Dear Boss, I Don’t Just Quit, I Give Up
Editor's Note: For background and history of the "Dear Boss" letter, see this post.
Dear Boss,
I don’t just quit. I give up.
Why should I keep on bleeding myself and my family dry on MQT, CMR, FMC, UTE, RAP, FLUG, DTS, TDYs, OPRs, ATSO, SARC, CBTs, AT/FP, IA/IP, UCIs, SORTS,OREs, ORIs, AEFs, IPUG, BMC, when in the end nothing that I do seems to matter? To put it another way, why should I put service before self when my Chief is systematically dismantling my service? To use a perhaps appropriately joint analogy, I’m a strong swimmer – so why stay aboard a ship whose captain is running it aground?
You might think that out in the field we don’t notice what’s going on at Headquarters. You might think that we’re too busy doing more with less, coping with the administrivia of yet another ancillary ground training requirement from some staff puke’s rice bowl, trying to magically improve our “readiness” reporting with geriatric jets that can’t make UTE [See Note 1] and a glut of inexeperienced wingmen that we can’t absorb – that we are too busy to notice that what leadership is doing. Well, we aren’t. When I was an FNG [New Guy], all I cared about was sounding good on check-ins, staying visual, flying good formation, and studying the 3-1. But now I know that senior leadership matters, and what my leadership is showing me is that nothing I do matters or ever will.
As if twelve years wasn’t enough of boring meaningless holes in the sky while our most demanding combat skills atrophied and we prematurely aged our inventory. Now, after a decade of drinking “green” tea and filling “in-lieu-of the Army doing its job” taskings and the “Cult of COIN,” I’m not sure if I’m in the Army or in the Air Force. I’m “all in”: CAS is king, and my Chief publically endorses Gate’s decision to kill the F-22 because Airpower is really just airborne artillery (who needs air dominance in Low Intensity Conflicts?). We’ve instituted two weeks of bivouacking and other mud-infested activities into our basic training so our young enlisted troops are better equipped to integrate and employ with the Army as the Army. We’re all hooah, nation building, and winning hearts and minds. Last I checked, infantry wasn’t an AFSC, and occupation wasn’t part of our 4+1. [See Note 2]
Even AirSea Battle is a setback for the Air Force. Tell me how AirLand Battle, a linear, sequential, and attrition based doctrine in which Airpower is subordinated to Land maneuver, is a good inspiration for AirSea Battle? Tell me how the Navy has the necessary expertise to have input and a vote regarding the requirements and design of our new bomber, or anything else in our portfolio? Tell me how AirSea Battle exploits the inherent asymmetric, parallel, strategic, and effects-based advantages of Airpower, and how USAF senior leadership is championing Airpower so we can do what is needed in this pivot to the Pacific? Joint does not mean the same or subordinate, but we’ve clearly forgotten that over the last decade. We’ve bent over backwards to prove that we’re “all in,” eviscerating our unique, core capabilities in order to prove that we’re good joint team players. I have no trust that AirSea Battle will end up any different.
Why should I have any hope? Being a good joint team player, my leadership offered up $4.8B in cuts (out of a total $5.2B cuts across the DOD baseline) while the Navy only lost $900M and the Army grew inside their baselines. I understand that this might be a rational approach to managing my household budget, but this is not home economics. Is this how we signal that Airpower is an essential element of AirSea Battle and our new strategic guidance? The last time we bought this few aircraft was in 1916, when we were still the Aviation Section of the Army Signal Corps. In just FY13, the Army and the Navy will buy more aircraft than the Air Force will buy in the entire FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan]! Everything I see indicates that senior leadership doesn’t understand, or worse, doesn’t care, why we have an independent Air Force. I thought the job of the CSAF was to organize, train, and equip – and be the strongest advocate for those responsibilities? When will my Chief have the integrity to put service before self? When will my Chief have the moral courage to stop being a yes-man and start telling the truth, start protecting our unique capabilities, start advocating for, even championing his Air Force?
