevant populations to the nature of the conflict. The parties to an IW conflict, whether states or armed groups, seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility. They seek to physically and psychologically isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.
3-80. IW operations also employ subversion, coercion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a relevant population.

What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations (a relevant population), its strategic purpose (to gain or maintain control or influence over), and the support of that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods. Creating and maintaining an enduring, functioning state requires the government to be legitimate in the eyes of the population.

This is what the Ukraine is all about and the FM does not cover that and interpreting a para or stretching a para to fit the event is a bad precedent.

Would rather see a national level UW and counter UW strategy-something that by the way was missing in "COIN".

By the way---this is a open source report that came into the Ukrainian media today---does it sound like that Putin is giving way as your quoted article seems to imply he will---actually not he is shifting to the true irregular warfare now. It is the end state and has been always the end state that he seeks---he calculates "costs" differently than we do in the West.

In recent days there was a transfer of communication specialists FSO RF to the Ukrainian border. Roman Burko wrote about this on his Facebook page.

“Our sources in the Defence Ministry reported that in recent days there has been fixed transfer of FSO RF communications specialists to the Ukrainian border. Russian special signallers transferred to the Russian border town of Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, which is near the border checkpoint “Izvarino” in town Krasnodon, Luhansk region; there pro-Russian militants have already established two checkpoints, which are blocking the main roads from Ukraine.

The way from the Russian territory through “Izvarino” in Krasnodon is fully open to smuggling of arms and transfer of Russian fighters. It is noteworthy that the main task of the FSO specialists, which are transferred to Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, apart from organization of SCS is opto-electronic reconnaissance of the ground using UAVs,” – says Roman.

“These border towns require increased attention from the ATO. If these arteries are not closed then the violent conflict in the Donbas will be constantly fed by new terrorist forces from the Russian Federation!” – added journalist.

“In addition to town Krasnodon in Krasniy Lutch district of Luhansk region there is also a problem with a border zone. There was a break through of 6 KAMAZ and 1 URAL vehicles with arms and people,” – he reminded.

This link tends to go against the quoted article.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/a-paradigm-shift-in-russi…

Bwilliams

Sun, 05/18/2014 - 10:20am

In reply to by Outlaw 09

What Russia is doing in the Ukraine is failing because it isn’t in Russian interests. The uncertainty caused by his actions has caused a massive decline in the MICEX and a decrease in the Russian ruble. A further escalation would destabilize the Russian economy. Russian troops have not advanced, even with clashes between separatist and Ukrainian military and a bogus vote to secede (or at least a vote that dramatically contradicts the best available poll: http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/despite-concerns-about-governance-u… ) . All of a sudden, Putin now supports the upcoming Presidential election.

As Max Fisher puts it,

http://www.vox.com/2014/5/16/5717674/obamas-plan-to-let-putin-hang-hims…

<blockquote>The lesson that Putin is learning is that Russia depends on the global economy, whether it likes it or not, and the global economy doesn't like it when you go invading other countries and tempting the richest nations in the world to maybe consider sanctioning you. This is actually a significant change for Russia, which at the height of its Soviet power was not integrated into the global economy and so didn't have to worry about things like investor sentiment. But now it is and it does.</blockquote>

I don’t buy for a second that this is some great plan and there is nothing we can do about it. I think this is a fundamentally stupid thing for Russia to do and it will fail because it is doesn't take into account the strategic environment.

Nor do I think the United States (or its allies) are mystified by these actions. They may have been surprised by them. But they aren't mystified. The path they are following is for two reasons. One is that there isn’t the political will to do a more robust response. Second, it will fall apart anyway for the reasons above. Just let it.

The question as it relates to FM 3-24 is, does the new doctrine provide some framework for the military understanding and acting, if the United States did decide it wanted a more robust response? I would argue it does. First, the FM does recognize there is a range of capabilities the United States can integrate to enable a host nation to defeat an insurgency. It does not doctrinally suggest the only solution is the industrial age counterinsurgency effort of Iraq. Perhaps more importantly, it fully recognizes the importance of an outside actor fueling an insurgency (For example, see 1-18, 4-62 to 4-64, and 7-21). I am not sure what else you would want to see from counterinsurgency doctrine in relation to a situation like the Ukraine. Doctrine on tactical missions one might perform, perhaps. However, that is in other doctrine.

Move Forward

Sun, 05/18/2014 - 10:02am

In reply to by Outlaw 09

Shchors and Outlaw,

The May 11th “New Republic” had an article titled “The Battle in Ukraine Means Everything” by Timothy Snyder, a Yale History professor. Recommend skipping the first weird paragraph to get into the history and current events lessons. It casts great doubt on the notion that any amount of Russian propaganda and UW could convert the Ukrainian majority to rejoin the Russian sphere of influence.

