This book provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units—teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions—have done to roll back the insurgency in some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan. The focus is on counterinsurgency at the tactical and local levels. The book includes 15 vignettes about different units from the US Marines, Army, and Special Forces, the British Army and Marines, the Dutch Army and Marines, and the Canadian Army. The case studies cover ten provinces in Afghanistan's south and east. They describe the diverse conditions these units faced, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and the successes they achieved. The research is based almost entirely on interviews with those involved in these operations.
Download the full report here.
Comments
The alternate (somewhat) argument that I often hear is that:
a. Globalization is running wild and rampant all over the planet and, thus,
b. It is uncontrollable globalization (not us or our interest-driven strivings) that is the cause of all these problems (terrorism; insurgencies; everything).
Within this context (uncontrollable [or simply uncontrolled] globalization is the cause; terrorism, insurgency, etc., are the effects), we now believe that we have both the need -- and the license -- to intervene and intercede, carte blanche, anywhere and everywhere in the world we deem necessary.
This, so as to help -- both we ourselves -- and those in the less-integrated world -- more quickly and more easily achieve the societal transformations that our new and unquestioned ruler (globalization) now requires.
This "you-must-transform-your-society-so-as-to-accommodate-globalization argument is what I often hear today as justification for -- not only our foreign policy focus -- but also our domestic policy direction as well.
This, of course, seems to suggest that:
a. Sovereignty and self-determination -- as we knew it -- no longer exist and
b. That we are not to be held at fault for any ill that befalls the world today -- because it is not us, but "uncontrollable globalization" that is the cause of all such things.
We, in determining to transform not only the societies of others -- but our society also -- are simply trying to do the best we can with the hand that we have been dealt.
Bill,
I believe you are correct to suggest this... We used to admit to "direct and indirect rule" during imperial times... but no longer. I just get tired of all the altruistic, touchy-feely, social work euphemisms when justifying the imposition of our morals and values on others or grandiloquent and ideologically packed phraseologies such as "societal devastation" (sorry Bill) when arguing against the evils of power politics... It is what it is...
In regard to giving rise to various forms of rebellion, terrorism, unrest... Thank God there still exist in the world folks that will push back when "tread upon"... What a milquetoast world it would be if otherwise... Show me peace on earth and I'll show you tyranny.
I believe the only truisms in the world (unless engaged in solving non-fuzzy mathematical problems) are that no plan survives first contact and nothing actually ever works out "exactly as we had planned and hoped for"... Bastardizing Clausewitz: Life is the realm of uncertainty... and we are all the better for it.
Wow, the darker angels of my nature sure took charge of this response...
It is the voices, Bill... those damn voices...
r/
MAC
MAC, et al:
Would I be correct to suggest that our overall purpose for many/most of our "small wars-plus welfare state" efforts -- today and yesterday -- is/has been:
a. To "open up," to make more compatible and to, otherwise, transform various "closed" and/or "different" countries, regions and societies so as to
b. Cause these countries, regions and societies -- via our-interests-specific efforts and reforms -- to become more capable of meeting our society's needs, wants and desires?
Thus, our initiaties today, as in our frontier days of the past, are once again directed at causing less-accessable, adversely-configured and under-utilized populations and regions to become, by way of our efforts:
a. Less of a problem for our society and
b. More of a resource that we might access and utilize re: our short and long-term interests and goals?
(As we know, this does not always work out exactly as we had planned and hoped for.)
The central problem in these frontier-type endeavors being, then as now, that often the populations of these regions are unwilling -- and/or unable -- to make such rapid and radical changes as we require.
This predicament giving rise to (and fuel for) various forms of rebellion, terrorism, unrest and, in some cases, various forms of societal devastation and disaster?
