According to Lambeth, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had a fully developed contingency plan to battle Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, in circumstances closely resembling those that precipitated the 2006 war. Yet when the crisis broke out, neither the civilian leadership nor top military commanders were —to implement the contingency plan, which called for a large combined arms air and ground campaign into Lebanon. When the crisis arrived, no one wanted a repeat of either the 1982 war or the subsequent 18 year occupation of southern Lebanon.
The fact that the Hezbollah contingency plan was "dead on arrival" reveals the first civil-military lesson from 2006. Civilian and military leaders should regularly review on-the-shelf war plans, to assess their assumptions, check whether they are politically feasible, and determine whether they are a useful match with current strategic objectives.
Lambeth heaps the most blame on Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who Lambeth believes made a severe blunder at the very beginning of the crisis by impetuously setting objectives that were unobtainable. Olmert's openly-stated goals were the return of the two captured Israeli soldiers, the suppression of Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel, and the removal of the Hezbollah military threat from southern Lebanon. Having established such maximal objectives -- seemingly blind to Israel's experience in Lebanon between 1982 and 2000 -- Olmert and his advisers then widened the gap between expectations and reality by choosing a military strategy -- stand-off bombardment only -- that did not have a chance of achieving those goals.
The lesson here for policymakers is to be careful about what one commits to. Fast-moving crises obviously exert great time pressure on decision-makers. Adopting an "under-promise, over-deliver" approach at the beginning allows a policymaker to later increase his promises. By contrast, doing the reverse is a setup for an embarrassing climb-down.
Lambeth's account shows that Israel's problems with the 2006 campaign began early on with faulty top-level assessments of ends, ways, and means. The "Cast Lead" operation against Hamas in January 2009 showed an improved assessment of ends, ways, and means, along with improved air-ground combat performance.
But even as Israel's strategic bumbling in 2006 resulted in many lessons learned, the war against Hezbollah seems to have successfully restored a climate of deterrence over southern Lebanon. As Israel's leaders fumbled toward a conclusion to the conflict, the IDF's 34 days of bombardment ended up delivering nearly 200,000 bombs, shells, and rockets into Lebanon. Did that punishment purchase five years of quiet from Hezbollah? That might be the most important lesson of all.