Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan
12.21.2013 at 02:56am
Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan by Jonathan Goodhand and Aziz Hakimi, United States Institute of Peace.
Arming local defense forces in Afghanistan has had mixed and often perverse effects on the security of local populations, according to this study on the role and impact of the Afghan Local Police in three provinces. These findings suggest that, as international forces draw down, the ALP will require stronger state oversight and absorption into the national police force…
After a quick read of this report one of the shortfalls is that it does not assess the early efforts conducted by Special Forces in 2002-2004 with local indigenous forces. For the most part the report focuses on 2008 and later. Any think any comprehensive assessment of these programs should include what really came before and efforts were abandoned due to lack of support by higher HQ and lack of understanding of the potential impact of focus on the local security challenges from the beginning rather than approaching the problem from a national level and one size fits all program. I wonder of the whole ALP/VSO effort might be characterized as too much, too fast, and too late. Too much because they tried to make the program bigger than it was capable of being, too fast because they tried to expand it too fast because for some it appeared to be the silver bullet, and too late because if there had been real support for sustained efforts in 2002-2004 perhaps Afghanistan would be in a little better place than it is today. But of course that is a counterfactual but I think it is an idea that a study like this should address. Maybe the idea will be debunked but I think it is worthy of study.
I’ve gotten half way through this well written and researched document. The conclusion that I draw, right or wrong, is that SF is no better at establishing a long-term local security force than larger general purpose forces are by training local ANP/ANA. The primary advantage of the ALP is its lower cost relative to the ANP/ANA. However, even the study acknowledges that as soon as the SF leave the area, the ALP would be highly susceptible to being slaughtered along with their families since most recruits are local.
Then there is this quote:
I’ve often been puzzled by some of RCJs comments that implied that the Pashtuns were mistreated by the Tajiks/Hazaras/Uzbeks/etc which of course is understandable given the Pashtun embrace of the Taliban which in turn embraced al Qaeda and abused the other ethnicities. The question then becomes, do you assume a strategic policy of favoring the majority of other ethnicities other than the Pashtun or do you favor the Pashtun plurality which has a history of unclean hands relative to the Taliban/Sharia Law and al Qaeda?
SF who train ALP seemingly cannot avoid the Stockholm Syndrome of identifying with the ideology of local forces. SF cannot help but adapt the views of those around them if they are to be effective in leading those ALP, be they Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek or other since they are local forces and generally one ethnicity is dominating that part of a district. As the article points out, this can lead to the SF performing functions contrary to the wishes of President Karzai the elected GIRoA Parliament and governors not to mention ISAF as a whole.
In addition, let me use this opportunity to dispute another favorite bashing point. These are the civilian casualty figures in Iraq as identified by Iraqbodycount.org as shown in Wikipedia:
2003…12092
2004…11638
2005…16223
2006…29293
2007…25755
2008…10040
2009…5140
2010…4109
2011…4147
2012…4574
2013…7900 estimate
Clearly, the levels of violence in 2013 are approaching 80% of 2008 but that was considered (and was) greatly decreased from the period of 2005 through 2007. That means about 1 in 4000 Iraqis may be subject to dying from a rebounding insurgency. Compare that to 1 in 10,000 Americans susceptible to dying in a car crash. It’s a serious problem to be sure. However, if a large Iraqi military and police force did not exist, made possible by long term presence of major general purpose forces, the casualties no doubt would be far higher.
Likewise, were it not for our hands off policy in Syria which has allowed an al Qaeda resurgence near and into Iraq, the casualty figures also would be lower. The Surge worked. The Iraqi security forces worked immediately after we left. They would still be working effectively if we had not withdrawn nearly in entirety following the failure to establish a SOFA with their government. Let’s hope Afghanistan does not make the same mistake.