McAllister: "Too bad, too sad that we continue to suffer the model-makers dilemma ... namely... we create models for ourselves and elevate them to the status of universal applicability anywhere, anytime. It saves us all from having to think about differing explanations for how the world works in the weeds. Also, simple models such as pop-centric coin/hearts and minds makes it easy to cruise the D.C. cocktail circuit and sound switched on when discussing the Korengal... Wanat... Marjah.... or some tucked away valley in Loya Paktia..."
Gentile: "History mind you provides no evidence at all of a foreign occupying power applying this theory of coin through the stated principles and having it work."
You know, there might come a point in the history of this nation when the US military's propensity for standardization, fixation on doctrine and inability to see beyond its own nose actually wounds the nation beyond repair. Kimmel gave it his best shot at Pearl Harbor; fortunately for us, the carriers were at sea. Oh, well, shit, we didn't need those battleships and sailors anyway. Short? We know what he didn't do. MacArthur? Didn't need those B-17s, I guess. We all know the Pearl Harbor excuses: War Department dropped the ball (which it did), etc. etc, but the fact is three and four star officers apparently didn't bother to read the newspapers or intelligence reports for months. They were too busy drinking their own bath water, congratulating themselves for being so wise and otherwise demanding the adulation they were due. Through their years of experience and command, they had literally thought themselves into a strait jacket, one that insisted the world would always be the way they had experienced it and the way they wanted it to be.
It's been well documented that many if not most of the guys who wore stars at the onset of WW2 were inept fools. We've made the ones who genuinely learned and adapted immortal, but we rarely talk about all of the others. Today's generals are different. They know their history and they're not going to be caught short. They're hip and they're going to be innovative and adapt, no matter what. In fact they're going to "reinvent" the Army. No more of this Fulda Gap nonsense: small wars is what it's all about. M16 over M1A3, coffee klatches over M109. So now today's generals have decided that the way they want the world to be is small wars. And they want the force to be oriented in that direction. Major conflicts? "Well, yeah, but we've got this stuff to do right now and we've decided that's what we want to do in the future. That means we've got to be experts in that and kind of not know very much about anything else. We have our new and improved doctrine and we rock."
The whole rest of the world understands that life is always one-off, that doctrine that works at low levels isn't worth very much at more sophisticated levels. Not us. We've got a book, an FM that tells us how to win a war. All of those guys wrestled with this problem over the centuries, and here we've broken the code. And we did it based on French occupation experiences. Are we good or what?
For the record, we should note that the French didn't win. What have the French ever won? And the US Army did not reinvent itself in Vietnam. Not the one I was in anyway; maybe that Army in that alternative universe. What really happened--and this is pertinent to your interminable wars of today--was that nobody wanted to be the last one to die. You couldn't do large scale search and destroy missions because nobody would go. You became "kinder and gentler" by default. By 1971, the US Army was effectively destroyed, culminating a trend that started in the 60s. The only saving grace was that the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies had even worse militaries than we did.
Oh, yeah. Vietnam destroyed the US Army.
To date, I've seen three reasons why you small war lovers have still been getting to wax philosophic about how neat it is for US troops to go in and liberate and love the unenlightened and unwashed, vanquish various and sundry dark lords and bring the city on the hill to all peoples. First, the generals and the politicians fell in love with it and worked hard on selling it. Who doesn't like this kind of liberation? Man, compared to Normandy, gotta be easy, right? Second, they aren't killing too many of our guys and the American people care only about our guys. Sort of. 5K in nine years? Barely a blip. Check Vietnam and Korea. Number three? The American people are collectively dumber than a box of rocks. The politicians and their generals depend on this.
Don't these self-serving think tank studies all kind of read the same? When I was on active duty, we ignored most of it or we said, "hey, come out and play with us." It's bizarre. People who've never worn a uniform, probably never even fired a weapon, swarming around think tanks funded by defense contractors (no conflict there, right?) "advising" military personnel on how to conduct war. Yeah, obviously, some of these people can serve a useful purpose, but it seems to me the think tanks now run the war.