I’ve never heard a Marine apologize for being a Marine. Every Soldier I know will proudly and loudly promote the Army. Sailors don’t feel compelled to marginalize or deny the Navy as a “Global Force for Good.” Yet my Chief can only say that we’re “all in” and are committed to being good, supporting partners in the joint team – as if we are just auxiliary members. Has my Chief ever read FM 100-20? What about the Key West Agreement? I’m accused of being an “Airpower zealot” because I proudly believe in my Air Force, what is unique about it, and what we do. I have worked with and have tremendous respect for and admire the other services. They are consummate professionals and an integral part of our national power as Littoral, Land, and Sea forces. But I became an Airman for a reason and I’m tired of apologizing for being an Airman. None of the other services can do their jobs without us. We bring policy options, capabilities, and alternatives to our Nation that no other service can. If you don’t have an Air Force, you don’t have a joint force. The Navy is buying twice as many fighters as the Air Force is this year, and you wonder why my faith is shaken?
So now my Chief tells me that we will get smaller, but that we will remain a ready force. Really? We’ve already divested so many fighters that our squadrons are broken. It doesn’t matter how much O&M you throw at us (as if there were any budget left after the cuts our leadership offered up); we cannot make the UTE necessary to create the training capacity required. Now we’re divesting more aircraft, and we’ll never be able to adequately train our young guys. We’re getting smaller and less capable and we can’t stop it. Although we never received as many Raptors as the national strategy requires, senior leadership emphatically denied any fighter shortfall. We refused a “4.5 Generation” gap-filler, and now the F-35 is slow-rolled with no plan B on the table. Our force was humiliated and betrayed by the shameful and disingenuous capitulation written by the Chief and Secretary after the F-22 cancellation. What happened to our core values? Instead, we’re changing the scenario to fit the tactics! Drop the requirements to meet force structure realities which are dropping to meet budget bogies. So much for a strategy-driven force structure, or even any strategy at all. Next we’ll probably drop experience definitions to meet our aging rate and PCS cycle. Avoiding a “Hollow Force” is a nice talking point; but at least in the 1970s we got the F-15, F-16, and A-10, while simultaneously developing the B-1 and F-117. My Chief is out of airspeed with full aft stick and a boot-full of rudder in an unrecoverable spin [See Note 3].
So you can keep your Bonus Take Rate and whatever other variables go into your Rated Distribution and Training Management models. Money isn’t going to keep me here. I didn’t become a fighter pilot because I wanted to get rich. I became a fighter pilot because I believed. And after everything I’ve seen, my trust and faith in the Air Force is so broken I don’t know why I’m doing this anymore. This flight path marker is buried in the dirt. I’m punching out.
Editor's Note: If you didn't click through to the link at the beginning of the letter, please go there now to read about the history of the storied USAF "Dear Boss" letter and for some additional background.
Note 1: UTE is Utilization rate, the number of times an aircraft can fly per month. Mission capacity, whether training or combat, is dictated by the number of aircraft available in a squadron (based on maintenance and depot availability) multiplied by UTE. The less aircraft a squadron has, the more each aircraft has to fly.
Note 2: "4+1" Refers to the unique Air Force capabilities, also known as the Air Force enduring contribution: (4) Air & Space Control (which includes Air Dominace), Global ISR, Global Mobility, and Global Strike; (+) plus Command and Control in Air, Space & Cyberspace.
Note 3: Aft stick and full rudder deflection are pro-spin control inputs; that is, they are deliberate and conscientious control inputs that will cause an aircraft to enter a spin and will keep the aircraft in the spin condition.
That’s it? This fighter jock’s big complaint is “filling ‘in-lieu-of the Army doing its job’ taskings” during wartime? He thinks CAS is beneath the dignity of the Air Force and (anonymously) calls the USAF leadership a bunch of cowards because they aren’t pushing to buy more Mach 2 fighters (presumably so that he could duel with the Taliban’s fighter jets). If this is in the tradition of “Dear Boss” letters, it sounds quite parochial and petty to me.
