Caveat Venditor: Think Twice Before Cutting Ground Forces
Pentagon Should Think Twice Before It Cuts Ground Forces, Historians Warn by Sandra Erwin, National Defense. BLUF:
In the wake of every conflict since World War II, ground troops have been declared obsolete. And each time, the prognosticators have been wrong, says military historian John C. McManus.
After a decade of grinding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the conventional wisdom is that America will have no tolerance for any more ground fights. Policy makers will take that as a cue that it is now time to shift defense dollars from infantry to high-tech weaponry that can be fired from aircraft or ships, far away from the battlefield.
That would be a huge mistake, says McManus, the author of “Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience, World War II Through Iraq.” In the book, which examines in detail 10 major conflicts over six decades, he concludes that “foot soldiers,” regardless of technological advances in weaponry, end up carrying the day every time the United States goes to war.
Of course the Army carries the load in war. We just don’t need a large one in peace. America’s wars are historically fought by militia and draftees, and our excellent geo-strategic situation makes that as true into the foreseeable future as it has been into the past. The relevant history here is the history of Great Britain and the US, both maritime nations with no land threat. Like Great Britain we will need a modest Army to work our foreign interests and to provide a core to mobilize a robust National Guard around. But we don’t need a large standing Army, and haven’t since the collapse of the Soviets.
I suspect decisions regarding Iraq and Afghanistan would have been much more “subtle” had we not been possessed of an excessively large standing Army that was all ramped up and ready to go. Add the first Gulf War to that list as well.
To carry an unnecessarily large Army creates a drag on our economy that is every bit as dangerous to our national security as any threat that might rise to challenge us in the time necessary to mobilize an effective force.
Now is the time for selfless service within the Services. To fight for the right force rather than some perceived right to maintain their own Service force. I love the Army, but we don’t need much of one to wage the peace.
The JOE was probably the best document JFCOM ever produced. I hope another agency picks up the ball in producing future ones every four or so years to help with the QDR.
I’m for reducing the ground forces a very modest amount, but believe we need a fairly large and capable ground force to wage peace. Waging peace is at least partly waged by having a credible deterrent to discourage actors from pursuing their aims through military force. Waging peace also involves support peace operations, which is largely boots on the ground to maintain the terms of agreement between the former (or currrent) warring parties. This definitely needs to be thought through carefully.
SWJED, relax, keep your thickskin on, no slights intended. I have read the JOE, and in fact, in my duties as the Director of Strategic Studies at USSOCOM, where we developed a Strategic Appreciation for that command, we coordinated very closely with JFCOM as we developed our separate, but coordinated products.
But that misses the point. We are not a nation at war. By applying that status to our current situation it has allowed DoD to in effect hold the nation hostage to ever growing defense budgets to counter a relatively minor problem at a time when our nation is facing its greatest financial challenges in generations. Smarter COAs for dealing with AQ that do not launch the US like a raging elephant stomping on a little mouse across the nations and populaces of the planet are far more acceptable, suitable and feasible than those pursued over the past decade are easily designed and adopted.
Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (beyond the initial strategic raid to punish AQ for the 9/11 attacks over 10 years ago) were and are both optional operations. In fact, 10 years ago there was few if any Afghan or Pakistani Muslims who had any incentive whatsoever to work with AQ to attack the US or US national interests at home or abroad. Would anyone dare to claim that the same is true today after 10 years of US military operations in, and political manipulations of, both those two countries? AQ merely leverages populaces with local grievances and the belief that the US enables the conditions that cause those grievances. By over-militarizing responses against the symptoms of the much larger political/foreign policy problem at the base (the same base that the popular movements of Arab Spring arise from) we have in many ways INCREASED the “threat” to the US even as we work to defeat those individuals who oppose our presence in their homelands.
Yes we need a credible peacetime deterrent force. States are deterred by such a force, non-state actors with no infrastructure to be held at risk far less so. The active Army is a relatively small part of deterrence compared to what the Navy, Air force, USMC and our robust reserve component bring to the table. Each service has a unique role, and the Army’s role is indeed warfighting. We must not allow the anomaly of the Cold War, where we essentially assumed the geo-strategic reality of Western Europe (which absolutely demands a relatively large investment in ground forces to deter aggressive neighbors). In fact, it is these same Western European states that should be making the current investment in large ground forces, which are critical to their national survival, allowing the US to focus on the type of forces critical to ours. Where are our allies in this? The US peacetime army is historically way too large, while Europe’s peacetime armies are I suspect (don’t have hard data at hand) historically far too small. We enable our allies to take “peace benefit” that rightfully belongs to the American taxpayers.