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117692/fascism-returns-ukraine

<blockquote>In late 2013 and early 2014, the attempt to bring Ukraine within the Eurasian orbit produced exactly the opposite result. First, Russia publicly dissuaded Yanukovych from signing a trade agreement with the European Union. This brought protests in Ukraine. Then Russia offered a large loan and favorable gas prices in exchange for crushing the protests. Harsh Russian-style laws introduced in January transformed the protests into a mass movement. Millions of people who had joined in peaceful protests were suddenly transformed into criminals and some of them began to defend themselves against the police. Finally, Russia made clear that Yanukovych had to rid Kiev of protesters in order to receive its money. Then followed the sniper massacre of February, which gave the revolutionaries a clear moral and political victory, and forced Yanukovych to flee to Russia. <strong>The attempt to create a pro-Russian dictatorship in Ukraine led to the opposite outcome: the return of parliamentary rule, the announcement of presidential elections, and a foreign policy oriented toward Europe.</strong>

This made the revolution in Ukraine not only a disaster for Russian foreign policy, but a challenge to Putin’s regime at home.</blockquote>

In addition, the article's history lesson about how Ukraine faired under Soviet and German control from 1922 through 1991 indicates a nation not ready to return to control by anyone other than Ukrainians. The article points out that 3 million Ukrainians were starved in the 1930s as the Soviets diverted grain for its own uses in the east. The Germans planned similar diversions of Ukrainian grain in the opposite direction with predictions that up to 30 million Soviets could be starved. During WWII, the Soviets and Ukrainians initially sided with the Germans before the 1941 betrayal at which time most Ukrainians fought with the Soviets with some 6 million dying “on the territory of today’s Ukraine.” The article emphasizes this saying:

<blockquote>More Ukrainians were killed fighting the Wehrmacht than American, British, and French soldiers—combined.</blockquote>

However that does not mean the Ukrainians favored the Soviets after the war or that Stalin displayed any gratitude. Ukraine evolved into a pluralistic society with loyalties to both Western Europe and the Soviets. Even more importantly, 90% of Ukrainians voted for independence in December 1991. The article mentions that most of today’s Ukrainian politicians were children during the 70s under Leonid Brezhnev:

<blockquote>Rather than subordinating Ukraine by hunger or blaming Ukrainians for war, the Brezhnev policy was to absorb the Ukrainian educated classes into the Soviet humanist and technical intelligentsias. As a result, the Ukrainian language was driven from schools, and especially from higher education. Ukrainians who insisted on human rights were still punished in prison or in the hideous psychiatric hospitals.</blockquote>

In this context, viewing events of the Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions, and recalling the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of one province in WWII, Putin must realize that the Ukrainians would continue to resist were force to be used in subduing all or even major parts of Ukraine. Russian pipelines to the rest of Europe would be at grave risk from insurgents. Is Putin that dumb? I doubt it. His best bet is probably to hold his Crimea gains and wait it out a few years until his next excuse for conquest presents itself….hopefully not in a NATO state.

Outlaw 09

Sun, 05/18/2014 - 4:34am

In reply to by Shchors

Shchors---your comment is interesting for a number of reasons and it applies to the FM being discussed here.

The FM has a strong section on culture and the US Army spent millions on training Iraqi and AFG culture but did not get us anywhere in either country? No not really.

Again my main concern is that the UW aspects of the current Russian doctrine while appearing old are actually a matching of the "old" with the "new" meaning the 19th century together with the 21st century and it works.

Why because we in the West stopped looking at such things like "nationalism", "fascism" after 1994 and did not take into consideration of the concept of "revolutionary populations" that started with the wars of liberation in Africa.

Actually we the US military/national leaders are extremely shy about discussing the terms "nationalism, fascism, and revolutionary populations" openly in our officer education systems and publications or in TV interviews out of DC.

We talk about the radicalization of the Sunnis via Salafists and Takfiri's but we do not talk about massive propaganda getting a target population to completely think in a different direction even in the face of total reality.

The Russians fully understand their target populations as the comment below suggests and they fit their strategy to that population until it reach's a "revolutionary population" level then they sit back and just nudge it in the "right" direction.

Example of this type of "radicalization". We use to have a robust psy-war capability with USASF but for some strange reason the Army decided to go the commercial I/O route which uses layers and layers of decision making again due to the "experiences of COIN".

http://inforesist.org/fake-russian-channel-1-in-a-report-about-slovyans…

This comment came from a leader Union leader in Donetsk and goes to explaining what I mean---and where in the FM is that being handled if an Army unit is requested to support such a population against an active UW political warfare campaign.

"Unfortunately, we Slavs, do not learn from mistakes of others, we always learn from our own and then beat the one who warned that we should not have done so. No, we will beat him up. First we will beat him for telling the truth and then if he survives we will beat him for not convincing us."

Right now the ethnic Russians in the east and south of the Ukraine are in that exact situation and no one in the West fully understands exactly how to address the comment---and believe me the answer is not to be found in the FM as we did not see that exact comment anywhere in the last 13 years of our "COIN" war experience.

The old US Army in the 50/60/70s did with Special Forces fully understood it but then the regular Army decided to "destroy" USASF in the 70s and that deep depth of UW knowledge was forced into history and now it is hard to recover that institutional knowledge base when surprise, surprise history starts repeating itself ie via the new Russian doctrine.

We the US never seem to develop a long term memory about anything these days.

Shchors

Sun, 05/18/2014 - 12:15am

Not my intention to divert the discussion regarding the new Army pub, but note that what the Russians are doing today in Eastern Ukraine is not new. They simply dusted off their old playbook from 1919 when the Bolsheviks sent "little green men" into Ukraine along the same axes of advance as today. In January 1919, Bolshevik Moscow needed grain and decided to seize Ukraine from a recently imposed upstart nationalist government that arose following a peasant revolt. However, following the signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to end WWI with Imperial Germany, they could not use the Red Guards/Red Army as the invasion force. Otherwise, the Bolshies would have been breaching the treaty. Consequently, they organized a faux Ukrainian invasion force, the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Division, and sent it secretly over the border into north and east Ukraine to liberate the Ukrainian proletariat from the bourgeoisie. Their plan was to subvert the Ukrainian peasant conscripts of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic with Communist slogans ("land to the peasants"). In essence, they pulled off a relatively bloodless invasion, where printing presses and agitators forced the Ukes to melt away before nary a shot was fired. This was, first and foremost, a propaganda war that utilized class struggle and the similarity between the Ukrainian and Russian languages. This time around, most of the Ukrainians live in cities and have had 24 years of relative democratic rule. We will have to see whether Putin will be able to pull off a similar bloodless invasion this time around (assuming he decides to invade). By the way, the commander of the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Division was one Mykola Shchors.