You want some cheese with that whine?
I get the impression that most of the people on SWJ are American ground soldiers. Unless there are a few 90 year olds commenting (I don’t think even Ken is that old) not one has any experience with operating when the enemy has the airplanes and we don’t. Seeing as how it has been 70 years since Americans have had to do that, it is only human to believe that that is the way it is and always has been. It hasn’t. The Air Force has its faults but they realize, because of their history and training that the Americans having the airplanes and the other guy not having the airplanes isn’t the natural order of things. You have to fight for it and since that fight is conducted with machines, you had better have a superior machine if you expect to win that fight. And you had better have superior pilots, ground crews, airfield mtx people, logistics people and on and on and on. None of that is easy to do. But if you don’t do it, the enemy has the airplanes and we don’t-at which point the Americans get reacquainted with being the targets of close air support.
I think that is what the author of this letter is really trying to get across, the ultimate real reason why we keep the USAF around is to keep the other guys airplanes from dropping bombs on the heads of American ground soldiers. Just because circumstances have been such recently that the Air Force hasn’t been called upon to do that doesn’t mean that that isn’t their primary mission and they really and truly can’t do that unless they get the resources.
Carl succinctly identifies the problem. The strategic mission of Air Force aviation is not providing Close Air Support. Neither was it the mission of Naval Aviation Units at the outbreak of World War II. The Navy / Marine Corps team solved that problem by providing the Marine Corps with its own Marine Air Wings that today have both Helicopter and Fighter / Attack Aircraft. One Marine Corps Air Wing assigned to support one Marine Division.
Weapons platforms should not be designated the property of a branch of the military, instead each branch should be allowed to possess the weapons platforms and necessary manpower to operate that equipment if it “directly” furthers on a routine basis their achieving their mission in a campaign / battle situation.
The Army’s mission is ground warfare and that requires its infantry be supported routinely by artillery, tanks, close air support, etc., etc. The units providing those capabilities should be organizationally part of the Army as they are in the Marine Corps.
The strategic mission of the Air Force is to ensure we control the air using AEW and fighter aircraft capabilities wherever needed; that we have the ability to strategically bomb America’s enemies using bombers, attack aircraft, or missiles as appropriate; and to provide large scale logistical support via air into a theater of war.
When needed, Navy Fighter / Attack squadrons supplement Marine Corps aviation units, but that is not their primary mission. The same would be true of the USAF providing B-52 / B-1 bombing efforts in support of ground activities on the occasions when needed.
The Air Force could resolve its budget problems and concentrate on achieving its strategic goals by transferring to the Army those capabilities only intended to support the Army’s ground forces. Again, mission responsibilities should not be assigned to a branch of the service based on type of platform. Tanks are not the sole property of armored divisions or the army for obvious reasons. Armored Warfare, however, is the mission solely of the Army.
Perhaps it is time for the DOD’s components to be somewhat reorganized based on missions and needed support. Then the aviators assigned to the Army will not have to complain about receiving ground training. The Marine Corps requires all its men and officers to be infantry capable and infantry first regardless of the mission they routinely perform–or at least I believe they still have that requirement.
Carl’s point is correct but as a note of minor interest, some of us in Korea in the early days did in fact get strafed and bombed by bad guys — once, for me including a close view of the palest, blond North Korean ever seen in a Beast cockpit as he passed by a hill. Even as late as 1952 when the UN Forces had almost total air dominance, the North could and did still slip random AN-2s or MiGs South at night to harass; not terribly effective but not stopped, either…
I’ve also been strafed and bombed by the USAF a few times but that’s another thread and irrelevant to the point. In that same Korean war, attempts at ‘Strategic Bombing’ wer broadly ineffective and UN air elements were rapidly shifted to CAS and interdiction (MiG Alley not withstanding…). I only mention all that above to emphasize that we certainly need a functional air combat capability yet we must acknowledge that it can never be error free or omnipotent.