It's time for this to end. I don't know a single retired officer who disagrees with me, no matter the personal politics. Time to end these grand experiments. Time for all of the great inside-the-beltway thinkers to find new pet rocks. Time to give the troops a break. Fortunately, it may be that the think tanks and the rest of the COIN pilot fish are going to have a rude awakening soon. We're broke. Try taking $$ from a gray panther on Medicare to fund continuing adventures in making friendships in foreign lands. Good luck. You want more deficit spending? Go see your Tea Party friends. They love war, but they don't like that deficit. k
MAC:
Your observations regarding "American Progressivism" and modernizing the frontier make a lot of sense. Those had never occurred to me before.
You are hereby authorized to make full use of, for all purposes, moral and otherwise, legal or less than, without attribution or credit, any dopey thing I manage to come up with.
My Mom, 83 years old and 4 inches shorter than she used to be, would appreciate the hug. She likes the attention.
Carl, man-up... you are getting a man-hug... it's good for you... and I believe your mom would agree with me... or maybe not :-)
Damn... I agree with all comments and find nothing to debate...
I agree that "restraint of force" is a tactic... part of a specific operation and applied within an appropriate stratagem... as is "application of force"... the yin and yang of conflict.
The "imposition of welfare state" comment is based on the idea that "pop-centric coin/hearts and minds" is a product of political and economic development theory. I can make the argument that pop-centric/hearts and minds or if you prefer "small wars'" historical legacy lies in "American Progressivism" first introduced to the U.S. military while serving along the western frontier and more fully developed in the Philippines (1899-1903 and beyond). Simply put (and we can draw this conversation out quite a bit but I see no reason to do so) current U.S. government definition for governmental legitimacy includes a robust public service capacity... i.e. a welfare state capability. We continuously push the narrative that the Karzai government is not providing "stuff" (public service) to the locals... Without this stuff the Karzi government remains illegitimate and the locals disillusioned and rebellious...
Secondly, our COIN (small wars) doctrine hasn't changed since our frontier days... all sexy definitions and flavor flaves aside... Bottom line, our COIN doctrine embodies a drive to modernize frontier regions and to indirectly control the process... We called this "indirect rule" during imperial times... NOT THAT THERE IS ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT... just don't hide this fact behind touchy-feely euphemism. It is what it is...
Don't apologize for the "village, arty, visit phrase"... It is a good visual. Please know that I will adapt and use this phrase myself when needed. I won't say that I borrowed the phrase for I want to be thought of as witty... but I will know it is yours when I do so... :-)
The simplest visual I have for the current pop-centric/hearts and minds (small wars) debate is that the pendulum has swung too far towards the carrot... the unswerving belief that everything is for sale... While I tend to agree with this depressing sentiment... the rules for buying and selling are somewhat different in a shame and honor culture...
No man-hugs for you... but I will respectfully hug your mother.
r/
MAC
Mac:
Whoa, Big Fella. I certainly didn't mean to include anybody except the Russians and others like the Imperial Japanese Army in the "kill everybody" school of small wars fighting and am sorry if I came across that way. We cannot use that school, and for anybody who can't, those four principles apply because they are so general.
One thing I always try to avoid is using the word "COIN" and the phrase "pop centric". I almost always use "small wars". I do that because "small wars" seems to me to better convey the uniqueness of each situation and therefore the unique best thing you can do to deal with each situation.
As far as the Korengal valley goes, from my general reading we really didn't figure out so well the local situation and if we didn't know that we couldn't come up with a good solution. The four principles could be applied to the Korengal because, again, they are so general.
"Focus on the population"-who are the people in the Korengal, what is there history, what makes them unique or the same as there near and far neighbors?
"the primacy of politics"-what set them off, why are they still set off, what will calm them down? Is it the same kind of thing that will calm their near or far neighbors or is it something different?