Move Forward

Mon, 05/19/2014 - 9:49am

In reply to by Bwilliams

No comments on Chapter 5 and 6 which look great. You guys did a fine job in this high profile mission with no doubt lots of “advice”:). I wrote doctrine for a few years and have been amazed at how quickly the ADPs/ADRPs also got generated.

Chapter 7 Minor edit recommendations:

Figure 7-1, decisionmaking misspelled in bottom right of diagram in “Develop the Plan” circle

Paragraph 7-26: “of” left out of lines of effort at start of first sentence

Paragraph 7-34, “asses” spelled wrong in second sentence

Paragraph 7-63 Consider shortening second sentence (delete “in insurgent-controlled or contested areas”) to avoid duplicating the first sentence of 7-64

Para 7-68, Consider adding two more bullets “Ensuring outposts are defensible from adjacent direct fires” and “Ensuring outposts are sustainable via trafficable and prudent-risk air and ground routes”

The last two bullet recommendation were primary issues at both Wanat and COP Keating that had poor road networks (and none at COP Bella that precipitated the new Wanat COP) and vulnerable LZs in valley COPs.

As for content, para. 7-70, has this passage:

<blockquote>Counterinsurgents make maximum use of special equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected areas and routes. Firepower and combat forces, with air assault capabilities, should be prepared to quickly attack identified targets. Because remote area operations can stress the capability of land forces to make rapid responses, commanders can mitigate risk by coordinating with joint enablers for close air support, tactical airdrops, information collection, communications relays, and personnel recovery forces.</blockquote>

The above quote partially answers Charles Dunlap’s concerns. It also is a response to those who insist a light footprint is always an option, even in large AOs. In large areas the size of Afghanistan and Iraq, FOBs and airfields close enough for vertical lift and CAS/CCA support are essential to protect isolated counterinsurgents. Often an airborne B-1B, F/A-18E/F, F-16, or F-35 may be a better initial and CAS Stack response vs. slower A-10s and Apaches far from the outpost. A long endurance UAS/RPA also offers an initial response when armed and in relative proximity.

Para 7-71 also may need to emphasize that fast movers and other UAS/RPA may be restrained from providing CAS due to risks of border crossings. Also consider adding a final sentence: “Advise the host nation that imposing laws limiting local export of regulated goods or illicit drugs may create tensions and open conflict with counterinsurgents.” This was thought to be a source of conflict at Wanat and Korengal with gem and lumber export restrictions imposed.

Operational Design appears overemphasized in Chapter 7. Couldn’t there be an alternative of a METT-TC analysis with ASCOPE emphasis and PMESII-PT analysis of the mission and operational variables for higher echelons as an abbreviated mission analysis followed by a task and purpose? In planning at lower echelons, what is the equivalent to troop-leading procedures in Operational Design since execution of some lines of effort occurs at company level and below?

<blockquote>Also, constant engagement of key leaders with the population is essential to enhancing understanding of the population and understanding of the counterinsurgency. Understanding the problem and having key leaders engage the population may be more important than having a large number of troops.</blockquote>

Yet leading up to Wanat, several KLEs led to several ambushes after the fact. Wanat’s COP also was far too close to the village it was supporting. At COP Keating, the primary Kamdesh population center was atop the mountain while the COP was in the valley below susceptible to surrounding direct fire. At Ganjgal, a KLE that actually was an ambush led to those deaths and two Medals of Honor. The whole notion that junior leaders (Lieutenants and junior Captains) should act as diplomats is somewhat counterproductive when an Afghan elder whose culture emphasizes his prominence is being “engaged” by someone in his twenties.

In Iraq, it seemed like more senior leaders dealt with fewer, senior tribal sheiks. In Afghanistan, far too many isolated smaller villages had local chiefs and no apparent central tribal authority responsible for multiple areas. The idea of KLEs led by junior leaders with limited or no diplomatic training may depend on the culture and demographics of the area.

Numerous bigger cities such as in Iraq favor senior leaders dealing with fewer local authorities. Areas with similar-sized but more dispersed rural populations like Afghanistan may still have KLEs. However, not sure it is a great idea for the U.S. to force the issue going long distances to them and getting ambushed afterwards. Let them come to us and then it does not seem like a forced issue with junior U.S. leaders telling elders and clerics what to do.

Bwilliams

Sun, 05/18/2014 - 10:34am

In reply to by Move Forward

The Army Publishing Directorate did not send the FM back to be proofed before it went online. That is why w was able to make that one change like that(and a few others).

That said, I think I will suggest we put in for a change 1 to the document before I leave doctrine land in June. Take care of some of these other problems and any others people point out.