Whether that air combat capability is a separate Air force or not is, to me, broadly immaterial; the issue is that air combat and air support elements be competent and capable. Aside from some national level issues divorced from ground combat, the Navy and Marines also have need of air combat and support capability. I see no major problem if an Air Force flies all that with on big caveat — air power not owned by the guys on the surface of the earth will never be fully responsive to the needs of those fighting at ground or sea level. For those who would say I do not understand the use of Air power, we can disagree but that is not pertinent to this thread. I mention all that only to make an added but quite critical point — parochialism is not really beneficial to achieving either more effectiveness or less bureaucratic stifling.
I have no reason to believe all the air elements are not broadly good to go at this time. They have been for most of the 60 plus years I’ve been around and paying attention — many of those enjoying that superiority and support Carl mentioned.
FWIW, such ‘letters to the Boss’ have been around all that time and in all services. All are generally truthful and heartfelt and fairly accurate, none have made much difference. Most authors, like Ron Keys, get it off their chest and drive on — it’s those that continue to drive that eke out minor changes; those that leave the road lose ability to influence things. It is an inefficient system and it’s driven by many conflicting political (inter service, intra service, inter community or specialty, domestic political party and individual / personal variants).
It works as well as it does only due to those that point out the flaws as this writer has and those who write or do not but have the fortitude to stick around and try to make a difference in spite of the mind numbing bureaucracy and thoughtlessness. Most of us figure out that we are going to continue to be inefficient unless and until we have a major trauma of some sort to belay some of the political and parochial idiocy. Democracies and their legislative bodies do not want really effective Armed Forces, they want adequate forces. We have suffered from that long before any of us were born. It is, as they say, the American way…
*Sigh* The US Air Force has seen a decade of fat budgets, with little to show for it. It’s had to sacrifice people, and allow its existing fighter fleet to age, all for 187 F-22 Raptors. Then it sees its crown jewel the subject of a scathing 60 Minutes investigation.
The US Air Force has inverted John Boyd’s famous “People, Organization, Equipment” maxim, and now finds itself wanting.
I’d say, if anything, the Air Force has an identity crisis. It’s become increasingly expeditionary, joint, and operates largely in uncontested airspace. It’s also had to take on decidedly un-sexy missions–look at the growing UAV field, and the stigma that the operators/pilots operate under.
As a fighter pilot with that much time in he should have attended formal schools that teach warfighting. Jomini, Clausewitz might ring a bell? Probably not, how about Billy Mitchell, James Doolittle? Warfare is changing, evolve or become irrelevant. A fighter pilot who refuses to say the “B” word (Bomb) is already there, thats you. You are just one generation away from being replaced with UCAVs. Adapt to the modern fight, join the team for the big win. This isnt about looking cool with your scarf and tailored flight suit at the club, its about fighting and winning wars- the current one and the ones to come. Your envisioned air to air enemy and dreams of glory in a furball over Eastern Europe is long gone. Do you understand what the threat is? Do you understand what our national objectives are? It is dishartening to hear CAS called “boring meaningless holes in the sky” when every single TIC in OEF/OIF ended when air arrived on station. It does explain why when the purple air checked with me they were invariably clueless. If you cannot understand that your service is a huge drain on the defense budget, does not contribute to the current fight we are in and simply wants to return to the glory days, then dont let the door hit you in the ass on the way out. Welcome to the era of doing more with less- the USMC has been doing it since its inception.
I admit that this came as a bit of a shock:
What happened to our core values? Instead, we’re changing the scenario to fit the tactics! Drop the requirements to meet force structure realities which are dropping to meet budget bogies.