No one, least of all me, is suggesting that we make radical, illogical cuts to our defense in any sector. But do not expect me to stand by silently either while others press for maintaining radical, illogical capabilities at a cost that hurts our nation far more than the capabilities benefit our nation.
Now is the time for selfless service. Equal is not fair, and if Service components push for “equal” cuts across all services and SOF we will not be “fair” to the American people, and we will not be providing them the best, most appropriate force for the world we live in today, and that is developing into the future as well.
OK folks. I’m going to go way out on a limb here and take a contrarian view. We don’t need to cut our end-strength. We need to increase it. And here are a few (very simplified) reasons why I think so.
First off, we need to plan for the worst. What is the worst case for our nation militarily? Two things keep me up at night: The threat of a major theater war with another major power such as China or a surprise nuclear attack against the homeland. While neither event has a high probability of occurring, the results of either would be catastrophic for our nation. In any case, we will need lots of uniformed bodies to respond; which we just don’t have enough of right now.
Second, growing the military has a stimulus effect on the economy. Adding end strength requires equipment which must be built here in the states. It also generates demands for supplies and services.
Third, increasing end-strength puts folks to work, both directly and indirectly. You have the direct hiring of additional folks in uniform plus the jobs that are created in the factories providing the equipment and supplies for the troops. Add on top of that the jobs that are generated in the local economies by increases in troop levels at bases and you result in a net overall increase in jobs.
Now granted, all of this is enormously expensive. However when you consider how much we spend each year to provide entitlements, I believe the money would be better spent in putting people to work providing for our common defense. Intuitively, more people working equals less collecting entitlements and more contributing to the tax base.
Just think of how many Brigades, ships or aircraft we could buy with the $450 billion the President recently proposed in his jobs bill? Let’s put Americans to work defending our nation and our way of life.
Does this article, our discussion and the JOE fail to adequately address an important aspect of what we intend to use our ground forces for — today and in the future?
This monster missing element (the proverbial 800 pound gorilla in the joint operating environment room?) is: The goals and ambitions of the United States.
This article, written by COL (ret.) Bacevich in 1998 may help address this critically important element; that seems to be continually FTR or AWOL from many forums.
http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9803/articles/bacevich.html
An excerpt:
“In short, the new narrative would both recognize and ratify the grand enterprise in which the United States has engaged, on and off, for a century. That enterprise spans administrations, transcends party and ideology and persists — as has become apparent since the demise of the Soviet Union — independent of any immediately threat to American security. The historian John Lewis Gaddis has characterized the result as “empire by invitation.” If so, the invitation is one to which those presiding over United States foreign policy have long since given collective assent. As a direct result of this enterprise, the United States has ascended to the status of global hegemon, with far-flung interests and responsibilities and without a challenger worthy of name. The implicit, if officially unacknowledged, grand strategy of the United States today is to consolidate and preserve its world supremecy, with the clear understanding that doing so will require the future extension of American influence.”
If this (or some other) articulation of United States’ goals and ambitions is accurate, should we work to better include — and factor in — this 800 pound gorilla (the goals and ambitions of the United States) in such things as the JOE; and in other forums addressing what size and shape our forces/ground forces should be?
Robert C. Jones makes good points about the cost of a large standing Army, etc. But, I believe he may be looking at the world through some SOF/Techno-Centric glasses.
I’m inferring from his comments that he believes we can “make do” with SOF, technology, ISR, drones, and so forth and that a standing Army can be built to need, as the need arises. He wrote a lot, I’m encapsulating, so I apologize to Mr. Jones if it’s not 100% accurate.
My response is as follows:
1) Let’s talk jobs…unemployment over 9% with no hope of coming down. Cut the force, that’s more unemployment. Seems paltry compared to the nation’s defense. However, it has far reaching effects. This unemployment is going to drive policy decisions, and our welfare, unemployment benefits, entitlements and so forth are going to pick up the tab for these people that are unemployed. Take health care for instance: kick out 1LT Jones from the Army because we magically have enough CPTs due to a RIF and he needs health care, and if he can’t afford it and still goes to the hospital. The hospital eats that bill, which will eventually be passed on to the tax payers – whether it’s ObamaCare or something else, there will be “bailouts” “buyouts” and “takeovers” of industry/business by the govt if our current economic situation does not increase. 1LT Jones can be a productive member of the military and get health care and other services that are already budgeted for we can throw him out and add his bils to the debt meter. As we do this to 1LT Jones, then to SPC Smith, and so one, pretty soon we don’t need as many child care centers, gyms, etc on the installations, so those people get fired – more to the unemployment line.