"restraint on the use of force"-self evident. We didn't loose a 3 plane B-52 strike on the valley to get them out of our hair.
"good governance"-that depends on what you learned about the population. Maybe to them good governance is just not bugging them much. Good governance I think is very much dependent on what the population expects. The residents of a wealthy American suburb expect something very different than a Mexican who lives in a village in the foothills Sierra Madre Oriental.
I am sorry I used the village, arty, visit phrase. I tried an exaggeration for effect and it didn't work. Tim over at Free Range International gives several examples of restraint of force as practiced by some of the Marines that illustrate what I was trying to get at perfectly.
As far as your last paragraph goes, check the last sentence in my second last paragraph. I think we are saying exactly the same thing.
Where did "imposition of the welfare state" come from?
I'll pass on the man hugs. I only hug my mother and then only sometimes.
Carl... I hope that you are not implying that those of us who question the notion that all that is needed to win any insurgency is the imposition of the welfare state and anyone who thinks differently only seeks to "kill everybody"... This argument is getting old. While this rhetorical tactic might allow the pop-centric coin/hearts and minds crowd to seize the moral high ground it doesn't answer the question why pop centric coin/hearts and minds didn't work in places like the Korengal?
You are absolutely correct... dealing with the Dulaym Confederation in Anbar required that the U.S. military and State Department had to figure out what the "local situation was, then doing what would work best in their little area"... If I follow this logic... then working the Korengal required that we figure out the local situation, then doing what would work in this little area... While the "focus on the population, the primacy of politics, restraint in the use of force, and good governance" mantra may sooth our troubled souls... the pop-centric coin/hearts and minds template didn't work... why not? Why not indeed, especially if the template, as advertised, retains a universal quality all its own. I'll share a secret with you... pop-centric/hearts and minds in Anbar didn't follow the template as advertised or praised since then either...
How soon we forget the medias disgust with the corruption, duplicity and intrigues that made it all work. The popular "awakening" narrative represents only one of many realities. It is history the way it ought to have been. While I lament the embarrassment to one and all that the newly released Wikileaks material might represent I actually welcome the opportunity for the great unwashed masses, subject to official communiques and media superficialities to share in the reality that is tribal politics, frontier warfare and diplomatic maneuverings...
There are lots of things that need to be considered in the school of small wars and frontier fighting... and you are absolutely correct... "you probably wouldn't want to soften up every village you planned to visit with an hours artillery fire, thereby restraining the use of force"... but if we are calling for "artillery fire"... then it isn't a "visit" we are talking about.. is it?
What is objectionable is not that pop-centric coin/hearts and minds doesn't have a place in our great tool box of challenging rebellion and popular revolt... What is objectionable is that it is touted and sold as the greatest and only snake oil in the world... and all other snake oils have been crowed out... How is that for brutal honesty :-)
Man hugs,
r/
MAC
Robert: I agree with you that small wars are so complex that figuring which thing precisely caused what outcome is impossible. The best you can do is figure what seems to work pretty well a lot of the time. That was my primary objection to Gian's initial comment when he mentioned "proven theory". That phrase belongs some place other than small wars. They don't call it the "art of war" for nothing.
Gian: The other objection I had to your comment was your stating, essentially, that never in history has an "foreign occupying power", using the stated principles in a small war, made it work. There is a lot of history out there and I tried to point this out with my questions, though in the first one I should have said "helped result" rather than "resulted".
I disagree with you regarding GEN Suchet (based on the whole 5 paragraphs of reference I could find on my shelf). I don't know if he restrained the use of force, not many did in those days, but he did apply the other three principles and he did pacify his area, and he was the leader of a foreign occupying power.
I am well aware of your view of the "surge". That is why I constructed my questions as I did. I agree with you about the "hollywood version". The success, such as it has been, was the result of a lot of effort of a lot of people over a lot of time and serendipity. But, some the changes that were made in the course of the "surge" were critically important-the large scale move from the big bases to many, many small ones for example. This wasn't something brand new, it is my understanding it was being done in some other places; but what was new was that it was applied on such a wide scale.