I wonder what “core values” are involved here. I also wonder how anyone in any branch of government service can fail to see that all operations, civilian and military, are necessarily constrained by those “budget bogies” and the realities they impose. It seems the author of this piece, and some others commenting here, think the US should have bought more F-22s. Ok, fine… given the reality of limited military budgets, what other budget lines should be sacrificed to achieve that goal?
If “core values” mean the belief that the Air Force should get whatever it wants regardless of real-world budget constraints, then those cor values are outmoded and need to be reassessed. Everybody wants more of everything. Resources are limited and everybody is going to have to learn to live with less than what they wanted. One response to that reality is to give up. Another possible response is to hustle, get creative, and find or make ways to do more with what you’ve got. Despite constraints we’ve still got more than anyone else in the world by a huge margin, so the panic and disgust seem a bit out of place.
The problem with the author’s assessment that the USAF has been underfunded and should have stood up more to Secretary Gates was:
a) The last group of USAF leaders that did that were fired. More can be fired for assuming they know more than civil leaders.
b) In actual wars fought since Vietnam, the majority of those dying have been ground troops. Guess that explains Secretary Gates monetary emphasis on MRAPs, Predator/Reaper, and CAS to reduce ground deaths. The author states that the USAF has received tasking “in-lieu-of the Army doing its job” while appearing to overlook that perhaps the Army could do its job if it had sufficient force structure to get away with USAF, Navy, and Marine 6-7 month tours instead of the 12-15 month ones Soldiers endured through most of the war.
c) In real USAF and Navy aircraft losses of recent wars, the causes were primarily air defenses, not air-to-air. Threats can afford air defenses. They can’t afford numerous 5th gen fighters. Even Russia and India will buy only 250 T-50s. India is not our adversary while Russia does not want to fight us due to MAD and multiple problems at home. Legacy non-stealthy aircraft have trouble surviving against current air defenses let alone those coming in the next 30-40 years. More legacy aircraft is not the answer.
d) The new report to Congress on China has a chart on page 29 showing that only 310 Chinese fighters are within range of Taiwan despite 1570 mostly old fighters aircraft being available overall. Taiwan has 388 fighter aircraft within range of China and many are in underground hangars. Looks like China fears their airfields and aircraft being bombed on the ground near the coast as much as we do via our AirSea Battle concept. Bombing and missiles are not one-sided. A Chinese fighter destroyed or stuck on the ground is denied access to Taiwan and the South or Each China Sea.
e) The USAF got RAND to do a 2008 study with assumptions that only 6 F-22 could be on station at any given time near Taiwan and that most aircraft in Japan would get eliminated on the ground. It then took 72 Chinese aircraft to eventually run the F-22s out of ammo and gas. Never mind that we might surge F-22s if the enemy surges its fighters. But wait, RAND did not consider air defenses, did not include Naval aircraft like the F/A-18E/F and future “baby-seal” F-35s, and assumed no Taiwanese or Japanese aircraft would participate? Huh? Japan and South Korea get massively missiled and do nothing?
f) If the USAF could afford to build the A-10, F-16, F-15, B-1, and F-117 in the Carter/Reagan years and later, they did it because there was a similarly strong Soviet threat. Aircraft were cheaper then, too. Now the threat is far smaller and aircraft are much more expensive and complex due to stealth, costly engines, and sensors. Quantity does not have a quality of its own if the quantity could not shoot down a stealth aircraft even if it was temporarily on its tail. It does not have a quality of its own if air defenses can shoot down non-stealthy aircraft with ease. That kind of eliminates the argument that we should simply buy more legacy aircraft or “lower observable” aircraft like Typhoon, F/A-18E/F, or Silent Eagle with about a one meter radar cross section (RCS) compared to the .0013 sq meter or 2 square inch size of the F-35 as cited by Wikipedia. The J-20 has a canard and engines that will increase RCS. Its size and two large engines should show up well on the F-35 infrared search-and-track and radar sensors. It also does not have low probability of intercept radar. If it emits, it is found and jammed, and it won’t outrun an AIM-120D.