Move Forward

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 1:24pm

In paragraph 4-7 in the last sentence, add the word <strong>is</strong> between” it” and “a” in the highlighted area:

<blockquote>The main point of a coup d’état is that <strong>it a </strong> means to change a regime by actors who are part of the government.</blockquote>

In Paragraph 4-32 in the bottom third speaking indirectly about opium exports from Afghanistan or cocaine from Columbia, etc., "insurgencies" is misspelled:

<blockquote>These types of <strong>insurgences</strong> are more likely to develop networked organizations with connections to criminal organizations or other insurgent groups with similar interests.</blockquote>

A final edit recommendation is in paragraph 4-64 to change the word “eternal” to “external”:

<blockquote> Limiting <strong>eternal</strong> support provides one means to affect an insurgency indirectly.</blockquote>

BTW, if a hiring authority I applied for a GS Technical Editor job at the National Ground Intelligence Center and for an Intelligence Specialist (ICD) position at ARCIC. Look for MQ-1C in the resume. Now for miscellaneous comments on substance, in paragraph 4-49 this quote is in its last sentence:

<blockquote>Organizations dependent on key charismatic personalities to provide cohesion and motivation
for their movement are vulnerable to disruptions if those leaders are co-opted or killed.</blockquote>

This statement under a “First Dynamic-Leadership” is why UAS/RPA strikes are effective. Educated, charismatic leaders are not easily replaced nor are key technical skills such as bomb-makers. Even if new insurgents are created by UAS/RPA strikes, they are not nearly as important to the cause as lost leaders and technical skills. This is also why insurgents assassinate effective political and military leaders that are part of or cooperate with host nation governments and external counterinsurgents. This is why green zones and bodyguards exist and why State Department and USAID civilians do not want to venture from safe zones (or volunteer to come) while the military will.

In paragraph 4-56 under the caption “Third Dynamic-Objectives” there is this statement:

<blockquote>In the example of the attack on the convoy, the operational objective might be to prevent logistic support of host-nation forces. When insurgents achieve various operational goals, they can achieve the strategic end state of their insurgency.</blockquote>

This applies to more than just COIN. This is one basis for the concept of A2/AD and its intersection with the need for prepositioning, FOBs, COPs, and safe airfields and ports. Those who argue that FOBs and COPs should not be used don’t recognize how that would complicate sustainment and increase force structure in theater. Missile and IDF defense are inherent in the creation of safe FOBs and COPs and it is more realistic to provide such support for a few FOBs rather than multiple tactical assembly areas easily identified and then targeted via future insurgent and lesser nation precision munitions.

HESCO and bunkers mitigate damage to ground forces from distant missile attack or local IDF that does get through whereas expensive stealth aircraft and large ships in port are more susceptible. Helicopters and F-35B can disperse off large airfields to hide using airfields primarily for major maintenance and perhaps refueling. A2/AD also is an argument for armor active defenses from top attack and new laser tactical weapons. Even with FOBs and COPs, concepts such as the Marine K-MAX UAS and driverless supply vehicles make sense to limit logistical support in theater. From a strictly cold-hearted monetary analysis, the pay-out for a driver killed or severely injured via an IED will easily pay for the driverless or UAS resupply capability—and save lives and limbs.

Then go on to the next paragraph 4-57:

<blockquote>4-57. A strategic objective is the movement’s overall political goal or desired end state. An insurgency will seek to—
* Force significant political, economic, or religious change.
* Overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power.
* Generate resistance to outside occupiers or change within a society.
* Nullify government control in an area.
* Cause a region to secede.</blockquote>

If truly objective in examining these bullets, they are not automatically unreasonable desires. These are areas that the State Department and National Command Authority should consider in rare future cases where a U.S. and allies attack or defend in a failed state area with follow-on and concurrent stability operations. This is where national boundaries and/or a federalist system make sense when the U.S. military has control prior to elections and handover to new host nation authorities. In lesser insurgency cases of existing governments with effective military forces, only diplomatic pressure and sanctions may apply along with SF irregular warfare.

From paragraph 4-66, is further evidence of the problem of say Pashtun areas on both sides of an international border that subscribe to Pashtunwali and therefore often will allow Taliban to operate in their areas. It also is an argument for a separate Pashtunistan within Afghan borders, Kurdistan and Anbaristan in Iraq...but too late now:

<blockquote>Passive supporters do not report insurgents to local counterinsurgent forces out of sympathy for the cause, antigovernment sentiment, reluctance to get involved due to peer pressure, threats of violence, or the benefits that the insurgency provides.</blockquote>

I would argue that allowed secessions and redrawn borders while the U.S./Allies are in charge would eliminate many of these nicely articulated symptoms in paragraph 4-68:

<blockquote>4-68. When analyzing the type and amount of support an insurgency has, possible indicators are:
* Reduction in local medical supplies or personnel absent from clinics and hospitals.
* Increased black market activities and extortion for resources.
* Increased theft or purchase of food and gas.
* New presence of bodyguards.
* New areas in which the local police are growing reluctant to patrol or conduct operations.
* New or increased interaction with local civilian leaders by insurgents.
* Intelligence confirming the presence of insurgents in areas where people gather and
communicate.
* Increased assassinations of those opposing insurgents or for symbolic value to frighten locals
* A drop in the number of walk-ins and tips due to fear of retribution.
* A rise in the reluctance of local civilians to be seen talking with counterinsurgent forces.
* An increase in the absence of local reconstruction crews, police, and military or a decrease in
their willingness to be associated with counterinsurgent forces or to leave their families.
* Suspension of local government or community meeting and events.</blockquote>

Under the caption Seventh Dynamic—Phasing and Timing, there is an interesting discussion about the three phases of an insurgency: latent and incipient, guerilla warfare, and the war of movement. The last of the three would be if Pakistan supported a full scale attack on Afghanistan after we depart or the historical example of the 1975 conventional invasion of South Vietnam.

I confess to not reading the Eighth Dynamic- Organizational and Operational Patterns and paragraphs 4-76 through 4-103 because it essentially involved Design for 8 pages to include the wiring diagrams.

