When it comes to a state fighting a nonstate enemy, there is a widespread impression the state is doomed to fail.
In 1968, Robert F. Kennedy concluded that victory in Vietnam was "probably beyond our grasp," and called for a peaceful settlement. In 1983, the analyst Shahram Chubin wrote that the Soviets in Afghanistan were embroiled in an "unwinnable war." In 1992, US officials shied away from involvement in Bosnia, fearing entanglement in a centuries-old conflict. In 2002, retired US Gen. Wesley Clark portrayed the American effort in Afghanistan as unwinnable. In 2004, President George W. Bush said of the war on terror, "I don't think you can win it." In 2007, the Winograd Commission deemed Israel's war against Hezbollah unwinnable.
More than any other recent war, the allied forces' effort in Iraq was seen as a certain defeat, especially in the 2004-06 period. Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former British minister Tony Benn, and former US special envoy James Dobbins all called it unwinnable. The Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group Report echoed this view. Military analyst David Hackworth, among others, explicitly compared Iraq to Vietnam: "As with Vietnam, the Iraqi tar pit was oh-so-easy to sink into, but appears to be just as tough to exit."
The list of "unwinnable wars" goes on and includes, for example, the counterinsurgencies in Sri Lanka and Nepal. "Underlying all these analyses," notes Yaakov Amidror, a retired Israeli major general, is the assumption "that counterinsurgency campaigns necessarily turn into protracted conflicts that will inevitably lose political support."
Gen. Amidror, however, disagrees with this assessment. In a recent study published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, "Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience," he convincingly argues that states can beat nonstate actors.
More at The Washington Times.
Comments
Very good article but I would take exception to this statement: "Twice U.S. forces defeated insurgents in the Philippines (1899-1902 and 1946-54)".
In the first instance we pacified the Philippines to allow for US occupation of the Philippines as a US colony. In the second instance I do not think there were any signficant US forces involved in the Huk Rebellion (remember that the Philippines was granted independence in 1946). I believe Edward Lansdale (along with a small element of his Military Assistance Advisory Group) provided advice and the US government provided some military equipment for assistance but I do not think there were any US forces involved in the Huk Rebellion. The success of putting down the rebellion has to go to the enlightened leadership of Ramon Magsaysay who made the requisite political (and land) reforms combined with effective security operations.
However, what I think we should consider is that as long as conditions exist that can give rise to an insurgency you can never really declare victory (from a military definition of victory). Events today in the Philippines (just as in many other conflicts around the world) show that there is linkage back to previous conflicts and we must realize that it is difficult to ever totally eradicate the conditions that give rise to insurgency and rebellion and even when those conditions (the ones that we can identify at least) are for the most part eradicated others may still exist or arise and those seeds can grow into a future insurgency.
But I think Pipes makes the right arguments. He rightly states that the national government must take the steps outlined below (though I think all 4 must be executed by the national government and I wish he would not imply that the last two are something that we should be responsible for as the outside support - we can help with intel and capacity building and the like but in the end the legitimate government must also be responsible for all COIN operations). I think too often we look at counterinsurgency as something we can conduct and win in some other country. As evidenced by the second Philippines example what made it successful was that it was a Philippine operation which had only some minor (but perhaps important) external support from the US.
Dave