g) Carl assures us, incorrectly (Carlo?), that the F-35 cannot beat the J-20 or T-50, and the F-22 will quickly be attrited. Wait Carl, it took 72 Chinese aircraft to eventually run off 6 F-22s. What if we added some F-35s from the USAF, Navy, and Marines to the mix. Could the F-35s hang back and be missile trucks for the sensing F-22s to pick off all those 72 inbound aircraft? If six F-22s downed just 36 aicraft assuming two misses out of eight AIM-120, and twelve F-35s downed another 36 aircraft assuming one miss out of four AMRAAM, doesn’t that add up to 72? Aircraft Guns? Won’t some Standard Missiles and Taiwan Patriots find their mark. What about some of those 388 Taiwan fighters? Will Japan sit idly by after missiles hit their country? Allies are good. So are other service aircraft and air defenses if we don’t assume them away.
h) Bottom line: Brilliant public relations campaign this AirSea battle. As TX Hammes said in a recent debate with Bryan McGrath that you can see at InformationDissemination.net, we could perform a distant blockade of vessels coming to China with oil by simply placing a squad of Marines or Army troops on each vessel to halt them or assure they went to Japan or other allies instead of China.
i) If we did attempt to bomb the interior, why not attack near the coasts with fighters instead of bombers the enemy knows may have nukes? If refueling aircraft top off F-22 and F-35s within a few hundred miles of China, that allows ample range to reach most coastal interior airfields and air defenses. We still have B-2s for more of the interior. We have ample B-1B and B-52H with standoff JASSM-ER. We have sub and surface Tomahawks. F-35s can sink Chinese ships with JSOW. Virginia class subs and our few Sea Wolfs can eliminate the rest of the surface and sub fleet. What’s the panic?
j) What if an aerial refueling capable UCLASS or a C-130-like stealth aircraft could get closer to shore or overfly China? Could F-22 and F-35 not then fly at will overhead? Which can defend themselves more easily loitering over enemy territory, a bomber or fighter? Could airborne troops not be inserted into Taiwan even after its occupation or SOF troops into China? If we plan to spend $35 billion on KC-Y, and $55 billion on long range strike-bomber (never mind that 187 F-22s cost at least $420 million each which makes fewer procured $550 million B-3s unlikely) couldn’t some of that money create 50 stealthy optionally-manned C-130-like aircraft that could bomb, aerial refuel, or drop airborne troops and supplies?
After reading this letter I was stunned. Realizing it came from an Air Force officer just left me shaking my head.
This “guy” lost his argument when he started whining about “in-lieu-of the Army doing its job” taskings coupled with two weeks of “mud training”.
His white scarf self immersion is so complete he can’t understand the current primary threat to his nation or the severe challenges his fellow service/servicemen were dealing with to defend the nation. To place his self absorbtion in cotext, 3752 soldiers have died in the last decade. The Air Force hasn’t broken a hundred. I’m sorry we aren’t doing our “job” well enough for you…
Before he can talk about “core values” he needs to go back to a commissioning source for a refresher and do some study on the value of selfless service. He dishonors both himself and his service with such trite whining. Look forward to some professional discussion on the pros, cons of one’s service and how it might fit into the joint picture. Hopefully the next airmen can write a cogent respectful piece so it can be taken seriously.
This is old “news”, but it’s still worth saying: It is a good thing the whole USAF is not this whiney and self-pitying.
This immature rascal doesn’t feel lucky to be a fighter pilot, he feels entitled.
With this angst and self-doubt, he probably wouldn’t be able to CQ in the Navy during the day, let alone operate around the back end of the boat on the proverbial dark and stormy night.
Put this guy where he belongs: the military non-flying community. Then, a few years working like a dog for a regional airline, while chasing a major, will give him an appreciation for what he so cavalierly kicked away.
Get out of the way, young man! There are plenty, in and out of the USAF, that want your job.