Move Forward

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 9:32am

Others here should exploit this opportunity to edit and comment on this manual. For instance, edits have already been made to Chapter 1 based on earlier comments about redundancy that must have been read here in the SWJ comments. Here is another minor Chapter 2 passage needing edits:

<blockquote>2-14. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.</blockquote>

Note the same sentence listed twice in the above quote.

As for substance that we won’t influence but can still argue about :), under the Social section of the PMESII-PT Operational Variables that is said to include cultural, religious, and ethnic factors, paragraph 2-32 contains the following “Danger Will Robinson “ (“Lost in Space” for the younger troops) statement:

<blockquote>A society usually has a dominant culture, but it can have secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures, as Canada and the U.S. do.</blockquote>

One comment would be that we have an extensive Hispanic population in the U.S. so why are we only comparing similarities between Americans and their northern neighbors. What about those in Quebec? Next, go to Silicon Valley and see if traditional caucasian culture is dominant there. Then compare the fewer remaining white guys/gals there to folks in the south or northeast. Are their cultures the same? Adjust the median income and education of any particular American of whatever color. Which cultures and demographics are "dominant" in which areas? Yet in the U.S. we all get along to include the multiple Indians, Pakistanis, and other Asians in Silicon Valley who might be at each other’s throats in other areas.

Now go to other operational environments where the income and education disparities remain and ethnic and religious cultural differences are far more prevalent and not accommodated by law and practice. The term culture itself is pretty ambiguous as we find in the manual's attempt to define it:

<blockquote>3-3. There are many definitions of culture in use by the United States (U.S.) military. As a starting point, this publication understands culture is a <strong>web of meaning</strong> shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.</blockquote>

This definition of the term “culture” is pretty confusing. Contrast the paragraph 3-3 definition with this far more clear one off the internet:

<blockquote>cul•ture
• noun \ˈkəl-chər\
• : the beliefs, customs, arts, etc., of a particular society, group, place, or time
• : a particular society that has its own beliefs, ways of life, art, etc.
• : a way of thinking, behaving, or working that exists in a place or organization (such as a business)</blockquote>

Then when you already are confused you read this in paragraph 3-4:

<blockquote>To be successful, commanders and staffs consider four fundamental aspects of culture when planning and executing military operations:

• Culture influences how people view their world.
• Culture is holistic.
• Culture is learned and shared.
• Culture is created by people and can and does change.</blockquote>

Each bullet’s explanation makes sense but I’m not sure it is a Soldier’s duty to learn in detail about or attempt to influence culture which is the implication of bullets 3 and 4. The learned and shared bullet implies a lifetime of parental and local influence that indoctrinates host nation and/or insurgent youth into ways of thinking. That is why youth become suicide bombers and jihadists after brain-washing in a madrassa or schools of the Gaza Strip.

The internet, TV, and things like the Arab Spring-turned-Fall (of governments) can alter culture but is cultural change deemed an objective of our military and is the "Arab Fall" always beneficial both internally and externally? Can most troops recognize the unique cultural influences of civilians they encounter often from afar particularly since it may vary substantially from person to person in a village, valley, and ethnicity or religious group in conflict with others in the same proximity.

How is the Soldier to know automatically who believes what in any encounter? For example, from afar is the Ukrainian a Russian favoring separatist or someone who wants to remain part of Ukraine? How can the interpreter fully be trusted to properly translate what all parties are saying particularly if two languages are involved and his proficiency is limited in one. If an interpreter is required, why not just use a host nation Soldier/Leader from the same ethnicity group or culture? Why are U.S. Soldiers playing diplomat if we aren’t completely sure a junior ANSF trooper who may speak the lingo can be taught to do the same?

Now don’t get me wrong, I’ve actually taught the cultures and make-up of different ethnicities in Afghanistan to Soldiers. I’ve taught in “crawl-stage” how cultural influences affected particular OEF battles using simulated “walk-stage” battle reenactments to include “run-stage” interactive simulation exercises. That is important for some level of situational awareness in understanding motivations of the operational environment as a whole.

However that does not mean culture will be readily absorbed by most troops or that a dilettante’s level of awareness (to include my own) makes troopers ready to play Henry Kissinger. I recall having discussions with a very competent Aviation Major who had never heard of HiG. Culture can be conferred in generalities for specific areas of Afghanistan. However district, valley, and village situations are all unique and there are not enough Green Teams and foreign area officers for one per battalion, company, or platoon in a micro-area let alone Human Terrain Teams of questionable expertise (unlike Ned who has proven knowledge and experience).

Chapters 2 and 3 completed. Chapter 2 talked about the Operational Variables of which Social is just one. It was 10 pages. Then 5 pages are dedicated in Chapter 3 to Culture which is included under the Social "S" in the PMESII-PT acronym. It is Chapter 3 that seems fraught with potential controversy. On to Chapter 4, "Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals."

Outlaw 09

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 1:25pm

In reply to by Move Forward

MF---part of the over all issue I have with the new FM is that while the Army refights the so called COIN war ie insurgency ie Iraq and AFG the Army via DATE scenario exercises is coming nowhere close to addressing the latest Russian political warfare doctrine called New-Generation Warfare which is an eight phase cycle of which the first four phases are pure through and through UW.

This goes as well for the new Chinese military strategy of "Three Stages Warfare".

Outlaw 09

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 5:30pm

In reply to by Move Forward

MF--would argue that if Russia used their new concepts and maintained the UW pressure against any of the Baltics and stayed under the "legal" definition of Article 5 of the NATO Statutes no one including the US would go to war--- then one would need a counter UW concept. Remember Article 5 states a member must be physically "attacked" and what is being seen in the Ukraine would in fact not legally trigger NATO even if they had been a member.