You know I disagree with you about VN too, but these are honest questions. Were there more or less of the big named sweep operations under Westmoreland or under Abrams? Would that be a point of evidence? Is there any way to fairly figure that out?
Mac: One of the best books I've read on fighting small wars is Linn's account of U.S. efforts in pacifying the Philippines. One of his main points was that our success was based on each of our units figuring out what the local situation was, then doing what would work best in their little area (they were forced into this because they were mostly isolated by the geography and bad communications). That is extremely important. You do what works after you figure out the lay of the land. Anybody who tries use one size fits all, in my amateur opinion, misses what the thing is about.
To everybody: The four principles quoted by Gian "focus on the population, the primacy of politics, restraint in the use of force, and good governance" seem pretty anodyne to me. They seem to be things you would have to consider no matter what school of small wars fighting you belong to, except of course the Russian "kill everybody" school. Even in the Korengal valley you probably wouldn't want to soften up every village you planned to visit with an hours artillery fire, thereby restraining the use of force. I just don't see what is so objectionable.
Mac:
Excellent points.
Here is another thing I cant figure with regard to the authors' introduction. They state in it that
"it was not until the fall of 2009 that counterinsurgency became the center piece of US strategy in Afghanistan."
But here is the rub that i have with that statement relative to the 15 small unit vignettes that the authors provide ranging as far back as 2004. In all but just a few the units involved essentially get the "principles" of population centric coin. So I ask, what really changed in the fall of 2009?
You see the counterinsurgency narrative that has been constructed over the years demands a better general be put in charge, a few more troops added, and a reinvented army on the ground doing things differently, radically different. This is the theme for Malaya and Vietnam; yet the reality based on primary documents is that there was no reinvented army doing things differently and instead the operational framework remained the same throughout the war. To be sure there was learning and adapting going on, but it all didnt change on a dime once the better general came on board.
In Vietnam for example the operational framework for the American army from 65 to 72 remained search and destroy, it never changed.
In Iraq and Afghanistan I submit the operational framework for both wars throughout remained essentially nation building or population centric coin, even before the birth of 3-24 and even before the better generals rode like cavalry to the rescue and onto the scene.
gian
Reference ... "a discrete type of counterinsurgency--aka population centric coin, or hearts and minds--has become so dominant that it is seen as the only way to counter and insurgency and is also seen as moving beyond problematic theory and morphed into perceived enduring principles and facts".
At the center of the cognitive approach is the problem of paradigm and perception. The point of paradigm is to make reality accessible. Without a familiar paradigm the policymaker is lost. Familiarity with the population-centric coin/hearts and minds product, makes it easier to peddle to the consumer (policymakers, media and political and military pundits). Consumers immediately recognize the "hearts and minds" mantra... as if there exists nothing else to motivate human passions... Ever hear of shame and honor?
The pop-centric coin/hearts and minds paradigm serves the purpose of all familiar ideas. It offers a powerful and parsimonious explanation for what ills you and how to fix it... Come on... all that was needed in the Korengal Valley was a laser-like "focus on the population, the primacy of politics, restraint in the use of force, and good governance"... right.. right?
Too bad, too sad that we continue to suffer the model-makers dilemma ... namely... we create models for ourselves and elevate them to the status of universal applicability anywhere, anytime. It saves us all from having to think about differing explanations for how the world works in the weeds. Also, simple models such as pop-centric coin/hearts and minds makes it easy to cruise the D.C. cocktail circuit and sound switched on when discussing the Korengal... Wanat... Marjah.... or some tucked away valley in Loya Paktia...
Reference Iraq... hell... the Dulaym Confederation and its power politics of leverage, conspiracy and patronage was a dynamic, interesting and confusing place... but thank God we had the pop-centric coin/hearts and minds paradigm to help us navigate within Anbar's shame and honor culture and opportunist human terrain.