2) Let’s talk economics: military is pared down, money to BAE and other R&D entities goes away. That means less fancy gadgets for SOF to play with, less technology to enhance our platforms, etc etc etc. Companies will not develop as much if funds are cut. This means capability takes a hit.
3) Let’s talk value: the FCS program was a huge bust. It wasn’t because of the technology, it was because of waste and mismanagement. How many billions were spent on that program, and just about all of it was for no benefit at all. How many people could be placed in uniform, or sustained in uniform for that cost? The common chasis for the FCS version of the tank, IFV, and many other platforms wouldn’t even be used in a place like Afghanistan – but that money could certainly be used to put more boots on the ground, enhance training, and so forth. I recently read an AAR focused on tactics from Afghanistan. Many units are having to call in Predator or another similar platform, long range artillery, and CAS/CCA in order to accomplish kills on two – yes, TWO individuals. The cost of the fuel, ordnance, and maintenance for those additional platforms could pay for an entire platoon in theater for 60 days if not longer, yet we question the value of ground forces. Once you cut the people from the force, the need for X number of Predators or whatever will go down and that part of the budget will go away as well. So, when we need to bump that number up, not only will we need to bring in more boots, but we’ll have to wait on more “Predators” to be built, as well as the people to operate them, facilities to house them etc. It is far more economical to bolster the Predator inventory than the people inventory should we enter a true war in the future.
4) Let’s talk war: yes I agree the nation is not at war, and that is the single biggest reason that our military is about to get crushed. People don’t see it, feel it, and it doesn’t get close to many in our country. 9/11 is a distant memory now. We are about to bring in austerity, reduce the force, and go zero-defects with fire and brimstone. We will throw out the propaganda that we’ll scrutinize promotions and only the best will get command etc, but that’s all BS and we all know it. We are about to begin developing a new brand of toxic leader and command will be based on how pretty an officer or NCO is, not how effective they are. Combine that to budget cuts that will affect troop strength, R&D, equipment readiness, and training and you have a recipe for disaster – and our oceans are not the robust barrier they used to be and when your economy is not just tied to sea lanes but also to internet cables, it changes the situation. At the least we can now count on, with certainty, on our SOF community having some catastrophes, our conventional forces arriving to an area wholly unprepared, etc. We’ll ask why, but we already know the reasons.
We’ve been doing this stuff for 250 years now. I guess it’s human nature. But at some point our luck will run out and we won’t be able to build, equip, and train a force fast enough, or respond well enough and it’s going to get ugly.
We need to fix our personnel system and fix the waste problem in our budget first. Then we should start looking at personnel numbers. Why we jump to personnel costs is beyond me. We know we’re getting ripped off on everything we buy, why not start there?
Should we consider that a logical and proper use of power (political, military, economic and cultural) — by the United States or by another country — in periods of little relative threat and significant relative advantage, is not so much for defensive but rather for offensive purposes?
(Thus, a nation’s “instruments of power,” if properly utilized in such circumstances, could/should be employed to take advantage of — rather than squander — the opportunities presented by the present advantageous moment.)
If THE GOALS AND AMBITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES are to bring forth, expand upon and/or better secure an international order whose chief characteristics are “openness” and “accessability,” and, in this manner, better provide for the wants, needs and desires of the American people,
Then what should our “instruments of power” look like (for example: our military ground forces) — and how should they be employed — to take advantage of this moment of advantage and better fulfill the goals and ambitions of the United States outlined in the paragraph immediately above?
If I have mis-characterized — as mere goals and ambitions of the United States — what are, in fact, our long-standing and continuing national security objectives (to wit: to bring forth, expand upon and/or better secure an international order whose chief characteristics are “openness” and “accessability” and, thereby, better provide for the wants, needs and desires of the American people).
(Past strategy — in the form of containment of the former USSR and communism — being considered as potential evidence of this fact [strategy designed and implemented to overcome the then-primary obstacles to the international order that we desire]).
How then might this consideration, if at all, change our discussion re: how our instruments of power should be configured — and how they should be employed — to overcome today’s primary obstacles to our national security objectives (noted above)?