If for example, Estonia asks for assistance and is being overrun with irregulars, "war tourists, criminal gangs or the Russian mafia, Russian intel and special ops in civilian all the while a heavy dose of information warfare is causing the ethnic Russian population to "radicalize" wanting to break away form Estonia. Does FM 3-24 cover this scenario---no it does not.

Do we even have regular army units that could in fact step in and conduct counter UW if asked---no we do not.

Reference Iraq----what many have not wanted to ask and COIN never could answer the following question -Just how was it possible for the Sunni insurgency---minus AQI in 2003 to go from the US Army arriving in Baghdad to a full Mao defined Phase Two guerrilla war within three weeks after we arrived?

With cells established in all of the major cities, funding flowing, fighters trained and using IEDs to include the first remotely detonated IEDs ---three weeks after we arrived?

What we did not fully understand --there was ongoing inside Iraq that no one in the IC had seen nor even envisioned---a steady low grade Salafist underground war against Saddam since Desert Storm and when we arrived we let the tiger out of the cage and they focused on us since we had eliminated Saddam for them.

If we look around today at the current world--will we ever send boots on the ground using COIN to say Syria, Somalia, Mali, CAR, Libya, Nigeria, Mexico, El Salvador, or Iraq again?---no not really as the American public is tired of war and after 4T spent we cannot afford to.

So were then does FM 3-24 fit in if we will never be deploying it?

If the following is the US response to the Russian new UW doctrine and cannot even get requested military grade tires to the Ukraine then how is the US government to use COIN in say the above Estonia example if the "radicalized" Russian ethnic population wants to leave Estonia for Russia?

An article appearing on May 16 in The Daily Beast Ezine has criticized the Obama administration for dragging its feet on Ukraine's request for assistance following Russia's annexation of Crimea and Kremlin-backed attempts to escalate tension in the country's eastern and southern regions.

There are some indications that the requested but not delivered US non lethal military aid has in fact limited the Ukrainian response to the terrorist attacks they are seeing from "irregulars and war tourists" especially if reports from today indicated that over six KAMAZ trucks broke through the Russian Ukrainian border and delivered RPG 18s to the "irregulars".

Move Forward

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 4:21pm

In reply to by Outlaw 09

<blockquote>Can any of the current Army BDE, Division, or Corp drop in from space and support the Ukraine in their ongoing political war with the Russians---none that I know of. Absolutely no DATE scenario exercises against the below phases (why---because we are so hung up on COIN as we have failed to realize it failed)</blockquote>
Outlaw,

First, I would advocate that neither NATO nor U.S. SF/SOF have any business being <strong>inside</strong> Ukraine which is not part of NATO. Second, to be loyal to what are my consistent if errant beliefs, Crimea and East Ukraine should be part of Russia if the overwhelming majority of its citizens favor that. Third, Russian UW never could fully seize Eastern Ukraine using the phases you describe let alone the rest of the country. Only Russian armor and conventional forces could accomplish that and U.S./NATO SF/SOF could not stop it. I also would wager that the three stage Chinese strategy could not seize Taiwan or the Senkakus either.

Finally, U.S./NATO SF/SOF could train Ukrainians in adjacent NATO territories were all of Ukraine to fall. Likewise, U.S. combined arms battalion slices of armored BCTs could be prepositioned and minimally manned in the same countries we have already deployed 173rd Airborne troops. Only heavy armor could stop the Russians from further advances into current NATO states. As you tongue-and-cheek point out, we have no capability to move heavy armor or even airborne forces into Ukraine from any space capability or C-17 risk perspective.

Stryker, airborne and air assault forces with limited task-organized heavy armor augmentation could work to support NATO states in a crisis. Even insertions of light units into Ukraine would be realistic if a variant of the LRS-B existed for airdrop of supplies and limited SF/SOF troops. That type aircraft, also equipped for aerial refueling, would be a true multi-mission aircraft that the USAF says it wants (except in the case of bombers?). Fifty of the desired 100 LRS-B could have reduced stealth levels to make those missions a reality. Of course that presupposes that an initial air war achieves destruction of most radar air defenses and achieves air supremacy.

Last, IMHO COIN did not fail when we left Iraq in 2008. Maliki failed by not agreeing to a SOFA, perhaps on purpose to eliminate our interference. Afghanistan always was under-resourced due to Iraq and the announcement of a date-certain to leave. Projected 2015+ troop strengths there also may be far too small if recent news reports are correct. The math of covering areas the size of Texas with a few SF troops does not add up. Otherwise, peaceful Texas would have just 150 Texas Rangers instead of 70,000 law enforcement personnel.

Outlaw 09

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 1:52pm

In reply to by Move Forward

MF---part of the over all issue I have with the new FM is that while the Army refights the so called COIN war ie insurgency ie Iraq and AFG the Army via DATE scenario exercises is coming nowhere close to addressing the latest Russian political warfare doctrine called New-Generation Warfare which is an eight phase cycle of which the first four phases are pure through and through UW.

By the way---this doctrine mentioned in 2013 is being currently employed in the real world and does not need to be discussed in multiple blogs--it is real and works

This goes as well for the new Chinese military strategy of "Three Stages Warfare".

MF---read the new FM and then check the Russian New-Generation Warfare phases---can anything in the FM even logically address any of the phases?

No not really as it takes a truly trained UW force not one that has trained in DATE with a "near peer". Welcome to the "new world order" ie the Ukraine.