Other than that... interesting read.
r/
MAC
...and Carl, I think you may know by now my arguments about Iraq and the role of the Surge in the reduction of violence which I have argued (and I may be wrong, history someday will tell)had more to do with other conditions on the ground than the idea of a reinvented army under a better general carrying out a classic fm 3-24 hearts and minds campaign. The latter I believe is more myth than fact.
agree with Robert.
Carl, that is why I suggested to Mike Few that he ought to try to get Professor Porch's view of French military history which might be a bit different from Dr Arquilla.
With regard to Suchet I would not characterize what he did in Aragon as a classic hearts and minds campaign to win the trust and allegiance of the local populations through the injection of government resources to improve the economy, infrastructure, etc. Instead he sought as the imperial government to control the population through military action, and relative to many of the other areas in Spain under different French Marshals, to rationalize French governing structures and to do his best to lessen the oppressive French taxes on the populace.
With all of the complexity of any given insurgency / counterinsurgency, determining what effects derived from what actions is virtually impossible.
I doubt very much that the Kama Sutra was written by a teenage boy after comparing his first sexual experience to the knowledge gleaned from reading 2-3 issues of Penthouse Forum. Right? But post-Iraq COIN doctrine is dangerously close to that.
Sometimes you just get lucky and you got the effects you were going for but it was caused by some combination of actions very different than the ones you were were applying to achieve those effects.
As one looks at insurgencies over time, Iraq is much more unique than it is the norm for a wide range of reasons. We'd be careful to draw too many universal lessons learned from that particular experience.
Gian:
If the US military learned the basic principles cited in Iraq, and if the US was an occupying power in Iraq, and if the application of those principles resulted in the dimunition of violence in Iraq to the very low level it is at now, could it not be argued that applying the stated principles "worked" thereby providing one historical example them having done so?
Also in the interview with Dr. Arquilla, he stated that GEN Suchet was able to pacify Aragon and Catalonia by applying what sounded like some of the stated principles. If that was the case, would that not also be another example of in history of them working?
This is a very useful collection of vignettes on small unit counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. What makes them especially valuable is that they span the course of most of the war, which proves very helpful in understanding change over time, the essence of history. Selfishly I have to say the authors work is greatly assisting me in my own research.
But i do have to comment on what the authors say in their introduction which is another indicator to me the a discrete type of counterinsurgency--aka population centric coin, or hearts and minds--has become so dominant that it is seen as the only way to counter and insurgency and is also seen as moving beyond problematic theory and morphed into perceived enduring principles and facts.
Here is what I mean.
In the intro the authors first say this:
"..nor is it a book about counterinsurgency theory"
and then a few paragraphs down the authors say that the US Military learned many lessons of counterinsurgency in Iraq and are
"now applying the principles in the villages of Afghanistan. The basic principles remain valid: focus on the population, the primacy of politics, restraint in the use of force, and good governance."
Yet stating these principles as such to the point where they are really nothing more than stated facts, or trusisms, betray a discrete theory of countering an insurgency called population centric coin. That theory has been derived from a number of historical cases over the past 60 years. But it is a theory nonetheless and a very problematic one at that because it assumes that if these principles are carried through by correct tactics and procedures then populations can be won over, hence their hearts and minds won.
History mind you provides no evidence at all of a foreign occupying power applying this theory of coin through the stated principles and having it work.
It may work in Afghanistan and it may not, but in terms of history and proven theory we are in a sense dancing in the dark with it.
But the authors of this piece should acknowledge up front that at least what they say in the introduction betrays a deep, hardened acceptance of a certain theory of coin; in other words this work is super charged with theory. It also calls into question their interview techniques, the kinds of questions that they asked and where they led to because if their introduction is any hint, a certain theory absolutely underpinned and guided their work.
gian