Can any of the current Army BDE, Division, or Corp drop in from space and support the Ukraine in their ongoing political war with the Russians---none that I know of. Absolutely no DATE scenario exercises against the below phases (why---because we are so hung up on COIN as we have failed to realize it failed)---know of virtually no defense contractor that can even replicate them without demanding millions in a contract--not even the Army simulation center in VA that has had millions pumped into it can even replicate 10% of any of the phases.

Could say the US Army SF ---yes indeed but currently the national level has no UW nor counter UW strategy to speak of.

The phases of new-generation war can be schematized as (Tchekinov & Bogdanov, 2013, pp. 15-22):

First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).

Second Phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.

Third Phase: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

Fourth Phase: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.

Fifth Phase: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

Move Forward

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 1:15pm

In reply to by Move Forward

<blockquote>Just a side note---nowhere in both FMs do I see a serious discussion on how to succeed in stopping major drug production and or serious corruption which has in both countries undermined whatever local US successes one might have called successes.

The "whole of government approach" has never figured out what to do about those two problems so how can a FM provide guidance if our own government does not set the tone in the field.</blockquote>

I never understood the poppy thing in Afghanistan either. That and tall marijuana complicated tactical efforts. However let's face it, without that source of revenue, Pashtun farmers would have been more likely to support or become Taliban. Was there truly a legal crop alternative? Could DEA have done it on their own?

Not sure what the answer is to corruption other than to cut off many of the "build" projects. Afghanistan had one of the lowest GDPs in the world and we couldn't turn that economy around with billions. We would have even greater difficulty trying to "build" in wealthier failing states or in some place like North Korea with former DPRK troops shooting at us the whole time.

Move Forward

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 1:05pm

In reply to by Outlaw 09

<blockquote>MF---hate to be a kill joy about the new and in fact the old manual---we trained over 300K soldiers and security personnel in both Iraq and AFG, we mentored, we led, they led and they often took point and we developed with both countries their own SOF capabilities that turned out in the end to be used to protect their very own senior leaders.

We even provided them/trained them on AtN, CIED, CT and CI they were trained on/given UAVs, Huey copters, and Hellfires and yet what have been the results-especially since it was the US that announced we have left behind an "established functioning government"--the FM cannot provide good governance and the rule of law if the host country is not willing to implement both nor can it overcome ethnic divisions or a revolutionary population.</blockquote>

I hear you, however, the underlying motivations for the insurgency were not alleviated by civil authorities in the U.S. and abroad. The U.S. military did its part but had to leave too soon in Iraq due to no SOFA. The fact that we trained so many Iraqi security forces and departed Iraq in less time is testament to having more troops on the ground there to perform that function while also performing stability operations. Contrast that with Afghanistan where few troops were on the ground initially and the surge was small and late.

Outlaw 09

Sat, 05/17/2014 - 10:57am

In reply to by Move Forward

MF---hate to be a kill joy about the new and in fact the old manual---we trained over 300K soldiers and security personnel in both Iraq and AFG, we mentored, we led, they led and they often took point and we developed with both countries their own SOF capabilities that turned out in the end to be used to protect their very own senior leaders.

We even provided them/trained then on AtN, CIED, CT and CI they were trained on/given UAVs, Huey copters, and Hellfires and yet what have been the results-especially since it was the US that announced we have left behind an "established functioning government"--the FM cannot provide good governance and the rule of law if the host country is not willing to implement both nor can it overcome ethnic divisions or a revolutionary population.

IMHO would love it see in bold print on the outside cover of the FM and it's related ADP the following statement--"Military will not engage until there is a clear and concise national strategy with a clearly defined transition and exit strategy that all can understand."

If reporting is accurate from yesterday out of Fulluja by a key local Sunni tribal leader supporting the government the Iraqi Army has lost over 6K and had 12K deserters alone just in the Fulluja attacks to regain the area.

And the Maliki government is dropping also major "barrel bombs" (and then denying it in the face of released social media videos) that they learned from the Syrians (actually far stronger) on the local civilian population flattening whole housing blocks.

So can anyone writing about the old and new manual explain to me what we got right in COIN if we could not transfer that knowledge/doctrine to the locals in over five years?

OR are we just creating a "smokescreen" (a new manual) to hide behind that we are great at COIN?

The new FM is just in the grand scheme of things under Army 2015 a TTP handbook/reference guide and as such should really only be giving high side guidance as in reality the ground never reflects exactly what the FM says one should be doing.

Based on the serious losses in the Sunni triangle the US trained Iraqi Army is currently enduring ---Was in fact COIN even successful or are we just uttering wishful thinking as we want and need a COIN success to justify the high cost of treasure and blood---really do miss that debate around the old and new FM.

Just a side note---nowhere in both FMs do I see a serious discussion on how to succeed in stopping major drug production and or serious corruption which has in both countries undermined whatever local US successes one might have called successes.

The "whole of government approach" has never figured out what to do about those two problems so how can a FM provide guidance if our own government does not set the tone in the field.

IMHO before the Army released it's latest FM there should have been a far more thorough conversation with officers and NCOs both current and those that have left about the success or failure of COIN---it is almost like no one really wants to challenge the validity of the FM and for that matter COIN itself.

https://medium.com/the-bridge/411c6f84920f

Move Forward

Fri, 05/16/2014 - 12:44pm

I've only gotten through Chapter 1. Paragraph 1-38 and 1-88 have very similar and in some cases identical sections. Paragraph 1-39 and 1-89 <strong>are</strong> identical. Elimination of one pair of paragraphs or the other would save half a page.

Overall, I liked Chapter 1 although the NGO portion seemed long, particularly since you normally would not expect much cooperation between the military and NGOs.

<blockquote>1-5. There is a spectrum of involvement in countering an insurgency. The U.S. could enable a host nation by not providing forces that are directly involved in securing the population or attacking the insurgents. For example, the U.S. could provide training or intelligence support to a host nation. Moreover, even if the U.S. is directly involved in defeating the insurgency, its primary role can be only to enable a host nation. A host nation may be capable of providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a force into the host-nation’s efforts that provides a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or field artillery. U.S. involvement can range from a modest and supporting commitment to a major ground force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation forces become better able to take on that role themselves.</blockquote>

This is a fitting synopsis of the entire manual. The final sentence in the above quote is why Iraq and Afghanistan were different than FID and COIN examples such as Columbia, El Salvador, and the Philippines. In OIF and OEF there were no existing governments or national security forces until large foreign forces built them. Retaining a Baathist Iraq security force only could have worked if separate Kurd and Shiite forces and areas had been created while we were still in control before separate elections.

<blockquote>1-6. Ideally, the host nation is the primary actor in defeating an insurgency. Even in an insurgency that occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central government or after a major conflict, the host nation must eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to its society and meets U.S. policy goals. The conclusion of any counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people who reside in that nation. Ultimately, every society has to provide solutions to its own problems. As such, one of the Army and Marine Corps’ primary roles in counterinsurgency is to enable the host nation.</blockquote>

This does not address whether a singular host nation should exist where current historic boundaries were illogical and even purposely drawn to break up ethnicities and religious groups. Until the National Command Authority and State Department begin to accept that some nations should be broken up, in other cases federalism is appropriate, and in place like the Philippines, areas can be ceded to particular groups, the main source of the insurgency and the difficulties for the counterinsurgent will remain in place.

I questioned the oversimplification of Consent and Coercion as being the sole means of achieving the population's cooperation with the host nation government in paragraphs 1-30 to 1-33.

As you read paragraph 1-33 below, think about the role of unified nationalism (as in post war Japan and Germany), carrots (like oil-rich states), and language, religious, and cultural affinity (or lack thereof as in Syria and Ukraine) that can create either consent or coercion/built-in conflict. Also note the misuse of state security operations frequently found in communist and Islamic states, and the ultimate coercion mechanism the West will never again practice...genocide and neighborhood slaughter by association if insurgents are deemed to be from a particular area.

<blockquote>1-33. Even if a population does not see an insurgency or a government as legitimate, control can be established effectively by coercion. Many states and insurgencies have used domestic intelligence apparatus or other means to control every aspect of their populations. Illegitimate governments often use distrust and divisions within a population to effectively control a society. Moreover, a population is not monolithic. It is made up of many groups and subgroups. In many autocratic regimes, various groups within a population have a vested interest in continuing the current government, even if it is repressive. Likewise, an insurgency might receive support from elements within the population, even if it is repressive and uses coercive methods. Legitimacy must be seen from the different perspectives of the different groups within a society.</blockquote>

Note that the second to last sentence in the quote above describes the relationship between Pashtuns and the Taliban, and between the ISI and the "good" Taliban and Haqqani network.

<blockquote>1-37. Soldiers and Marines are not permitted to use force disproportionately or indiscriminately. Typically, more force reduces tactical risk in the short term. <strong>But in counterinsurgency, the more force that is used, the less effective it can be.</strong></blockquote>

The law of land warfare applies, unless you are Syria or Russia in which case the last sentence bolded (by me) in the quote above is inaccurate. Russia leveled Grozny to rubble and Syria's use of barrel bombs and the leveling of neighborhoods also was effective. The West lacks that option, however the relocation of ethnicities through land swaps as well as the separation via concrete T-Barriers in Baghdad (and in Israel) are viable options. Establishing new nation-states or a federalist system within previous boundaries can work with the T-Barrier solution to break up large urban areas and let particular areas within them be controlled by different governments and security forces.

<blockquote>1-37 continued. It is more likely that counterinsurgents will achieve an end state by protecting a population, not the counterinsurgency force. When military forces remain in secure compounds, they lose touch with the situation, appear to be indifferent to the population, simplify enemy intelligence operations, or appear afraid to engage the insurgents. In effect, they concede the initiative to the insurgents. To be successful, counterinsurgency forces must work with and share risks with the host-nation forces and the population. Soldiers and Marines must accept some risk to minimize harm to noncombatants. Accepting prudent risk is an essential part of the warrior ethos and an obligation of honorable service.</blockquote>How does this portion of the paragraph jive with the notion that heavily armed patrols risk alienating the population and attracting IEDs and direct fire to areas where they otherwise would not exist? Can we ask Soldiers/Marines to patrol without armored trucks, jammers, rollers, dogs, body armor, and tools like aerostats and UAS? Can the host nation military lead the patrols on point and do most of the talking? If so, the U.S. will look less like an occupation force and you won't have privates being asked to act like diplomats.

I have a personal (and possibly misguided) concern that patrols that use an honesty trace thereby never retracing prior ground are not of much use since you never observe the same areas on a recurring basis. Even if they observe from differing vantage points, what prevents the Taliban from emerging as soon as the patrol leaves? Would presence surveillance be more appropriate using squad-sized OPs and unattended sensors and unmanned ground and air systems? How do you secure that OP (HESCO, parked M-ATV?) and are commander's willing to take that prudent risk? With sensors you don't have the risk and you also don't have the appearance of occupation.